Understanding Chinese nationalism through Chinese politics:

competing claims and state-society dynamics by Ren, Justine Zheng
1 
 
 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding Chinese Nationalism through Chinese Politics 
Competing Claims and State-Society Dynamics 
 
 
 
Justine Zheng Ren 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to  
 
The Department of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
London, November 2015 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation directed by 
 
John Sidel 
 The Sir Patrick Gillam Professor of International and Comparative Politics  
 
  
2 
 
Declaration  
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other 
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent 
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).  
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without 
my prior written consent.  
 
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 106,056 words. 
 
任政 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how different understandings, interpretations, and claims of diverse 
social actors from a growingly liberalizing society interact with China’s authoritarian 
state and various agents in the market in shaping contemporary Chinese nationalism. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that sees the force and impact of nationalism 
primarily through its homogenizing effect on the people, this thesis argues instead that 
the success of nationalism, as a mobilizing force, depends on the existence of 
differences that various social actors inject into the discourse of state nationalism. 
Therefore, the key to understanding contemporary Chinese nationalism is to study the 
meanings and causes of such differences, which are wrapped up in the discourse of 
nationalism and reflect new dynamics of Chinese politics.  
 
This phenomenon, as observed in China, represents a typical case in societies where the 
willingness and capabilities of people have increased in lodging nationalist claims 
towards other peoples. By explaining how and why nationalism has become a useful 
mobilizing force in China, where people do not take for granted what is propagandized 
by the government, this thesis also tries to make a theoretical push in the literature of 
nations and nationalism. It investigates the dialectical relations between tensions and 
disparities embedded in nationalism, on the one hand, and the homogenizing effect of 
nationalism at the national and symbolic levels, on the other hand. In so doing, it sheds 
new light on one of the most inviting puzzles in the field of nations and nationalism – 
why nationalism (like all ideologies) can incite widespread passion and appeal on the 
ground. 
 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 examine the phenomenon of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism, the conventional wisdom under which it has been studied, theoretical 
assumptions and their major critiques, and the theoretical propositions to be advanced in 
this thesis. Chapter 1 explores the puzzle of why nationalism can incite popular passion 
and appeal in the general field of nations and nationalism. In particular, it asks where 
the mobilizing power of nationalism comes from - whether it lies in the capacity to 
regularize diversity and construct homogeneity among the population, or it is in the 
other way around. Thus this chapter demonstrates what the study of contemporary 
Chinese nationalism can borrow from and lend to the field. Chapter 1 lays out major 
propositions of the thesis, introduces the research methods employed, and offers an 
overview of the rest chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 has two parts. The first part reviews and challenges three basic assumptions 
in the study of contemporary Chinese nationalism, which have to be reconsidered for 
the field to advance. The first assumption sees the rise of Chinese nationalism as a post-
1989 phenomenon. The second assumes state-centrism, lacking systematic investigation 
of the dynamics between state and society in reproducing nationalism. The third takes it 
for granted that Chinese nationalism must be a subversive force for international 
security, either because it is manipulated by the Chinese government or because it is 
incited by populists from below.  
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The second part offers an introduction to the changing relationship between state and 
society in contemporary China, deciphering the sociopolitical context in which the 
following empirical chapters are developed. For the purpose of understanding the rise of 
diverse social actors, and their understandings, interpretations and claims of Chinese 
nationalism, this part disaggregates Chinese society so that relevant processes of social 
differentiation and contention during the reform period can be analytically presented. 
For the purpose of understanding the mechanisms through which these social actors are 
able to make their nationalist claims under the banner of Chinese nationalism sponsored 
by the state, it also disaggregates the (party-) state so that the relationships between its 
component parts and with society, and the relations between the central and local 
authorities in contemporary China are clarified. 
 
Except for the introductory and conclusion chapters, this thesis is composed of four 
empirical chapters. Chapter 3 deals with different understandings, interpretations, and 
claims of Chinese nationalism through the problem of victimhood in Sino-Japanese 
relations. It shows how competing claims for suffering in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War 
have been expressed, transformed and nationalized, which grows from the bottom of 
society and incites anti-Japanese nationalism at the national level.  
 
Chapter 4 studies visual representation of disparities and tensions between sub-
populations and the party-state in making claims and interpretations of Chinese 
nationalism, through the changing images of anti-Japanese resistance in films, television 
series and Internet programs. It finds that joint endeavors and differing motivations of 
local governments, profit-seeking producers, artists and intellectuals, and minority 
groups have transformed popular images of anti-Japanese resistance in the Maoist years 
to new stylized images in the time of mass entertainment.  
 
Chapter 5 looks at the Baodiao (Protecting the Diaoyu Islands) Movement and its 
evolution in three political contexts (Taiwan, Hong Kong and China). It shows that, in 
all of the three contexts, Baodiao is a spontaneous social movement unfolding in the 
contestation between the regime and competing claimants for nationalism. Yet it is 
under the most authoritarian and unstable regime that civilian contestation embedded in 
Baodiao, as advocated by the middle class and professionals, has been stifled, and the 
movement has fallen prey of street violence.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on one special group of the Chinese elites – the outspoken military 
officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It shows how their views in the mass 
media, which encourage anti-American nationalism, reflect more of their own personal 
viewpoints and sectoral interests than the Party’s line. Taken together, Chapters 3, 5 and 
6 shed light on the general argument of the thesis by providing case studies of different 
social strata in contemporary China.  
 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion chapter. This chapter offers a summary and five policy 
caveats for international security and diplomacy, which are derived from the study of 
this thesis. It suggests that the evolution of socio-political conditions and state-society 
dynamics, rather than the substances and contents of state nationalism or popular 
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nationalism, that will determine what kind of impact nationalism is likely to have on 
China’s domestic politics and international behavior. Therefore we should be careful not 
to draw too much, either pessimistically or optimistically, from the rise of contemporary 
Chinese nationalism. 
 
  
6 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the encouragement and support 
of Professor John Sidel and my mother. My deepest gratitude and appreciation go to 
them. 
 
It is my great honor and good luck to have had John as my academic supervisor and 
intellectual mentor when I decided to become a political scientist. His intellect, critical 
mind, and talents of humor set a high standard for me to emulate. Above all, thanks to 
his enlightening guidance, I find the only road to infinite intellectual creativity – a free 
mind to think beyond boundaries. 
 
  
7 
 
Dedication  
 
For My Parents  
Who Opened My Eyes 
For My Mentors 
Who Opened My Mind 
  
8 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 The Puzzle of Nationalism Between Homogenization and Division: The Rise 
of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Its Theoretical Implications ……………..10 
 
Chapter 2 Understanding Chinese Nationalism through Chinese Politics: Challenges to 
Three Assumptions in the Conventional Wisdom ……………………..………….…...39 
 
Chapter 3 Competing Claims for War Suffering: Chinese Victims, Intellectuals and the 
State …………………………………………………………….……………………...87 
 
Chapter 4 Changing Images of Anti-Japanese Resistance, Changing State-Society 
Dynamics ...…………………………….…………………………..............................124 
 
Chapter 5 Contestation in the Protecting the Diaoyu Islands Movement: Baodiao 
Activists and the Authority in a Comparative Perspective ….…..………..…..…....…175 
 
Chapter 6 The Party Line or Personal View: China’s Outspoken PLA Officers in the 
Mass Media …..….……...……………………….……………………………….......229 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Policy Caveats ……………………......….……....……...272 
 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………….....…..…….,…295 
  
9 
 
 
 
 
“Why are you anti-Japan?” asked I to an activist, seated in a fancy cafeteria in 
Beijing’s central business district, “It has been over sixty years. Our generation did not 
eye-witness the atrocities of that time.” 
“It’s quite simple,” my interviewee, a decent middle-class man, replied in 
calmness, “because our government won the war, but our people did not.” 
-- Dialogue in Beijing, January 2009 
 
 
“The American government is the enemy of the Chinese government, but the 
Japanese people are the enemies of the Chinese people.”  
-- Quotation from a posting, appearing in the aftermath of the 1999 Anti-NATO 
protest, from Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Student protests in fin-de-siècle China”, New 
Left Review, 237(1999), p.70. 
 
 
“The top of our society is anti-American, not anti-Japanese. The bottom of our 
society is anti-Japanese, not anti-American.” 
-- A Chinese professor spoke to the author in Beijing, January 2009 
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Chapter 1 The Puzzle of Nationalism between Homogenization and Division: 
The Rise of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Its Theoretical Implications 
 
The rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism has inspired intensive debates among 
academics and policy advisers, out of curiosity as well as fear for the China threat. No 
doubt that arguments about Chinese nationalism will continue, as long as China is seen 
as a rising power that will come into conflict with Western civilization and challenge the 
dominance of U.S. hegemony.1 In recent years, the growing assertiveness of China’s 
political gestures and military activities in Asia seems to provide new evidence for such 
a concern. Even for those experts who understand China’s fragility, their concern with 
Chinese nationalism is explicit.2 It is in these international and academic contexts that 
the study of Chinese nationalism becomes a topic of growing interest. 
 
This thesis tries to add something that has been overlooked to the field of Chinese 
nationalism. Instead of looking at how nationalism is propagated and utilized by the 
state, it explores how different understandings, interpretations, and claims of 
nationalism by actors from an increasingly liberalizing society have shaped 
contemporary Chinese nationalism as such. These initiatives from below interact with 
the authoritarian state and an opportunistic market, the process of which not only 
determines the substances and contents of Chinese nationalism, but also explains why 
nationalism has become a most arresting ideology for the Chinese to fill in the vacuum 
after the bankruptcy of communism.  
 
It is an age-old myth that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda has been 
so successful that the Chinese people are brainwashed to accept nationalism as the new 
ideology, in replacement for the collapsed communism. This myth relies on a hidden 
assumption however. That is, the success of nationalism (like all ideologies) depends on 
the effect of homogenizing people’s mind, which makes people identify with the nation 
                                                        
1 Samuel Huntington, 1993, “The clash of civilization?” Foreign Affairs, 72(3), pp. 22-49; Richard 
Bernstein and Ross Munro, 1997, The Coming Conflict with China, New York: Vintage Books; John 
J. Mearsheimer, 2001, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton. 
2 Susan Shirk, 2007, China: Fragile Superpower, New York: Oxford University Press. 
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in the same way and therefore act in the will of the state. Nevertheless such an 
assumption is not held to be true, in both theory and practice.   
 
Theoretically, it is commonly believed that the political force of nationalism lies in its 
ability to homogenize people, construct commonality and build solidarity among them. 
As Ernest Renan describes in his famous essay “Qu'est-ce qu'une nation”, two things 
constitute the soul of a nation. “One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of 
memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to 
perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.” 3 
According to Ernest Gellner, nations were created by the demand of the industrial 
revolution and modern societies, which required a mobile and literate workforce, and 
led to unprecedented mass immigration to cities. Hence modern industrial societies 
generated a demand for creating some form of common identity and cultural 
homogeneity. The demand was met by creating a common history, culture and language, 
which united the new workforce and absorbed them into a high culture community (that 
is, a nation) in the process of industrialization and modernization. 4  For Benedict 
Anderson, a nation is an imaged community facilitated by novel technologies of 
communication (“print-capitalism”), because “regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship.”5 The community bounded by horizontal relations also means 
a high level of essential similarity. Thus, as Richard Handler defines, nationalism is “an 
ideology concerned with boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing 
diversity…however individual members of the nation may differ, they share essential 
attributes that constitute their national identity; sameness overrides difference.”6 (Italics 
added).  
 
                                                        
3 Ernest Renan, 1882, “What is a nation? (Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?)”, first delivered as a lecture in 
1882. Excerpts available at http://www.nationalismproject.org/what.htm 
4 Ernest Gellner, 1983, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
5 Benedict Anderson, 2006 (1983), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London; New York: Verso, p. 7.  
6  Richard Handler, 1988, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec, Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, pp. 6-8. 
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According to these classical definitions, the effect of internal differentiation should be at 
most minimal for studying nations and nationalism. “[T]he nation is conceived by 
nationalism as an imaginary entity whose substance bears no internal differentiations of 
any consequence.” 7  Therefore, the discourse of nationalism derives a “super-class 
character”, which makes it difficult to relate “the object of nationalism to the specific 
interests of social classes.” It becomes possible in modern society because of the rise of 
mass education. Educational institutions construct and preserve “the dominant version 
of national identity by the homogenization of all members of the nation…by the 
cultivation of a uniform national consciousness and the inculcation of the idea of 
supreme loyalty to the nation.”8 (Italics added). 
 
These definitions and propositions, represented in the classical view of modernists, 
constitute the theoretical foundation of the conventional wisdom of nationalism. That is, 
the power of nationalism lies in its capacity to regularize diversity and construct 
homogeneity among the population, which is imposed by the state, the elite or the 
socio-economic processes of modernization on the population for instrumental purposes. 
However, some other studies of nations and nationalism suggest the possibility of a 
different theoretical story: Modern nations are riven by entrenched ethnic, religious and 
cultural differences. Internal differentiation in society has oftentimes led to competition, 
rivalry and even civil war, rather than a unified society and a people of homogeneity.  
 
In fact, both modernists and their critics have realized this challenge to the conventional 
wisdom, and both have offered valuable insights. As Eric Hobsbawm, a modernist 
theorist, incisively points out, nations and the phenomena associated cannot be 
understood except as “dual phenomena, [which are] constructed essentially from above” 
but should also be “analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, 
needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and 
still less nationalist.”9 Because the dual phenomena “from below” are “exceedingly 
                                                        
7 Padelis Lekas, 1996, “The supra-class rhetoric of nationalism: an introductory comment.” East 
European Quarterly. 30(3), p. 272. 
8 Ibid., pp. 277-78.  
9  Eric J. Hobsbawm, 1990, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
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difficult to discover”, Hobsbawm proposes three principles in deciphering the 
relationship between nationalism from above and nationalism from below, 
 
First, official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is in the 
minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters. Second, and more specifically, 
we cannot assume that for most people national identification - when it exists - 
excludes or is always or ever superior to, the remainder of the set of identifications 
which constitute the social being. In fact, it is always combined with identifications 
of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them. Thirdly, national 
identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in 
the course of quite short periods. In my judgment this is the area of national studies 
in which, thinking and research are most urgently needed today.10 
 
These tensions between the purpose of state nationalism to homogenize people and 
enduring divisions within modern society are also noted and debated by 
primordial/perennial and ethnosymbolic theorists of nations and nationalism. Clifford 
Geertz, a prominent primordialist,11 finds that in the new states in Asia and Africa, there 
exists a “peculiarly severe and chronic form” of tension between “peoples’ sense of 
self”, which “remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, 
religion, or tradition”, and “the steadily accelerating importance … of the sovereign 
state as a positive instrument for the realization of collective aims”.12 The persistence of 
the tension comes from the interaction of two sources. On the one hand, for those 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10. 
10 Ibid., p. 11. 
11 The difference between a primordialist claim and a perennial claim is that the former argues that 
nations and nationalism are both perennial and natural. However, Fearon and Laitin argue that 
primordialism “is itself something of a construct of constructivists”. They study Geertz’s original 
text (pp.255–310) in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), and find that Geertz does not commit the 
alleged primordialist fallacy. As they argue, “Geertz holds that peoples’ beliefs in their primordial 
attachments, rather than the inherent immutability of those attachments, drive ethnic conflict in non 
civic societies.” Nevertheless they admit that “[i]n other of his essays on Bali, Geertz appears to be a 
primordialist”. Thus the standpoint of the so-called “primordialists” may be more complex and 
ambiguous than commonly assumed. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 2000, “Violence and 
the social construction of ethnic identity”, International Organization, 54(4), p. 849. 
12 Clifford Geertz, 1963, “The integrative revolution: primordial sentiments and politics in the new 
states”, in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and 
Africa, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe: Collier-Macmillan, p. 108. 
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peoples, to “subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favor of a 
generalized commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a 
loss of definition as an autonomous person, either through absorption into a culturally 
undifferentiated mass or, what is even worse, through a domination by some other rival 
ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is able to imbue that order with the temper of 
its own personality.” On the other hand, “at the same time, all but the most 
unenlightened members of such societies are at least dimly aware - and their leaders are 
acutely aware - that the possibilities for social reform and material progress they so 
intensely desire and are so determined to achieve rest with increasing weight on their 
being enclosed in a reasonably large, independent, powerful, well-ordered polity.”13 
Therefore the tension between the two sources - peoples’ specific and familiar 
identifications and an undifferentiated culture that underpin a large polity – is unlikely 
to be reconciled.  
 
Ethnosymbolic theorists, who reject both modernist and primordialist/perennialist views, 
seek a middle ground. They try to build a more coherent theory of nations and 
nationalism, incorporating both historical continuity (between traditional and modern 
eras) and the great transformations wrought by modernity on collective identities. In so 
doing, the tension between the homogenizing effect of nationalism as a product of 
modernity and “variations in the scope, intensity, salience and political importance of 
collective cultural ties and sentiments” has become a major focus on their research 
agenda. 14 It is mainly through two channels - cultures and institutions – that these 
ethnosymbolic scholars have been advancing the new theoretical orientation.  
 
Through culture, ethnosymbolism emphasizes memories, values, myths and symbols of 
historical ethnie, and their role in pre-figuring the themes and forms of modern 
nationalism.15 Thus, for Anthony Smith, although nations are a product of modernity, 
they do not derive “tout court” from the needs of modernity.16 Against Gellner, who 
                                                        
13 Ibid., p. 109. 
14 Anthony Smith, 1988 (1986), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 13. 
15 Ibid. pp. 13-18. 
16  Anthony Smith, 1996, “Memory and modernity: reflections on Ernest Gellner’s theory of 
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claims that “the cultural continuity is contingent, inessential” in making modern 
nations,17 Smith argues for the importance of the genealogy of nations, which “ensure[s] 
some connection and even continuity between the modem nation and one or more 
pasts”. The connection and continuity are established through two mechanisms – 
cultural continuity and collective memories.18  
 
Ethnosymbolism also stresses the role of institutions, which have carried memories of 
“centuries of conflicts” into the modern world through “missionary religions, imperial 
expansion, warfare, long distance trade and mass migrations and colonisations”. It 
rebuts the idea that cultures and identities are purely idealist and unrestrictedly protean. 
Rather, as John Hutchinson argues, they are vested with “binding power … when they 
are institutionalized.” 19  Institutions, according to Douglas North, are “the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction”.20 These constraints can be informal 
or formal, from “conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of behavior to statute law, 
and common law, and contracts between individuals.” While “formal rules may change 
overnight…, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct 
are much more impervious to deliberate policies”. 21  Cultural attributes of social 
networks, such as language, customs, traditions and codes of conduct, are also informal 
institutions vested with binding power. In forming and sustaining cultures and identities, 
“the people who possessed specific cultural attributes often formed a social network or 
series of networks, which over the generations became what we today designate ‘ethnic 
communities’.”22 
 
Within the framework of ethnosymbolism, the power of nationalism to homogenize 
people is challenged. The purely instrumental view of nationalism from above is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, 2(3), p. 375.  
17  Ernest Gellner, 1996, “Ernest Gellner's reply: ‘Do nations have navels?’”, Nations and 
Nationalism, 2(3), p. 369. 
18 Anthony Smith, 1996, “Memory and modernity”, p. 378. 
19 John Hutchinson, 2005, Nations as Zones of Conflict, London: Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, pp. 
4-5. 
20 Douglass North, 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 Anthony Smith, 1989, “The origins of nations”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 12(3), p. 344. 
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criticized as well. Cultural difference in nations is seen as persistent existence. As John 
Hutchinson points out, “the power of states to regulate populations is limited and 
fluctuating.”23 “[T]he nationalists do not operate within a tabula rasa”, because they 
have to “invoke ethnic pasts, symbols and cultures”, and what they can and cannot 
exploit are hence pre-figured by the established cultural systems and pre-existing ethnic 
sentiments. “It is implausible, therefore, to conceive of modernising nationalists as 
outside their society mobilizing it from above. Once invoked, ethnic memories have an 
independent force with which they have to negotiate.”24  
 
According to Anthony Smith, the disparity between instrumental nationalism from 
above and ethnic vernacular cultures is the key to understand “why nationalism so often 
has such a widespread popular appeal”. While the intelligentsia “may ‘invite the masses 
into history’ and politicise them and their cultures”, the people do not necessarily 
respond, unless the process “involves the vernacular mobilisation of the masses”.25 This 
reflects the “subtle relationships between modern nations and older ethnie, and between 
modern nationalism and a more long-lived and ancient ethnocentrism.” Therefore, “in 
order to forge a ‘nation’ today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the 
lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to ‘nation-building’.”26 
 
The insights herein offered, from both modernists and their critics, shed light on the 
importance of tensions and disparities between nationalism from above and nationalism 
from below. In particular, they suggest that nationalism from below is not necessarily 
national or nationalist, and that nationalism can be divided along various lines of 
interests and longings. Unfortunately, this wisdom has not been sufficiently heeded in 
the study of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Obsessed with the role of the party-
state, the existing literature lacks sufficient investigation of the subtle relations between 
elite nationalism and popular nationalism.  
 
                                                        
23 John Hutchinson, 2005, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 4. 
24 Ibid., p. 33. 
25 Anthony Smith, 1996, “Opening statement: nations and their pasts”, Nations and Nationalism, 
2(3), p. 362. 
26 Anthony Smith, 1988 (1986), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 17. 
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To make the point, it is worth borrowing the critiques offered by Whitmeyer of 
empirical studies in the general field of nations and nationalism. As Whitmeyer 
indicates, we cannot conclude causal relationship between the elite and popular 
nationalism just because in many places a great deal of such promotion precedes 
popular nationalism. “Even when popular nationalism adopts cultural aspects of 
nationalism advanced by the elite – such as myths, history, even the standardized 
language – it does not follow that the elite have caused the nationalism itself.”27 There 
are alternative explanations for such associations. Elites “do affect expressions of 
popular nationalism, and do take advantage of popular nationalism and use it to their 
own ends”. 28  But they are neither necessary nor sufficient condition for popular 
nationalism. “If elites frequently fail to create popular nationalism, for whatever reason, 
then elites clearly are not sufficient. If popular nationalism appears without being elite-
led, again for whatever reason, then elites clearly are not necessary.”29 Therefore, for the 
proposition that “elites create nationalism” to hold, it needs “two legs of support”. First, 
“we must be able to see how what they postulate could happen at the level of the 
individual behaviour”. Second, we must see empirical evidences – “when elites promote 
nationalism, ordinary people soon adopt that nationalism, and when elites do not, 
ordinary people do not”.30 
 
This thesis, based on systematic empirical study of contemporary Chinese nationalism, 
speaks to the general literature in the field of nations and nationalism as well as the 
literature on Chinese nationalism. Debunking the age-old myth that Chinese nationalism 
is an outgrowth of the CCP’s instrumental propaganda, this thesis offers a new 
theoretical account of the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. It finds that the 
homogenizing power of nationalism exists only at the national and symbolic levels. At 
the micro-foundation - that is, the interaction between state and society in constructing, 
mobilizing and expressing nationalist claims, nationalism is anything but a force of 
forging consensus and eliminating diversities among people. Instead, the power of 
                                                        
27 Joseph M. Whitmeyer, 2002, “Elites and popular nationalism”, British Journal of Sociology, 53(3), 
p. 328. 
28 Ibid., p. 321. 
29 Ibid., p. 323. 
30 Ibid., pp. 328-29. 
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nationalism to mobilize population and construct consensus at the national and 
symbolic levels comes from the enduring differences in interpretations, understandings 
and claims held by various sub-populations and wrapped up in the discourse of 
nationalism. The existence of such differences is a necessary condition, not an 
impediment, for forging nationalism as an effective ideology. 
 
Why Nationalism Can Incite Popular Passion and Appeal? Competing Claims and 
State-Society Dynamics 
 
Although sharp minds such as Hobsbawm have proposed that nations should be 
understood as “dual phenomena”, few efforts have been made to understand the puzzle: 
How are the “dual phenomena” constructed? As nationalism from below and 
nationalism from above are differently constructed, how and why are they ultimately 
combined? Ethnosymbolists have offered some insightful account of the puzzle, through 
the subtle relations between instrumental nationalism from above and cultural 
differences embedded in pre-existing ethnic communities. But their approach is mainly 
historical. This means that their approach would be better at explaining long-time 
evolution under the impact of large-scale institutional changes. Accordingly, micro-
level dynamics in a short span of time would not be dealt with in their theory, 
particularly when the nations and nation-states associated are thought to be well-
established and relatively stable in the short period. 
 
Therefore, although ethnosymbolism also emphasizes processes and understands 
nations as “dynamic entities”,31 it leaves the important puzzle unanswered: Why do 
nationalist mobilizations and claims rise and fall in a short span of time, when there are 
few significant changes in the broader process of nation-building? This is what 
happened in China since the 1980s. The rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism has 
been enthusiastically researched in intellectual circles, thanks to the global concern with 
the rise of China and its authoritarian resilience. However the literature on 
contemporary Chinese nationalism does not seem to be well-informed of theoretical 
                                                        
31 John Hutchinson, 2005, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 5. 
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advances in the literature of nations and nationalism. This has led to the embarrassing 
situation that the field of contemporary Chinese nationalism only speaks to itself, 
downplaying its potential contribution to the general field.  
 
The phenomenon in China is not unique. It represents a typical case where there 
emerges a trend of growing willingness and capabilities of peoples to lodge their 
nationalist claims towards other peoples. This is what the “rise” means when we are 
talking about the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. This is a grey zone on the 
continuum between extreme nationalist mobilizations (such as identity wars and large-
scale ethnic violence) and everyday representations of the nation. It is the area 
deserving more academic endeavors for the field in general today, because such kind of 
phenomena is more prevalent than the kind of extreme nationalist mobilizations that are 
attentively studied today. Ethnic cooperation, rather than wars and violence, is the norm 
in our world. In fact, the impressive links between nationalism and violence analyzed in 
the literature are in conflict with quantitative data, suggesting that academic focus on 
extreme nationalist mobilizations may have been misled by selection bias.32 In terms of 
political implications, such kind of phenomena is more important than everyday 
representations of the nation, because it will have influential constraints on state’s 
diplomacy and international security. 
 
In this regard, this thesis speaks to the general literature of the field as well. Based on 
systematic study of contemporary Chinese nationalism, it tries to make a theoretical 
push, bridging the general field of nations and nationalism and the specific field of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism by showing what the latter can borrow from and 
lend to the former. Today one of the most inviting unresolved puzzles in the general 
field of nations and nationalism is to explain the tensions and disparities, on the one 
hand, and the subtle relations of symbiosis, on the other hand, between nationalism 
constructed from above (by the state, by national or local elites or by large socio-
economic processes) and nationalism constructed from below. This question has 
                                                        
32 David D. Laitin, 2007, Nations, States, and Violence, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
p. vii and p. 23. 
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engendered and implicated major debates in the field. At the grand socio-historical level 
there is the debate on the origin of nations between modernists, primordialists and 
ethnosymbolists. As discussed above in the account of Eric Hobsbawm, Clifford Geertz 
and Anthony Smith, despite their different theoretical origins, scholars from the three 
schools all realize, more or less, that nationalism cannot be fully understood as a top-
down process, because this cannot explain why nationalism can incite widespread 
popular passion and appeal on the ground. Therefore, factors such as historical ethnies, 
institutions, vernacular cultures and other social identifications have been brought in to 
develop different explanations of the origin of nations and nationalism in the great 
socioeconomic transformations wrought by modernity. This is the first major debate in 
the general field.  
 
In my view, the core of this debate should not be whether nations have navels, 
borrowing the famous metaphor Ernest Gellner used in the Warwick debate. Rather it 
should focus on why and how Adam was created in the form as he was presented at the 
moment of creation, with “the cycles of respiration, blood circulation or food digestion 
which Adam would have to have in order to live”,33 borrowing Gellner’s metaphor 
again. “Nihil ex nihilo. Nothing comes from nothing.” 34  Anthony Smith is more 
coherent and convincing in the debate. The logic behind judgment is simple and clear: If 
the nations are created by nationalism, which nevertheless cannot invite popular passion 
and appeal on the ground ex nihilo, then how can the nations created in this way be said 
to be created ex nihilo? For modernists to debunk the ethnosymbolic argument and 
prove that nations were created all of sudden by the nationalists ex nihilo, it is not 
sufficient to claim that pre-existing ethnie is only a nation’s navel (which they have not 
been very successful so far). It also requires answering why the masses follow 
nationalism from above and showing whether the masses really follow nationalism from 
above.  
 
Among modernists, Gellner never considered these questions in detail. Hobsbawm 
                                                        
33 Ernest Gellner, 1996, “Ernest Gellner's reply: ‘Do nations have navels?’”, p. 369.  
34 Anthony Smith, 1996, “Memory and modernity”, p. 385. 
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raised the puzzles, but did not sufficiently address them. Neither do ethnosymbolic 
scholars such as Anthony Smith. This is not because they ignore the existence and 
importance of such questions, but because the level of analysis of their theories is not 
suitable for studying these questions. Such a deficiency has been avoided in the second 
major debate in the field, which is more empirically oriented, focusing on extreme 
nationalist and ethnic mobilizations (e.g. identity wars and large-scale ethnic violence) 
in contemporary politics. Its contemporary perspective offers a chance to observe both 
local mechanisms and structural causes in extreme mobilizations under the banner of 
nationalism. 
 
The second major debate is between culturalist and rationalist accounts on extreme 
nationalist and ethnic mobilizations, which is best summarized by Fearon and Laitin.35 
Reviewing six empirical studies across a wide set of societies, including Hindu-Muslim 
tensions in Northern India, Hutu-Tutsi conflicts in Rwanda, fight between the 
Sinhaleses and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, ethnic civil wars in Sudan, the war between 
Serbia and Croatia in the collapses of the Yugoslavia, and the radical Sinn Fein party in 
Northern Ireland, Fearon and Laitin test whether social construction of ethnicity has any 
bearing on the likelihood of large-scale ethnic violence. Because participation in 
violence is dangerous and costly to the masses, they pay special attention to the puzzle 
of why the masses follow. They arrive at three conclusions.  
 
(1) The rationalist theories “linking individuals (whether elites or masses) to ethnic 
violence” and the culturalist theories “linking discourses to violent behaviors” can be 
bridged and placed in one constructivist framework, because both traditions posit “the 
content and boundaries of ethnic groups as produced and reproduced by specific social 
processes”.36 
 
(2) There is considerable evidence that “large-scale ethnic violence is provoked by 
elites seeking to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political power”, particularly 
                                                        
35 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 2000, “Violence and the social construction of ethnic 
identity”, International Organization, 54(4), pp. 845–877. 
36 Ibid., p. 874.  
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when there are “internal conflicts between extremists and moderates”. These conflicts 
incentivize “leaders or dissidents to provoke violence with members of an out-group”.37 
 
(3) However, on the ground, “some evidence suggests that the masses are not duped at 
all”. Ordinary folks strategically construct ethnic boundaries, motivated by calculations 
such as “looting, land grabs, and personal revenge”, fear of tit-for-tat violence if elites 
“let the thugs go”, or desire to raise their in-group status. 38  Therefore, “what is 
described as ethnic violence” may not have “necessary ethnic dimension”.39 
 
This is a more clear explanation of why the masses follow in extreme nationalist and 
ethnic mobilizations. Its most valuable insight is this: Even at a time of dramatic 
nationalist and ethnic mobilizations when the masses do not seem to have other choices 
but to follow the elites, they still cannot be treated as passive respondents. Rather the 
masses are as strategic as the elites who try to manipulate them. For the puzzle of why 
the masses follow, this is a powerful explanation, but it is not sufficient to explain such 
phenomena as the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Unlike nationalist and 
ethnic mobilizations to violent extremity, the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism 
represents a different (and broader) category of nationalist mobilizations. It lies on the 
spectrum between large-scale violent mobilizations and everyday representations of the 
nation.  
 
People involved in nationalist mobilizations are different at a time of peace and stability, 
compared with those at a time of violent large-scale conflicts. Fearon and Laitin’s study 
also implies this. As they suggest, ethnic violence “looks very much like gang violence 
with no necessary ethnic dimension”. Thus “one might conjecture that a necessary 
condition for sustained ‘ethnic violence’ is the availability of thugs (in most cases 
young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) 
who can be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated, 
                                                        
37 Ibid., p. 846. 
38 Ibid., pp. 871-74. 
39 Ibid., p. 869. 
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would shy away from killing their neighbors with machetes”.40 However, at a time of 
peace and stability, thugs are usually not major activists in nationalist mobilizations. 
Identifying thugs as major strategic actors at a time of peace and stability also 
contradicts the argument that people are not duped at all. Because among population 
these people are more prone to be “seduced by the ‘high’” (quote from Fearon and 
Laitin)41, due to poor education and financial conditions, how can we ascertain that the 
masses from below, if composed of thugs, are not duped and always pursuing their own 
agenda? As the opportunity of looting, land grabs, personal revenge and tit-for-tat 
violence is very small, what are the specific desires and fears thugs have if they 
strategically follow the elites at a time of peace and stability? Thugs are unlikely to be 
major activists in nationalist mobilizations at such a time. 
 
Looking into the subtle relations between state nationalism and social actors in 
contemporary China in a period of peace and order, like ethnosymbolism, this thesis 
rejects the oversimplified view of structural-instrumentalism that sees nationalism as 
imposed from above. Complementary to ethnosymbolism, this thesis can focus on 
socio-political dynamics at the micro-level due to the short span of time it studies. 
Through these dynamics, it reveals the role of social groups and their different appeals 
in inciting nationalism and shaping nationalist mobilizations and expressions. Through 
process-tracing of nationalist mobilizations, it explains why Chinese people with 
different motivations and appeals have reacted to the invitation and manipulation from 
above, and how their reactions have been facilitated as well as constrained by socio-
political conditions in contemporary China.  
 
The explanatory framework offered in this thesis is more useful and integrative for 
studying the subtle relations between nationalism from above and nationalism from 
below, compared to the rationalist-constructivist approach used in the study of 
nationalist and ethnic violence. It not only addresses the differences between 
nationalism from above and nationalism from below, but also suggests that differences 
                                                        
40 Ibid., p. 869.  
41 Ibid. 
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in nationalism from below are as important as differences between state and society. In 
this thesis we will see a great deal of differences between the understandings, 
interpretations and claims of nationalism by various social actors. Oftentimes they differ 
from state nationalism and sometimes they contest with state nationalism. Sometimes 
they compete with each other and sometimes they are complementary to each other. 
Taken together, counter-intuitively, they increase the popularity of state nationalism. 
Thus the existence of such differences at the micro-level is a necessary condition, not an 
impediment, for forging nationalism at the national and symbolic levels.  
 
At the core of the subtle relations between nationalism from above and nationalism 
from below, it is the symbiotic relationship between state and society in reproducing 
nationalism. The success of nationalism, as a homogenizing power at the national and 
symbolic levels, not only depends on the state’s intention and capacity to exploit the 
interests and appeals from bottom, but also on the degree of autonomy and spontaneity 
of such interests and appeals. For the symbiotic relationship to work, society requires a 
certain degree of autonomy and spontaneity. Only authentic interests and appeals from 
below can inject into the discourse of state nationalism the power of generating popular 
resonance. Neither the indoctrination of state nationalism, nor the appeals from the 
duped or the seduced, can work to this effect. Society is not a monolith. At a time of 
peace and stability, social actors from mainstream society, not the irregulars and thugs, 
play a major role in bringing up nationalist appeals and organizing nationalist 
mobilizations. Such nationalist actors are well-educated, politically sophisticated and 
socially resourceful. Their participation, mobilization and interaction with the state 
cannot be reduced to seduction by the high, because these actors also try to advance 
their own interest and raise their ingroup status in the process. As we will see in the 
thesis, oftentimes it is the Chinese party-state that has been forced into diplomatic crisis, 
which it would otherwise have wished to avoid by all means.  
 
The subtle relations revealed in the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism also 
suggest that we need to take into consideration the broad socio-political structure that 
influences the interaction of the two kinds of nationalism. In authoritarian China, 
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political space for sub-populations to advance claims is limited. Political culture is 
conservative and still bears the trace of the Maoist time. These factors have led to a 
situation where social actors are more likely to yield to self-censorship. They tend to 
adapt and present their claims in a way that they think politically “right”. Therefore the 
autonomy and spontaneity of mobilizations from below is also regulated and 
constrained by the socio-political structure and political culture, which sustains and 
reproduces unequal power relations embedded in the state-society relations. As a result, 
the most subversive part of nationalism from below will be “autonomously” filtered, as 
it emerges in the public discourse. Meanwhile the most appealing part of nationalism 
from below will be integrated into the official discourse of nationalism, which enhances 
the legitimacy of state nationalism. 
 
Thus, the symbiotic relationship between state and society has two sides, which are 
contesting with and complementary to each other, in inciting nationalist mobilizations 
and expressions at the national and symbolic levels. What deserves attention is not the 
proposition that nationalism from below is not the same as nationalism from above. 
This is apparent. The main contribution of this thesis is that, because, rather than despite 
that, nationalism from below is not the same as nationalism from above and nationalism 
from below is necessarily divided from within, nationalism has become a powerful 
ideology and a useful means of mobilization for the authoritarian state. In order to 
advance empirical study of contemporary Chinese nationalism, the key is to studying 
the meanings and causes of these differences, which are wrapped up in the discourse of 
Chinese nationalism claimed by different social groups, and reflect ongoing new 
dynamics in Chinese politics. These new political dynamics is the outgrowth of broader 
socio-political transformations, which is what is beginning to happen in China.  
 
Structure of the Thesis and Main Propositions 
 
In this thesis, I examine an array of social actors in Chinese society, and their 
understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese nationalism. I look at the 
mechanisms through which these actors are able to make their claims of Chinese 
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nationalism under the banner of state nationalism. I reveal why, through these different 
understandings, interpretations and claims, rather than through the state’s often-mocked 
propaganda machine, that Chinese nationalism has become a powerful ideology and a 
useful means of mobilization in today’s China.  
 
To cover the social spectrum as wide as possible, social actors studied in this thesis are 
chosen from diverse social backgrounds that span the entire social hierarchy in 
contemporary China. At the bottom are subalterns struggling for war reparation and 
official recognition in national memory. In the middle, China’s middle class and 
professionals have played a significant role in intensifying the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute, making the authoritarian state mired in a series of international crises that the 
CCP would otherwise have wished to avoid. Then the thesis moves to the top of the 
social hierarchy, looking at one most outspoken group of the elite - the military elite 
fanning anti-American nationalism in mass media. 
 
While these social actors share little in social capital, political goals and means of 
mobilization, they are strikingly similar in one way - that their respective interpretation 
of, and active engagement in Chinese nationalism, plays an important role in the rise of 
nationalism in today’s China. The changes in the understandings, interpretations and 
claims of Chinese nationalism are also reflected in cultural products in mass media, as 
represented in films, television series, and internet programs. The images of anti-
Japanese resistance have experienced a dramatic shift in the past three decades, 
compared to what they were in the Maoist era. The shift not only reflects changes in the 
taste of the audience and the demand of market, but also reflects changes happening in 
China’s state-society relations. The new images of anti-Japanese resistance in such films, 
television series, and internet programs represent more diverse social backgrounds, 
echoing changing state-society dynamics that re-emphasize a variety of social actors in 
constructing Chinese nationalism.  
 
Taken together, these different understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese 
nationalism, and the new images of nationalist heroes in mass media, shed light on a 
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new direction to studying contemporary Chinese nationalism. As a result of changing 
socio-political dynamics in China, the rise of nationalism should be understood through 
the interaction of the state, market and a liberalizing Chinese society. In particular, it 
should be studied through socio-political dynamics in which various claims of Chinese 
nationalism are wrapped up and interact with the state. 
 
This thesis tries to show that, in the process of transforming nationalism into an active 
political force in contemporary China, the autonomous engagement from society, with 
distinctive understandings, interpretations and claims made by various social actors, is a 
necessary condition. But this story of society autonomy has double sides. On the other 
side, while engagement from society is genuine and autonomous, it is constrained, by 
the authoritarian political culture and by the disadvantageous structural position in 
which some actors are restrained and constructed by unequal power relations.  
 
The policy implication of the thesis is apparent. To understand the rise and implications 
of Chinese nationalism, one must first understand these new dynamics happening in 
Chinese politics. It is the evolution of these dynamics, not the content of Chinese 
nationalism (either from below or from above), that determines whether Chinese 
nationalism will serve as a force for political liberalization or authoritarian 
consolidation, and whether China’s foreign policy will become more cooperative or 
assertive in international society. Therefore, any prediction of political implications of 
rising Chinese nationalism is groundless, without considering these evolving political 
dynamics in China. 
 
To make the main arguments of this thesis more clearly and concisely, it summarizes as 
follows,  
 
(1) Chinese nationalism from above and Chinese nationalism from below are 
necessarily different.  
 
(2) Nationalism from below is a vague concept, and it has to be examined at the sub-
28 
 
population level.  
 
(2.1) In different sub-populations, popular nationalism is comprehended and 
represented with different meanings, interpretations and claims.  
 
(2.2) These sub-populations, when reaching the top of social hierarchy, can have an 
overlap with state authority, which suggests that, under some circumstances, the 
state should also be understood in a disaggregated fashion in studying nationalism 
from below.  
 
(3) These contradictions, between nationalism from above and nationalism from below, 
and between different sub-populations (or social groups), taken as a whole, collectively 
construct the “dual phenomena” of nationalism.  
 
(3.1) In particular, it is the different understandings, interpretations, and claims of 
nationalism by various social actors that make campaigns of state nationalism 
successful, in the sense that nationalism has become a useful means of unifying 
power for the state.  
 
(3.2) Without the emergence of such differences in a liberalizing society, as what is 
occurring in China, campaigns of state nationalism would fail, like other 
propaganda campaigns by an authoritarian state resting on dwindling legitimacy.   
 
(4) This has significant policy implications. Although nationalism is on the rise in 
contemporary China, we should not draw too much from the phenomenon for China 
policy. It is the evolution of socio-political dynamics, not the content of Chinese 
nationalism (either from below or from above), that determines what kind of force it 
will serve in China’s domestic politics and international behavior.  
 
While this thesis focuses on contemporary Chinese nationalism, for research in the field 
of nations and nationalism, this thesis also renders some interesting hypotheses which 
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deserve exploring in the future. Because both the state’s intention and capacity to 
exploit nationalism and the degree of a society’s autonomy account for the 
homogenizing power of nationalism at the national and symbolic levels, changes in the 
two aspects may influence the trend of nationalist mobilization and expression at a time 
of peace and order. Here are some ideal types which can be investigated and compared 
in future research. 
 
(1) If the state’s intention and capacity to incite nationalism are strong, but at the same 
time, there is little public space or information for social actors to initiate different 
understandings, interpretations, and claims of nationalism, then nationalism as a 
mobilizing ideology can hardly generate widespread popular appeal.  
 
Empirical cases corresponding to this ideal type can be totalitarian or highly 
authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea under Kim Jong-il, where nationalist 
mobilization and expression are completely stage-managed by the state. Although 
expressed nationalist sentiments are very high under these regimes, the effect of 
nationalism as a useful mobilizing ideology to unify the people is suspicious, especially 
in the mid-to-long term and in the time of crisis. Thus, we see flows of North Korean 
refugees across the border, who seek new life at a huge risk of severe punishment. It 
suggests that the mobilizing effect of state nationalism could be weak under such 
regimes, if not being backed up by the repressive apparatus of the state. 
 
(2) If the state’s intention and capacity to incite nationalism are strong, and at the same 
time, there is some public space and information for social actors to initiate different 
understandings, interpretations, and claims of nationalism, then nationalism as a 
mobilizing ideology can generate popular appeal, and lead to the rise of nationalism 
during a short span of time. This is a scenario similar to what is happening in 
contemporary China.  
 
(3) If the state does not have strong intention or capacity to incite nationalism for 
whatever reason (e.g. strong legitimacy from alternative sources or fear of inciting 
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separatist movements), then nationalism as a mobilizing ideology also has troubles in 
inciting popular appeal at the national and symbolic levels. Because in this situation, 
any social group who has strong incentive to campaign for their own understanding, 
interpretation, and claim of nationalism is difficult to find resonance at a higher level 
and with members of an out-group. 
 
Research Methods and Chapter Overview  
 
While this thesis also tries to make a theoretical push in the general field of nations and 
nationalism, its primary goal is to analyze and explain the rise of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism through Chinese politics behind it. By taking mixed methods, it surveys the 
interpretations, understandings and claims of Chinese nationalism of representative 
social groups, from the bottom to the top of social hierarchy, and investigates the 
images of nationalists represented in mass media.  
 
Because of the wide range of subjects it deals with, this thesis combines qualitative 
methods of oral history, historical archives (including official archives, newspapers, and 
personal documents), participant observation, in-depth interviews, online content 
analysis, media analysis and academic literature review. The standard by which methods 
are selected for the study of each chapter is straightforward. That is, to make the 
analyses and explanations as informative as possible. In the rest of this introductory 
chapter, it provides an overview of the following chapters and the methods used in each 
empirical chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 offers a critical review of the existing works on contemporary Chinese 
nationalism. It challenges three prevailing assumptions explicit or implicit in the 
literature. The first assumption sees the rise of Chinese nationalism as a post-1989 
phenomenon, which was an outgrowth of the CCP’s patriotic campaigns against the 
collapse of the communist ideology. The assumption overlooks the effects of historical 
continuity and has serious empirical flaws. It relies on observation of nationalist 
mobilization when and only when it succeeds, which leads to selection bias based on the 
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outcome variable and assumes that nationalism is a psychological phenomenon or an 
outburst of irrationality to extremity.  
 
Related to the first assumption, the second assumption is state-centrism, which only 
takes a cursory view of social actors. Although in recent years, the field of study is 
evolving from state-centrism to a dialectical perspective, taking into consideration the 
role of both the state and society in inciting nationalism, it still lacks a systematic 
investigation of the dynamics between state and society in reproducing nationalism.  
 
The third assumption to be challenged is policy implications of the rise of contemporary 
Chinese nationalism. Most scholars concur that Chinese nationalism is a subversive 
force for international security, which is either manipulated by the Chinese government 
or incited by populists from below. Although a few scholars begin to challenge this 
pessimistic view, their number is small and their counter-arguments are too optimistic to 
be empirically sound.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at the nationalist activists at the bottom of Chinese society. It explains 
how the making of historical memory of Chinese suffering in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945) has emerged in post-reform China, and become an important factor in 
affecting Sino-Japanese relations. Through competing claims of war suffering, made by 
Chinese war victims, intellectuals and the state, contemporary Chinese nationalism has 
been constructed on the victimhood of the Chinese nation.  
 
As the first empirical chapter of this thesis, this chapter is important for complicating 
the overall picture that this thesis tries to present and establish. On the one hand, this 
chapter debunks and complicates a narrowly “top-down” picture of Chinese nationalism. 
On the other hand, it does not present an oversimplified picture of purely, authentically, 
autonomously “bottom-up” dynamics and sentiments of war victims, because the 
historical memories produced and reproduced still bear the traces of the party-state.  
 
Before the party-state started its patriotic campaign in the early 1990s, Chinese war 
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victims and a small group of civic activists were already initiating campaigns to 
commemorate war suffering and demand war reparation. But their activities were 
unable to leave enduring influences in the repressive political environment. The 
dynamics did not change, until some war victims and their descendants, with the help of 
Chinese intellectuals, lodged lawsuits against the Japanese government. Such a 
symbolic activity disrupted the political dynamics that had previously repressed the 
expression of war suffering from Chinese society.  
 
Two other factors further complicate the situation. First, the role of the intermediaries, 
that is, the Chinese intellectuals, with their interpretations and claims, are sometimes in 
conflict with both the party-state and the victims, while at other times, their engagement 
helps facilitate the making of historical memory on the political agenda of the state. 
Second, the making of historical memory, and thus the construction of anti-Japanese 
nationalism in post-reform cannot be comprehensively understood without the 
knowledge of the early post-revolutionary political discourse, practices and political 
culture in China. Because of such a legacy, and because of the authoritarian nature of 
the party-state, the “bottom-up” dynamics and sentiments of war victims bear the deep 
imprint of the party-state.  
 
This chapter uses a mixed methodology of in-depth interviews, oral histories, 
participant observation, and archival research to find how war suffering has been 
preserved, remade and disseminated since the occurrence of war atrocities. My 
participant observation was conducted in Chongshan Village, which is located on the 
suburbs of Yiwu City in Zhejiang Province, in the summer of 2010.  
 
During the Japanese occupation in October 1942, a Black Death hit the village, which 
had a population of about 1,200 persons in 300 households. Within three months, 405 
villagers died of the plague, and 23 households perished. The homes of 176 households 
were burnt, and 421 rooms were completely destroyed, for preventing the spread of the 
disease. The plague was not a natural catastrophe, but was imposed by the Japanese 
bacterial warfare in Zhejiang Province during 1940-1942.  
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In Chongshan Village, I attended the meetings of nationalist activists, visited the local 
bacterial war museum and the clan temple, acquired published and unpublished 
materials from the activists and the Yiwu Archive Bureau, and conducted interviews 
with activists in China’s civil reparation movement. I also held interviews with, and 
acquired publications from, activists of the movement in Shanghai and Beijing.  
 
Using these materials, this author shows that, although the expression of war suffering 
had been stifled for decades after 1949, it was preserved and transformed at the bottom 
of Chinese society through family stories, public events of village, and Maoist political 
mobilization sponsored by the state. This preserved and transformed memory of war 
suffering has been repeatedly exploited by intellectuals and state agents to advance their 
own political agendas in the past decades.  
 
On the other hand, the victims and their descendants - the voiceless and powerless in 
Chinese society, also attempted to seize all possible opportunities to air their grievance. 
Even in the Maoist time, when anti-Japanese nationalism was sidelined in the national 
political agenda, and class struggle dominated political mobilization, these war victims 
never forgot their grievances, and tried all kinds of means to have their grievances 
publicly expressed. Their campaigns to seek redress for war suffering were far ahead of 
the party-state’s policy change towards Japan in the 1990s. The state’s patriotic 
campaign in the 1990s was just a new opportunity for them to have their grievances 
heeded. 
 
Chapter 4 studies the cultural representation of the central argument in this thesis. The 
primary source of research is visual materials in films, television series, and internet 
programs, most of which were not used in the existing literature on contemporary 
Chinese nationalism.  
 
It researches changing images of anti-Japanese resistance in Chinese films, television 
series and internet programs. It explores how different motivations and joint endeavors 
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of Chinese local governments, profit-seeking film and TV producers, Chinese artists 
and intellectuals, and various minority groups, have been transforming old images of 
anti-Japanese resistance fighters in the Maoist years, to new stylized images in the post-
Mao era. This is not only a process of fundamental changes in cultural products in mass 
media, but a process that reflects deep transformations in Chinese society.  
 
It finds that, in the cultural products of mass entertainment, there is a fundamental 
change in the narrative of China’s resistance against Japan after the ending of the 
Maoist years. In the Maoist years, the portrait of nationalist resistance was coloured by 
a language of class struggle. This standard portrait has been gradually shifting to new 
images since the mid-1980s, which allows for and exploits the expression of social 
divisions in Chinese society.  
 
What has risen is a multitude of images of anti-Japanese resistance fighters, including 
the “class enemy” such as the KMT, gentries and warlords, and the “bad elements” in 
the people such as bandits and prostitutes. In contrast, the prominent role of the CCP in 
the resistance movement has been contracting, from the unique leader to a supporter of 
or an ally with other organized force, and sometimes even being absent in the course of 
resistance. These new images have stoked wide popularity in mass media.  
 
Nevertheless, like the old images, these new styles do not present an accurate picture of 
history as well. Despite striking differences between old images and new ones, 
continuity in images of anti-Japanese resistance is salient. The new images are still 
coloured by a legacy of the political discourse in the Maoist years. They lack deep 
reflection on the war, and they are more of socio-political constructs under new political 
dynamics in China, not necessarily being closer to historical veracity. 
 
Chapter 5 looks at the mobilization of Chinese middle class in the Protecting the Diaoyu 
Islands Movement (Baodiao). It reveals how and why the middle class, the educated 
and professionals engage in Baodiao Movement, with an analysis of their 
understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese nationalism. Their initiatives and 
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participation in Baodiao not only has brought the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute to the centre 
of the political agenda, but has altered the set of policy choice that the party-state is 
facing.  
 
There are different kinds of Baodiao mobilization in the Greater China area. This 
chapter also compares Baodiao Movement under different socio-political conditions in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. Whereas in all the three contexts, Baodiao was initiated 
by activists that were contesting with the state for the power of explaining Chinese 
nationalism, the movement displays a pattern of similarities and differences across these 
contexts.  
 
This is the first study that researches Baodiao with rich historical materials and cross-
contextual comparison. The benefit of a historical and comparative perspective is that it 
not only contributes to a better understanding of how the understandings, interpretations 
and claims of Chinese nationalism by Baodiao activists in China differ from what is 
propagated in state nationalism, but also reveals how and why the way that China’s 
Baodiao activists construe, express and exploit state nationalism is different from their 
counterparts in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
Through the comparison, this chapter demonstrates striking differences in both 
members of Baodiao activists and evolution of the movements in different contexts. 
Due to different levels of repression from the authority, it requires different mobilizing 
structures that activists can utilize to successfully challenge the state’s monopoly of the 
discourse of nationalism. Because a different mobilizing structure requires a different 
combination of resources and skills, the state’s propensity to repress also explains why 
leading Baodiao activists have different social backgrounds in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
China. It is in China, under the most authoritarian regime, that civilian contestation in 
Baodiao has been derailed in the direction of street violence.  
 
In this chapter, the author used the snow-ball method to identify interviewees, who are 
leading activists of Baodiao Movement in China. Combined with online content 
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analysis, the author double-checked the accounts acquired from interviews, and 
obtained more details of the movement. All interviews were conducted in Shanghai and 
Beijing in 2008 and 2009. The websites for online content analysis were popular 
websites maintained by Chinese nationalists. These websites used to be the information 
platform for organizing navigations from China to the Diaoyu Islands, and for soliciting 
donations for various nationalist purposes. In researching Baodiao Movement in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, the author relied on publications, newspapers and personal memories. 
Because Baodiao occurred in Taiwan and Hong Kong a few decades before in China, 
there are sufficient written materials on what was happening in the two political 
contexts.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on one outspoken group of Chinese elites - the military officers of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who are fanning anti-American nationalism in mass 
media. The officers of the PLA were formerly confined to secretive military institutions 
and invisible in the public sphere. In recent years, there has emerged a group of PLA 
officers who are outspoken in mass media. Through the channels of television and 
broadcasting, newspapers and magazines, bestselling books and the internet, their 
viewpoints are being aired to millions of Chinese and become widely popular. 
 
On the surface these viewpoints echo the Party line of nationalist propaganda and its 
long-embraced fear of U.S. intentions and capabilities. However, a close investigation 
reveals that these PLA officers are more likely to have seized the channels of mass 
media to express their own personal viewpoints and sectoral interests under the banner 
of Chinese nationalism. Their recommendations on foreign policy are more offensive 
than the Party would encourage. Moreover, they are no longer satisfied with being 
confined to the foreign policy arena, and have begun to make public their critiques of 
domestic policy, which are always wrapped in the discourse of nationalism as well. 
 
Methodologically this chapter surveys four types of Chinese media to conduct the study 
of military elites – television and broadcast programs, newspapers and magazines, 
bestselling books, blog posts and websites. In studies of the Chinese military, 
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information transparency and the reliability of news leaks have been notorious problems, 
although access to military analysts has improved since the 1990s. Unlike previous 
studies, this chapter does not rely on information collected from academic journal 
articles or from news leaks in the Hong Kong press, which are either unavailable to 
most Chinese audiences or of questionable reliability. Instead it draws on open-source 
materials that have been viewed, read and debated by millions of Chinese, rather than 
on internal reports or academic articles being circulated and read by a limited number of 
academics or military staff.  
 
Apparently this chapter has a selection bias of research subjects, because the media tend 
to encourage and make use of the most outspoken speakers. However, this is a positive 
factor for the purpose of this research, because it is precisely the views of these most 
outspoken PLA officers that penetrate the public sphere and influence public opinion. 
As Susan Shirk points out, the information gathered from such sources may be skewed, 
but it is precisely this distortion that affects the perception and choices of policy-
makers.42 
 
Chapter 7 offers five policy caveats for international security and diplomatic choices of 
China and Japan, based on the systematic study in previous chapters. As the CCP’s 
control over nationalism has been weakened, compared to the Maoist years, it is 
unrealistic for international society to hope that the Chinese government will be able to 
effectively contain nationalism at home. There is simply no way for the CCP to 
monopolize the understandings, interpretations and claims of nationalism in an 
increasingly liberalized society.  
 
It also reminds readers and policy makers that we should be careful not to draw too 
much from the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism when making China policy. As 
the complicated dynamics between state and society shows, it is the evolution of socio-
political conditions and state-society dynamics, not the substances and explicit claims of 
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Political Science, 8(1), p. 60 
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state nationalism or popular nationalism, that will determine what kind of force Chinese 
nationalism serves in China’s domestic politics and international behavior.  
 
This has practical implications for international security in East Asia and Sino-Japanese 
relations. Because there is no such evidence to evaluate whether Chinese nationalism is 
ultimately good or bad for international security, practical policy research on Chinese 
nationalism should consider China’s entire portfolio – such as its interests, intentions, 
capacities, history records of behavior, opportunities and constraints.  
 
In terms of Sino-Japanese relations, for both Chinese and Japanese statesmen who hope 
that time will ultimately wash away the remembering of war suffering and hatred, this is 
an empty wish that would better be abandoned sooner than later. This is because war 
suffering has its own life and it can be transformed and nationalized. To build more 
stable and reliable relations, both governments should be prepared with strategic 
foresight to facilitate deep reconciliation, which is only possible when both 
governments pay attention to the bottom-up initiatives, heeding their concerns and 
relieving their discontents.   
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Chapter 2 Understanding Chinese Nationalism through Chinese Politics: 
Challenges to Three Assumptions in the Conventional Wisdom 
 
Questions of nationalism are always about representation of the nation, as if the nation 
is a monolith and its representation is homogenous. Yet the question of representation is 
one which is political and open to contestation and change, for reasons such as 
structural transformations and different motivations. For nationalism to become an 
effective ideology of mobilization, which can be exploited by the state or elites, its 
mobilizing power has to be built on solid micro-level foundations.  
 
Therefore, it should suggest that, instead of homogenizing people’s thoughts through 
the indoctrination of nationalism from above, the success of nationalism as a mobilizing 
power may depend on the existence of different understandings, interpretations, and 
claims that social actors are able and willing to inject into the broad discourse of 
nationalism. This is a reverse mechanism that has not been sufficiently studied in the 
existing literature. It is also the main proposition that this thesis argues for.  
 
The Chinese today are passionate about nationalism, but they do not understand, 
interpret and claim nationalism in the same way that the state has wished for. Instead 
Chinese nationalism from below is decentred from the orthodox nationalism, as 
propagated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from above. Their understandings, 
interpretations, and claims of nationalism are often inconsistent with, and sometimes 
contrary to what the Chinese state wishes to represent.  
 
Moreover, the Chinese people, who are designated as a totalistic entity, do not 
understand, interpret, and claim nationalism in the same way as well. Their disparities 
and divergences can be seen in the various instances of nationalist mobilization and 
expressions by different social groups, from the subalterns to the middle class activists 
and the military elite. 
  
However, in the existing works on contemporary Chinese nationalism, research is often 
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based on some explicit and implicit assumptions, which are not necessarily held to be 
true. By critically reviewing the existing literature on contemporary Chinese 
nationalism, this chapter challenges three most prominent assumptions in the literature, 
which is necessary to critically reflect and clarify for the field to advance. Empirical 
studies start from the next chapter.  
 
Literature Debate 1: Historical Discontinuity vs. Historical Continuity 
 
The first assumption to be challenged sees the rise of Chinese nationalism as a post-
1989 phenomenon. This is a widely-held conventional wisdom with its major argument 
as follows: Against the collapse of the communist ideology, the CCP propagated 
nationalism and used it as an alternative ideology to legitimize its rule and consolidate 
the authoritarian regime.43 The first assumption is not equal to state-centrism, which 
will be considered in the next part. While most scholars in this band emphasize the role 
of the state, some also take a bottom-up view, and see the existence of a gap between 
state nationalism and popular nationalism.  
 
Therefore, advocates for both nationalism from above and nationalism from below can 
be found in this group. According to them, the age of the 1980s is regarded as being in 
stark contrast to the decade of the 1990s.44 Whereas the 1980s resembles a liberal and 
pro-Western era, the 1990s is a time of irrationality and xenophobia, in that the Chinese 
(especially the rising middle class) turn a blind eye to domestic problems and act out of 
                                                        
43  Suisheng Zhao, 1998, “A state-led nationalism: the patriotic education campaign in post 
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nationalist fever. 
 
This assumption has serious empirical flaws nevertheless. In most studies and in almost 
all journalistic reports, there is a standard style of representing Chinese nationalism. It 
records in detail periodic outbursts of Chinese anger against foreign targets, showing 
that Chinese nationalism has been dangerously growing. The 1999 anti-NATO student 
protest after the Belgrade bombing, the 2001 spy-airplane conflict, the 2005 anti-
Japanese mass demonstration, and the 2008 torch relay protest, just name a few that are 
frequently talked of in academic and journalist discourse.  
 
However, these incidents do not reveal the causes of Chinese nationalism at all. First, 
because outbursts of nationalist mobilization are triggered by accidental events, they are 
political outcomes, not political causes, of the rise of Chinese nationalism. Thus it is 
groundless to deduce, from these incidents, whether Chinese nationalism is stage-
managed by the state or spontaneously rising from society, simply by pointing to some 
incidents occurring at such a time of mobilization.  
 
Consequently, anecdotes supporting either side of the story can be found in such 
incidents. But anecdotes cannot explain anything. An anecdote such as state universities 
transporting students to the U.S. Embassy to participate in protest could be out of the 
intention to stir up anti-American nationalism among the youth, but could also be out of 
the intention to control the protest so that it will not turn into an anti-government 
demonstration. In the same vein, the autonomous self-mobilization of the Chinese on 
such occasions might be out of their genuine anger, but it is unclear that, to what extent, 
such “genuine” public opinion is authentic, free of interference of power and constraints 
of the broader environment these people live in. 
 
Second, these records rely on observation of nationalist mobilization, when and only 
when it succeeds. This renders selection bias based on the outcome variable. It is good 
to use these cases for analyzing China’s state-society interactions at the time of 
diplomatic crisis, but it does not reflect the causes of Chinese nationalism, and does not 
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explain why nationalist mobilization succeeds at some time but fails at other time. The 
real causal mechanism(s) must be able to explain two things at the same time: (1) Why 
Chinese are prepared to rise up for nationalism at a time of crisis, not why they rise up 
at such a time; (2) Why Chinese rise up at certain times, but keep silent or are kept 
silent at other times.  
 
Therefore, the causes of these nationalist outbursts, the real socio-political causes, 
should exist somewhere else, outside these incidents and prior to the time of crisis. 
Unfortunately, because the mainstream view presents Chinese anti-foreign mobilization 
as irrational activities of brainwashed Chinese people, few efforts have been made to 
investigate why these activities occur from a broader view anchored in the dramatic 
socio-political changes taking place in China. When sometimes these changes are 
discussed, they are talked of as a general background, lacking necessary work of 
process tracing to show how and why these changes have manufactured the socio-
political causes of contemporary Chinese nationalism. 
 
The study of Chinese nationalism could and should learn more from other fields in 
social sciences. In developing new theory of social movements in the early 1980s, Doug 
McAdam criticizes the classical model of social movements that it is supposed to 
represent more of a psychological than a political phenomenon. 45  The focus on 
“madness” has also derailed the study of political violence for a long time that Stathis 
Kalyvas, a most distinguished scholar in the field, refers to it as a major “pathology” 
which is “unsatisfactory and misleading”.46 This is the same disease from which the 
study of Chinese nationalism suffers. 
 
Nationalism, like other socio-political products of a society, is first of all a socio-
political phenomenon, not outbursts of irrationality or simply an instrumental tool of the 
state, which is able to take control of when and how nationalism should emerge, evolve 
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and recede. Theoretically, the concept of nationalism is not a monolith.47 It refers to 
(intellectual) ideas, (popular) sentiments and concrete actions. 48  For nationalism as 
actions to take place at a certain point of time, it is indispensible to consider two 
necessary conditions – the reproduction of nationalist sentiments preceding these 
actions and the conditions for successful mobilization in a society.  
 
Therefore, nationalism cannot be taken for granted as a psychological phenomenon or 
an outburst of irrationality to extremity, though it arrests most attention at the time of 
extreme manifestations. As students of social movements remind us again, “the politics 
of nationalist contention as well as its intersection with other forms of politics” should 
not be “cordially ignored” 49 . Because nationalism as actions is a form of political 
engagement by various social actors, it is insufficient to analyze nationalism only as a 
sentiment or a belief, and it is also insufficient to analyze nationalism only at a time 
when it erupts in a most extreme form.   
 
Because the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism is a socio-political phenomenon, 
it needs to be studied with a scientific historical view. Seen from a historical perspective, 
the conventional periodization of Chinese nationalism, using the year of 1989 as a 
watershed event,50 does not reflect historical reality, but represents an academic and 
political construct. In fact, if history is seen as a continuum, not a ruptured chain of 
critical junctures, the causes and rising course of contemporary Chinese nationalism 
would have been seen very differently.  
 
The view holding that the rise of Chinese nationalism is a post-1989 phenomenon 
assumes that history is discontinuous, separated by critical junctures (i.e. those big 
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48  John Breuilly, 1993 (1982), Nationalism and the State (2nd ed.), Manchester: Manchester 
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49 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, 2001, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: 
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events). The idea of critical juncture is borrowed by historical comparativists, from the 
idea of path dependence in institutional economics, to study major events in revolution, 
modernization, industrialization, democratization, historical institutionalism and 
technology change.51 Following Collier and Collier, critical junctures are defined as 
transitions that “establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that 
shapes politics for years to come.”52 These transitions are often pushed by “the choices 
of key actors”, which “lead to the formation of institutions that have self-reproducing 
properties.” Because “[t]hese institutions…produce[s] a series of reactions and 
counterreactions that culminate in the creation of major regime outcomes,” the “key 
actor choices during critical junctures” are causally more deterministic.53 Key actors are 
influential “political leaders, policymakers, bureaucratic, judges…[who] during a phase 
of institutional fluidity … steer outcomes toward a new equilibrium.”54 
 
According to the definition of critical juncture, seeing the rise of Chinese nationalism as 
a post-1989 phenomenon seems to be logical and correct. The bloodshed on 
Tian’anmen Square in 1989 not only ended vigorous student activism in the 1980s, but 
also ousted the CCP’s reformist leader Zhao Ziyang and his team of bureaucrats. The 
incident interrupted China’s political reform and shifted the trajectory of its economic 
development. Attempts to make incremental political reform have been suspended. The 
nascent market has become deeply penetrated by state power. Crony capitalism has 
flourished, and corruption has gone wild. Technology innovation has been halted. A 
bubble growth, built on real estate speculation and monopoly over high-yields sectors, 
has become the most important pillar of national economy. The society has become 
deep divided and fragmented. With grave environmental, human and moral costs of 
development, social morale has sunk, and political discontent has grown.  
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Then why was the Tian’anmen Massacre not the watershed event that has brought up 
the rise of Chinese nationalism? The answer lies in the systematic strength of existing 
empirical evidence. Whereas the 1980s has been idealized as an age of liberalism and 
the 1990s as a time of nationalism, empirical evidence points in the other direction. 
History does have critical junctures, but first of all, history evolves in continuity. The 
existence of watershed events (such as the Tian’anmen Massacre) in the course of 
history does not suffice to discontinue the evolution of history. It changes the trajectory 
of history, but does not separate it from the past, whether seeing history as a whole or as 
being made up of each building block. The political system does not experience 
discontinuity. “Even in revolutions, political systems are never completely 
transformed.” 55  Institutions, as a major building block of political system, do not 
discontinue. “A critical juncture with respect to one institution may not constitute a 
critical juncture with respect to another…even when political systems as a whole face” 
has changed dramatically, “many institutions may remain unaffected.”56  
 
When applied to the field of nationalism, the idea of historical discontinuity encounters 
more challenges, because nationalism is “not just a doctrine…but a more basic way of 
talking, thinking, and acting.” 57  Nationalism is an enduring political discourse and 
political force in modern societies, constructing our identities on an everyday basis, and 
reproduced through everyday practice. 58  Such a discursive dimension and the 
embeddedness of nationalism in everyday practice also suggest that contemporary 
Chinese nationalism cannot be a socio-political product of historical discontinuity. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, neither nations nor nationalism were created ex 
nihilo. This suggests that factors bearing the traces of historical continuity, which may 
not be national or nationalist, oftentimes come into play in reproducing nations and 
inciting nationalism. 
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Empirical studies of contemporary Chinese politics substantiate these theoretical 
conjectures. In a comparative study of the 1989 and the 1999 student movements, 
Wasserstrom finds that the 1999 anti-NATO student protest and the 1989 June 4th 
movement are not completely dissimilar. The idea that the generation of 1999 is 
xenophobic, standing in contrast to the generation of 1989, who are thought to be liberal 
and internationalist, is simply a myth.59  
 
The 1989 pro-democracy movement is also not separable from the political campaigns 
led by the CCP in an earlier age. In the Maoist years, nationalism and mass mobilization 
were the two most powerful apparatuses of mobilization in the hands of the CCP. 
Through a process of socialization in these campaigns, particularly the Cultural 
Revolution, the Chinese became so acquainted with such tools that they would 
habitually take up the same tools to direct discontents towards the government. 
 
As Craig Calhoun, who was in China during the 1989 movement observes: “The sense 
of acting on behalf of the Chinese nation was a powerful motivator for protesting 
Chinese students…The vocabulary of national identity also enabled students to affirm 
the higher purposes of democracy and freedom and to rise above their more narrowly 
self-interested claims and desires.”60  
 
In Calhoun’s record, there is an emotional letter from a student on hunger strike in the 
1989 movement. It is clear, from this letter of an ordinary participant of the 1989 pro-
democracy movement, that it is first out of “love for my country”, not out of admiration 
for liberal internationalism that inspired students to participate in this risky hunger 
strike in the 1989 movement. The excerpt is quoted below (italics added):  
 
Dear mother and father, 
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I am part of this student movement because I love my country. I am not a 
counterrevolutionary. I am not a lawless agitator. Please understand my 
actions…Rest assured that your son will not bring shame upon you. I will not die in 
disgrace.61 
 
The country is our country, 
Its people are our people, 
The government is our government, 
 
If we do not cry out, who will?   
If we do not act, who will? ... 
 
In the spirit of sacrificing our lives, we fight for life. But we are children, we 
are still children! Mother China, look earnestly upon your sons and daughters; as 
hunger mercilessly destroys their youth, as death closes in on them, can you remain 
indifferent?62 
 
Whereas democratic appeals in the 1989 student movement were ruthlessly repressed 
by the authoritarian regime, nationalist elements in the movement continued after 1989. 
As to be seen in this thesis, nationalist appeals of the 1980s have been integrated into 
the political appeals of different social groups in China since the 1990s. In the 1980s, 
the intelligentsia-student alliance was the only social force that was able to challenge 
the state’s monopoly of the nationalist discourse in the public arena. But in today’s 
China, more and more social groups are able to interpret and claim different meanings 
of Chinese nationalism.  
 
In fact, from the view of historical continuity, the 1989 pro-democracy movement is 
also inseparable from political mobilization that was prevailing in earlier periods of the 
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People’s Republic of China. As MacFarquhar points out, the form of mass mobilization 
in the late 1980s seems to bear “the dark penumbra of the Cultural Revolution”, 63 
though scholars such as Esherick and Wasserstrom disagree with his judgment. 64 
Nevertheless, Esherick and Wasserstrom’s counterargument does not address the key 
concern in MacFarquhar’s argument. Their counterargument may be normatively 
appreciated, but it is not persuasive.  
 
The valuable point in this debate is not to make a normative judgment about the 1989 
student movement. It is to understand how and why those protesters acted as such. For 
example, the dramatic performance of which some of the student leaders who knelt 
down when presenting the petition to the officials,65 and the students’ distrust in the less 
educated people (such as peasants, workers and entrepreneurs) 66 , in the eyes of 
Elizabeth Perry, indicate “an ancient tradition of scholar-martyrs dating back to the third 
century B.C.”67 To those student protesters, fighting for the future of the nation might 
not be a cause of sacrifice only. It could also be a privilege of honor and grace reserved 
for the knowledge class. While the normative implications of these students’ behavior 
remain open to debate, the fact that the 1989 student movement occurred in a context of 
historical continuity can help reconsider the assumption of historical discontinuity in 
studying Chinese nationalism.  
 
Some scholarly works are beginning to rediscover nationalism as a foundation for 
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political mobilization of Chinese students in the early 1980s. Jessica Weiss’s 
dissertation records for the first time in detail the 1985 anti-Japanese protests, which 
“were the first display of popular anti-Japanese sentiment that had been allowed in 
mainland China since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.”68 Weiss 
also realizes that the 1985 anti-Japanese protests were connected with the 1986 pro-
democracy protests, in that the 1985 anti-Japanese protests “made the 1986 protests 
more likely”, and “helped set the stage for the 1989 democracy movement.”69 In Strong 
Society, Smart State published in 2012, James Reilly also finds that the root of anti-
Japanese populism in China should date back to the years prior to 1989, and argues that 
waves of anti-foreign public mobilization in recent years are largely explained by 
factors beyond the control of the CCP.70 
 
This thesis adds two new dimensions to this emerging trend that reconsiders 
contemporary Chinese nationalism in a framework of historical continuity. First, it 
surveys different social strata in contemporary China, particularly those social groups 
that have played an important role in the rise of Chinese nationalism, but have not been 
systematically studied before. Second, it investigates the lingering influence of socialist 
political culture in the Maoist years (1949-1976) on the expression of anti-foreign 
nationalism in today’s China. The three-decade socialist rule with distinct Maoist 
characteristics is a most important source of historical continuity for China today. For 
example, Xi Chen, a scholar of Chinese contentious politics, finds that the rise and 
routinization of social protests since the early 1990s was facilitated by the 
organizational legacy of the party-state in the Maoist era. 71 Yet in the literature of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism, its influence and implications remain untouched, 
due to the conventional assumption that the rise of Chinese nationalism is principally a 
post-1989 phenomenon. 
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To clarify, the purpose of this thesis is not to document and narrate the existence of 
nationalism, in terms of both action and sentiment, before 1989. The purpose of the 
thesis is analytical and explanatory, not descriptive. It is to offer a systematic and 
historical explanation of the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism, and provide a 
scientific foundation for making policies concerning China. The empirical chapters will 
reveal historical continuity in contemporary Chinese nationalism by tracing political 
dynamics behind its rise. 
 
Challenging the assumption of historical discontinuity does not negate the role of 
critical junctures in history. A view of historical continuity does not deny the role of 
dramatic changes in the course of history. As Collier and Collier summarize, “[i]n some 
instances, one may be dealing with apparent continuities that conceal significant 
changes.… Alternatively, one may find apparent differences that conceal continuities.”72 
The principles in social science research are always dialectical. 
 
The end of the Mao era, the economic reform, and the outbreak and the suppression of 
the 1989 pro-democracy movement are all critical incidents that have left an impact on 
the evolution of political dynamics in China. Nevertheless, the effects of these 
watershed incidents should be weighed with scrutiny in understanding the rise of 
Chinese nationalism. While the 1989 pro-democracy movement triggered the CCP to 
strengthen patriotic campaigns, the causal link between such campaigns and Chinese 
nationalism in the 1990s remains unclear. No direct evidence proves the CCP’s patriotic 
campaign was the cause of the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. What we 
know is that the CCP did strengthen patriotic education and propaganda after 1989, and 
therefore such an action predated most nationalist mobilization in the 1990s and the 
2000s. Yet temporal sequence cannot guarantee causality.  
 
In fact, before the late 1980s, nationalism had already been embraced by some Chinese. 
The critical juncture of 1989, and the subsequent patriotic campaign, is only one factor, 
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among many others, that have changed political dynamics in China. The uninterrupted 
economic reform, the reconfiguration of social bases, technology innovation in mass 
communication, and the changes in international environment, all contribute to the 
subsequent mobilization of Chinese nationalism, besides the CCP’s patriotic campaign. 
Furthermore, the effects of these watershed incidents do not converge in one direction. 
The net effect depends on the process through which the CCP and society engage with 
each other. Therefore, a multitude of factors needs to be weighed concerning their 
respective roles in changing China’s political dynamics, and causing the rise of Chinese 
nationalism.  
 
Literature Debate 2: State-Centrism vs. Dialectics 
 
The second assumption to be challenged in this thesis is state-centrism. The field of 
study is evolving from state-centrism to a dialectical perspective, which considers both 
state and society. This thesis will push forward this ongoing change of the field beyond 
where it has stopped. That is, it is not sufficient to point out that both state and society 
have affected the rise of Chinese nationalism. It requires a systematic study of the 
dynamics between state and society in reproducing nationalism, and a reevaluation of 
the policy implications it bears. 
 
State-centrism is a conventional perspective in the literature. In this tradition, it only 
takes a cursory view of social actors, and ascribes the rise of nationalism largely to the 
state’s political campaigns after the 1989 crisis.73 This is the basic, instrumental type of 
state-centrism. A second type of state centrism emphasizes the constructive aspect of the 
top-down process of manufacturing Chinese nationalism. It is a process that national 
memory has been reconstructed.  
 
The reconstruction of national memory unfolds through the rewriting of history. China’s 
account of war history tends to stress some aspects and neglects others. As Parks Coble 
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writes, public memory of the 2nd Sino-Japanese war virtually disappeared in the Maoist 
years, and it only returned in the reform era. In the reform era, the government has not 
only stressed “a patriotic nationalist narrative of heroic resistance”, but emphasized 
Japanese atrocities, “virtually a ‘number game’ in historical writing”. 74 As a result, 
despite voluminous publications on the war emerging in recent years, the Chinese 
perspective of the war remains selective, failing to provide a comprehensive and 
unbiased narrative of history.75 
 
Because the content of official war history has been changing with political concerns of 
the state,76 the elite have played an important role in historical “mythmaking”.77 In this 
view, other social actors are taken for granted as the silent masses who are passive 
recipients of the instructions from the elite. 78 Thus, both the state and the elite are 
regarded as if they were a monolith, wielding the baton of anti-foreign nationalism as a 
bargaining leverage in international negotiations79 and directing mindless people as they 
wish. 
 
However, such an assumption of state-centrism is itself a myth. In the rise of Chinese 
nationalism, social actors are anything but mindless and monolithic. They are not 
mindless, because they make rational calculation and act out of emotion as well. They 
are not monolithic, because they are differentiated by the political, social, economic and 
cultural capitals they possess. Therefore, between the orthodox nationalism, which is 
propagated by the state, and its heterodoxies, which are advanced by various social 
actors, there exists wide disparity and even intense tension. 
 
In fact, disparity and tension between the orthodox ideology from above and its 
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heterodoxies from below is a universal principle of social sciences. It is observed in a 
wide range of social phenomena, including communism and religion,80 civil war and 
ethnic violence.  
 
In the study of agrarian societies, for example, such a contrast is studied as a society’s 
little tradition vis-a-vis the great tradition of the elite.81 The essential difference between 
the two is not in the form, which is often represented as “oral” vs. “written”, nor in the 
place of its dissemination, which is rural area vs. urban area. It is in the process of 
transforming the great tradition when it reaches out to different groups of people under 
different social structures. As James Scott says, the relationship between great tradition 
and little tradition is not, as some cultural anthropologists believe, isomorphic and 
harmonious,82 but is full of tension, criticism, resistance, subordination, hierarchy, and 
power relation reflecting the larger social structure. 
 
Nevertheless, the tension between the process imposed from above and the one 
emerging from below does not always lead to a zero-sum game. It can generate a 
symbiotic relationship between the two processes. In the study of civil war, Kalyvas 
also finds that “the habitually cited causes of groups division (e.g., ideology, social, or 
ethnic polarization) often fail to account for the actual dynamics of violence.”83 Instead, 
“selective violence is the result of transactions between political actors and individuals: 
it is jointly produced by them.” 84  (italics added). When one political actor (the 
incumbent or insurgent) is near hegemonic in civil war, selective violence is mostly 
likely to take place, because at such times this political actor’s demand for information 
can meet the supply from local individuals. The reason that local individuals are willing 
to providing information is that they “have strong incentives to exploit the informational 
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asymmetries of civil war in order to reap all kinds of benefits, including settling 
accounts with personal and local enemies”,85 not that they are motivated by the master 
cleavage at the national level. 
 
Such a “collaborative” process between the centre and the periphery can also be found 
in the study of Chinese politics, particularly in the field of the Cultural Revolution. 
While this disastrous political movement was initiated and manipulated by Mao Tse-
tung, the movement cannot be understood without seeing the motivations, interests and 
appeals from below. The mainstream view of the field holds that the sudden collapse of 
state governance in the movement was resulted from pre-existent conflicts of interests 
between social groups. 86  Particularly, it was the resentment towards the privileged 
communist bureaucrats that made people enthusiastically support Mao’s destructive 
policy. People followed Mao’s endless revolutionary instructions, not because they were 
crazy and mindless, but because they were rational actors who saw their own interest in 
pursuing Mao’s instructions. Political factions everywhere took advantage of the 
ambiguous instructions from the top to interpret them in their own interests.87 Local 
collaborators tried to “manipulate these campaigns to their own advantage. In many 
cases, they were motivated by long-standing hostility between individuals, families, or 
local factions.”88 It was the autonomy and rationality from bottom that ultimately led to 
aggregate irrationality in a top-down political campaign in the specific setting of 
China’s authoritarian institutions.89  
 
In the field of contemporary Chinese nationalism, a dialectical approach that challenges 
state-centrism has recently emerged. It recognizes the role of both state and society, 
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seeing social actors as active constructors of Chinese nationalism. Peter Gries and Xu 
Wu argue, through their respective research, that popular nationalists are empowered by 
the Internet, and are able to act independent of the state in an organized way.90 James 
Reilly finds that the rewriting of history on the 2nd Sino-Japanese War is not completely 
a state project. Its beginning and evolution are inseparable from a group of “history 
activists” emerging in the 1990s, who “share a single, guiding objective: to document 
Japan’s wartime atrocities to ensure they are not forgotten”. These activists, having 
“academic liberties, local support, and popular appeal”, also possess “a measure of 
political autonomy” that the Chinese government has been wary of.91  
 
Furthermore, the dialectical approach argues that, in the process of constructing Chinese 
nationalism, the relationship between the state and social actors has been uneasy.92 On 
the one hand, the tension in the relation has affected China’s foreign policy through the 
“rebirth of minjian waijiao” (public diplomacy), which is imposed by public opinion 
that the CCP would not have wished to see.93 The mass mobilization against Japan in 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s, which was comprised of “shifts in public opinion, 
political activism, and popular media content”, was mainly an initiative of social actors, 
and the CCP’s goal during this period was to maintain a balance between popular 
appeals and manageable bilateral relations with Japan. In this process, the state was a 
passive respondent at most times.94  
 
On the other hand, the CCP has not yet lost control of nationalist mobilization, due to 
the authoritarian institutions it can take advantages of. Whenever the CCP was 
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determined to repress nationalist mobilization, mobilization of popular nationalism was 
contained, though oftentimes for a short while only.95 Moreover, the kind of strategies 
the CCP took has affected the development of civil organizations in anti-Japanese 
nationalism movement, as Bin Xu and Xiaoyu Pu find through their extensive fieldwork 
in China.96 The state still plays an important role in shaping the opportunity structure 
and micro-environment of nationalist mobilization, though it is already unable to 
exclude social actors and their different claims from the domain. 
 
This is the development of the dialectical approach in the field of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism. Despite the progress, the new approach still suffers from a critical 
deficiency. Whereas it emphasizes the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism as 
“dual phenomena”, it does not explain how the discrepancy and tension between the 
state and social actors has led to regeneration and reproduction of Chinese nationalism, 
not reduction or demise of it, as seen in other areas where the Chinese state and society 
are fiercely contesting each other.  
 
It is realized, in the dialectical approach, that disparity and tension does exist between 
state and society in the understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese 
nationalism. But it does not provide an answer to the question it departs from. That is, 
since nationalism is a “dual phenomenon”, how is it constructed in the competition and 
tension between the state and social actors who have different understandings, 
interpretations, and claims of nationalism? What is the nature of the relations between 
the state and social actors in the rise of Chinese nationalism?  
 
In particular, if the state has to compete with social actors for the discourse of Chinese 
nationalism, as suggested by the dialectical approach, why does the CCP’s patriotic 
propaganda seem to be so successful facing the challenge of these heterodoxies? This 
puzzle can be framed in a reverse way. While the CCP never gives up its efforts to 
tighten ideological control over a growingly diverse society, why have most of the 
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propaganda campaigns it initiated been disregarded, derided and deconstructed in 
society?  
 
For example, the campaign for a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui), initiated by the 
former paramount leader of China Hu Jintao, has been ridiculed as the campaign for a 
“river crab society” (hexie shehui). In mandarin Chinese, “river crab” and “harmonious” 
are homonyms, whereas “river crab” is a metaphor of rampant power that tramples on 
civil rights and overturns the rule of law. The anti-porn campaign is another 
illuminating instance. Such a campaign is a traditional means of tightening control over 
ideas and thoughts, usually in the name of “cleaning spiritual pollution”, in China. It 
used to work well, in both the early 1950s and the 1980s, but has failed today. Instead of 
applauding the campaign, the Chinese are now fiercely debating whether the brutal 
treatment of sexual workers by the police violates human dignity. This indicates that the 
campaign has been ideologically bankrupt, unable to resonate with the people anymore. 
 
In contrast, the patriotic campaign seems to be exceptionally successful, in the sense 
that nationalism does become a useful means of mobilization for the state to unify the 
people. Its success relies on a simple fact that nationalism is able to ring true to the 
public. As Shogo Suzuki points out, for the Chinese elite, the use of rhetoric of anti-
Japanese nationalism to serve their political ends can work, only because the rhetoric is 
able to capture the audience.97 Zheng Wang also argues that the key to understanding 
Chinese nationalism is not whether it is a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon, but why 
the propaganda of national humiliation has a large and sympathetic audience.98  
 
Both Suzuki and Wang try to give an explanation, but neither of their explanations is 
substantiated by empirical studies. This is because, although they both realize that 
historical memory is deeply entrenched in society, and thus cannot be attributed to elite 
manipulation only, their work does not start from the empirical study of changing 
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society in China, but from the psyche of the nation, which is not substantiated or 
falsifiable by the changing socio-political dynamics occurring in China.  
 
In this approach, Suzuki finds that Japan is an important “Other” in China’s defining its 
self-identity,99 and Wang studies the power of historical memory in Chinese identity 
formation.100 Because their analyses remain at the level of the nation – an aggregate 
intellectual construct, their interpretations are tautological, unable to address why 
Chinese people believe in the propaganda of nationalism as they do. If the propaganda 
can evoke resonance in the Chinese people, because of Japan’s role in defining national 
identity of the Chinese, as Suzuki and Wang suggest, then what makes people think and 
believe as such in the first place? After all, why do Chinese people of different sub-
populations need to bother with the relations between Japan and their national identity? 
These puzzles are left unanswered by Suzuki and Wang.  
 
This thesis tries to improve the dialectical approach by focusing on how the interactions 
between the state, market and social actors reinforce each other in making Chinese 
nationalism, because of, not despite of, their different interpretations, claims, purposes 
and relational tensions. It advances the dialectical approach in two aspects. First, 
besides analyzing the differences in claims of nationalism between the state and social 
actors, this thesis also emphasizes the differences between various sub-populations. 
Second, by exploring the meanings and causes of such differences between the state and 
social actors, and between various social groups, this thesis proposes a counter-intuitive 
causal mechanism in the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. That is, for Chinese 
nationalism to become a powerful ideology that is capable of capturing a wide 
sympathetic audience, it has to be first construed and utilized by various social actors in 
ways that are adapted to their own interests and purposes.  
 
This proposed causal mechanism overturns the causal explanation implicit in the 
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conventional wisdom that the Chinese are becoming more nationalist because, for 
various reasons, they accept the CCP’s patriotic propaganda. What is suggested in this 
thesis is an opposite logic. That is, unless social actors have their own understandings, 
interpretations and claims of nationalism, the state’s propaganda campaign could not 
have been taken as a legitimate discourse by society. This can be seen in the failed cases 
of the campaign for a “harmonious society” and the anti-porn campaign, as discussed 
above.  
 
It is the different motivations, interpretations, and claims of different sub-populations 
that inject legitimacy into the CCP’s propaganda campaign for Chinese nationalism. 
This counter-intuitive causal mechanism also exists in other socio-political phenomena, 
and deserves more attention of social scientists in their future endeavors. Here just name 
a few more examples from the broader study of Chinese politics.  
 
In the study of Chinese politics in the Republican era (1912-1949), Zhongping Chen 
finds that the May Fourth Movement of 1919 - the banner of Chinese nationalism in the 
Republican era – incorporated different interests of regional warlords in its successful 
rise, rather than homogenized and eliminated such differences.101 More than that, it was 
exactly because the Movement “incorporated their varied personal, parochial, and 
factional interests into a broad nationalist platform”, that “the May Fourth Movement 
could obtain crucial support from the different factions of provincial warlords and 
achieve its final successes.” As Chen suggests, this was a mutually reinforcing process, 
because “the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement gave provincial warlords a new 
opportunity to increase their influence in politics, especially in diplomatic issues.”102 
 
The experience of the Kwangsi militarists in Chinese politics between 1925 and 1937 
shows much the same thing. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that “a high degree of 
political regionalism may threaten the cohesiveness of the nation,” Diana Lary finds 
that even “in a period of extreme devolution of Central authority, the 1920s and 1930s, 
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and in a province on the edge of China, Kwangsi,” regionalism and nationalism were, in 
fact, supplementing each other.103 Therefore, the belief that “the stronger regionalism is, 
the weaker nationalism is”104 is simply a myth.  
 
The mutually supplementary process was possible because nationalism was used by 
regional militarists to justify regionalism in the name of serving the nation, as those 
militarists saw that “the Kuomintang’s weakness as nationalists meant that other groups 
could lay claim to nationalism.”105 Therefore, the weakness of central authority and the 
ambition of local militarists to compete for the interpretations and claims of nationalism 
converged, leading to the political dynamics that was pushing up the momentum of 
Chinese nationalism in the age of the 1920s and the 1930s.  
 
This process, this author finds, is very similar to what is observed in today’s China in 
the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Although the CCP today is much stronger, 
in both economic strength and authoritarian control, than the KMT in the Republican 
era, the CCP is weak in the arena of ideology, facing all kinds of challenges from 
society. It shows again a combination of weak central authority and strong appeals from 
sub-populations under the banner of Chinese nationalism in today’s Chinese political 
dynamics. 
 
In the study of the Republican China, not only the differences in regional warlords, but 
also those in the native places of merchants and working class, were an influential force 
in supporting the rise of nationalism. Bryna Goodman’s study of regional networks and 
identities in Shanghai shows, that in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, “native-place 
organization underlay many of the social coalitions that staged the Shanghai student, 
commercial and worker strikes following the news of the May Fourth arrests of students 
in Beijing.” 106  These native places were not only an instrument of nationalist 
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mobilization, but also constituting the national identity. As Goodman argues, they 
“illuminate a paradox: universal identity (nationalism) depended on the further 
articulation of specific identity…In this fashion native-place strength contributed to 
national strength.”107  
 
A similar phenomenon is found in Elizabeth Perry’s study on labor politics in the 
Republican era in Shanghai on Strike. From archival work on labor movements in 
Republican Shanghai, Perry finds that “the Shanghai labor movement had a life of its 
own, closely linked to the countryside from which its workers sprang.” Her most 
interesting finding is that intraclass divisions were not an obstacle to the labor 
movement. “Despite (and, in large part, because of) important distinctions along lines of 
native-place origin, gender, and skill level, the Chinese working class has shown itself 
capable of influential political action.” (italics added) 
 
This political dynamics has important implications. As Perry explains, “[t]he Chinese 
labor movement certainly did undergo a major transformation when politically 
motivated intellectuals became involved in its direction….Nevertheless, Chinese 
workers were not a tabula rasa on which Party cadres could write whatever political 
messages suited their designs. Workers were heir to their own traditions of protest, 
rooted in native-place cultures and workplace experiences, which engendered a certain 
tension between them and student organizers and limited the direction in which labor 
could be led.” It is clear, in the view of Perry, that divisions in society, exemplified in 
the fragmentation of the Chinese labor in Shanghai, influenced state transformation in 
the Republican era.108 
 
To summarize, there is a rich tradition in studying Chinese politics that substantiates the 
dialectical relations between a top-down process and a bottom-up process, which is 
represented in both ideological propaganda and mass mobilization. This tradition is 
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intellectually subtle and sophisticated. It not only sees the differences between the two, 
but also realizes the differences in various sub-populations in society, and the mutually 
reinforcing interactions between process from above and process from below.  
 
Such a rich and intelligent tradition of dialectical approach in studying Chinese politics 
has been forgotten in the recent literature on Chinese nationalism. This thesis tries to 
restart the momentum, advancing our understanding of the relations between social 
diversity and state nationalism. As Helen Siu, a respected China scholar, impressively 
points out, for understanding state-society relations in Chinese politics, without “the 
initiative of the ambitious individuals who actively pursued the symbols of power 
recognized by the state tradition”, “the priorities of the various state systems could not 
have penetrated local society.”109 
 
Literature Debate 3: Determinism vs. Uncertainty 
 
The third assumption that this thesis challenges is policy implications of the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism. Regardless of their views on the origins and actors 
of this socio-political phenomenon, most scholars concur that Chinese nationalism is a 
subversive force for international security. As they have warned, Chinese nationalism is 
manipulated by the authoritarian state as a means of diverting discontent and venting 
anger towards western democracies (including Japan). Even for those who have seen 
the role of social actors and the challenges they pose to the authoritarian state, the 
prospect of Chinese nationalism is not optimistic. Chinese nationalists are regarded, 
above all, “populists” who “seek a powerful state capable of defending all of China’s 
territorial claims and securing international respect.”110 
 
Only a few scholars have challenged this pessimistic conclusion, but their counter-
arguments seem to be too optimistic, proposing that the nationalist movement in China 
is pro-democracy. Suisheng Zhao argues that nationalist activists are “liberal 
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nationalists” who “have called for popular participation in foreign policy making.”111 
Jessica Weiss also finds that the 1985 anti-Japanese protests were related to the 1986 
pro-democracy protests.112 But these counter-arguments are empirically weak. Zhao’s 
claim lacks solid evidence, and only uses remarks from two professors to corroborate 
his optimistic prediction. While Weiss’s study contains much richer information, the 
policy implications of the 1985 protests for today are doubtful, as political context and 
social conditions have dramatically changed ever since.  
 
What can we learn from such paradoxical predictions of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism from both pessimistic and optimistic scholars? In the view of this author, 
the pessimistic argument is too mechanical, and the optimistic one is too idealistic. Let 
us first reconsider what the pessimistic argument fails to inform. As the American 
historian Peter F. Sugar reminds us, “there is no corner on the globe where the leaders 
of the most significant or the most insignificant state do not constantly use all the means 
of communication (in the widest sense) at their disposal to foster nationalism, the state-
supporting loyalty”.113 Therefore, the pessimistic argument does not provide us with a 
useful tool to understand what is happening of specific interest in China. That is, what 
distinguishes contemporary Chinese nationalism from state-sponsored ideology and 
state-solicited loyalty in other countries at other times? Because it is almost a universal 
state project to foster nationalism in the modern international system, it provides little 
insight to say that the CCP is interested in inculcating and mobilizing nationalism for 
the sake of its interest.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, socio-political phenomena, once created, acquire a life 
of its own, and will evolve beyond the anticipation of the elite who are motivated to 
create them. Theoretically, it is unwarranted to assure that the CCP is able to keep 
Chinese nationalism under its control, or manipulate it to its advantage. It may turn out 
that the rise of Chinese nationalism does help consolidate state legitimacy in certain 
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crises, but it does not necessarily prove, as analyzed above, that it is either because of 
the CCP’s propaganda or the CCP’s will. It is through a complicated and interactive 
socio-political process, which is largely out of the control of the state, that it arrives at 
certain outcome at certain time.  
 
This means that there is no guarantee that it can arrive at the same outcome every time. 
In fact, for the CCP, in the second decade of the 21st century, the primary trouble is that 
the Chinese are too passionate about interpreting and claiming nationalism in their 
respective ways, not that they are unresponsive to the call of nationalism. Therefore, it 
is groundless to infer that China will become more authoritarian at home or more 
assertive abroad, simply because Chinese nationalism is on the rise. There is also no 
systematic evidence from which to infer whether Chinese nationalism is “good” or “bad” 
for international security. And this author doubts whether such evidence would ever 
exist.  
 
Whereas the pessimistic argument is weak, it does not lead to the opposite conclusion 
that the optimistic argument should be stronger. Portraying Chinese nationalism as a 
form of civil participation and a force of pro-democracy movement, the optimistic view 
jumps quickly to an unsubstantiated conclusion. That is, Chinese nationalism is a threat 
to the authoritarian regime, and nationalist challenges from society are a pro-democracy 
force in contemporary China. The rationale behind the inference is groundless. It also 
does not specify the conditions under which the threat would come true. This means it is 
not falsifiable.  
 
A most frequently cited reference point for such uneasy relations between Chinese 
nationalism and the authoritarian regime is the Republican era. The KMT’s inability to 
resist Japan’s invasion was fiercely attacked by left-wing intellectuals, which provoked 
demonstrations and protests against the KMT government. Written in 1932 by Chen 
Duxiu, the founding father of the CCP, the famous article, “From Anti-Japan to Anti-
KMT (cong fanri dao fan guomindang)”, defended students’ violence against the KMT 
government in the name of nationalism, and encouraged that students escalate the anti-
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Japan movement to a higher stage of against the KMT government.114  
 
Therefore, in the 1930s, anti-Japanese nationalism and anti-KMT movement did 
converge. The most commemorated event of this convergence was the December 9th 
Movement of 1935, when university students were demonstrating against Chiang Kai-
shek’s anti-communist policy and urging the government to form a united front against 
Japan’s invasion. But such a convergence occurred in a very specific historical context – 
after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and its ongoing encroachment of 
China’s territory. Meanwhile, the CCP, an organized political and military force, was 
rising to power. By using nationalism as a powerful propaganda tool, it not only 
mobilized the peasant class to join in the CCP-led revolution, but also attracted the heart 
of leftist students and intellectuals. After the breakout of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 
1937, the CCP’s propaganda machine was “remarkably free of a ‘Communist’ quality”, 
but stressed “national salvation” instead.115  
 
Although anti-foreign nationalism played a role in leading to the demise of the KMT, it 
happened in a specific context of protracted war and foreign invasion, and under a less 
authoritarian regime than what China is today. Unlike the KMT in the Republican time, 
today, the CCP has eliminated all kinds of organized political and military force. There 
is no alternative force that can compete with the CCP for claiming legitimacy on the 
basis of nationalism. And today we are living in a time of long peace. National revival 
has replaced national salvation to become the most powerful appeal in Chinese 
nationalism. That said, the relations between nationalism and regime change are not 
determined, depending on the broader socio-political context and the international 
environment. It is equally likely that anti-foreign nationalism arising from society, 
despite being different from state nationalism in interpretations and claims of 
nationalism, can help consolidate the foundation of the CCP’s rule under certain 
circumstances.  
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Even though we assume that Chinese people’s discontent with the CCP will ultimately 
lead to the demise of the party-state, such a regime change does not necessarily 
guarantee that China will become a liberal democracy. As William Callahan’s revealing 
study of competing discourses on the China Dream shows, “China’s new civil society is 
not necessarily liberal; rather, it contains a broad spectrum of activity that ranges from 
promoting the fundamentalism of the China model to more cosmopolitan views of 
China and the world.”116 Democracy may flourish after the collapse of the CCP, but 
constitutional liberalism may not. While democracy and constitutional liberalism have 
been interwoven in the West for almost a century, they “are coming apart in the rest of 
the world”, and they have “never been immutably or unambiguously linked”.117  
 
Not only could a China after democratization be illiberal, a democratizing China could 
go illiberal as well. As Mansfield and Snyder report, states undergoing democratic 
transitions are more likely to participate in external wars than those regimes remaining 
unchanged or changing in an autocratic direction. This is because elites in newly 
democratizing states tend to use nationalist appeals to attract mass support, and the 
weak institutions of transitional states are not able to check these war-prone 
demagogues.118 Using a more refined research design, they further find out that the 
transition from an autocratic regime to one that is partly democratic is particularly 
dangerous.119 
 
Given these theoretical and empirical backgrounds, this thesis refutes the view that 
policy implications of rising Chinese nationalism are determined, in whichever 
direction. Rather it takes a cautious and agnostic view that does not predict any policy 
implication of contemporary Chinese nationalism. In such a view, the predictions 
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rendered by both pessimistic argument and optimistic argument share the same 
weakness that this thesis challenges. That is, they exaggerate the level of determinism in 
the evolution of Chinese nationalism, which actually depends upon structural changes in 
international society, in Chinese socio-political conditions, and upon fortuitous factors 
in the historical process.  
 
This does not mean predictions are impossible. But they should be built on a more solid 
empirical ground and a more dynamic approach in studying China’s ongoing socio-
political dynamics. This is one more instance showing that the study of Chinese 
nationalism could and should borrow insights from other sub-fields in political sciences. 
In the literature on democratization, for example, there has been a call for “revised 
thoughts” on the requisites for democratization. As Karl and Schmitter argue, there 
could be no single set of preconditions for the emergence of a democratic polity, and 
consequently, the focus of research should shift from looking for structural conditions to 
strategic choices, shifting alliances, emergent processes, and sequential patterns 
involved in democratic transition. 120  
 
Therefore, in understanding outcomes of democratic transition, both structural 
conditions and uncertainty should be weighed. “On one hand, intention and uncertainty 
are important even when structural conditions are controlled. On the other hand, even in 
midst of the tremendous uncertainty, the decisions made by various actors respond to, 
and are conditioned by, socio-economic structures and political institutions already 
present, or existing in people’s memoires”. 121  In a recent article in Journal of 
Democracy, Donald Horowitz also reconsiders the transition paradigm of 
democratization, and says much of the same thing – “the tyranny of starting conditions 
and the fortuity of early choices”, according to him, are the only two variables worth 
emphasizing in various paths to democracy.122  
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This thesis agrees much with the same principle. In understanding policy implications 
and making policy recommendations for rising Chinese nationalism, both structural 
conditions and uncertainty should be weighed. To do so, we need to rebuild the study of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism on a richer empirical study of Chinese sub-
populations, and their understandings, interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism. 
We need to investigate whether these interpretations, understandings, and claims differ 
from state propaganda and from each other. We need to ask where such differences 
come from, and how they interact with each other and state propaganda in constructing 
Chinese nationalism. We need to pay attention to the causal mechanisms that construct 
Chinese nationalism in such a way that it becomes receptive to the audience, for which 
state propaganda has failed in many other arenas. We need to see through the hidden 
power relations in the process, and to understand Chinese nationalism through the 
ongoing socio-political changes behind it. A more comprehensive discussion of these 
caveats for Chinese nationalism will be developed in Chapter 7, the conclusion part of 
this thesis.  
 
The Background Context: Changing Relationship between State and Society in 
Contemporary China 
 
Before moving onto the empirical chapters of the thesis, it is necessary to introduce the 
changing relationship between state and society in contemporary China, that is, the 
sociopolitical context in which the following empirical chapters are developed. The 
study of contemporary Chinese nationalism should not be isolated from this context, 
because it is the processes of social differentiation and contention during the reform 
period that make possible increasingly active expression of different understandings, 
interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism. Interacting with the authoritarian 
state and an opportunistic market, the processes not only determine the substances in the 
claims of Chinese nationalism, but also explain why nationalism has become a most 
attractive ideology for the Chinese to fill in the vacuum left by the bankrupt ideology of 
communism.  
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On the other hand, such expressions and their influences are both facilitated and 
restrained by the (party) state, the term of which will also be clarified in this part. While 
the thesis will provide more detail in the conclusion explaining the mechanism how top-
down and bottom-up mobilizations of nationalism reach mutual accommodation in 
contemporary China, this introduction part offers some background information on 
China’s (party) state and its relations with society.  
 
This part has two sections. For the purpose of understanding the rise of diverse social 
actors, and their understandings, interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism, the 
first section disaggregates Chinese society so that the relevant processes of social 
differentiation and contention during the reform period are analytically presented. For 
the purpose of understanding the mechanisms through which these social actors are both 
facilitated and restrained by the state in making their claims of Chinese nationalism, the 
second section disaggregates the (party-) state so that the relationships between its 
component parts and with society, and the relations between the central and local 
authorities in contemporary China are clarified. 
 
Disaggregating Chinese Society 
 
The state-society relationship has experienced dramatic changes in China since the start 
of the reform in the late 1970s. Before the reform, the Chinese party-state directly 
controlled the means of production, monopolized distribution of all economic resources, 
and strictly limited the existence of private property. It was able to create a totalistic 
institutional structure that was built on “a web of bureaucratic organization by the late 
1950s which covered all Chinese society and penetrated deep into its fabric”. 123 
Although the scope, intensity and effect of the penetration of the party-state and the 
cohesion of the top leadership have invited reconsideration and debate, particularly with 
respect to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and its aftermath, it does not overturn 
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the important insights of the general portrayal of Chinese party-state.124  
 
In the Maoist period, all important aspects of economic, political and social life of 
Chinese people were strictly regulated by, and organized around, the system of work 
units (danwei) in cities and communes in rural areas. For individuals, not only 
subsistence and social welfare were monopolized by the state, their political and social 
life was also bound to work units and communes. In cities, work units provided 
employees with life-long employment and welfare, including housing, child care and 
other kinds of service. However, not all urbanites were treated according to the same 
standard. Families of class enemies were deprived of opportunities of social 
advancement. Welfare available to individual workers was associated with loyalty to the 
party-state. In the countryside, the benefits of the peasantry were largely sacrificed for 
the sake of the urban industrial revolution and China’s international competition with 
the U.S. and USSR. Under strict internal immigration policy and the household 
registration (hukou) system, it was very difficult for both urbanites and villagers to 
change employment and place of residence.  
 
Since the reform, the state has continued withdrawing from the economic and social 
spheres. Although some path-breaking initiatives of the reform were created by 
individuals at the bottom, it is the reformist leadership (Deng Xiaoping and his 
comrades) and state policies that quickly seized such initiatives, and promulgated them 
as a reform model across the country. This was how China’s rural reform started. In 
1978, a small group of starving farmers in Xiaogang village (Anhui province) secretly 
signed an agreement to divide the land between them, which turned out to be effective 
for increasing the production of food. This innovation, which was illicit at the time at a 
huge political risk, was soon found out and upheld by the new leadership, who were 
enthusiastically seeking for ways to reform China’s bankrupt economy after the 
disastrous Cultural Revolution.  
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The reform opened a long period of rapid economic and social transformation in 
contemporary China. In the rural sector, the communes were dismantled and the 
individual household-based farming system (i.e. the household-responsibility system) 
was set up in 1979. As a result of a series of policies, including the increase of state 
procurement prices for major corps and increasing availability of chemical fertilizers, 
China’s agricultural growth during 1978-1984 was accelerated to levels several times 
higher than the preceding period.125 Meanwhile, government domination of enterprise 
and commerce also began to ease, in both rural areas and cities. According to Minxin 
Pei, the percentage of China’s total industrial output contributed by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) dropped from 78% to 28% between 1978 and 1999. Employment 
also became more diversified. While employment in SOEs accounted for 60% of non-
agricultural jobs in 1978, its share fell to only about 30% in 1999.126 The private sector 
has gained increasing prominence and become the main source of economic growth: “as 
of 2007 it contributed 66 per cent of GDP and 71 per cent of tax revenues.”127 Although 
state policy started to shift in favor of cities in the 1990s, redirecting national resources 
from the countryside to big cities like Shanghai - which is regarded as 
counterproductive in terms of entrepreneurial spirit and poverty reduction in the 
countryside128 - China’s economic achievement in both cities and the countryside during 
the past three decades has been unprecedented and stunning.  
 
As important as growing economic development and differentiation is the increasing 
space for social autonomy and political activism unleashed from the totalistic control of 
the party-state. First of all, mass social mobility and nationwide physical mobility 
became possible in the 1980s. The restrictive policies banning certain classes from 
upward social mobility in the Maoist period were lifted. Although the household 
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registration system was not abolished, internal immigration became much easier so that 
people (both urbanites and villagers) could use their skills to find better-paying and 
more promising jobs across the country. “[T]he existence of alternative lucrative income 
opportunities …has restructured the aspirations of the entire rural labour force. 
Approximately 60 million rural residents migrate annually in search of higher paying 
jobs. Some migrate to cities, others to richer, more industrialized rural areas…”129 In 
cities, the blossoming economy has created a large base of middle class. “From 1995 to 
2005, the population of China’s middle class, defined here as households with annual 
incomes ranging from $6,000 to $25,000 - grew from close to zero in 1995 to an 
estimated 87 million in 2005.”130 
 
Consequently a relatively independent civil society began to emerge, and the 
relationship between state and society has been restructured. Reflected in the scholarly 
literature, these changes have led to the blossom of the society-centered paradigm and 
the state-society model, that challenge the dominance of the state-centered paradigm in 
the China field, shifting “the focus to relatively autonomous markets, culture, ideas, 
class, social groups, or even individuals”.131 As an indicator, the number of associations 
grew dramatically after the beginning of the reform. While only few state-sponsored 
associations were active during the Cultural Revolution, the number grew quickly after 
1978. In Jiangsu province (one of China’s wealthiest provinces), for example, only 65 
registered provincial associations were found before 1978, while the number soared to 
254 between 1978 and 1985, and 268 between 1986 and 1992.132 
 
China’s civil society is not completely independent of the state. Many civil society 
organizations in China do not meet the Western criteria of non-governmental groups. 
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However, the emergence of civil society “exerts a critical impact on political 
outcomes … often through a close ‘embedded’ relationship with the state”.133 It has 
“created new opportunities for public participation in the state’s policy making 
process…. with greater access to information and more sophisticated communication 
capabilities, there has been a continuous expansion of rights consciousness among 
Chinese people.”134 The unique status of China’s civil society is partly a reflection of the 
party-state’s willingness and efforts to readjust the state-society relationship, so that it 
could delegate some state power and transfer some management functions to the 
designated social organizations in order to achieve better social governance.135 However, 
this dynamics between state and society in expanding civil sphere should not be 
misinterpreted - in either direction.  
 
On the one hand, the CCP’s permission or initiative to encourage the establishment of 
civil society organizations does not mean that the party-state has been moving towards 
political liberalization. Rather it “is fully aware of the political risk that accompanies the 
rise of Chinese [civil society organizations], and has spared no effort to dictate the 
outcomes of China’s political development.” By co-opting new stakeholders such as the 
middle class and engaging civil society organizations in addressing common social 
issues, the CCP has been “utilizing China’s social organizations to maintain political 
legitimacy and social stability.” 136  The effectiveness of the CCP’s co-optation is 
strengthened by the composition of China’s middle class, which is a path-dependent 
outcome of the reform. The formation of China’s middle class follows two distinct paths, 
that is, either “through the state institutions, where the middle class is employed in 
government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises, collective owned enterprises, 
and public organizations”, or “through the market institutions, where the middle class is 
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employed in the private sector (e.g., private enterprises, foreign-related enterprises, and 
private organizations) or self-employed (e.g., self-employed laborers)”.137 According to 
a survey conducted in five cities in 2008, “about a half of the Chinese middle class is 
employed in the public sector”. The finding is consistent with some earlier studies, and 
it confirms that “the Chinese state played an important role in creating and shaping the 
middle class”.138 
 
On the other hand, a one-sided picture of the party-state’s attempt to co-opt emerging 
civil society risks obscuring “the capacity of the ‘co-opted groups’ to influence the 
policy-making process or to pursue the interests of their members.” There are two main 
reasons for this caveat. First, the state’s “capacity to realize this control is increasingly 
limited”, because it lacks financial means and human resources to implement controls, 
and because local governments may pursue goals that are in conflict with national 
policy. Second, social organizations can devise “strategies to negotiate with the state a 
relationship that maximizes their members’ interests or that circumvents or deflects state 
intrusion.”139 As a result, social organizations can always make successful policy input, 
obtain their members’ interests or achieve organizational goals through “negotiation, 
evasion or feigned compliance”.140 
 
While the continuing expansion of rights consciousness among Chinese people cannot 
be properly heeded and institutionalized, it leads to social contention to express 
grievances and make collective bargaining. From the 1990s to the 2000s, popular 
resistance grew dramatically in China. According to Jianrong Yu, a researcher at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), while the number of incidents of protest  
was only 8,709 in 1993, it soared to 90,000 in 2006, of which more than 75% were 
lodged by workers and villagers. 141  The predominant model of studying social 
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movements in Western societies is the political process model, which is composed of 
three conceptual tools – political opportunities (and constraints), mobilizing structures, 
and framing alignment (and processes).142 Though useful as a heuristic tool kit, the 
model is too static and structuralist to study contentious politics in the context of 
contemporary China. As China specialist Elizabeth Perry points outs, it is close 
attention to sentiments and acute sensitivity to power relations, rather than highly 
professionalized works, that should guide the study of social movements.143 Even Doug 
McAdam, the father of the political process model, now encourages using more 
dynamic frameworks to incorporate “the unfolding patterns of interaction between the 
various parties to contention” in the overarching structural model.144 
 
Therefore, in studying contentious politics in contemporary China, indigenous concepts, 
frameworks and empirical works are often more useful than general social movement 
theories for understanding social differentiation and contention. During the last decade 
China scholars have contributed to a spate of empirical work on labor politics, villagers’ 
protests, student movements, urbanites’ property rights movements, and environmental 
protests, along with other forms of popular resistance. 145  Among these works, the 
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concept of “rightful resistance” generates a particularly useful framework for 
understanding the dynamics between protestors and segments of state apparatus in 
China. Defined as “a form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of 
authorized channels”, rightful resistance “employs the rhetoric and commitments of the 
powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions 
within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public.”146 Similar to 
the idea of “consentful contention” theorized in the context of former German 
Democratic Republic147, the value of rightful resistance is in that Chinese protestors, 
situated in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis state power and corrupt state agencies, 
can take the state as its word to “beat the authorities at their own game”.148 
 
The concept of rightful resistance illuminates the study of contentious politics in 
contemporary China in two ways. First it treats the state in particular as stratified and 
fragmented, the structural characteristic of which provides opportunity space for social 
and political contention under an authoritarian regime. Second it points to a symbiotic 
relationship between state and society even at times of contention, because the 
opportunity space for contentious politics also constitutes the base for the reproduction 
of state power. For example, in rural resistance, China scholars already find that “those 
officials and administrative appellants …cooperatively lubricate the governing machine 
in the new era.”149 When both villagers and local cadres attempt to exploit the blurring 
boundary of public and private spheres, the cadres can always take advantage of 
personal ties and common sense to implement state power, which otherwise would be 
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impossible or very costly to implement.150 Although most of these insights derive from 
social contention triggered by economic grievances (e.g. layoff of labor, pension arrears, 
insufficient compensation for seizures of land, property demolitions, or corruption in 
village elections), they also shed light on state-society dynamics in understanding the 
rise and development of nationalism in contemporary China. Accordingly, the study of 
Chinese nationalism should not be separated from this background context, because it 
coexists with other forms of popular politics under the rule of the party-state.  
 
Disaggregating the Party-State 
 
In order to understand the mechanisms of state-society dynamics, through which social 
actors are both facilitated and restrained in making their claims of Chinese nationalism, 
it is necessary to have an understanding of the relationships between the Chinese party-
state’s component parts and with society, and the relations between the central and local 
authorities in China. This section addresses these issues.  
 
Before the reform, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was dominated by government 
officials, workers and peasants. With the processes of economic and social 
differentiation after the reform, the CCP has tried to absorb new social strata that 
represent the advanced force of production and new culture in order to expand its social 
base. In 2001, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared on the 80th birthday of 
the Party that “private entrepreneurs, private business owners, self-employed artists, 
white-collar professionals employed by foreign companies and joint ventures are 
welcome to join the Party”.151 This declaration, along with the decision on enhancing 
the Party’s governing capacity in 2004, is most indicative of the CCP’s proactive 
pragmatism in adapting to new circumstances.152 
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The Chinese party-state is an autonomous entity. It should not be reduced to just a 
superstructure reflecting the interests of an economic or social base. Although the Party 
(i.e. CCP) and state are nominally separate, it is the CCP that ultimately controls the 
state. This kind of regime is typically referred to as a party-state.153 Like all single-party 
states, the CCP has the right to form the government as a single political party, 
outlawing all opposition parties. The relationship between the CCP and the government 
is thus at the core of China’s political system. Generally speaking, the CCP “leads the 
work of the government (usually called by Chinese the ‘state’, guojia), but remains 
distinct from the government.”154 In this thesis, I use the CCP (Party), state and party-
state as synonymous terms when it refers to national authority at the center. When it 
refers to authority at the local level, the terminology of local government is used.  
 
The nominal highest legislative branch of the Chinese government is the National 
People’s Congress (NPC). However, because the CCP derives its ruling authority from 
the success of the 1949 Revolution rather than legislative processes, it is the CCP that 
sets up the guidelines and policies for the NPC to carry out, exercises authority over the 
routine work of the NPC Standing Committee and those at lower levels, appoints cadres 
to important positions in the congresses and exercises authority over the election work. 
The State Council is the executive branch of the Chinese government, and the Chinese 
judiciary branch functions more as a department of the executive. The CCP leaders 
simultaneously occupy all important positions in the executive and judiciary 
institutions. 155  At the apex, the CCP “is headed by the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo, the Politburo, and the Central Committee …. At provincial, municipal, and 
county levels there are similar leadership bodies (CCP committees) and staff offices. 
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Every agency of the national, provincial, and county governments has within it a Party 
committee.”156 
 
While the CCP can appoint and occupy all important positions at various levels of the 
government, its monopoly over the processes of decision making and policy 
implementation is not guaranteed. Although there seems to be “a unified chain of 
command at the apex of the Chinese political system”, as Susan Shirk argues, the 
authority structure between the CCP and the government is more like “a manifestation 
of the delegation relationship” between the two, “not evidence of the lack of boundaries 
between Party and government.”157 That is, the CCP acts as the “principal” and the 
government as the “agent”. This brings up all possible principal-agent problems in this 
authority relationship. The CCP’s authority over the government is based primarily on 
its authority to appoint and promote government officials, to set the general policy line 
and oversee the work of the government, and to remold the ideology of the entire 
society through its control of the media.158 However the CCP has never been able to 
dictate and unify agents’ fragmented motivations and interests that may be different 
from, and even opposed, to the party-state as such (per se).  
 
It used to be believed that policy directives by the CCP at the center were to be 
implemented unconditionally at various levels, but empirical research since the 1980s 
has found this is not to be true. Rather “authority below the very peak of the Chinese 
political system is fragmented and disjointed … The fragmentation, moreover, grew 
increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the late 1970s.”159 Therefore, 
contrary to the predictions of the “rationality model”, policy outcomes are not 
“coordinated responses to perceived policy problems, in light of the ideological 
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proclivities of the prevailing policy makers”.160 As Lieberthal and Oksenberg argue, the 
rationality model ignores the constraints on the Chinese leadership, not taking into 
consideration the limited information, the ambiguities and ambivalences of the leaders’ 
value preferences, and the time pressure they confront in evaluating alternatives. It also 
neglects “the pursuit of and struggle over power as a core interest in politics”, 
uncritically accepting the notion “that policy is shaped primarily at the top”.161 
 
For the CCP, there simply never existed “a cohesive leadership group in smooth control 
of its society”, even under the charismatic leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Rather political 
conflict and tension have been endemic in Communist China.162 The end of the Mao era 
and the start of the reform complicated the problem of fragmentation and disjointedness. 
Compared with the Soviet Union, which was more centralized because the Stalinist 
purges had decimated political elites at the regional level, the CCP’s strength at the 
provincial level since its establishment provided an opportunity for the reform-oriented 
leadership to take the path of administrative decentralization.163  
 
Before the reform, the CCP relied on Party “leading groups” or “fractions” (dang zu) 
that were established in all government agencies for acquiring information about 
government actions and administering the work of the agency. Under this arrangement, 
the CCP “actually substituted itself for the government”, and the “organizational lines 
between the Party and government blurred”.164 The blurred relationship between the 
CCP and the government began to change in the 1980s, because “decentralization of 
decision-making authority was a key reform initiative”, through which “Beijing seeks to 
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work with lower levels rather than to dictate to them”.165 Hence “[t]he Party delegated 
more responsibility to the government bureaucracy, especially in economic policy-
making… At the provincial level, specialized Party departments overlapping their 
counterpart government departments were abolished.” 166  By reducing the use of 
coercion, laying stress on feasibility studies, encouraging government organs to become 
self-supportive, loosening the use of ideology as an instrument of control, and 
decentralizing personnel management, these reformative developments “have produced 
increased bargaining in the Chinese bureaucratic system.”167 
 
Bargaining processes further transformed government departments and lower levels of 
government from agents of delegation to stakeholders, as they endowed various organs 
with “mutual veto power” in the search for consensus to develop projects. “This 
consensus, in turn, required extensive and often elaborate deals to be struck through 
various types of bargaining stratagems.”168 This fragmentation and decentralization has 
also led to local protectionism, compartmentalized institutionalization of power, and 
rampant corruption, which could harm both prosperity and governance of the party-state. 
At departmental levels, various administrative departments are both law implementers 
and lawmakers. As it is “within the scope of authority of the administrative organs to 
interpret and implement” the general legal provisions promulgated by the NPC and the 
State Council, the administrative departments are incentivized to use their de facto 
legislative power to legalize their own interests. Sometimes their “discretionary power 
is so abused as to become a violation of law.”169 At local levels, local governments were 
given much greater power over the local economy and resources as well as much 
greater responsibilities for delivering public service. Due to considerable regional 
variations in economic revenues, many local governments without a sufficient tax base 
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to fund their operations turned to cut public services or impose arbitrary taxes and fees 
on farmers, which has been a major source of conflict and contention for the party-
state.170 
 
Despite the fragmentation and decentralization of the ruling authority, it is not accurate 
to conclude that in general the party-state has been weakened in the reform era. Here are 
three of the most important reasons. First, it is a general strategy of the Chinese 
leadership to drive reform initiatives by “playing to the provinces”, incentivizing the 
local officials, and circumventing the central bureaucracy controlled by rival leaders. 
This is the rationale behind the radical fiscal decentralization introduced by Deng 
Xiaoping and many of the other reform policies in the 1980s. In one word, 
“administrative decentralization became a key element in the political strategy of 
economic reform.”171  
 
For the Chinese Communist regime that had just ended the Cultural Revolution, it was 
more urgent to fulfill such governmental functions as developing the economy and 
providing public goods and services, than curbing corruption and centralizing authority 
in the economic sphere. It is also evident, in hindsight, that ensuring economic growth 
and stability has been one of the pillars that underpin the current regime. In the local 
political systems characterized by fragmentation of authority and the absence of rule of 
law, patronage networks have performed functions that are not accomplished by 
professional modern bureaucracies at certain times of transition. Although local officials 
have competing interests that are different from, and even opposed, to the party-state 
per se, in the process of competing for access to state power and meeting the CCP’s 
basic policy dictates, their patronage networks also serve to coordinate across agencies, 
mobilize funding, implement projects, and provide a supplementary set of rules for 
facilitating local governance.172 
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Second, although decision making processes and actual policy implementation are 
affected “in significant fashion” by the decentralization and fragmentation of the 
bureaucracies, the system still retained “important elements of coherence”. The 
processes of research, debates and bargaining have contributed to the formation of 
“policy communities” built upon particular projects and issues that cut across formal 
bureaucratic lines. In general, the central authority is not “helpless”, the departments of 
the bureaucracies are not “unable to cooperate”, and the locales are not “all-
powerful”.173 It is simply the case that the ruling authority in Communist China, as in 
liberal democracies, is constrained by bureaucratic politics and informal networks 
characterized by the structures and processes of the political system. 
 
Last but not least, the level and intensity of decentralization is uneven in political and 
economic spheres. In broad terms, China’s national political organizations can be 
grouped into six functional clusters: economic bureaucracies, propaganda and education 
bureaucracies, organization and personnel bureaucracies, civilian coercive 
bureaucracies, military system, and communist party territorial committees. 174  The 
strategic initiative of decentralization mostly took place in certain clusters, which can 
increase efficiency and revenues relying upon the market. This is why some scholars 
characterize the Chinese regime as “political centralism and economic federalism”175 or 
“federalism in a unitary state”.176 
 
In other clusters, such as China’s military system, the relationship between the CCP and 
the cluster is more centralized. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is directly 
subordinate to the CCP, and its leading body is co-equal in rank with the executive 
branch of the government. The PLA not only functions as the security provider against 
external threats, but also has been involved in domestic political rivalry in the history of 
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communist China.177 The relationship between the PLA and the CCP is vital to the 
survival of the Chinese party-state. As in other Communist militaries, “there is an 
essential symbiosis between the army and the ruling communist party.” Although 
sometimes the CCP asserts greater control over the PLA and at other times the PLA 
becomes more politically assertive, “because of the essential symbiosis, militaries 
generally do not engineer coups d’état against their ruling parties (although they may 
become involved in intra-party factional maneuvering).”178 
 
Unlike the economic initiatives in the early reform period, the key organizational reform 
of the PLA was steps towards recentralization in the 1980s. “[T]he eleven military 
regions were amalgamated into seven in order to improve the centralization of 
command and control from the General Staff Department in Beijing…the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) ordered all main and regional force units placed under 
GSD control (the latter had previously been controlled by military regional 
commanders). As a result, the movement of any forces of brigade size or larger must be 
authorized specifically by the GSD, and in no case can troops be moved across military 
region boundaries without CMC approval.” 179  Moreover, the PLA’s decade-long 
commercial activity since the 1980s was formally stopped by the CMC in 1998.180 The 
issue of the accountability of the PLA to the state, instead of the CCP, was first brought 
into debate in the 1980s, and resurfaced in 1997 when the National Defense Law was 
passed in the National People’s Congress. 181  However, these initiatives have never 
challenged the CCP’s essential control over the PLA, despite the continuing 
professionalization of the officer corps and efforts to legislate government authority 
over the PLA.182  
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In recent years, some new elements have triggered a wave of reflection on the evolving 
PLA-CCP relationship. Frequent reports have surfaced of the PLA’s purported actions 
without civilian authorization, the Party leaders currying favoring with the military, and 
the increasing exposure of PLA officers in the open media. These changes have split 
observers of Chinese politics. While some attribute these trends to the increasing 
influence of the PLA on a wide range of policy issues, Saunders and Scobell believe 
that PLA influence on Chinese policymaking has been overestimated. However, this 
debate does not deviate from the basic consensus that the PLA remains a “party-army” 
that is responsive to orders from the CCP rather than from the government (e.g., the 
State Council and the National People’s Congress).183 
 
Despite remaining a party-army, the structural changes in PLA-CCP relations – such as 
the changing character of the CCP leadership, the bifurcation of civilian and military 
elites, the professionalization of the officer corps and the formation of a military 
corporate identity, the emergence of new avenues and an active opinion market - have 
affected the PLA’s role in policymaking and the maneuvering room of the PLA. This is 
why even Saunders and Scobell admit that today’s PLA has more influence on military 
issues and has become more actively engaged in policy debates on mixed civil-military 
issues, while its  influence on political issues has declined.184 The problem for Saunders 
and Scobell is that the nature of the issues is not easy to adjudicate in real world politics 
as in academic discussion. In particular, the category in-between (i.e. mixed civil-
military issues) is broad, deserving most attention at a time of pluralism in Chinese 
policymaking, when informal and indirect channels endow the PLA and its officer corps 
more leverage and autonomy in exerting influence at the operational level and through 
unconventional means. Chinese military specialist You Ji also concludes that there is a 
fine division of labour in foreign affairs between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) 
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and the PLA, with the former in charge of generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy 
and the latter responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs. But the problem, 
as he admits, is that this division of labour over diplomatic issues is thin, and hard to 
demarcate for outsiders.185 Therefore, even though the PLA does not deviate from the 
Party line at the strategic level, it is likely that the influence of the PLA will cross the 
thin division and disturb the status quo. As Eric Hagt argues, the PLA’s focus on 
strategic objectives can complicate overall Chinese diplomacy and produce outcomes 
incongruent with those of the foreign policy apparatus.186 
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Chapter 3 Competing Claims for War Suffering:  
Chinese Victims, Intellectuals and the State 
 
It is assumed that war suffering in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945, a.k.a. the 
anti-Japanese war of resistance in China) should have been forgotten in Chinese society, 
as six decades have passed since the end of the war. Following the logic of this 
assumption, it seems natural that the rising claims for war suffering in recent years 
cannot be reasonably explained, unless they were produced and manipulated by the 
Chinese government. This is because, in the CCP’s patriotic campaign, which attempts 
to fill in the ideological vacuum after the collapse of communism, one of the major 
themes is to stress war suffering of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese war. 
 
After the collapse of communist ideology, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, 
the CCP seized nationalism as an ideological instrument in order to rebuild legitimacy 
of rule.187 This top-down process is not only instrumental, but constructive. The party-
state has been actively engaging in remaking the collective memory of history, 
particular the traumatic memory of the anti-Japanese war. In this process, the account of 
official history has been changing upon political concerns of the time. 188  Through 
selectively stressing some aspects of the war and neglecting some others, China’s 
remembering of the anti-Japanese war has been reshaped.189  
 
In recent years, the new remembering of the anti-Japanese war has become a driving 
force for anti-Japanese nationalism in China, which is constructed on victimhood of the 
Chinese people. According to Yinan He, this phenomenon is explainable by the theory 
of “elite mythmaking”190. As suggested in the subtitle of her article, “Elite mythmaking, 
mass reaction, and Sino-Japanese relations”, it is the political elite that have played a 
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dominant role in constructing this new myth, while other social actors are regarded as a 
passive and undifferentiated “mass” who “react” to the elite’s mythmaking.191  
 
This chapter argues against both myths of the above. Through original fieldwork in a 
Chinese rural community, it shows first that war suffering has its own life. It has 
survived in Chinese society much longer than is assumed. Second, the emergence of a 
new remembering of the anti-Japanese war of resistance is not a narrowly top-down 
process. It was neither initiated, nor was it dominated, by the Chinese political elite. 
Instead, it was through joint endeavors of Chinese war victims, intellectuals and the 
state, that contemporary Chinese nationalism has been reconstructed on the victimhood 
of the Chinese nation in the anti-Japanese war. 
 
State-Society Dynamics in Producing a New Remembering of War 
 
This process of producing a new remembering of war bears two characteristics worth 
noting for understanding the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism, which has been 
neglected in the existing literature. First, the actors who have constructed the new 
remembering have different and sometimes conflictual understandings, interpretations, 
and claims of Chinese nationalism. Although Chinese suffering in the anti-Japanese war 
is emphasized in the CCP’s patriotic campaign, claims for war suffering have very 
different origins, motives, and meanings, all of which ultimately contribute to the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism. It is exactly because of, not despite, the existence of 
such discrepancies that makes Chinese nationalism a successful ideology for political 
mobilization, which otherwise would not have become possible through the party-
state’s propaganda.  
 
The party-state regards Japanese wartime crimes and war suffering of the Chinese 
people as a useful instrument for mass mobilization, a good source of political 
legitimacy, and a bargaining chip in international negotiations. Its major goal is to 
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monopolize the tool of anti-Japanese nationalism, and maintain its interactions with 
Japan as flexible as possible, not to seek rectification for the Chinese people from the 
Japanese government. Therefore the CCP has tried to keep alive the theme of Sino-
Japanese friendship in propaganda. By blaming war crimes and its denial on a handful 
of Japanese jingoists and rightists, it reinforces the “myth of the military clique” that the 
Japanese government and the majority of the Japanese people did not bear 
responsibilities for the war. This was exactly the myth made by the Japanese 
conservative elites in the 1950s,192 who tried to whitewash Japan’s war record and the 
war responsibilities of its political and economic elites. 
 
However, this discourse of war suffering is not what is accepted in popular discourse. In 
the post-reform era, the state is no longer able to monopolize the use of war suffering to 
advance its political agenda. Other actors, particularly intellectuals and local activists, 
are major agents of changing the Chinese vernacular memory of the war of resistance. 
They help bring the unheeded war suffering of rural communities to the national 
audience. The intellectuals’ claim for war suffering is different from both of the state 
and local activists. On one hand, their rhetoric of moralization clashes with the state’s 
discourse of nationalism, given their emphasis on civil rights and humanity. On the 
other hand, their rhetoric also conflicts with the communal interests of subalterns who 
place more value on material compensation. Local activists are usually strongmen or 
capable men who are resourceful in political capital, social networks or intellect in the 
community. For them, the major concern is to seek attention and redress for their 
community.  
 
The second characteristic is that, though these understandings, interpretations, and 
claims are different and competing with each other, this does not necessarily lead to the 
naive conclusion that the engagement of local activists (including war victims) and 
intellectuals presents a picture of authentically and autonomously “bottom-up” 
dynamics and sentiments. The historical memories produced and reproduced still bear 
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the traces of the party-state.  
 
This is for two reasons. On the one hand, these nationalist activists live in an 
authoritarian environment in which public space for expressing dissident voices is 
limited. As a result, the possibility for social actors to compete with the state, to some 
extent, relies on their ability to seize the discourse propagated by the state in order to 
advance their own claims. This is a dynamic of “mutual capture”. While the state is 
captured by social actors to commit to what it pays lip service to in the state propaganda, 
the kind of claims that social actors are able to make is also captured by what is 
propagated by the state.  
 
Such a dynamic can be seen in various forms of contentious politics. In studying rural 
resistance in contemporary China, O’Brien and Li propose the concept of “rightful 
resistance” to describe such dynamics between social protestors and state apparatus. It 
is “a form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, 
employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, 
hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing 
support from the wider public.”193 The idea of “consentful contention”, developed by 
Straughn, is a similar conceptual tool. As he finds, in the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), there existed “various nonradical practices of contention under the old 
regime…that used performances of consent to contest state directives”.194  
 
At the core of both concepts is that dissidents in an authoritarian regime, despite being 
in a disadvantageous position in their power relation to the state, can resort to legal 
rights, central policies, values, principle or precedents which are propagated (yet not 
guaranteed in practice) by the government, in order to object to the abuse of power in 
governance and defend their rights. The nature of both concepts is taking the state as its 
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word in order to “beat the authorities at their own game”. 195  In fact, the dynamic 
mechanism revealed in these concepts has universal application, travelling beyond 
socialist or authoritarian political contexts. It includes, just to name a few, contentious 
politics of the blacks struggling for residency rights in apartheid South Africa, workers 
campaigning for equal pay in modern United States, peasants seeking for redress in 
Egypt on the eve of British colonial rule, and numerous cases in imperial and republican 
China.196  
 
However, taking the state as its word has cost as well, because it not only provides an 
opportunity space for people to make different voices, but strengthen the productive 
power of the party-state. As Elizabeth Perry points out, contentious politics in the form 
of rightful resistance, strengthens rather than weakens the traditional Chinese concept of 
“right”, which lacks counter-hegemonic consciousness of modernity.197 Ying Xing, a 
Chinese sociologist, makes the point more straightforwardly. He argues that such a 
dynamics discloses how the Chinese state satisfies “the secret need of governing power” 
by turning rural resistance into a mechanism of power reproduction. The base of this 
mechanism is the state’s institutional design after the failed experiment of the people’s 
commune. “It is those officials and administrative appellants who cooperatively 
lubricate the governing machine in the new era.”198 Ying’s view may be radical, but it is 
not groundless.  
 
The second reason why the reproduced historical memories still bear the traces of the 
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party-state is that they have been deeply influenced by the political discourse, practice 
and culture of the Mao time. That is, regardless of the dynamics between nationalist 
activists and the authoritarian state in the post-reform era, the process of reproducing 
historical memories in Chinese society cannot be separated from the past. In fact, the 
emerging competing claims for Chinese suffering in the anti-Japanese war of resistance 
have historical roots in the political campaigns of the Mao time.  
 
In the Maoist years, Japanese atrocities and war suffering of the Chinese people were 
intentionally played down by the CCP for geopolitical calculations in the Cold War. 
Japanese war criminals were tried with mass clemency. Scholars and the public were 
denied access to records of war atrocities. Objections to such policies in public opinion 
were suppressed.199 In the 1950s, while the CCP tried to persuade the Chinese people to 
“let bygones be bygones”,200 Japan was in the early post-war period of whitewashing its 
war crimes and responsibilities, the process of which was dominated by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and the conservative elites who had taken part in engineering 
the invasion of China.201 From the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, Japan’s official policy 
was consistently unapologetic.202 
 
However, the absence of the state’s intention and activities to emphasize and redress 
war suffering for the Chinese people in the Maoist years does not mean that war 
suffering was forgotten in Chinese society. In the existing literature, the research agenda 
is biased towards one question: why the Chinese people still remember the traumatic 
experience of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War after six decades since the end of the war. 
Unfortunately, this is not a valid research question, because it starts from a non-
empirical assumption. It ignores that traumatic experience and war suffering, like 
wealth and power, is unevenly distributed in any society.  
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China’s most war-inflicted area in the anti-Japanese war of resistance was in the vast 
rural regions, not in large cities where rehabilitation from war suffering was faster 
because of the abundance of resources and mass immigration. Therefore, the adverse 
effects of traumatic war experiences have been more enduring in China’s rural society, 
where subsistence, everyday life and social networks of residents were more vulnerable 
to war destruction, compared to those more privileged social groups in large cities.  
 
This raises a challenge vis-a-vis our conventional knowledge of the new remembering 
of war suffering in Chinese nationalism. In most of the existing literature, two things are 
conflated - the expression of war suffering and the remembrance of it. To put it simply, 
that the expression of war suffering has been suppressed in a society for a long time 
does not mean that war suffering has been forgotten in a society during the same period 
of time. In particular, because both war suffering and the means of recovering from it 
are unevenly distributed, war suffering has its own life and survives longer in some sub-
populations than in some others, while it not expressed at the national level in the 
Maoist years.  
 
The absence of war suffering in historical records during the early post-revolutionary 
years only reflects one thing – that the party-state monopolized written records of 
national memory, and intellectuals were conspirators, wittingly or unwittingly, in such a 
monopoly. But this does not mean that war suffering cannot be kept in various 
unofficial and unwritten ways by the Chinese people.  
 
Historical studies already show that the subalterns have their own ways of keeping 
historical memory alive. Between 1958 and 1962, the Great Famine decimated the lives 
of millions of rural Chinese people. Although death tolls were covered up by officials, 
the remembering of the suffering outlived the cover-up action of the state. The 
devastating effects were well remembered far beyond the early 1960s,203 because during 
the famine, the adverse effects of the misery upon ordinary people could not be easily 
                                                        
203 Dali Yang, 1996, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change 
since the Great Leap Famine, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
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washed away. People were ruthlessly humiliated, beaten to the point of permanent 
injury, forced to trade sex, to sell their children, and lose their family.204 The memory of 
such devastation cannot be forgotten for the entire life of those victims, and if 
circumstances allow, is likely to be passed down to their descendants. 
 
Because Chinese peasants were the major bearers of the costs and suffering of the anti-
Japanese war, and because they were not able to make a written history without the help 
of intellectuals, it is of particular interest to study how they kept remembering of war 
suffering and expressed their grievances in the Maoist years, which was a politically 
problematic subject at that time.  
 
As this chapter will show, their claims for war suffering are not the same as what are 
propagated by the party-state or what are advocated by the intellectuals who help them 
to voice their claims in the post-reform era. These claims bear distinct concerns of rural 
communities. But on the other hand, they also contain a legacy of revolutionary 
discourse which was in the mainstream political culture in the Maoist years. As a result, 
the so-called “new” remembering of war suffering is contaminated by the political 
culture of the Mao era, instead of being a completely new phenomenon that only 
reflects the socio-political dynamics in the post-Mao period.  
 
This finding is strikingly similar to some studies from different political and cultural 
contexts, which suggests there are some law-like mechanisms in state-society dynamics 
in reproducing a political discourse of any kind, even that discourse has been outdated 
or rejected by the subjects. In Shahid Amin’s book on Chauri Chaura, he likewise finds 
it impossible to have a pure subaltern memory uncontaminated by the national narrative 
of the elites. The event of Chauri Chaura referes to an incident of February 4, 1922, in 
which peasant adherents to Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement set fire to a police 
station and killed twenty-three policemen. Gandhi and India’s nationalist elites, however, 
disassociated themselves from the incident and denounced it as a riot and crime. This 
                                                        
204  Frank Dikotter, 2010, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating 
Catastrophe, 1958-62, London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
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was a process of trying to depoliticize and criminalize the incident. This dominant 
national narrative had shaped the memories of the subaltern informants Amin 
interviewed in Chauri Chaura. Although the local informants, either from the families of 
the policemen killed or from families of local peasant activists, injected political 
elements to their narrative of the incident, their accounts were still influenced by the 
master narrative of the state that defined the incident as a crime.205 
 
Overview of the Empirical Case: Chongshan Village 
 
This chapter is based on a case study of a war-inflicted Chinese community. Chongshan 
(崇山) Village was attacked with Japanese bacterial warfare in the 2nd Sino-Japanese 
War. The village is located on the suburbs of Yiwu (义乌), a county-level city in 
Zhejiang Province. It is three hours from Shanghai by rail. Sitting in hills, Yiwu is 
famous for its thriving market of small commodities and light industries. It has been one 
of China’s top ten most developed counties (and county-level cities) since 2007. 
Chongshan is only a 30-minute bus ride from the downtown of Yiwu. Today many 
villagers make a living by renting their houses to small labor-intensive workshops, or 
going to work in other cities. Some villagers have their own workshops, and run them 
as small entrepreneurs.  
 
Most villagers belong to the local Wang (王) clan or are related to it through marriage. 
In October 1942, during the Japanese occupation, a black death hit Chongshan, which 
then had a population of about 1,200 persons and 300 households. Within three months, 
405 people died of the plague, and 23 households perished. The homes of 176 
households were burnt to ashes, and 421 rooms were destroyed. 206  Not a natural 
epidemic, the plague was a product of the Japanese bacterial warfare on Zhejiang 
Province, which was conducted during 1940-1942.207 
                                                        
205 Shahid Amin, 1995, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992, Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
206 Figures were provided by a local informant to the author.  
207  Indictment to Tokyo Local Court (1999), available at http://blog.sina.com.cn/wx5286 (Xuan 
Wang’s blog), under the section of susong wenjian (lawsuit documents) 
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This chapter examines how the interactions between villagers, intellectuals and the state 
have constructed the expression of war grievances in the post-reform era – sometimes 
enabling the expression in certain ways and sometime restricting it in other ways. But 
the study does not stop at the beginning of the reform era. It takes a process-tracing 
approach, and explores how and why the Chinese claims of war suffering in anti-
Japanese nationalism have been constructed in certain ways. It traces the claims back to 
the Maoist years, when they were first preserved in unwritten ways by villagers, and 
then transformed in socialist campaigns. It examines how these earlier experiences of 
preserving and transforming war suffering at the local level have affected the expression 
of war grievance in public discourse today.  
 
Unlike what the conventional wisdom would predict, this chapter finds that the 
expression of war suffering did not perish in the Maoist period. At the local level, war 
suffering was preserved, spread and transformed by the victims and their families 
throughout the entire Maoist period. Moreover, the expression of war suffering was also 
exploited by the state, from time to time, as a resource for political mobilization during 
the same period, though such kind of mobilization was not aimed at Japan. 
 
Consequently, the socialist experience has shaped the discourse of war suffering in the 
reform era. In the post-Maoist years, the loosening political sphere allowed war victims 
and their descendants to seek new opportunities for airing their grievances and 
demanding redress. It became possible with the help and intervention of intellectuals, 
who have their own understanding, interpretation and claim of nationalism and Sino-
Japanese relations. Through this process, the bottom-up initiative encountered the 
patriotic project from above, which nationalized local war suffering to serve the 
political goals of the state. Thus state nationalism and popular nationalism have been 
conflated, affecting each other and culminating in strong resentment against Japanese 
war atrocities after six decades since the end of the war. 
 
My fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2010 in China. Chongshan was selected 
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because it is the most developed case in China’s Civil Reparation Movement (CRM, 
a.k.a. minjian suopei yundong 民间索赔运动). The CRM has engaged in a series of 
civil activities that demand reparation from Japan for Chinese victims who suffered 
from bacterial warfare, chemical weapons, massacres, indiscriminate bombing, or who 
were forced into slave labors or were comfort women during the 2nd Sino-Japanese 
War.208 Among all of the cases, the movement of victims of the bacterial warfare has 
developed most robustly, in terms of activeness of participants, functioning organization, 
and financial state. 209  Chongshan is also the birthplace and the headquarters of all 
branches of the CRM in Zhejiang Province.  
 
The success of Chongshan in publicizing war suffering and constructing anti-Japanese 
nationalism at national level provides a useful lens to observe how war suffering was 
preserved and exploited at the bottom of Chinese society. The war suffering in 
Chongshan is astonishing, but is not exceptional compared to civilian suffering in other 
rural areas. However, very few rural communities have been able to express grievances 
to a larger audience outside their community, and air their competing claims in national 
remembrance of the anti-Japanese war. This is because their attempts to do so have 
failed in the harsh political, material and intellectual environment where they live. Most 
of the grievances can live through two to three generations, if they are not captured in 
official records. After that, these grievances, along with the suffering lives of their 
victims, are buried in the dust of history, without any opportunity to be aired and heard 
again. Hence the salience of Chongshan in marketing their grievance with the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism presents an opportunity to observe mechanisms how 
Chinese rural communities preserved, transformed, and expressed war suffering in both 
of the socialist and the reform periods. 
 
Preserving War Suffering in Unwritten Traditions 
 
For war suffering of rural communities to be expressed, which occurred more than six 
                                                        
208 Sometimes damages and casualties occurred after the war, particularly in the cases of abandoned 
chemical weapons.   
209 Bin Xu and Xiaoyu Pu, 2010, “Dynamic statism and memory politics.” 
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decades ago, first, it has to be preserved in local memory in some unwritten ways, 
because most rural communities in China do not have had a tradition of keeping written 
records. In war-afflicted areas, suffering is usually more enduring in rural communities 
than in large cities, because the subsistence life and social networks of villagers take a 
longer time to rehabilitate, due to resource scarcity and characteristics of community 
life in villages. In Chongshan, a first important means by which villagers used to pass 
down their experience of war suffering is the oral tradition in the everyday life of a rural 
community.  
 
“[After 1953] we talked a lot about Japanese Guizi (literally “devils”). When 
working collectively on the farm, we talked about those women who were raped, 
how many people died in those families, how painful it was when someone died, 
and how many corpses one helped to bury…We spoke of these as stories. Some 
young people didn’t know it, so we kept talking.” [Interviewee b.1932] 
 
“We all heard something from the elderly. At that time we were working in the 
production team. We were young at that time and heard these as stories. The elderly 
in the production team talked about how many died today or yesterday... It was said 
that everyone was so scared [during the plague] that no one was outside home after 
three o’clock in the afternoon.” [Interviewee b.1947]210  
 
Although the expression of war suffering was suppressed in the Mao era, the generation 
of war survivors felt a sense of responsibility to recount the war suffering of the village 
to the younger generations. These traumatic stories of war, passed down from the elder 
generation, became a cultural legacy of Chongshan village. It penetrated the everyday 
life of members of the community, and strengthened a feeling of belonging to the 
community which had barely survived the plague.  
 
War suffering was not only kept in words and stories. Hardship in life and loss of social 
networks impressed a remembering of war suffering on everyday life of the survivors 
                                                        
210 Nine of this interviewee’s family members were died of the plague. 
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and their families. 
 
“[After my father’s death in the plague, life became] very difficult. I don’t know 
how we were able to struggle for living at that time. As so many people in the 
family had been infected, we had spent a large sum of money saving them, but in 
the end people died and the money was gone. In order to bury their corpses, we had 
to borrow money, but we had nothing with which to pay back the debt. The 
creditors came to our home and took whatever they saw – our waterwheel, farm 
tools, and cattle. After everything was gone, the other creditors climbed on the roof 
of our house and attempted to take off the roof tiles. I still keep a lively memory of 
that day. While many tiles were being stripped off, my blind grandpa, who cried 
himself blind at the death of my father and uncle, knelt down and begged for 
mercy…Before the death of my father and uncle, our family lived a decent life, 
having two good labourers and no worries for food and clothing. But after such a 
blow, we lost source of labour and owed debts. Only the elderly and children 
survived…My sister and I had to dig wild vegetables and sometimes beg food from 
others. I was only eight or nine years old at that time but had to work full time. 
While other kids went to school every day, I could only attend school once or twice 
a week. Most time I studied on my own while working…Sorry, I cannot continue, 
it’s too sorrowful. The misfortune had an impact on my childhood and growth.” 
[Interviewee b.1940]211  
 
“We used to live in Jiangwan Town before I was thirteen.212 Because our house had 
been burnt to ashes by the Japanese, we had to rent a house in the town. Whenever 
others asked why we did not have our own house, my mother would tell them the 
story of the Japanese. That’s why I often heard of the plague… The debris of our 
old house stood in the village for decades. When living in the town, we often 
visited our relatives in the village. Whenever we came back to the village and saw 
                                                        
211 Five members of this interviewee’s family members were died of the plague. The interviewee is 
from Changde, Hunan Province. The author met the interviewee at a meeting held by the CRM 
activists in Yiwu in June 2010. 
212 Jiangwan Town is very close to Chongshan Village. By the author’s experience, it only takes five-
minute bus ride to the village. 
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the debris, the memory came to us. If we had rebuilt our house earlier, perhaps we 
would not have remembered it for such a long time. We did not rebuild our house 
until 1985 or 1986.” [Interviewee b.1966] 
 
Compared to hardship in life, loss of social networks had a more enduring effect on 
memories of war. The social conditions in a traditional rural community made it 
possible to keep war suffering alive among villagers who have not experienced any life 
hardship directly caused by the war. In a Chinese village, the head count of males is a 
symbol of power and family status. Because a male family member not only means a 
source of labour but a reliable defender for family interest, the loss of head counts, 
especially those of males, would leave an incurable scar on the family for generations. 
 
“After the death of my uncle, my father no longer had any brother. In a village, one 
always has brothers and sisters, and this is very important. I used to complain to my 
father about his not having siblings. On these occasions he would say that he had 
had…Living in a village one needs brothers. The more brothers you have, the 
stronger you are. Without brothers, you would get into trouble and no one dares to 
uphold justice for you.” [Interviewee b.1966] 
 
“[None died of the plague in my close family.] I did not experience the plague. My 
father was only six at that time. He was sent to a relative’s home in another village, 
so he was also not clear of the plague. My grandma was infected, but was 
fortunately rehabilitated. She was infected when helping with the funeral at Wang 
RL’s home. Wang RL’s father was my grandpa’s brother. Before the plague, Wang 
RL had 13 siblings in his family. Once the plague broke out, 11 of the 13 died 
within several days. Together with other relatives who died in the plague, our 
family lineage lost 17 to 18 lives. The plague was a big blow to our lineage. Were 
these people still alive, said my grandma, a large half of Chongshan would have 
been under our lineage’s influence.”213 [Interviewee b. 1964] 
                                                        
213 Chongshan Village is a natural village, which is comprised of two administrative villages. One is 
named Chongshan and the other Upper Chongshan. The division was arbitrarily made after 1949 for 
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Transforming War Suffering in Socialist Campaigns 
 
While unwritten traditions have kept alive war suffering in the memory of rural 
communities through generations, socialist campaigns have transformed these oral 
accounts and family experiences with idiosyncratic characteristics to some model 
stories, which were easier to spread and impress audience beyond the community. 
Transformation is not necessarily taken in writing. In fact, the 1986 Yiwu County 
Annals shows that in the mid-1980s the official history of the county only had scarce 
information of the plague. Recorded in the documents of local health office, such 
information gave a cursory mention of the black death occurring during the war.214 The 
plague was treated as a natural disease, without any indication that the dreadful 
casualties were related to the Japanese bacterial warfare.215 
 
Notwithstanding, Chongshan’s encounter with socialist campaigns in the Maoist years 
facilitated the formation of a standardized account of their war suffering, and expanded 
the remit of its influence. Under the early rule of the CCP, speaking bitterness (suku 诉
苦) was one of the most important governing techniques of building and consolidating 
regime legitimacy in rural areas.  
 
“Speaking bitterness” was massively used for the first time in the land reform of 1946 
in the CCP’s rural base. In the land reform, this technique was exploited to mobilize the 
mass peasants, because the real economic disparity was not as sharp as the CCP 
proclaimed, and in some areas there was no intense conflict between peasants and 
landowners.216 The goal of “speaking bitterness” was not to liberate the peasants by 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the convenience of administration. There is no identifiable boundary between the two parts. The 
interviews were conducted by the author in both administrative villages, but what the interviewee 
herein referred to was Chongshan Administrative Village. 
214 In the 1980s, Yiwu was categorized as a county in China’s administrative system. It is now 
categorized as a county-level city. 
215 Yiwu Xianzhi (Yiwu County Annals), 1987, p. 11. The Annals were recompiled in 2005 and 2010 
(trial copy). 
216 Lifeng Li, 2007, “Tugai zhong de suku: yizhong minzhong dongyuan jishu de weiguan fenxi 
(Speaking bitterness in land reform: a micro analysis of a mass mobilization technique),” Nanjing 
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allocating them lands, but to rebuild their understanding of the cause of poverty as 
“exploitation” and to incite their resentment towards the landowners. It was usually at a 
“speaking bitterness” assembly that mass mobilization became more and more 
violent. 217  Through repeated land allocation and reallocation during 1946-1949, the 
CCP purposely led an extra-violent mass mobilization of land reform in order to fight 
the KMT in the civil war.218  
 
The use of “speaking bitterness” also reshaped people’s idea of the state in the Chinese 
revolution. By evoking suffering from peasants, it constructed one positive and one 
negative state image through the creation of class identity based on some extant social 
divisions. 219  In various post-1949 political campaigns, the technique of “speaking 
bitterness” was inherited and repeatedly used to produce enemies – either class enemies 
or imperialists. 
 
This technique of governing power has reproductive effects on the subject’s identity as 
well, as can be seen in a path-breaking study on Soviet subjects in Steven Kotkin’s 
Magnetic Mountain. 220 Instead of “speaking bitterness” through socialist campaigns 
among peasants, the Soviet workers in Magnitogorsk, an industrial city founded in 1929, 
learnt to “speak Bolshevik” through the Stalinist social revolution.  
 
As Kotkin’s meticulous research shows, Stalinism became an accepted system in Russia 
not only because the system had an intensely repressive nature, but because people 
willingly accepted the norms and values of the system, and behaved in a way that 
conformed to the required norms and values. This is a process of social engineering, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Nanjing University), 44(5), pp. 97-109. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ming Zhang, 2003 (June), “Dongyuan jiegou yu yundong moshi: huabei diqu tudi gaige yundong 
de zhengzhi yunzuo (1946-1949) (Mobilization structure and movement mode: political operation in 
the land reform movement of Huabei (1946-1949)),” 21 Shiji (wangluo ban) (21st Century (internet 
edition)), No.15.  
219  Yuhua Guo and Liping Sun, 2002, “Suku: yizhong nongmin guojia guannian xingcheng de 
zhongjie jizhi (Speaking bitterness: an intervening mechanism for the formation of the state idea 
among peasants),” Zhongguo Xueshu (Chinese Academic), 3(4), pp. 130-157. 
220 Stephen Kotkin, 1995, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, London: University of 
California Press.  
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through which the entire population of the Soviet state was rapidly socialized to acquire 
a new set of norms and values that redefined the relations between individual and 
regime. As each person learnt what norms and values were expected of, he learnt how 
to “speak Bolshevik”. He himself was therefore transformed, becoming a carrier of the 
Bolshevik discourse and reproducing the governing power, regardless whether he really 
believes in it or not. This transformation of identity was possible not because of 
authentic willingness from below, though it had a certain level of autonomy and 
willingness at individual level. The repressive nature of the state, along with its 
totalitarian control of the means of survival, welfare and personal advancement, 
changed the calculative matrix of individuals, who were pragmatic and self-interested 
beings rather than the mindless mass under the Stalinism. As a result, the subjects 
“voluntarily” chose, under coercion and cajoling, to play the “identity game” set by the 
state.  
 
Chongshan, a small village in the hilly hinterland of coastal Zhejiang Province, had a 
similar experience of socialist campaigns as in many rural communities in the Maoist 
years. Through the identity game of “speaking bitterness” in socialist campaigns, the 
oral accounts and family experiences of war suffering had been transformed into model 
stories, and the villagers into a living carrier of the socialist discourse with Maoist 
characteristics. 
 
According to the author’s interviews, the first wave of public denunciations of the 
Japanese atrocities in Chongshan occurred at the time when the province was taken over 
by the CCP, and the Peasants’ Association of the locality was established. In a 
“speaking bitterness” assembly, peasants were urged to accuse of the imperialism, the 
landowner class and the KMT. But the villagers of Chongshan did not feel suffering 
under landowners and the KMT, as it used to be a relatively well-off village. Therefore 
the object of denunciation had to shift to imperialism in order to continue these 
campaigns.  
 
“In terms of suffering under imperialism, we knew nothing about American 
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imperialism, but we had suffered so much under the barbaric aggression of the 
Japanese. It is Japanese atrocities that we most frequently denounced at that 
time…In Chongshan, public denunciations focused on suffering under 
imperialism… The focus was Japanese Guizi (literally “devils”),” the then village 
militia leader [b.1932] recalled during an interview.221  
 
Mass assemblies and meetings were the most popular form of socialist campaigns in 
Chongshan between 1950 and 1953, when the new communist regime was extending 
outreach to every organic unit of society. The new socialist life in Chongshan was 
vividly summarized by villagers in a popular saying, “going to queue in daytime, and 
going to meet at night” (zaoshang paipaidui, wanshang kaikaihui 早上排排队,晚上开
开会). Thus, life in the village was entirely reorganized around means of communist 
mobilization – in the daytime, villagers went to sell agricultural produce in a queue to 
the Supply and Marketing Cooperative (gongxiaoshe 供销社); and at night, they went 
to meetings convened by party cadres. 
 
These years of regime building and consolidation happened to be concurrent with the 
Korean War (1950-53), which placed denunciation of American imperialism at the 
centre of political mobilization. However, American imperialism was too far from the 
villagers’ life experience. To encourage mobilization, villagers were encouraged instead 
to denounce the Japanese war atrocities on the assemblies and meetings, although the 
target of criticism was still the United States.  
 
In fact, such a propaganda technique, which incited people’s resentment towards an 
exotic target by evoking their negative emotion towards a replacement target, was 
widely used in the early years of the Chinese communist regime. A boastful article on 
the official website of the History of the People’s Republic of China has revealed the 
intention of using this technique,  
 
“In the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid North Korea, the feature of 
                                                        
221 Interviewed by the author, June 2010. 
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propaganda was to take on different forms of movements and mobilize/organize 
different movements at different stages. It was to embed a series of small 
movements in the large movement…It was necessary to combine the appeal of 
every small movement at every stage with the concrete work of different sectors, 
and with the people’s idea and life in order to give patriotism a sensible, tangible 
and humanized meaning…Meanwhile, the propaganda to Resist U.S. Aggression 
and Aid North Korea was combined with other movements such as the Movement 
to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Land Reform, and the Movement to 
Eliminate Traitors, Local Despots and Bandits, so that this movement not only 
became a spiritual source of patriotism, but also mobilized the widest mass 
participation in economic reconstruction and democratic reform, elevated mass 
political consciousness, and encouraged their recognition of and love for the new 
regime…”222 
 
There was no written record regarding what the villagers in Chongshan said of the 
Japanese at these “speaking bitterness” assemblies. But according to the recollection of 
the villagers, the small village donated “several hundred loads of paddy” in the 
campaign of donating air fighters and cannons in 1952 during the Korean War. There is 
no evidence to deduce that the villagers donated such a large amount of their life 
subsistence because they believed in the CCP’s propaganda that “not taking actions to 
resist the imperialism, they will suffer once again”. Yet their action indicates one thing - 
that through successive political campaigns, the organic decentralized accounts of war 
suffering preserved in villagers’ daily life were being transformed through political 
campaigns. The political transformation of war suffering captured the most horrendous 
elements in original accounts, and it was rehearsed for many times in such campaigns 
before the account of war suffering became crystallized and standardized.  
 
Therefore, although Chongshan’s suffering was not written in the official history of the 
county at that time, the accounts of their suffering became standardized, and more 
                                                        
222 Dan Sun, “Lun kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de guonei xuanchuan gongzuo (On propaganda 
work in the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid North Korea),” accessed 1 Oct 2010,  
http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsyj/zhutiyj/111/111_2957/200909/t20090909_30281.html  
106 
 
accessible to a larger audience outside the village. The most frequently recounted 
stories today are still those which were considered the most horrendous at the time, and 
therefore were transformed into model stories in socialist campaigns. 
 
“On the day Wu XN was dissected by the Japanese in the Linshan Temple, she 
cried out, ‘Help, help!’ She cried as such seven times and then did not say anything. 
Zhang JL happened to be in the temple on the same day. She went there in the hope 
that the Japanese could cure her. Hearing Wu’s cry, she realized the danger. As the 
Japanese were guarding the gate, she escaped by crawling out a hole in the public 
toilet. Upon returning to home, she warned the villagers not to go to the temple 
because the Japanese were dissecting patients there.” [Interviewee b.1932] 
 
“Only the names of those well-known victims were recorded [in the investigation 
by the Air Force in the 1960s], such as Wu XN, the one whose belly was cut open 
alive by the Japanese. We’ve heard of the story since we were little boys. 
Whenever one came to investigate, the woman who crawled out the public toilet 
would accompany them to the Linshan Temple and made a public speech. We often 
went to these speeches when we were young…There has always been a legend that 
Wu XN was still alive when cut on her belly.” [Interviewee b.1949] 
 
In the post-Mao era, particularly after Chongshan started to engage in the CRM, Wu 
XN’s misery has been brought to numerous written records, and has become part of the 
orthodox memory of history. A book on Japanese bacterial attacks on Chongshan, 
which was published in 1999 by Zhejiang Education Press, vividly describes the 
dramatized story as follows.  
 
“The most miserable was Wu XN. She was Wang ZF’s child bride and was only 18 
at the time…She was infected and sent to the Linshan Temple by her mother-in-law 
in the morning…In the afternoon, the Japanese military doctors tied her on a bench. 
Being surrounded by the white-clothes and realizing the danger, she cried and 
begged, ‘Sir, I’ll recover! Sir, I’ll recover’, in order to refuse the ‘treatment’ by the 
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Japanese. The Japanese military doctors cut open her chest while she was still alive, 
took out her heart and lung…During this process she kept crying. Yet her cry was 
dwindling and ended with her last breath.”223 
 
Similar recounts of Wu XN’s story, only with minor variations, have appeared in local, 
provincial, and national newspapers, in books and on internet forums.224 The story of 
Wu, a child bride who lived at the bottom of social hierarchy in a Chinese village, has 
now become a reference point in the orthodox history of the village’s war suffering, 
which links this village’s historical remembering to the national narrative of the anti-
Japanese war of resistance and Japanese war atrocities.  
 
The mode of transformation also changed in tandem with the form of political 
mobilization. In the late 1960s, when amateur drama troupes became a popular means 
of mass mobilization in socialist campaigns, Chongshan villagers wrote and performed 
a drama based on their suffering of the plague in the war. The play was composed by an 
ordinary villager, Xu CQ [b. 1930s]. It was performed by the villagers, and was funded 
by the performers. In contrast to the plays performed by neighboring villages, which 
featured despotic landowners and KMT spies, the play of Chongshan was unique in its 
emphasis on the villagers’ suffering of the plague under the Japanese occupation. The 
play had such scenes about Japanese planes hovering over the village, the horrors of the 
plague, the death of the village doctor, and the burning down of houses.  
 
On the one hand, this play was a grassroots initiative to air the villagers’ real suffering 
in a political milieu in which only such themes as cleansing the class enemy were 
                                                        
223  Shixin Zhang, 1999, Zhejiangsheng Chongshancun Qinhua Rijun Xijun Zhanzheng Zuixing 
Shishi (Chongshan Village of Zhejiang Province: Crime Facts of Japanese Bacterial Warfare in 
China), Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Press, p. 13. 
224 For coverage in local news media of Yiwu City and Jinhua District, see: Shangpin Shijiebao 
(Commercial World News), 30 Aug 1997; Jinhua Ribao (Jinhua Daily), 20 Nov 1998. For coverage 
in Zhejiang provincial media, see the website of Zhejiang Zaixian (Zhejiang Online), 8 Aug 2005, 
http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/05zjnews/system/2005/08/08/006262279.shtml. For coverage in national 
news media and books, see the report in Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekends), 7 Jul 2005, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-07-07/10497160794.shtml; Xianghong Nan, 2005, Wang Xuan de 
Banian Kangzhan (The Eight Years’ Anti-Japanese War of Xuan Wang), Beijing: Shiyue wenyi 
chubanshe (October Literature Publishing House). 
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permitted and encouraged. It shows that even at a time when class struggle was the only 
political correct theme in the official discourse, the subalterns had their own 
understanding of what was of most concern for themselves. My interviews in 
Chongshan attest that it was persecution under the occupation of the Japanese, rather 
than class struggle that was the focus of the villagers’ concerns. 
 
Me: Did you talk about other issues (than Japanese atrocities) in the production 
team, say, the landowners (as class enemy)? 
“No. Landowners were different here. They didn’t organize armed force. Through 
diligent work, they accumulated some money, bought some land, and then built 
their houses. Landowners here were different from those on television.” 
[Interviewee: b. late 1940s] 
 
On the other hand, the initiative of the villagers that deviated from the line of class 
struggle could only survive in the narrow space within the state-sponsored ideology, 
and it could only get publicity on state-organized assemblies and ceremonies. Even their 
expression was colored by the language of class struggle, as seen in the name of the 
play - Blood, Tears and Hatred (xue lei chou 血泪仇). Most performers were also 
intentionally recruited from the activists of socialist campaigns, because participation in 
rehearsals and performances required spending time and money at their own expense. 
 
Me: Were you paid for the performance? 
“Nothing at all. We had to buy makeup for ourselves. We even donated our 
clothing quota to make stage settings. I was a member of the Communist Youth 
League, and they promised to introduce me to join the Party. I was very happy, and 
donated five yuan and one quota for clothing.”225 [Interviewee: a female villager 
who staged in the play] 
 
Me: For how many times was the play performed? 
“Many times. We performed all over the town. Whenever the town was holding an 
                                                        
225 It was a large sum of donation by the standard of that time. 
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assembly, they would call us to perform before the assembly started, so that the 
mass would be educated on the scene. Our village was famous in the county, 
because a lot of people had died of the plague. On the assembly, some elderly 
women were also mobilized to “speak bitterness”… [We were called to the 
assembly so that it] could attract more people.” [Interviewee: ibid] 
 
Sometimes, the state adopted a more straightforward mode of intervention in the 
transformation of war suffering in the locality. Compared to “speaking bitterness” and 
performing drama, which depended on the victims of war suffering to taking an active 
role, official investigation represented a top-down tradition that transferred communal 
memory to official records and transformed active “people of suffering” into a passive 
“population of sufferers”.  
 
After 1949, there have been three investigations about Chongshan’s casualties in the 
black death. The first one took place in 1953, conducted by Wang ZM, a doctor 
working in the clinic of Jiangwan Town. The purpose of this investigation was to record 
epidemic characteristics of the plague. It estimated a toll of more than 300 people, but 
all the materials of this investigation were lost. The second investigation occurred in 
1966, when the 5th Army of the PLA Air Force came to the village in order to conduct 
class education by visiting the poor and inquiring the suffering (fangpin wenku 访贫问
苦). According to the statistics compiled by the 5th Army, 382 people died of plague, 18 
households were decimated and 420 rooms were burnt to ashes. This investigation did 
not collect names of the victims, but it recorded the story of vivisection. 
 
The third investigation was initiated by Japanese activists, not the Chinese state. In 
1991, some Japanese activists of Japan’s Peace Movement, interested in the Japanese 
bacterial warfare in Yiwu City, visited Chongshan. Because there was no convincing 
record at that time, Wang D, a retired officer of the city’s health and prevention centre 
and a native of Chongshan, was commissioned to conduct a survey. This investigation 
not only recorded epidemic characteristics of the plague, but also the names, gender and 
age of the victims. Wang D’s work did not proceed well until Wang PG, an able and 
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retired township party secretary, who was also a native of Chongshan, joined in 1996. 
Thanks to Wang PG’s strong networks and tactic leadership226, the third investigation 
was developed to a memory movement that has spread to neighboring villages and 
adjacent regions which suffered from the plague as well.227  
 
The different outcomes of the three investigations suggest that the purpose of the 
investigation was more important than when it was conducted for acquiring accurate 
information on the plague. The first investigation, which occurred only ten years after 
the plague, should have been able to collect most information, because at that time 
many villagers who had witnessed or experienced the plague were still alive. 
Nevertheless, it was the most incomplete investigation, because its purpose was simply 
to record epidemic characteristics of the plague. In my interviews, none of the villagers 
remembered this investigation. In contrast, while the investigation was triggered by 
political motivations, it became more productive in collecting information. Both the 
second and the third investigations enumerated death tolls and loss of properties, and 
recorded the most horrendous stories of the Japanese “atrocities and savageness”. The 
third investigation, which was inspired by the CRM to collect evidence for reparation 
lawsuits in Japan, was the most meticulous, documenting the name and demographic 
characteristics of each victim.  
 
Unlike “speaking bitterness” and performing drama, these investigations put a priority 
on counting. Even small changes in the numbers meant a big difference. On a notice 
board in the Bacterial Warfare Museum, which is located in the clan temple in Jiangwan 
Town, it lists a roster of all victims in Yiwu City, with a serial number attached to each 
name. At the end of that list, there is an informal note, which reads, “Plus four more, 
1318 persons altogether.” In an interview, when the author mentioned, that the toll of 
the village was 403, the interviewee who led the local investigation immediately 
                                                        
226 According to the author’s interview, this is not only because he used to be a CCP township 
secretary, but also because the municipal government is located in the town he used to govern, which 
gives him extra leverage in dealing with the municipal officials. 
227 The chronology of investigations is based on a document drafted by D. Wang found in the 
Bacterial War Museum in Jiangwan Town. The document records four investigations but the author 
finds that three are more appropriate according to interviews. 
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interrupted and corrected, “No, it should be 405. Two more victims have been verified 
since then.”  
 
Why is the number so important? What is the real difference between 403 and 405? 
Correctness generates authority. Counting grants authority to those who supervised and 
controlled the process of investigation. Through this process, regardless of who the 
enumerators are – state agencies, local elites, or outside intellectuals - they are entrusted 
with authority to speak on behalf of the suffering community. Whoever controls the 
authority of enumeration, therefore controls the power of interpreting war suffering. 
Because an investigation requires considerable resources such as money, time, literacy 
and local networks, it cannot be controlled by the voiceless peasants. The process of 
investigation becomes a ritual that generates authority independent of the suffering 
community. 
 
It should not be a surprise that through all the mechanisms of transforming war 
suffering, those inconsistent voices from the community have been filtered, either 
because they were from the politically “unreliable” elements in socialist campaigns or 
because those narratives did not sound sufficiently “horrendous and barbaric”. “No one 
has ever come to interview me,” a well-educated interviewee with a good memory [b. 
1926] told me when I visited his house in Chongshan. The interviewee had graduated 
from middle school, and was staying in the village when the plague broke out in 1942, 
whereas those representatives who have been chosen to speak publicly on behalf of the 
victims were only three to ten years old at that time.  
 
In the interview, this informant not only talked of the plague and hardship under the 
Japanese occupation, but revealed other sides of history that were not covered in official 
discourse or the claims made by local activists. He talked of local Chinese rogues who 
helped the Japanese to plunder the village. He described the takeover of the village by 
the Japanese during the plague to supervise sanitation conditions in the village. He also 
mentioned that some small money for compensation, only worth several kilos of rice, 
was distributed by the Japanese after they burnt down villagers’ houses.  
112 
 
 
Whilst the Japanese troops stationed in the region attempted to make an impression of 
good order under their occupation, and because they probably did not have knowledge 
of the bacterial attack, which was secretly administrated by a special military unit, the 
account offered by this informant does not mitigate the atrocities conducted by the 
Japanese. However, his account was politically “incorrect” in the eyes of official 
agencies, local activists and intellectuals, thus it was excluded from the process of 
transformation. In this process, not only the state, but also local elites and outside 
intellectuals, “collaboratively” played a role in censoring and filtering such heterodox 
narratives of war suffering from below. 
 
Nationalizing War Suffering in Public Discourse 
 
Once war suffering had been transformed, it became the currency of grievances and was 
ready for nationalization. To some victims, however, remembrance of suffering is 
instinctively repulsive. After doing fieldwork for six years on the victims of bacterial 
warfare in Changde (常德), Hunan Province, cultural anthropologist Nie Lili writes, 
 
“Some victims and their family members talked ‘in extreme tranquility’. An elderly 
person spoke to me in simple words, ‘I had had five sons. All died that year. All 
died.’ Then she did not say a word. Another old woman, who had lost almost all 
family members in the plague…when I visited her, she looked at me in an empty 
expression, repeating one sentence, ‘[I’ve] forgotten it, all forgotten.’”228  
 
This author had similar experience when doing fieldwork in Chongshan. When I talked 
informally to a group of villagers who were chatting on a public terrace, a man in his 
sixties replied listlessly, “[I’ve] forgotten it, all forgotten.” Then he reluctantly turned 
his face to the ground, without one more word.  
                                                        
228 Lili Nie, 2006, “Changde minzhong rijun xijunzhan shouhai jiyi de wenhua renleixue yanjiu (A 
cultural anthropological study on the victims’ memory of Japanese bacterial warfare in Changde),” 
Hunan Wenli Xueyuan Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) (Journal of Hunan Arts and Science College 
(Social Science Edition)), 31(6), p. 23. 
113 
 
 
The expression of war suffering, whether in interviews, in newspapers, on the Internet 
or in witness statements to court, is by no means natural and spontaneous for the 
suffered, particularly those who had a traumatic experience, to talk. When the currency 
of grievances circulates out of the suffering community, it also swirls out of control of 
the villagers. Among those who are able to use the currency of grievances to construct 
public discourse, intellectuals are the most powerful agent.  
 
Xuan Wang is a major figure in bringing the suffering of Chongshan to China’s national 
audience. Receiving a master degree in Japan, she speaks fluent English and Japanese, 
and has family connections in Chongshan.229 Wang’s involvement in the CRM started in 
1995, and it became a turning point for the movement. She advocated that the CRM 
should be independent of the Japanese activists, and used her media skills and 
connections to promote the publicity of the movement. In 2002, Wang was selected as 
one of the “Top Ten People who Moved the Hearts of the Chinese”, a highly honored 
award sponsored by the CCTV (China Central Television). She is also a member-elect 
of the Political Consultative Conference in Zhejiang Province. 
 
Unlike state propaganda, which interprets war suffering of the Chinese people in a 
discourse of national humiliation, Xuan Wang, as an intellectual, has issued competing 
claims in the rhetoric of morality. Rights, dignity, and peace are the most frequently 
used words in her interpretation of the movement. 
 
“Why do we persist? Just for money? We the people in Yiwu do not need money… 
We need apology, and we need acknowledgement of facts! What we have done is 
for the friendship between China and Japan, for Japan not committing such 
blunders again, for the good of the Japanese people, and for humanity…Bacterial 
warfare is a historic fact, a momentous event in human history…We are struggling 
                                                        
229 Xuan Wang’s father was born and grew up in Chongshan before joining the CCP. He worked in 
the Shanghai Supreme Court as a senior official after 1949. His brother died of the plague at the age 
of 13. Xuan Wang [b.1952] was brought up in Shanghai. When the Chinese youth were sent down to 
the countryside, she went back to Chongshan and taught in a village school. She graduated with a 
B.A. in English, went to work in a middle school in Yiwu, and then went to study and work in Japan. 
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for our dignity.”230 Xuan Wang announced at a mass meeting to the villagers in 
2005.  
 
“This war was a disaster for China as both a state and a nation. It was also 
disastrous for numerous families in this state and millions of individuals of this 
nation. Whether China and Japan will resolve the legacy problems of the war 
largely depends on how we Chinese look at and treat history. The history is the 
common history of thousands of millions of Chinese. It is also the individual 
history of thousands of millions of Chinese. The historical problem between China 
and Japan is fundamentally the problem of everyone.”231 Xuan Wang wrote in 2004 
in Southern Weekends, a metropolitan weekly popular among the educated Chinese.  
 
“The lawsuit is a joint endeavor of the Chinese and Japanese people...in order to 
find the facts of history and fight for the rights of the victims, the process of which 
contributes to deepening mutual understanding, eliminating hatred, understanding 
the war and moving forward to peace…Circumventing issues of history means 
ignoring victims, ignoring the existence of their lives and dignity.”232 Xuan Wang 
addressed at the Southern China Lecture in 2007, a public forum jointly sponsored 
by a popular metropolitan daily and the propaganda department of Guangdong 
Provincial Government. 
 
Through the discourse of morality, the claim of intellectuals wins the attention of 
national audience, but it also marginalizes the claim of the sufferers in public discourse. 
Rural communities are subsistence-oriented. Neither the discourse of morality nor state 
nationalism is an organic expression of their grievances and claims. Therefore the 
intellectuals’ discourse encounters challenges when facing grassroots activists.  
                                                        
230 Xianghong Nan, 2005, Wang Xuan de Banian Kangzhan (The Eight Years’ Anti-Japanese War of 
Xuan Wang), p. 4. 
231 Xuan Wang, 18 March 2004, “Bainian shanghen (Scars of one hundred years),” Nanfang Zhoumo 
(Southern Weekends), http://www.southcn.com/weekend/top/200403190052.htm 
232 Xuan Wang, 1 September 2007, “Yiqie weile kefu guoqu: xijunzhan susong (All for overcoming 
the past: the lawsuits of bacterial warfare),” address at the Southern China Lecture, transcription 
available at http://www.nbweekly.com/Print/Article/3405_0.shtml 
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“What I would like to emphasize is that our victims are still concerned with 
reparation, although we have talked a lot of the significance of bacterial warfare. To 
the victims, the issue of reparation is most practical. We know a guy whose family 
lost ten lives. He survives as an orphan, being handicapped and unmarried. He is in 
his seventies and lives a very hard life. Admittedly it is necessary to seek justice for 
people like him, but it is also very necessary to claim economic compensation for 
him. We don’t need to say all the time that we are claiming justice from Japan,”233 a 
local activist spoke indignantly at a general meeting of the CRM. [bold italic added] 
 
The words of this activist immediately triggered a fierce debate at the meeting. On most 
occasions, the discontent of grassroots activists is contained, but such self-restraint does 
not extinguish their antipathy to the discourse of morality and the nationalization of 
communal grievances.  
 
“Ordinary people won’t talk in this way (such as national dignity and state dignity). 
They value pragmatic interests. They want compensation from the Japanese 
government and that’s all…At the beginning we once proposed that we should 
restrict the movement within Chongshan or Yiwu. It should not spread to other 
places.” [Interviewee A] 
 
“There was a different opinion in our village in contrast to the movement leaders’. 
It was our village that initiated the lawsuit against the Japanese government, and it 
was our village that had suffered in the plague. But now the movement has spread 
all over the country. Were our village alone, perhaps the Japanese would have paid 
some compensation to our village, as it would not be a large sum. Many people 
once had such an opinion.” [Interviewee B] 
 
However, the lack of intellectual and discursive resources in rural communities means 
that, for their grievances to be aired and win sympathy, their claims for war suffering 
                                                        
233 Participant observation by the author, June 2010. 
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have to be subordinate to competing claims that are colored in some grand discourses. 
Because only the state and the intellectuals can invent master discourses, the villagers 
have to adapt and speak in the new discourse that is alien to their life experience and 
authentic claims. 
 
“Today we come here to discuss what to do next [for the CRM], and how we can 
assist the work of Xuan Wang…We are not doing it for money, but to voice 
grievances. It is part of our rights. Our ancestors suffered all kinds of bitterness and 
abuses. We, as their descendants, have to inherit [the memory] and let the world 
know how much grievance and bitterness we experienced. We have the rights to 
uphold justice. So we must follow the leadership of Xuan Wang and these people of 
vision to continue the movement!”234 
 
This was an opening remark made by a villager representative at a CRM annual meeting 
in the clan temple of Chongshan. The message is short, but it demonstrates a unique 
mixture of the state’s socialist culture and the intellectuals’ discourse of morality. 
Words such as “grievance”, “bitterness” and “abuses” are inherited from political 
mobilization in the Mao era, while words such as “rights” and “justice” are new terms 
borrowed from the intellectuals. The remarks also reflect a clear consciousness of the 
villagers of their subordinate role in the CRM, as represented in such words as “assist” 
and “leadership”, although their purpose is to “let the world know” their own suffering.  
 
The subordinate status of villagers does not mean that the state and intellectuals can 
completely dominate the expression of their grievances. In addition to dealing with 
public challenges and antipathy of the villagers, the state and intellectuals also need 
cooperation from below. In order to keep the expression of grievances alive and 
affective, they need to mobilize active engagement and authentic emotion from the 
villagers. Sometimes intellectuals have to exploit the meaning system of local culture to 
solicit support. 
                                                        
234 The meeting was attended and recorded by the author in the summer of 2010. The participants of 
the meeting included activists from Zhejiang province and Hunan province, and some old villagers 
in Chongshan. 
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“As said in the old words of Chongshan, one has to apologize and remedy for the 
wrongdoings he has committed. He has to buy something as a gift, or by whatever 
means [to apologize], but till now nothing has been done [by Japan]. If you do not 
continue [the movement], it means you give it up,” Xuan Wang tried to encourage 
the villagers at one meeting.  
 
More often, persistence is not enough. The expression of grievances, to be effective and 
impressive, relies on active participation of the villagers. This requires performance of 
rituals. Ritual is the “symbolic behavior that is socially standardized and repetitive.”235 
After the plague and until the entire 1980s, the villagers of Chongshan did not hold any 
specific ritual to commemorate the victims.236 Although they used to burn some paper 
money as an offering to the victims on Chinese tomb-sweeping day or during the 
Chinese New Year’s Festival, they did not treat these victims of the plague in a way 
different from other deceased family members.  
 
To some extent, the lack of ritualization can be explained by hardship in the post-plague 
time. But the fundamental reason is that in the Mao era, all political rituals must serve 
the purpose of socialist campaigns which were centered on class struggle. Ritualization 
of war suffering had little political function at that time, except on rare occasions when 
it could be framed in socialist discourses.  
 
It was not until the 1990s, when the state began to re-exploit the resource of war 
suffering in the Patriotic Education Campaign, that ritualization of Chongshan’s 
suffering developed fully. 237  Wu ZY was the principal of Jiangwan Middle School 
during 1990-1996. He recounted in an interview how a patriotic monument was erected 
                                                        
235 David Kertzer, 1988, Ritual, Politics and Power, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 9. 
236 According to one interviewee, there was a Daoist ritual to pacify the dead after the plague, which 
was held in the clan temple in 1943 or 1944, right after the plague. However, this recollection is not 
confirmed by other interviewees. Moreover, using Daoist rituals to pacify the dead and seek blessing 
for the community, particularly after a disaster, is a conventional practice in Chinese culture. This 
ritual, even if it did exist, has very different meanings from those emerging in the 1990s. 
237 For a detailed account of the campaign, see Suisheng Zhao, 2004, A Nation-State by Construction. 
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for a students’ assembly in front of the Linshan Temple, where the child bride Wu XN 
was dissected. The theme of the assembly, held on 18th September 1992, was 
“Revisiting History and Remembering National Humiliation”. 
 
“Some villager representatives came and talked at the assembly. The head of the 
village was very supportive. The villagers carved the monument and erected 
it…The chief of Yiwu Education Bureau also came. So did some officials in the 
United Front Department [of the CCP]… [Before the patriotic assembly,] patriotic 
education was dull, such as the campaign of ‘Learning from Lei Feng’, ‘the five 
stresses, four beauties’ campaign238, or the trip to martyrs’ memorial mausoleum. 
After this assembly, the Linshan Temple was designated as the ‘moral education 
base’… The Linshan Temple was first written into our Yiwu local textbook for 
moral education in 1996 or 1998.” 
 
According to Wu ZY, the Linshan Temple has become a tourist site for “moral 
education” of the state since 1992. Many middle schools in Yiwu City came to the 
temple for the purpose of patriotic education. In the Bacterial Warfare Museum, there is 
an exhibition of honor placards. The engraved text on these placards silently records the 
increasing influence of Chongshan’s war suffering in national memory. On each placard, 
it writes in which year a school recognized the temple and the museum as its “moral 
education base” or “patriotic education base”. The earliest placard, dated to 1992, is 
from Jiangwan Middle School, which belongs to the township where Chongshan 
Village is located. The next placard, dated to 1995, comes from Yiwu Middle School, 
which belongs to the city administrating Jiangwan Town. A college in Ningbo, a city of 
Zhejiang Province where Yiwu is located, recognized the education base in 2006. Most 
recently in 2009, a middle school in Shanghai, a region adjacent to Zhejiang Province, 
put up its placard in the temple. 
 
The 1992 students’ assembly is not only part of the patriotic education campaign, but an 
                                                        
238 The “five stresses” are stress on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morals. The “four 
beauties” are beauty of the mind, language, behavior and the environment. It was initiated in the 
early 1980s.  
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important ritual to consecrate the Linshan Temple. Through this process of ritualization, 
a place of horror and legend, which was repeatedly spoken of in local memory and 
socialist campaigns, was sacralized. It became a symbolic space linking local war 
suffering to national humiliation. The stone monument standing outside the temple, 
which was erected in 1992, is an ironical symbol that represents the relations between 
the suffering community and the state in the process of nationalizing war suffering of 
the subalterns. Whereas it was the villagers who spent time and money building this 
monument, in the hope of venting their unheeded grievances, the monument has 
become a hallmark of state power, serving the interest of the state to reinforce state 
nationalism rather than heeding the concerns of the locality. The irony lies in the 
unfortunate fact that the suffered can only seek to legitimize their suffering in national 
discourse through a process that delegitimizes their own legitimate claim of war 
suffering. 
 
The power of ritualization also relies on the form that a ritual takes on. The more 
dramatically a ritual is performed, the more arresting it is in the eyes of outside 
observers. Furthermore, a ritual with some coloring of local elements produces stronger 
theatrical effects, and therefore is more likely to be voluntarily performed by the 
villagers. The most frequently reported and broadcast ritual in Chongshan is the very 
performative and traditional form of paying homage to the deceased. A typical 
newspaper report describes such a ritual as follows:  
 
“It is another year’s Tomb-sweeping Day. More than 80 representatives of the 
Bacterial Warfare Victims’ Organization, coming from Quzhou, Lishui, Ningbo, 
Jinhua, Yiwu of Zhejiang Province and Changde of Hunan Province, are marching 
towards the memorial pavilion in Chongshan to memorize our innocent compatriots 
dying of the plague. [At the front of the procession,] each representative is holding 
a portrait of a deceased member of the complaint group [who has been suing Japan 
for their family members that were victimized in the bacterial warfare]. ”239 
 
                                                        
239 Zhezhong Xinwen (Middle Zhejiang Province News), 29 March 2007, p. 14. 
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Along with the report, pictures of the solemn procession are displayed in a melancholic 
way. In one picture, the representatives were asked to vow before the memorial pavilion, 
with their fists waving over head. The participants obviously knew that they were 
performing in the presence of outside observers, as two of the pictures show a journalist 
carrying a professional video camera with the procession.  
 
Because large-scale rituals are organized only at certain momentous times, small-scale 
rituals are necessary for getting media’s attention from time to time. In those rituals, 
sticks of incense are burnt and Chinese wreaths, usually taller than adults, are offered to 
the deceased. People, fewer in number, are standing solemnly in front of the memorial 
site to pay homage. 240 According to Yiwu Tourist Bureau, many news media have 
visited to make documentaries of the national humiliation monument and the memorial 
pavilion, including the CCTV, provincial and municipal televisions from Shandong, 
Hunan, Shanghai, Zhejiang and Nanjing, as well as international media such as the BBC 
and Asahi.241 The visit of news media is often an occasion to perform such a ritual. 
 
Besides moralization and ritualization, internationalization is also an expediency of 
nationalizing war suffering in public discourse. There are two target audiences in this 
process - the West as the immediate audience and people at home as the ultimate 
audience. Xuan Wang, the charismatic leader of bacterial warfare lawsuits as well as a 
symbolic figure of the CRM, clearly knows who should be the audience to address. In 
an interview published in China Youth Daily, she explained why she committed herself 
to the CRM. Despite knowing that the lawsuits would not succeed, she thought that she 
had to let the world know what the Japanese had done in China. “Perhaps we will not 
win the cases in court, but we must win them in morality and public relations.”242 
Indeed, Wang has been rather successful in achieving this goal. Many major 
                                                        
240 See Xuan Wang’s blog: http://wx5286.blog.sohu.com/156122224.html accessed on 15 Oct 2010. 
241  Yiwu City Tourist Bureau, “‘Buwang guochi’ ji’nianbei (The monument of ‘remembering 
national humiliation’),” http://www.yw.gov.cn/ygb/25644/25646/200812/t20081225_164123.html 
accessed on 15 Oct 2010.  
242 Tieyuan Chen, “Wang Xuan: yige rang riben shifen touteng de zhongguo nvren (Xuan Wang: a 
Chinese woman who makes Japan uneasy),” Zhongguo Qingnianbao (China Youth Daily), 28 Aug 
2002, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20020828/809658.html 
121 
 
international media, such as the BBC, the NOS, the New York Times, Reuters, the 
Associated Press and Asahi News,243 have made special reports on China’s bacterial 
warfare lawsuits.  
 
Another way of internationalizing local war suffering is to bring foreigners on site. On 
such an occasion, the foreigners are less regarded as experts (journalist, pathologist, 
professor) than a “judge” to redress the injustice and allay the ordeal that the Chinese 
people experienced, although for the foreigners, they come primarily for professional 
commissions. Most of the foreigners are Westerners from the most developed countries 
(including Japan). This is because only citizens and media from the most powerful 
countries are regarded as proper witnesses to behold China’s ordeal and as competent 
judges to do China justice. A nation’s psyche does not differ much from an individual in 
that it needs recognition and consolation from those it admires and envies.  
 
The domestic politics of China also accounts for the necessity of seeking international 
recognition, because it can help open political opportunity for the CRM in an 
unfavorable political milieu and encourage activists to continue the movement despite 
the failure of the lawsuits for war reparation. Though the immediate audience of 
internationalization is Westerners from the old OECD countries, the ultimate audience 
is still domestic people. It makes human species feel good and dignified when they feel 
committed to fighting against a powerful evil, and that feeling is intensified if they are 
knowingly fighting before a powerful Other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The case of Chongshan represents the unheeded war suffering of the Chinese in the 2nd 
Sino-Japanese War. War suffering does not end with the armistice of warring states or 
the decease of the war generation. It has its own life, surviving in people’s oral 
traditions, in their lived experiences, and in the social conditions of their community. As 
                                                        
243 Ibid.; also see: Xianghong Nan, 2005, Wang Xuan de Banian Kangzhan (The Eight Years’ Anti-
Japanese War of Xuan Wang).  
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a source of politically problematic grievances and of anti-Japanese nationalism, the 
expression of war suffering is conditional on the political environment of the time and 
on the way it is mobilized. Under socialist campaigns in the Mao era, the expression of 
war suffering was suppressed and replaced by class struggle at the national level.  
 
Nevertheless, that expression of war suffering has been stifled in a society for a long 
time does not mean that war suffering has been forgotten. In particular, in the 
communities that experienced grave suffering, the devastating effect of war and the 
memory of it were not erased in the Maoist time. The absence of war suffering in 
historical records after 1949 reflects the state’s monopoly of official national memory 
and the complicity of intellectuals in making history under an authoritarian state. The 
Chinese people, particularly the less privileged social groups, did not forget war 
suffering and renounce their claims. Moreover, they had their own ways of keeping 
memory alive. This long suppressed remembering and airing war suffering at the 
bottom of Chinese society should be rediscovered and reemphasized in understanding 
the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism.  
 
On the other hand, the picture presented in this chapter is not a purely, authentically, 
autonomously “bottom-up” dynamic. The production and reproduction of historical 
memories bear deep traces of the party-state and intellectuals, who control the grand 
discourses and resources of mobilization. In the Mao era, the expression of war 
suffering became possible only when the villagers were able to find a crack in the state-
sponsored ideology and make their claims in the political campaigns of the state. 
Therefore, though the Mao era was a time when the expression of war suffering was 
stifled in national discourse, the CCP was still able to exploit local war suffering as a 
resource for mobilization. Consequently the new remembrance of war suffering today 
has been inflicted by the political culture of the Mao era.  
 
In the post-reform era, the state is no longer the only actor transforming local war 
suffering. Other actors, particularly intellectuals, are also major agents working to 
change the Chinese vernacular memory of the war. On the one hand, they help to bring 
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the unheeded suffering of rural communities to a national audience. On the other hand, 
the intellectuals have also issued competing claims about war suffering, which are 
different from those of the state or the villagers. The intellectuals’ rhetoric of 
moralization clashes with the state’s discourse of nationalism, given their emphasis on 
civil rights and humanity. Their rhetoric also conflicts with the communal interests of 
subalterns who prioritize material compensation.  
 
Local activists also play an important role in the process. They are usually resourceful 
in political connections, social networks or intellectual merits in the community. 
Different from the state and intellectuals, their major concern is to seek attention and 
redress for their community. However, their claims have to rely on the grand discourse 
provided by the state and intellectuals to attract the audience beyond the community. 
Participation of ordinary villagers, as seen in speaking bitterness, drama performance 
and the process of ritualization, also plays a role in transforming and nationalizing war 
suffering, as both the state and intellectuals need their active engagement and authentic 
emotion for successful mobilization. 
 
Therefore, the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism and its concern with Chinese 
war suffering in the anti-Japanese war of resistance is not a purely top-down or bottom-
up dynamics. It is a mutually constitutive process between the state and various social 
actors. It is also a historical process in which Maoist socialist campaigns and political 
culture have left a deep trace on the remembering of war suffering today. The claims 
wrapped up in Chinese nationalism of the state, the intellectuals, and the subalterns are 
rarely consistent with each other. Nevertheless, it is because of, rather than despite, 
these discrepancies and conflicts in understandings, interpretations and claims that 
Chinese nationalism has become a successful ideology for political mobilization, which 
otherwise would not have been possible through the party-state’s propaganda alone. 
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Chapter 4 Changing Images of Anti-Japanese Resistance,  
Changing State-Society Dynamics 
 
As in all kinds of societies, cultural product is a reflection of politics. The disparities 
and tensions, between sub-populations and the party-state in the understandings, 
interpretations, and claims of Chinese nationalism, are represented in the changing 
images of anti-Japanese resistance in films, television series and Internet programs. 
Taking the Mao era as a reference point, this chapter explores and explains the 
emergence of such a fundamental change in visual representation in the post-Mao age. 
By chronicling this change, it shows how state-society dynamics in Chinese politics 
have reshaped and will continue to reshape the images of anti-Japanese resistance in 
China.   
 
Since the mid-1980s, the standard portrait of anti-Japanese resistance, as colored in the 
language of class struggle in the Mao era, has gradually shifted to new images that 
allow and exploit the expression of disparities and tensions between sub-populations 
and the party-state. These new images in films, television series and Internet program 
have generated wide popularity and explosive reactions in Chinese society, and become 
a popular and profitable theme in the industry of mass entertainment.  
 
Channel 1 of China Central Television (CCTV) is the most widely watched as well as 
the most politically important television channel in China. When Showing Sword (liang 
jian 亮剑) was first broadcast in 2005, it was not expected that the television series 
would win the biggest audience among all series broadcast on Channel 1 in the year.244 
The series are cast against the backdrop of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, the civil 
war and the early years of the People Republic of China (PRC). It portrays a disobedient 
and charismatic CCP military officer Li Yunlong, and his legendary military 
achievements, particularly in China’s anti-Japanese war of resistance.  
 
                                                        
244 For the audience rate of CCTV Channel 1 in the year of 2005, see:  
http://ent.people.com.cn/GB/42075/3926640.html 
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Unlike traditional CCP protagonists, Li Yunlong is not a model party member, and 
often makes mistakes. He speaks and behaves in a coarse manner. He beats soldiers. He 
defies rules and orders from the superiors. He is shrewd and self-centered. In order to 
gain more supplies for his own troops, which is regarded as selfish and not disciplined 
in the CCP’s behavioral code, he dares to violate the rules and disciplines of the CCP. 
He makes friend with a talented general of the enemy, the Nationalist Party (KMT), 
with whom he fights in the anti-Japanese war, and against whom he fights in the 
subsequent Chinese civil war. He even falls in love with the best friend of his wife, 
which is a sign of spiritual corruption in the orthodox code of the CCP.  
 
All these characteristics of Li Yunlong subvert the requirements of a model CCP 
military officer by tradition. However, such a protagonist has received wide popularity 
in society, and stoked a contentious debate as well. The sensational success of Showing 
Sword, based on an unconventional CCP protagonist, has encountered harsh criticism 
from radical conservatives. “Li Yunlong is like a bandit!” “He is not like an officer of 
our army. He does not understand at all the disciplines of our army. He is far from a real 
soldier of the people’s army.” “Li Yunlong is completely a warlord.” The anger of the 
conservatives has been fiery. To them, Li was an iconoclast, and Showing Sword 
subverted the principle that “the Party commands the gun”. It ridiculed and tore down 
the three major principles of the political work of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
It denigrated senior PLA officers and damages the image of the army in public 
opinion.245  
 
Yet these accusations did not deter appraisals. After its first appearance on CCTV, the 
series were rebroadcast by more than twenty provincial televisions in three months. 
High audience rates and high rebroadcast frequency encouraged a nationwide fever for 
the original novel and recording DVDs. From China’s most authoritative source of 
audience survey, more than 50% of the audiences were civil servants, CCP cadres and 
managerial personnel, a strong indication of its popularity among the Chinese middle 
                                                        
245 Hui Cai, 18 Sep 2005, “Li Yunlong xiang tufei. Liang Jian liangchu le shenme? (Li Yunlong is 
like a bandit. What does Showing Sword show?),” accessed on 5 Mar 2012,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2005-09/18/content_3506321.htm 
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class and elite.246 Disagreeing with the conservatives, even the sons and daughters of 
late senior PLA officers, such as those of Marshal Liu Bocheng and Senior General 
Chen Geng, lauded Showing Sword for “its faithfulness to the historical context”.247  
 
Despite the great success, the popularity of Li Yunlong cannot be attributed only to the 
personality of the protagonist. The character would not have been so impressive if he 
were not placed in the historical context of China’s war of resistance. In the 30 episodes 
of the television series, the first 18.5 episodes depict Li’s legendary story in the war of 
resistance, while the next 6.5 ones and the last 5 focus on the civil war and the early 
years of the PRC.248  
 
In response to the criticism of Showing Sword, its defenders are apparently aware of this 
advantageous position on the moral high ground. “No doubt that Li Yunlong is not an 
easily manageable character, but his loyalty to the state, the nation and the course of 
anti-Japanese resistance is second to none,” a television drama critic commented. “Li 
Yunlong is the hero made by the time. The war of resistance needs such kind of military 
men. Li is born for the war,” the renowned actor who starred Li Yunlong replied to 
criticism.249 To them, if the charisma of the protagonist and its popularity among the 
audience do not sufficiently justify political correctness of Li Yunlong, then his 
nationalist credentials in the war of resistance does.  
 
Back to the year of 1955, the politics of mass entertainment, which was under a lively 
communist ideology, produced another type of popular anti-Japanese hero. The 
protagonist in Guerrilla of the Plain (pingyuan youjidui 平原游击队) Li Xiangyang is a 
guerilla leader, whose wisdom and valor intimidate Japanese invaders and Chinese 
traitors. Guerrilla of the Plain has been one of the most popular and influential films on 
                                                        
246 Aixin Chai and Jia Jia, 28 Dec 2005, “Renxinghua junren suoxiang pimi (The humanized military 
men are bound to be welcomed),” http://news.sohu.com/20051228/n241171111.shtml 
247 Ibid. 
248 It is calculated by the author. The series are accessible online. The introduction of each episode 
can be accessed via http://news.xinhuanet.com/ent/2005-09/07/content_3456384.htm 
249 Shu Yu, 8 Oct 2005, “Liang Jian yin zhenglun: Li Yunlong shi yingxiong haishi ‘tufei’? (Showing 
Sword instigating debate: Is Li Yunlong a hero or a bandit?),” accessed on 5 Mar 2012 
http://ent.people.com.cn/GB/1083/3748463.html 
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China’s war of resistance. Even in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when most 
films were prohibited from screening, this black-and-white film of 1955 was recast in 
color in 1974, with only minor changes in substance. In a special feature to 
commemorate Chinese films on the war of resistance, which was made by China’s 
largest Internet portal sina.com in the 60th anniversary of the war, Li Xiangyang was 
rated at the top of the ten most popular anti-Japanese heroes.250  
 
Comparing the image of Li Xiangyang in 1955 with that of Li Yunlong in 2005, the 
differences are striking. Although both are from the same class background, the 
peasantry in Northern China, Li Xiangyang is wise but not cunning, brave but not 
rebellious, authoritative to soldiers, but not in a coarse and explosive manner, all of 
which are in sharp contrast to Li Yunlong. Above all, unlike Li Yunlong, Li Xiangyang 
is unconditionally obedient to the orders and principles of the CCP, and acts as a perfect 
role model for the CCP’s military officers. 
 
The changing image of anti-Japanese heroes from Li Xiangyang to Li Yunlong is not a 
coincidence. In the post-Maoist years, films, television series and Internet programs 
have started to integrate various social actors into the narrative of China’s anti-Japanese 
war of resistance. Such a change constitutes part of China’s broad narrative change of 
this war. The success of Showing Sword is not an exception, but only a case that 
represents the culmination of such a trend.  
 
In this process, a multitude of political and social actors, particularly the “class enemy” 
such as the KMT, members of the gentry and warlords, and the “bad elements” in the 
people such as bandits and prostitutes, have gone mainstream in the representations of 
anti-Japanese resisters. Meanwhile, the protagonists of the CCP, who used to be touted 
as the dominant agent in anti-Japanese resistance, are sometimes relegated to a minor 
status, if not completely absent. In some other works, their image has been subversively 
reconstructed. As shown in Showing Sword, such protagonists are no longer uncritical 
                                                        
250 “Jiaopian zhong de fenghuo niandai: kangzhan ticai dianying huigu (The years of fire in the films: 
a retrospect of the films about the Anti-Japanese War),” accessed on 5 Mar 2012 
http://ent.sina.com.cn/f/m/krdy/index.shtml 
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practitioners of the CCP’s principles or true believers in communist ideology. Instead 
they are presented as unruly figures with grassroots spirit, who dare to challenge the 
rigidity of the Party’s rules and principles. In one word, they are not a role model of the 
CCP officers, and even not a qualified CCP member in any traditional sense.  
 
On the other hand, the change is not simply a process of de-politicizing the images of 
Chinese anti-Japanese resisters. The images of the legendary heroes today, despite their 
striking differences from those which were created at the height of the socialist culture 
in the Maoist years, are not a return to historical veracity. Rather, they are created in a 
process of re-politicizing the images of anti-Japanese resistance, which has been 
reconstructing China’s national memory on the new narrative of the anti-Japanese war 
of resistance.  
 
Despite the subversive challenges that these new images have brought to the traditional 
ones, which were erected by the CCP in the Maoist time, the new images are widely 
recognized and lauded, first in society, for their reinterpretation of loyalty and 
contribution to the Chinese nation, and then in official discourse, for their popularity 
and recognition in society.  
 
Thus, the standard of political correctness for the narrative of the war of resistance has 
been dramatically changed, first through the efforts of various society agents, and then 
through acquiescence and even encouragement from the Chinese government. Loyalty 
to the nation and contribution to the war of resistance now replace political loyalty and 
unconditional obedience to the CCP as the primary standard of making a successful and 
popular image of anti-Japanese protagonist.  
 
Such a change has both cultural and political implications. As the Chinese name of this 
war suggests, “resistance” is the central theme in defining collective identity of the 
Chinese nation and the CCP’s legitimacy. From the 1930s to the 1940s, successful 
mobilization of peasant nationalism in the war of resistance was a crucial factor for the 
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CCP’s rise to power.251 During the subsequent civil war and in the early years of the 
PRC, it was also based on the myth that the CCP was the leading force in China’s 
nationalist quest for greatness and modernization that united different subpopulations 
and bought the acquiescence of those who had feared communism.252  
 
However, at the turn of the 21st century, the CCP is surrendering its role of leadership in 
resistance against Japan to a variety of social and political forces, as represented in the 
new images of anti-Japanese resistance. Behind these changing images are changing 
state-society dynamics of contemporary China. The CCP, which is ideologically 
bankrupt, would not have been able to reconstruct such a group of new images in the 
cultural market, without the joint endeavors and different motivations of various social 
agents, including local governments, profit-seeking producers, artists and intellectuals, 
and some minority groups in the population.  
 
On the other hand, the new images are not free of political traces and constraints of 
earlier and present times. It is still influenced by stylized images of anti-Japanese 
resistance, which is inherited from the ideal of the people’s war in the Mao era. It also 
reflects the regulative power of the CCP, which incentivizes various social agents to 
engage in self-censorship and to use symbolic CCP characters in their cultural products. 
Consequently, most of these new images lack deep reflection on the anti-Japanese war, 
and are unable to represent the veracity of history.  
 
This chapter examines changing narratives of China’s war of resistance, as represented 
in films, television series and Internet programs, and its evolvement, limitations and 
implications. It tries to explain how and why it occurs as such against the backdrop of 
both historical continuity and changing state-society dynamics in China. In the rest of 
this chapter, it first takes a brief review of narrative change of China’s war of resistance 
in the existing literature, and shows why use of visual images in films, television series 
and Internet programs will be revealing. Then it divides into two major sections. The 
                                                        
251 Chalmers A. Johnson, 1963, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, pp. 3-4. 
252 Suisheng Zhao, 2004, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 210. 
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first section analyzes the images of resistance in the early PRC, and the second part 
studies the period of the post-Mao era. The two sections are set as a reference point of 
comparison for each other. A conclusion then follows.  
 
Changing Narratives of China’s anti-Japanese War of Resistance: from Text to 
Image 
 
In the existing literature on Chinese nationalism and China’s changing narratives of the 
anti-Japanese war of resistance, text materials are the main source of research. They 
include, but are not limited to, bestselling books, newspaper articles, internal reports 
and research articles. Using materials from these sources, scholars of the field have 
produced valuable works that advance our understanding on the subject.  
 
In China’s New Nationalism, Peter Gries observes, based on books, articles, conference 
talks and newspapers, that China’s narrative of the anti-Japanese war has shifted from 
“China as victor” to “China as victim”. In the postwar era, the storyline was that there 
would be no New China without the Party-led victory of the anti-Japanese War. Yet after 
the death of Mao, a new narrative of victimhood arose. It is obsessed with quantifying 
casualties, documenting the most horrendous cases (such as those in the Nanjing 
Massacre) and presenting China’s suffering to the West.253  
 
To historian Rana Mitter, the war of resistance was reconfigured in the era of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform. During the Cold War and under the Maoist historiography, the CCP 
took a pragmatic policy to appease Japan, and purposefully raised the importance of the 
Yan’an base area in the war of resistance. As a result, the war was dealt with in a 
cursory manner in propaganda, and the trauma of the Japanese invasion was 
downplayed.254 According to Justin Jacobs, even at the time of the 1950s, when war 
atrocities remained alive in the memory of the war generation, high-profile cultural and 
                                                        
253 Peter Hays Gries, 2004, “Victors or victims,” Chapter 5 in China’s New Nationalism, pp. 69-85.  
254 Rana Mitter, 2003. “Old ghosts, new memories: China's changing war history in the era of post-
Mao politics,” Journal of Contemporary History, 38(1), Special Issue: Redesigning the Past, pp. 
117-131.  
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propaganda campaigns were held by the Chinese government in order to persuade the 
people to restrain their bereavement and embrace yesterday’s aggressor as today’s 
friend.255  
 
The status quo was shattered by the 1978 economic reform. It led to deep splits in the 
Chinese leadership and society. Rising income inequality and growing regional disparity, 
with the resurgence of religious and ethnic separatism, pushed China to the brink of 
fragmentation. The danger was particularly grave in late 1988 to early 1989, around the 
time when the Tian’anmen Massacre took place. Therefore, a new ideological force, 
which would pull China together, was in urgent need for the CCP in the post-reform era. 
Along with these dramatic socio-political changes, commemoration of the war of 
resistance started.  
 
In fact, as Yinan He points out, Japan’s cover-up of war crimes was never challenged by 
the CCP until the early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy met with strong 
resistance from party conservatives and society. In order to “facilitate intra-party 
consolidation and for rallying public support”, history education regarding China’s 
resistance of foreign aggression was enthusiastically promoted after the 1982 Sino-
Japanese textbook controversy. War commemorations began to be held in newly 
constructed war museums, which were designated by the Party as patriotic education 
bases. The KMT’s military contribution to the war of resistance also began to be 
acknowledged in history textbooks, which were “published on the basis of the 1986 
Teaching Guideline”. 256 In view of Yinan He, this process of China’s reinterpretation of 
the war was one of national myth-making, which was exploited by the ruling elite for 
instrumental purpose as they felt insecure at home.257  
 
However, text materials are neither the only means, nor the most important ones, of 
studying political culture. In socio-political life, narrative changes can be represented in 
                                                        
255 Justin Jacobs, 2011, “Preparing the people for mass clemency.” 
256  Yinan He, 2007, “History, Chinese nationalism and the emerging Sino-Japanese conflict,” 
Journal of Contemporary China, 16(50), pp. 6-7.  
257 Yinan He, 2007, “Remembering and forgetting the war.” 
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a multitude of ways, both linguistically and non-linguistically. Using multiple sources 
of materials to study narrative change has the advantage in that it reveals multiple 
aspects of the change and enriches our understanding of the trend. Hence it requires 
expanding the scope and type of sources for studying China’s changing narratives of the 
anti-Japanese war of resistance.  
 
In light of the requirement, the early years of the PRC and the formation of new 
socialist culture provide an excellent case of reference for scholars interested in 
studying narrative change in contemporary China. Through a variety of means - spatial 
reconstruction, monument building, folk dance, parade performance, history writing, 
visual representation (such as oil painting, cartoon and New Year print) and 
commemorative ritual, the CCP succeeded in manufacturing and spreading a new 
political narrative within only a short period of time.258  
 
Museums, memorial sites and spatial symbols are believed to play a more direct and 
enduring role in shaping collective memory. “For most people, the written texts of 
history are only pale reflections of the history they see in their everyday surroundings. 
An ancient building, a local museum, a statue in a park, or even a notable landscape can 
carry historical narratives in ways that are more immediate and lasting than any well-
researched discourse on history.”259 China’s narrative change in the war of resistance 
has been reflected in the growing number and shifting style of museums, memorial sites 
and spatial symbols. In the Maoist era, the city space of Beijing was void of anti-
Japanese memorials - “no cenotaph, no tomb of the unknown soldier, no elite honor 
guard, no eternal flame”. Among the ten bas-reliefs at the base of the Monument of the 
People’s Heroes, the only one relating to the war of resistance is “not one of the bloody 
main-force engagements, but rather a scene from the guerrilla war against the 
Japanese”.260  
                                                        
258 Chang-tai Hung, 2011, Mao's New World: Political Culture in the Early People's Republic, Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
259  James A. Flath, 2002, “Managing historical capital in Shandong: museum, monument, and 
memory in provincial China,” The Public Historian, 24(2), p. 41. 
260 Arthur Waldron, 1996, “China's new remembering of World War II: the case of Zhang Zizhong,” 
Modern Asian Studies, 30(4), Special Issue: War in Modern China, p. 949.  
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In the post-Mao period, many landmark museums and memorial sites of nationalism 
have been constructed all over the country, such as the Longhua Martyrs Memorial Park 
(Shanghai), the Yuhuatai Memorial Park (Nanjing), the Nanjing Massacre Memorial 
Hall (Nanjing), the Memorial Museum of the People' Resistance to Japan (Beijing) and 
the Unit 731 Crimes Museum (Ha’erbin).261 In a comprehensive study of war museums 
in China, Kirk Denton finds that it was in the 1990s that the new narrative of 
emphasizing Chinese victimhood and atrocities came into the mainstream. 262 
Meanwhile, exhibitions in these museums were also shifting. For example, as Rana 
Mitter finds, the Military Museum, which was constructed in the Mao era, represented 
the style of the old period. Portraying the struggle between the CCP and the KMT as the 
main storyline, it described the Japanese invasion in a secondary position. In contrast, 
the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, which was opened in 1987, represented a new 
style of interpreting the war of resistance. In its exhibition, not only the prominence of 
the KMT’s military resistance, but also China’s contribution to the world anti-fascist 
war was recognized and acclaimed.263  
 
Besides museums, memorial sites and spatial symbols, rituals and performances also 
play a role in changing political culture and war narrative. As William Callahan points 
out, “politics is best analyzed as a series of performances, not just by state actors in 
official sites like the Foreign Ministry, but also through the cultural governance of less 
official sites in art, film, literature - and public holidays.” 264  His study of the 
performances on China’s national humiliation day is illuminating in this regard. 
Comparing the early 20th century and the early 21st century, the study shows that China 
has had different kinds of practice on such a national day, and such differences have 
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produced different political implications. In the early 20th century, political 
performances on the national humiliation day aimed to make a nation for salvation. 
After 1989, commemoration on the national humiliation day was revived, with the 
purpose of containing the nation and limiting the expression of identity by the 
populace.265 
 
Parks Coble is one of the few scholars who realize that China’s restoration of war 
memory in the post-Mao era not only relies on text materials, but on visual images 
through such media as television dramas, films and cartoon books. Despite this 
understanding, his empirical study only exploits writing materials. From voluminous 
new writings on the war of resistance that have surfaced in public sphere since the 
1980s, Coble reaches the conclusion that the themes covered in this new wave of 
memory restoration are selective. Only the narratives of heroic resistance and Japanese 
atrocities have been emphasized, whereas research and reassessment of the war from 
other perspectives has still been in underdevelopment.266  
 
In contemporary China, films, television series and Internet programs have become one 
of the most important means of propaganda. Taken together, they represent the most 
important source of visual images in the mass media.  However, in the existing study of 
changing narrative of China’s war of resistance, changes of this source in popular 
images have barely been touched. 267  Compared to text materials, museums and 
monuments, and official rituals and performances, materials of this source have a 
cutting edge: As a means of propaganda, films, television series and Internet programs 
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are most influential and faster in reaching to the public.  
 
As early as in the Maoist years, the CCP already understood to take advantage of 
motion pictures to mobilize the subaltern population. Starting a politico-cultural 
campaign, it aimed to train and send motion picture projectionists to remote rural areas. 
From 1950 to 1976, the number of projectionist teams increased from 600 to 81,367. By 
the mid-1980s, there were more than 120,000 teams that delivered motion pictures in 
rural areas, covering 97% of the production brigades nationwide.268  
 
Since the mid-1980s, televisions began to replace motion pictures as the primary means 
of propaganda that used visual pictures. With rapid economic development, televisions 
became one of the major assets in Chinese households. The majority of urban 
households owned at least one black-and-white television at the time. Ten years later, 
urban households had at least one color television on average, and the majority of rural 
residents owned one television per household (though 70% of the televisions in rural 
areas were black-and-white). 269  By the time of 2005, when Showing Sword was 
broadcast, the coverage rate among the population was 95.81%, which kept increasing 
to 97.23% in 2009.270 Meanwhile, China’s Internet users had reached 111 million by the 
end of 2005. The figure kept growing, climbing to 298 million in 2008 and soaring to 
over 513 million by the end of 2011.271 
 
Table 1: Household Year-end Ownership of Television Sets for 100 Households 
 Urban 
Average 
Urban 
Lowest Income 
(10%) 
Rural 
Average 
Rural 
West China* 
                                                        
268 “Liushinian fengyu jiancheng: zhongguo nongcun dianying fangyingdui (Sixty years of rural 
motion picture projectionist team),” see the website of China New Rural Film, 
http://n.chinafilm.com/news/60thncfy/ accessed 5 Mar 2012 
269 See Table 1. 
270 Statistics of the state administration of radio, film and television are available at:  
http://gdtj.chinasarft.gov.cn/showtiaomu.aspx?ID=9839bd59-979e-47f8-a7f7-11de55a00415 
271 China Internet Network Information Center, January 2012, Zhongguo Hulian Wangluo Fazhan 
Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao (Statistical Report of China’s Internet Development), No.29, p.12 
http://www.cnnic.cn/dtygg/dtgg/201201/W020120116337628870651.pdf, accessed 6 Mar 2012 
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 Color Black 
-white 
Color Black
-white 
Color Black   
-white 
Color Black   
-white 
1985 17.21 66.86   0.80 10.94   
1990 59.04 52.36   4.72 39.72   
1993 79.46 35.92   10.86 58.30   
1995 89.79 27.97 72.01 38.88 16.92 63.81   
1997 100.48  83.56  27.32 65.12   
2000 116.56  98.79  48.74 52.97   
2005 134.80  107.26  84.00 21.77 78.40 22.43 
2009 135.65  111.25  108.94 7.65 96.70 8.83 
Source: Collected by the author from Statistics Year Book of China (1996, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2010), 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/ 
 
Besides their unparallel coverage in influencing the public, films, televisions and the 
Internet are also more accessible to non-state actors, compared to museums, monuments, 
official rituals and performances. In contemporary China, a market of films, televisions 
and Internet programs has been in relatively good shape, whereas a market for museums, 
monuments and official rituals remains underdeveloped, leaving these means more 
vulnerable to the intervention of the party-state and scholars. Therefore, empirical study 
on narrative changes in the war of resistance can be benefited if employing more 
materials from the rarely researched source of films, televisions and the Internet. This 
chapter tries to take a lead from this neglected gold mine, and construct a roadmap 
concerning how and why the narrative of China’s war of resistance has changed as such 
in films, television series and Internet programs.  
 
Images of Resistance in the anti-Japanese War in the Early PRC 
 
In China’s cinema studies, PRC films are traditionally periodized into two eras.272 To 
some scholars, before 1978, films were only an instrument to serve the CCP’s ideology, 
                                                        
272 A more subtle periodization differentiates 1949-1966 from 1966-1978 because the latter period 
was in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. 
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which went to the extreme in the Cultural Revolution that only a limited number of 
model dramas (yangbanxi 样板戏) were permitted to be screened. It was not until the 
second period, when the fourth and fifth generations of directors rose to prominence, 
that films on the war of resistance began to flourish with diverse themes and 
perspectives. 273 To other scholars, although the second period is closer to historical 
veracity, the first period is also filled with effervescent enthusiasm, which cannot be 
entirely attributed to the enforcement of the CCP’s ideology. “These works have 
received lasting popularity, because they reflect popular taste, national and traditional 
empathy, and the environment of the time.”274  
 
Despite the differing views between scholars, a consensus has been reached that in the 
first period the central theme of the films was to “integrate it [nationalism] into the 
grand narrative of the new state ideology.” “In the authoritative discourse …modern 
Chinese history is a history of the people’s resistance towards foreign aggression and 
counterrevolutionary regime under the leadership of the CCP. The war of resistance 
against Japan is one part of Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle led by the CCP.”275  
 
Because television was a luxury and the Internet was non-existent in the first period, my 
study of this period focuses on Chinese film. Based on secondary literature of cinema 
studies and through personal viewings of representative films of this period, this author 
finds that the CCP’s ideology was represented in three aspects of the images of anti-
Japanese resistance - legendary heroes, indomitable people, and hierarchical relations 
between the CCP and anti-Japanese resistance. Altogether they constituted a dominant 
narrative of China’s war of resistance in popular culture, which served the political 
needs of the CCP and the popular taste of ordinary people.  
                                                        
273 Qingguo Qian, 2002, “Xinzhongguo kangzhan ticai dianying gushipian xingtai yanbian (Image 
and style change in new China’s Anti-Japanese War movies),” Jiefangjun Yishu Xueyuan Xuebao 
(Journal of People’s Liberation Army Arts College), No.4, pp. 12-19 and p. 23. 
274 Bogong Shi, 2005, “Yizhong ticai, bieyang fengcai – zhongguo ‘kangzhan ticai’ dianying shuping 
(1932-2005) (One theme, different styles – commentary review on China’s Anti-Japanese War 
movies (1932-2005)),” Dangdai Dianying (Contemporary Cinema), No.5, pp. 80-86. 
275 Lili Wang, 2005, “Minzu jiyi yu yingxiang shuxie – zhongguo kangzhan ticai dianying de lishi 
wenhua bianqian (National memory and image writing – historical and cultural change in China’s 
Anti-Japanese War movies),” Wenyi Lilun yu Piping (Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art), 
No.4, pp. 21-27. 
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At the Core: Legendary Heroes of Resistance 
 
There is a galaxy of legendary heroes in the films of this period. These protagonists are 
guerrilla or militia leaders, or work in occupied areas as intelligence agents. Their 
activities are under the direct leadership of the CCP, or they can receive guidance from 
it. In these films, each hero is a legendary figure, if not a superhero, in leading the 
people’s resistance against the Japanese.  
 
The popular film Guerrilla of the Plain (1955) tells the story of Li Xiangyang and his 
guerrilla in the Japanese mopping up operations (saodang 扫荡) in Northern China. Li 
is assigned a difficult task by the leader of the Eighth Route Army (the CCP’s army in 
the north). The task is to contain the Japanese force in the neighboring county, and to 
transport grain, which is stored in Village Li, to the Army’s mountainous base area. Li’s 
first appearance in the film is evocatively portrayed, not only as an experienced 
guerrilla leader, but as a Robin Hood. Skilled in riding and bimanual shooting, Li 
successfully broke through the Japanese blockade, with the company of one guerrilla 
soldier. On the way Li takes his men to Village Li, they defeat a small corps of puppet 
army on the way without striking a blow. The power of words that “Li Xiangyang is 
coming” suffices to intimidate the enemy. The film ends when the guerrilla wipes out 
the enemy in Village Li, saves the people and grain, thanks to the leadership of Li.  
 
The legendary figure Li Xiangyang in Guerrilla of the Plain is not an exception, but a 
role model of protagonists at the time. In some films, the images of heroic resistance are 
portrayed in an ensemble. The No. 51 Military Warehouse (1961) (wushiyihao bingzhan 
五十一号兵站) is such an example. During the Japanese occupation, the CCP has a 
secret military warehouse in Shanghai, which provides strategic supplies to the New 
Fourth Army (the CCP’s army in the south). Unfortunately, it is found by the Japanese 
police. In order to protect strategic supplies and prepare for a military counteroffensive, 
a young military officer Liang Hong is dispatched to Shanghai. To fulfill the task, he 
has to use a fake identity as a secret society member, who has relations with the head of 
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Shanghai’s puppet army. Although Liang does not like this identity, he accepts the task 
without hesitation, for his willingness to do whatever the CCP asks him to do. 
Encountering doubt and distrust, the young hero manages to split the enemy, and wins 
the trust of the head of the puppet army. As a brilliant intelligence agent, Liang is able to 
deal with all walks of life, including the head of the puppet army, his associates, a 
master spy and the godfather of the local secret society. Behind this CCP-style James 
Bond is a small group of CCP intelligence agents, who operate the No.51 military 
warehouse. In the end, they not only finish the impossible mission of transporting 
strategic resources to the base area under the scrutiny of the Japanese, but also persuade 
the head of the puppet army to become their collaborator. 
 
Among the images of legendary heroes in these films, there are subtle differences. The 
closer are their relations to the CCP, the more impeccable the images of the heroes. 
Symbolically, these heroic protagonists constitute a rigid hierarchy of communist rule, 
which reflects the political order in real life in the Maoist years. On the top of the 
hierarchy are the perfect heroes of resistance, such as Li Xiangyang and Liang Hong. In 
addition to unparalleled wisdom, courage and good looks, which other protagonists may 
also have in these anti-Japanese films, the perfect heroes never commit mistakes in the 
struggle of resistance. They do not need to experience a stage of “growing up” in 
leading the resistance. Since their first appearance, their image is both mature and 
legendary. But such characters of maturity and perfectness are not seen in other kinds of 
heroic protagonists. 
 
In Railway Guerrilla (1956) (tiedao youjidui 铁道游击队), another influential film on 
China’s war of resistance, which was produced one year after Guerrilla of the Plain, the 
protagonist is guerrilla leader Liu Hong, who fights the Japanese on the railway in 
Shandong Province. Despite being as legendary as Li Xiangyang and Liang Hong, Liu’s 
image is imperfect, compared to the two model CCP protagonists. Like Li and Liang, 
Liu is charismatic and adventurous. In order to acquire weapons for the guerrilla, he 
climbs up a running train which is transporting weapons for the Japanese. His signature 
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posture, standing at the front of a running train, with left hand clasping the train and 
right hand raising a gun towards the sky, is a powerful image of anti-Japanese resistance.  
 
Liu is also a loyal follower of the CCP. At the beginning of the film, the political 
commissar, who is dispatched by the CCP, brings a new order that the guerrilla should 
abandon the newly established base in the Japanese occupied area and withdraw to the 
lake area. The associates of Liu vehemently object to it. It is only under the authority of 
“Brother Hong” (Liu Hong) that they finally concede. Although unhappy with the new 
order, Liu insists on obeying it, because they are “the CCP’s army”. He persuades his 
associates that the primary requirement is to maintain party discipline and listen to the 
political commissar. Liu’s insistence shows that he is closer to the CCP than his 
associates.  
 
However, compared to the political commissar, who has closer relations to the CCP, Liu 
appears immature. After the Japanese attack the village, which is the base of the guerilla, 
Liu gets irritated. In retaliation, he disregards the objection of the political commissar, 
and orders his men to fight the Japanese, which puts the entire guerrilla force at a great 
risk. Liu’s recklessness results in the death of his closest associate and a nearly 
complete collapse of the guerrilla force. The political commissar is also wounded in the 
battle. In bitter regret, Liu admits his mistake to the political commissar, who, is of a 
similar age but with paternalistic lenience and military foresight, and teaches Liu the 
principles of guerrilla war and does not blame a word on him.  
 
The lesson arising from the mistake of Liu Hong is revealing. Without the correct 
leadership of the CCP, which is represented in the image of the political commissar, the 
heroic protagonist, no matter how brave, clever and charismatic he is, will commit 
mistakes and direct the course of anti-Japanese resistance into abysmal failure. In 
Guerrilla of the Plain and The No. 51 Military Warehouse, the protagonists do not 
commit mistakes because both Li Xiangyang and Liang Hong are military officers from 
the CCP’s army, and are dispatched by the superiors to carry on a special mission in the 
base area. Before their departure, they are both called to headquarters, and are given 
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instructions to lead the struggle. In both cases, their direct connections with the CCP, as 
well as their long-term service in the army, ensure the correctness of their leadership in 
anti-Japanese struggle. In such protagonists, we see an integration of the CCP’s 
leadership and grassroots heroes in one person, who constitutes a perfect protagonist of 
anti-Japanese resistance. In contrast, in Railway Guerrilla, the guerrilla is newly 
incorporated into the CCP’s Eighth Route Army. Although Liu Hong is also dispatched 
from the CCP’s army (at an unclear time), his connection with the CCP is weaker than 
the political commissar, whom Liu relies on to obtain order and learn correct strategy of 
struggle.  
 
The weakness in the image of Liu Hong also exists in the images of other heroic 
protagonists, whenever they are not an integrated symbol of the CCP’s leadership and 
grassroots resistance. In such films, there is often a theme of “growing up”. Grassroots 
heroes have to commit mistakes first. Only under the mentorship and support of the 
CCP are they able to gradually become mature leaders of anti-Japanese resistance. 
Muslim Regiment (1959) (huimin zhidui 回民支队) recounts the story of Ma Benzhai, a 
leader of a grassroots Muslim troop that fights against the Japanese in Northern China. 
Almost perishing in a battle with the Japanese, Ma and his force are saved by 
commander Guo’s Eighth Route Army. In order to survive and continue anti-Japanese 
struggle, Ma takes his force to join the Eight Route Army. To transform the Muslim 
regiment, the CCP dispatches Guo to be Ma’s political commissar, but Ma does not 
know that Guo is the person who saved him. Because of Ma’s warlord style, arrogance, 
and the instigation of Ma’s associate, who later betrays Ma, suspicions and conflicts 
break out in the regiment. Nevertheless, every time Guo is able to help solve the 
acrimonious problem and win Ma’s respect.  
 
Ma’s experience is a vivid demonstration of how a grassroots anti-Japanese force, 
which is led by a legendary hero without previous connection with the CCP, is 
transformed into a revolutionary army, and how the hero himself is converted into a 
qualified CCP member. In fact, the theme of growing up is represented in every major 
episode of this film. Soon after joining the Eighth Route Army and studying Mao Tse-
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tung’s On Protracted War, Ma’s knowledge of military strategy immediately improves. 
He leads a successful assault on the Japanese, whereas not long ago he has been 
devastatingly defeated. Besides military skills, Ma’s political leadership is also 
strengthened. Due to his insistence on putting anti-Japanese resistance over the struggle 
against landlords, Ma is losing authority in the Muslim regiment. It is the political 
commissar who saves Ma’s authority by supporting the soldiers’ claim. At the end of the 
film, the Muslim regiment defeats a Japanese main force yet political commissar Guo 
dies. Beside the dying Guo, Ma swears to join the CCP. The death of Guo implies the 
rebirth of Ma. The protagonist, after a long process of mentoring under the CCP, finally 
becomes the integrated symbol of party leadership and grassroots resistance.  
 
Not every heroic protagonist can be converted into such an integrated symbol, even 
though he is from the most revolutionary force - Chinese peasants in the CCP’s base 
area. In the early 1960s, two propaganda films, Landmine Warfare (1962) (dilei zhan 地
雷战) and Tunnel Warfare (1965) (didao zhan 地道战), received wide popularity. 
Tunnel Warfare has had 3,000 copies and more than 1.8 billion times of viewing.276 The 
two pedagogic films contribute another two well-known heroes to the images of anti-
Japanese resisters - Zhao Hu, the militia leader in Landmine Warfare and Gao Chuanbao, 
the militia leader in Tunnel Warfare. Their appearance represents the image of heroes in 
the people’s war of Mao Tse-Tung’s thought.  
 
These heroes from the people’s war are at a lower rank in the hierarchy of the 
communist rule than those professional military officers in Guerrilla of the Plain, The 
No. 51 Military Warehouse, Railway Guerrilla or Muslim Regiment. In Landmine 
Warfare, the protagonist Zhao Hu only plays an ancillary role in resistance. After being 
trained at the CCP’s military base, he returns to the village and leads the militia to fight 
the Japanese with self-made landmines. Although the militia is enthusiastic and brave, it 
is the Eighth Route Army that finally saves the villagers and defeats the major Japanese 
force. Likewise, in Tunnel Warfare, although Gao Chuanbao is growing up from a 
reckless young man to a mature militia leader, the role of his militia in resistance is 
                                                        
276 Quoted in Bogong Shi, 2005, “Yizhong ticai, bieyang fengcai (One theme, different styles)”. 
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secondary to the Eighth Route Army. In two episodes, Gao and the villagers are almost 
annihilated by the Japanese, before the Army comes to rescue them.  
 
Despite being popular in the audience, Zhao Hu and Gao Chuanbao are not highly 
evaluated in the CCP’s hierarchy of anti-Japanese resistance. They are not formal army 
officers, who are dispatched from the CCP’s military base to carry on a special mission 
as a guerrilla leader or intelligence agent. They are not charismatic leaders of local 
military forces, who are worth being converted into qualified military officers of the 
CCP. Therefore, such protagonists as Zhao and Gao are politically unfit for being made 
into legendary figures in the war of resistance. Their relations to the CCP are inherently 
inferior, compared to those legendary protagonists. Their weak tie with the CCP only 
suffices to make them stand out among the ordinary people in anti-Japanese resistance. 
They are heroes of a minor status, belonging to the people, not the CCP.  
 
In the Periphery: Liberated Ordinary People in Resistance 
 
Images of anti-Japanese resistance in the early PRC also include ordinary people, who 
are depicted as unyielding and resolute in accordance with the principles of the people’s 
war. In the course of resisting the Japanese, they assist the legendary heroes and the 
CCP’s army. They are both victors and victims of the war. Whereas their victory is often 
symbolized in the final battle between the CCP’s army and the Japanese, their 
victimhood is intertwined with unyielding resistance against the formidable enemy.  
 
A typical episode is as such: The Japanese and the puppet army kidnap villagers as 
hostage, and try to compel them to hand over the guerrilla soldiers they help hide. The 
villagers are resolute and loyal to the CCP. Then the Japanese begin to torture and kill 
people. At this time, a supporting actor or actress - usually an elderly man or woman - 
will bravely stand out. After denouncing the Japanese, s/he sacrifices his/her life. To 
enhance the impression of Japanese cruelty, the death of the elderly is often 
accompanied by killing children and setting fire by the Japanese. However, these 
victims do not die in vain. Their death inspires the anger of the legendary heroes and the 
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CCP’s army to take revenge, which leads to the demise of the enemy at the end of the 
film.  
 
The images of ordinary resistance fighters are present in many popular films in the early 
PRC. In Guerrilla of the Plain, refusing to tell the location of the guerrilla, Grandpa 
Laoqin, the most authoritative person of the village, is burnt to death by the Japanese. 
Little Baozi, a boy of five to six years old, is killed as well. Despite his young age, the 
boy does not have any fear and keeps resisting the Japanese until his death. In Zhang 
Ga the Soldier Boy (1963) (xiaobing zhangga 小兵张嘎 ), the most impressive 
children’s film on the anti-Japanese war of resistance, the soldier boy’s grandma saves a 
company commander of the Eighth Route Army. In order to protect the commander, she 
is killed by the Japanese. In Muslim Regiment, the Japanese arrest Ma Benzhai’s mother 
in order to induce Ma to capitulate. After instructing his son to repel the Japanese, Ma’s 
mother kills herself on a hunger strike. In Struggle in an Old Town under Wild Fire and 
Spring Wind (1963) (yehuo chunfeng dougucheng 野火春风斗古城), which is one of 
the most popular films on intelligence battle in the occupied area, the mother of the 
protagonist (a guerilla political commissar) jumps out of the imprisonment tower and 
uses her death to strengthen his son’s conviction in anti-Japanese struggle.  
 
The images of these ordinary people are heroic and unyielding, completely different 
from the images of passive victims emerging in films of the post-Mao era. For example, 
in the sensational film Nanking, Nanking (2009) (a.k.a. City of Life and Death 南京!南
京 !), there is little trace of resistance by ordinary people. The Chinese nation, as 
depicted in this film, is weak, cowardly and miserable. Although the renowned director 
repeatedly told the media that he was trying to remake the image of the Chinese in the 
Nanking Massacre and show that “resistance is everywhere”277, his word was just a 
bluff. A film critic wrote in fury against the passivity of the Chinese people in the film, 
                                                        
277 “Lu Chuan jiedu Nanjing: zhongguoren de lian buzai mohu (Lu Chuan interprets Nanking: the 
face of Chinese people is no longer vague),” originally from Xinwen Chenbao (News Morning), 13 
April 2009, cited from http://ent.163.com/09/0413/13/56PJDGP0000335TL.html, accessed 25 
March 2012; “Lu Chuan: ‘wo jiang de shi Nanjing de dikang’ (Lu Chuan: ‘I am telling the story of 
Nanking’s resistance’),” originally from Chongqing Shangbao (Chongqing Business), 14 April 2009, 
cited from http://ent.163.com/09/0414/02/56R0TJ2800032DGD.html, accessed 25 March 2012. 
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“I have viewed Nanking, Nanking twice, but do not find a pinch of resistance”.278 Such 
an absence of resistance would be unthinkable for films in the early PRC, in which 
victims die from resistance against the Japanese, not in surrender and humiliation.  
 
The images of ordinary people constitute part of the narrative of resistance in the early 
PRC, and fit the CCP’s propaganda of the people’s war. These images, like those of 
legendary heroes, demonstrate the subtle political hierarchy in communist China. The 
resistance of ordinary people is praised, but it is bound to fail at first. It is only under the 
leadership of the CCP that they can organize themselves, and assist the CCP’s army. 
When they are persecuted by the Japanese, it is the legendary heroes, the guerrillas, and 
the CCP’s army who comes to rescue them or takes revenge on their behalf.  
 
Furthermore, for these ordinary people, the process of resistance against the Japanese is 
also a process of liberation under the leadership of the CCP. In the early PRC, the 
propaganda of anti-Japanese resistance is often intertwined with the propaganda of the 
communist revolution. The three major themes in films on anti-Japanese resistance are 
struggle against economic oppression, resistance against enforced marriage, and fights 
with local traitors, usually from landlords, capitalists, local despots and villains. Led by 
the CCP, ordinary people are simultaneously liberated and empowered in the process of 
anti-Japanese resistance. They are “growing up”, and becoming conscious fighters 
against the old social order as well as the Japanese. 
 
New Story of Heroic Sons and Daughters (1951) (xin’ernv yingxiongzhuan 新儿女英雄
传) is one of the first films that recounts ordinary people’s anti-Japanese resistance in 
the language of class struggle. It is directed by Shi Dongshan, a renowned left-leaning 
director who committed suicide under political pressure in 1955. This film depicts how 
submissive peasants in a village of Northern China are enlightened by the CCP, and 
learn to organize themselves in resisting the Japanese and defending their homeland. In 
                                                        
278 Pingbang Sima, “Nanjing shi Q, Labei shi A (Nanking is the question and John Rabe is the 
answer),” http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_537fd7410100d33b.html 
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the film, the course of social revolution is tightly bound up with the course of anti-
Japanese resistance. 
 
Why do we ask for reducing rents and interests?  
For us tenant farmers to eat our fill. 
Why do we ask for eating our fill?  
For us to produce more this year 
Why do we ask for producing more?  
For us to resist against the Japanese with less difficulties 
… … 
Let us tenant farmers unite for the movement of reducing rents and interests 
Oh Landlord please listen,  
Reducing rents and interests is for the anti-Japanese war 
… … 
For living a peaceful life after the victory of the anti-Japanese war 
 
This emotional lyric is sung to the villagers at the beginning of the film, where the 
villagers are educated that only by implementing the good policy of the “democratic 
government” (i.e. the CCP) to reduce rents and interests, will they win the anti-Japanese 
war. Not only sufferers from economic oppression, but victims of enforced marriage are 
liberated in the course of anti-Japanese resistance. Xiao Mei, who used to be a cowardly 
young woman suffering from arranged marriage and her husband’s mistreatment, grows 
to be a capable revolutionary through her work for the CCP led anti-Japanese resistance. 
Finally she divorces her defective husband, and gains true love from a fellow 
revolutionary, whom she fell in love with before the arranged marriage.  
 
These revolutionary themes are recurrent in popular anti-Japanese films of that time. In 
Guerrilla of the Plain, the landlord is a traitor, and at the end of the film, he is executed 
by the revolutionary forces. In Muslim Regiment, it is also the landlord who betrays the 
regiment, although he initially joins the anti-Japanese force and finances it. The uneasy 
relationship between the landlords and peasant soldiers almost dissolves the Muslim 
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regiment, if the CCP’s policy of reducing rents and interests were not implemented. In 
Jie Zhenguo (1965) (jie zhenguo 节振国), a film of rigid Cultural Revolution style that 
portrays the struggle of mine workers in Northern China, the working class resistance 
against the Japanese is simultaneously the struggle for economic welfare under the 
leadership of the CCP.  
 
Even in a few films of higher artistic quality, class struggle and social revolution are 
still a pivotal point in representing anti-Japanese resistance by ordinary people. Story of 
Liubao Village (1957) (liubao de gushi 柳堡的故事) is a very special film in the 1950s-
1960s in that it delicately depicts the love between a CCP soldier and a young village 
woman, which is forbidden by the CCP’s military discipline. Although the story 
challenges the CCP’s orthodox propaganda of the army, the film does not deviate from 
the standard narrative that integrates anti-Japanese resistance with class struggle. The 
coming of the CCP’s New Fourth Army not only liberates the villagers from the 
Japanese, but also frees them from exploitative landlords and saves the female 
protagonist from forced marriage with a villain, who is working for the KMT and the 
Japanese. Like Xiao Mei in New Story of Heroic Sons and Daughters, the female 
protagonist in Story of Liubao Village also experiences “growing up” under the CCP-led 
revolution, from an ignorant young woman to a capable revolutionary cadre. At the end 
of the film, she reunites with the CCP soldier who comes back to Liubao Village, who 
has also grown up to be a mature military officer. 
 
Bitter Lettuce (1965) (ku caihua 苦菜花 ) is probably one of the last works of 
impressive artistic quality before the Cultural Revolution. What makes this film unique 
is that the protagonist is an old woman, whereas in most films of that time, an elderly 
female only plays a supporting role. As a fatalistic rural woman, the protagonist suffers 
from poverty and misery. Her husband is beaten to death by the landlord, and her elder 
son is forced to escape. Despite all the suffering, she is intimidated and dares not to 
resist. However, seeing the power of people led by the CCP and the sacrifice of the 
CCP’s revolutionaries, she feels empowered and completely changes. Becoming a 
steadfast supporter for the revolution and anti-Japanese resistance, she encourages her 
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elder daughter to work for the CCP and insists sending her younger son to join the army. 
At the end of the film, the protagonist grows to be a mature revolutionary. In calm and 
with great valor, she leads the Japanese army to the field of landmines, and kills the 
traitor by hand. The short dialogue between the protagonist and her younger daughter in 
the prison explains why she has changed.  
 
“My good kid, do you know what your elder brother, elder sister, Xin Mei sister, 
and the Eighth Route brothers are doing?”, asks the protagonist to her little girl, 
who is sick after being tortured by the Japanese.  
 
“Fighting the Japanese evil,” murmurs the little girl. 
 
“Yes, they are fighting the Japanese evil (da guizi 打鬼子) and struggling for the 
revolution (nao geming 闹革命). They are to uproot the misery and poverty of 
the poor. What are you going to do when you grow up?”  
 
“Learning from the elder brothers and sisters to fight the Japanese evil and 
struggle for the revolution.”  
 
In early PRC films, fighting the Japanese and struggling for the revolution are two 
indivisible sides of the same cause, which is the source of legitimacy for the CCP and 
its mass mobilization. This is an artificial amalgamation for political purposes, because 
there is no internal causal logic between the two goals. By combining the two, the CCP 
successfully inculcates the idea that the resistance movement would not be achieved, if 
the poor people were not liberated and the social revolution did not succeed, all of 
which should be under the leadership of the CCP. The amalgamation nicely fits the 
political hierarchy constructed in the CCP’s narrative. The ordinary people rely on the 
CCP for national salvation; they also need the CCP for class liberation. In both relations, 
they are placed in a subordinate position, inferior to the CCP and the legendary heroes 
who lead the CCP’s army. 
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Images of Resistance in the anti-Japanese War in the post-Mao Era 
 
In the early PRC, the CCP tried to “integrate it [nationalism] into the grand narrative of 
the new state ideology”.279 In the post-Mao era, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
the socio-political conditions have been dramatically changing, with the decline of the 
communist ideology and the opening of a cultural market. These new conditions enable 
a variety of social actors to join in reconstructing the narrative of China’s anti-Japanese 
resistance, which breaks away from the model narrative of the early PRC. Whereas the 
CCP still tries to take advantage of anti-Japanese discourse to serve its social and 
political goals, it has to compromise with these new actors in the context of changing 
socio-political conditions.  
 
In the cultural market, these new actors, driven by economic, political and cultural 
motivations, are trying to have their voices heard and their interests expressed by 
reconstructing the national narrative of China’s anti-Japanese resistance. They include, 
but are not limited to, a new generation of artists, local governments, market-oriented 
television producers, and religious and minority groups. Consequently, new images of 
anti-Japanese resistance have emerged in films, television series and Internet programs 
in the post-Mao era. The relations between anti-Japanese resistance and the CCP have 
also undergone a fundamental change, as presented in these new images. These changes 
are a response to the bankruptcy of the CCP’s ideology, changes in popular taste, and 
the desires and means that these new actors have to remake the war narrative.  
 
State, Market and Local Groups: Remaking Class Enemy and Bad Elements in 
People 
 
Starting from the 1980s, those model images of anti-Japanese resistance in the early 
PRC began to lose popularity. The traditional war narrative was not extinguished, but it 
no longer appeared in any monumental or sensational work in the post-Mao era. The 
CCP-led guerrilla warfare in Northern China, which was depicted as the major 
                                                        
279 Lili Wang, 2005, “Minzu jiyi yu yingxiang shuxie (National memory and image writing).” 
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resistance movement in films of the early PRC, has lost prominence in the new 
narrative, facing challenges from other forms of resistance organized by non-CCP actors.  
 
The first challenge emerged in 1986, when Blood Battle in Tai'erzhuang (1986) 
(xuezhan tai’erzhuang 血战台儿庄) was released. Recognized as a monumental work 
in Chinese film history, it is the first film in the PRC that positively depicts the KMT 
army and resistance in the front battlefield, as opposed to the battlefield of guerilla 
warfare in the war of resistance. The Tai'erzhuang battle marks the first major victory of 
defense of Chinese army in the war, which is directed by the KMT leadership of Chiang 
Kai-chek and Li Tsung-jen. The film also portrays a group of renowned KMT generals, 
such as Chang Tzu-chung (1891-1940), Wang Ming-chang (1893–1938) and Chih 
Feng-cheng (1903–1955), who abandon their personal grudges and fight heroically in 
the battle.  
 
Not only the images of KMT officers, but also those of unknown soldiers are 
evocatively represented in the film and capture the hearts of the audience. In order to 
thwart the progression of tanks in a crucial battle, the KMT soldiers rush to the 
marching tanks with a bunch of grenades, and throw themselves to the bottom of the 
tanks. Before they march to the battlefield, these soldiers are given some incentive 
money for this special commission. Yet they immediately throw all the money on the 
ground, saying, “Sir, what is the use of money if we do not care our lives anymore? 
Please don’t forget to erect a monument for us after the victory of the war of resistance.” 
This is an emotional and thought-provoking plot arranged by the film director. It 
implicitly questions the nationalist credentials and political morality of the CCP for its 
wiping out the contribution of ordinary KMT soldiers in the war of resistance. 
Apparently, the KMT martyrs were betrayed and forgotten in the early PRC.  
 
On the other hand, although this film aims to revoke national memory beyond politics, 
it cannot escape politics in the real world that has complicated the birth, spread and 
influence of the film. As early as in 1982, the first script of the film had been finished. 
But the proposal for making a film on KMT-led anti-Japanese resistance was rejected by 
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all state-owned film production factories. It was not until 1985 that the changing 
political atmosphere in China made it possible to cast such a film. The change was not 
completed in one day. In October 1981, on the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, 
Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CCP, released a signal of CCP-KMT 
reconciliation by publicly inviting KMT gurus to visit China.280 
 
The ultimate transition took place in 1985. In that year, for the first time, the Chinese 
Military Museum redesigned the exhibitions to showcase the contribution of the KMT 
in the war of resistance. On 25 August, The People’s Daily officially lauded the victory 
of the Tai’erzhuang battle, which was downplayed in the official historiography of the 
early PRC.281 On 3 September, Peng Zhen, a party guru and chairman of the standing 
committee of the National People’s Congress, formally acknowledged the contribution 
of the KMT on the front battlefield and proposed a third collaboration between the CCP 
and the KMT, when addressing on a conference to commemorate the 40th anniversary of 
the victory of the war. In the same year, two scholarly monographs were published, in 
which the military operations led by the KMT in the war of resistance were covered.282  
 
The production of Blood Battle in Tai'erzhuang suited the political need of the CCP at 
the time. As the signal from the top was becoming conspicuous, the support for the film 
was also growing unconditional. In the process of making the film, the Ji’nan Military 
Region dispatched its best troops to participate in the casting. The film successfully 
passed the censorship meeting, which was attended by senior officials from state 
departments. In 1987, Blood Battle in Tai'erzhuang was granted the highest honor of 
Chinese films – the best feature for the Hundred Flowers Award and the best 
                                                        
280 Yuenong Wu, 2005, “Deng Xiaoping he Jiang Jingguo zai taiwan wenti shang de qujin (The 
convergence on the Taiwan problem between Deng Xiaoping and Chiang Ching-kuo),” Dangshi 
Wenyuan (Journal of Party History), No.5, pp. 48-52, available at  
http://history.huanqiu.com/china/2008-10/254631.html 
281 Chengliang Yuan, 2009, “Xuezhan tai’erzhuang paishe de taiqian muhou (The stories before and 
behind the blood battle in Tai’erzhuang),” Dangshi Bolan (Review of Party History), available at 
http://xinmin.news365.com.cn/ygb/200904/t20090418_2286016.htm 
282 Wenqing Wang and Yiding Liu, 2007, “Kangri zhanzhengshi yanjiu yu zhongguo shehui jinbu: 
fang zhongguo kangri zhanzhengshi xuehui huizhang He Li jiaoshou (Research on the history of 
anti-Japanese war an social progress in China: Interview with Professor He Li, chairman of history 
of China’s anti-Japanese War),” Bai Nian Chao (Tide of One Hundred Years), No.7, pp. 59-64. 
http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/news/JSYJ/10102914160C77C8C1BCC64DC112AHD.html 
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script for the Golden Rooster Award. It was listed as one of “the hundred films of 
patriotic education” by the Chinese government. It is believed that the film has achieved 
the political effect that the CCP’s leadership had wished for. Upon learning this film, 
Chiang Ching-kuo and the central committee of the KMT immediately viewed it in 
Taiwan, and allowed it to screen in 1987. In the same year, Chiang approved the policy 
that allowed old KMT soldiers to visit China and reunite with their families there.283 
 
Despite all of the above, Blood Battle in Tai'erzhuang was not pre-planned work of the 
CCP. It was not until the last minute that the CCP saw the political benefit of such a film 
and threw support to its casting and circulation. The director of the film, Yang 
Guangyuan, was well aware of the political risk of his initiative in making this film. He 
was so deeply worried about the censorship meeting that he even brought a copy of 
Quotations from Chairman Mao to the meeting, hoping that it would justify his political 
loyalty in case he were be politically attacked at the meeting.284 Moreover, the success 
of Blood Battle in Tai'erzhuang did not guarantee that his later works on the KMT 
would have the same good luck.  
 
His second monumental film on the KMT’s fighting in the war of resistance, Iron and 
Blood on Kunlun Fortress (1994) (tiexue kunlunguan 铁血昆仑关), was banned for ten 
years. The film was cast in 1994 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the victory of 
the war in 1995. The combat on Kunlun Fortress, led by KMT Major General Du 
Yuming and his associates, Major General Dai Anlan, Qiu Qingquan and Zheng 
Dongguo, was the first victory in capturing Japanese occupied fortress in the front 
battlefield. When the film was ready for public screening, the political atmosphere 
suddenly changed in an unfavorable direction. The Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui 
visited Cornell University in June 1995, and the first presidential election in Taiwan was 
to be held in the following year.  
 
                                                        
283 Ibid. 
284 Chengliang Yuan, 2009, “Xuezhan tai’erzhuang paishe de taiqian muhou (The stories before and 
behind the blood battle in Tai’erzhuang).” 
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These incidents triggered the CCP’s fear and anger. In retaliation, the CCP deployed a 
series of missile tests from July 1995 to March 1996 in the surrounding waters of 
Taiwan. Meanwhile it was also a critical juncture for Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as 
he was trying to consolidate his power within the Party and the military. As a result, 
Jiang needed to shore up support from the PLA,285 and took a stern stance towards 
Taiwan. The missile crisis of 1995-96 barely brought China and Taiwan on the brink of 
a regional war. Although Beijing stopped military coercion and resumed to seek cross-
straits talks in 1997, for Iron and Blood on Kunlun Fortress, the political opportunity of 
passing censorship in the mid-1990s was missed. As an example of contrast, in 1994, 
Flame of War in the Sky (changtian fenghuo 长天烽火), a television series on the KMT 
Air Force in the war of resistance, was still able to appear on China’s televisions. In 
1995, however, Iron and Blood on Kunlun Fortress was banned for its acclaim for the 
KMT generals who had fought the CCP. It was not until ten years later that public 
screening of the film was approved. That was the year 2005.  
 
The year 2005 was the 60th anniversary of the victory of China’s war of resistance, and 
it witnessed the first visit of a KMT chairman to the PRC ever since its retreat to the 
island. On 29 April 2005, Chinese President and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao met 
KMT Chairman Lian Zhan in Beijing, which signaled a new phase for CCP-KMT 
relations. 286  In September 2005, in an address on the commemoration of the 60th 
anniversary, Hu Jintao again sent out a signal of cooperation to the KMT, and praised 
both the KMT army and the CCP army for taking a leading role in resisting the Japanese, 
in the front-line battlefield and in the battlefield of guerrilla war respectively. The CCP 
officially acknowledged that major battles led by the KMT in the front-line battlefield 
had severely crushed the Japanese.287  
 
                                                        
285  Suisheng Zhao, 1999/2000, “Military coercion and peaceful offence: Beijing's strategy of 
national reunification with Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs, 72(4), Special Issue: Taiwan Strait, pp. 495-512. 
286 “Lian Zhan fangwen dalu: 26/04/2005-03/05/2005 (Zhan Lian’s visit to mainland China: 26 April 
through 3 May 2005),” available at http://news.sina.com.cn/z/lzfdl/index.shtml 
287 “Hu Jintao zai kangzhan shengli jinian dahui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua (Hu Jiantao made 
important speech on the commemoration conference of the success of the anti-Japanese War),” 3 Sep 
2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-09/03/content_3530293.htm 
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After 2005, the KMT-led anti-Japanese resistance began to reemerge and return to the 
mainstream in films and television series. Chinese Broadsword against Japanese Sword 
(2007) (dadao xiang guizimen de toushang kanqu 大刀向鬼子们的头上砍去) is a 28-
episode television series, dedicated to the KMT broadsword brigade of the 29th Army. 
Crimson West Hu’nan (2007) (xuese xiangxi 血色湘西), a popular television series, 
portrays the heroic resistance of the KMT’s new 86th Corps and local people in West 
Hu’nan. My Chief and My Regiment (2009) (wode tuanzhang wode tuan 我的团长我的
团 ) and China Expeditionary Force (2011) (zhongguo yuanzhengjun 中国远征军 ) 
remind the audience of the forgotten achievements of the Chinese expeditionary army in 
Yunnan and Myanmar. Death and Glory in Changde (2010) (diexue gucheng 喋血孤城) 
is the first film to commemorate the failed defensive battle of Changde City, which was 
led by KMT Major General Yu Chengwan. The Changde battle was one of the bloodiest 
defensive battles in the war of resistance. In the 8315 personnel of the 57th Corps of the 
74th Army, only 83 survived the battle. Sichuan Legion Fights till the Last Drop of 
Blood (2011) (chuanjuntuan xuezhan daodi 川军团血战到底) is the first television 
series that commemorates the contribution of Sichuan Legion and presents the unfair 
treatment on the “irregular army”. During the war of resistance, the region of Sichuan 
sent out a total of 3.5 million soldiers to the frontlines across the country.  
 
The list cannot be exhaustive, but the trend it conveys is conspicuous. The most 
distinctive feature of these new films and television series is the recognition and 
commemoration of the role of the KMT army in China’s war of resistance. Though the 
political atmosphere has been more tolerant in this respect since 2005, there is still 
political risk of not passing censorship. In order to circumvent such a risk, there 
emerges an interesting expediency of compromise in almost all the works. That is, some 
unnecessary scenes or figures will be added in order to represent the role of CCP in the 
resistance movement.  
 
Unlike its role in films in the early PRC, the CCP now becomes a generous supporter of 
the KMT-led resistance in the front-line battlefield, not the absolute leader and 
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miraculous savior in the course of resistance. Accordingly, the KMT army now is called 
“the allied army” (youjun 友军), not “Kuomintang reactionaries”. For example, the 33-
episode Sichuan Legion Fights till the Last Drop of Blood has four episodes that depict 
a plot in which the CCP Eighth Route Army officers sacrifice their lives to save the 
KMT protagonists and help them return to the legion. No longer a leading force of 
resistance, the CCP army becomes a selfless ally that wholeheartedly helps the KMT in 
the course of fighting against the Japanese.  
 
In some cases, the images of the CCP become so awkward that there is no reason to 
have such characters in the works except for the sake of overcoming censorship. In 
Crimson West Hu’nan, it portrays a group image of local people and the KMT army, 
and their brave fighting against the Japanese army in the area which is historically 
related to the Changde defensive battle. In order to show the political correctness of the 
series, it tries to emphasize the CCP’s leading role in the resistance by setting up a 
woman who comes from outside and helps to mobilize the local people to resist the 
Japanese. This is a traditional way of constructing legendary CCP heroes and erecting 
the image of an omnipotent CCP in resistance in the early PRC.  
 
However, this character becomes a complete failure in Crimson West Hu’nan. Not only 
does she lack the wisdom, skill and charisma to lead the local people, but her presence 
brings troubles and disaster to the local people. In this television series, the traditional 
war narrative is completely subverted, though superficially it attempts to revive it. It is 
not CCP ideological work but Japanese cruelty that mobilizes the local people to join in 
the resistance movement under the leadership of local strongmen and bandits. It is not 
the CCP woman who saves the local people from the Japanese, but the local people who 
organize themselves and sacrifice their lives to defend their hometown and save this 
woman. In the end of the series, in order to protect the radar station which is supposed 
to be crucial for the Changde defensive battle, all major protagonists and the entire 
KMT army die in the bloody fight, and the CCP woman survives, without shooting a 
bullet at the Japanese.  
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This CCP figure is so unsuccessful because there is a fundamental conflict between this 
character and the purpose of the entire television series. As Crimson West Hu’nan is to 
sing praises for the local people and the KMT army in the war of resistance, the 
appearance of a CCP figure who is supposed to lead and mobilize the local people is 
self-contradictory. As a result, a compromise is made between political correctness and 
the need of the work. The CCP woman is present in the series, but she does not play an 
important role in the resistance movement, and her image is weak and pale. Such an 
embarrassing image of the CCP in Crimson West Hu’nan reflects the embarrassing 
political situation that the CCP has to face today: As the narrative change in the war of 
resistance is becoming inevitable in the post-Mao era, the CCP can no longer maintain a 
monopoly of the discourse of nationalism, and its nationalist credentials are being 
challenged by various actors arising from a growingly open society.  
 
Besides the KMT, the images of other kinds of “class enemy” and “bad elements” in the 
people, as classified in films in the early PRC, have also been reshaped in films and 
television series in the post-Mao era. Today they have become part of the mainstream 
images of anti-Japanese resistance in the new narrative. The popular characters include 
warlords, capitalists, landlords, gentries and bandits, who reflect more comprehensively 
the composition of anti-Japanese resistance in history. Since 2005, these new images 
have become a distinct type of cultural product in the industry of mass entertainment. 
Table 2 is an inexhaustive list of Chinese films and television series from 2005 to May 
2012 that use such characters as major protagonists. Along with this diversification of 
anti-Japanese protagonists, there is the changing role of the CCP in these films and 
television series. Whereas in some works, it plays a traditional role of enlightenment to 
the resistance, in some others, it is an ally, an actor of no importance, or does not exist 
at all.  
 
Table 2 Examples of Films and Television Series with New Images of Resisters 
Year Title Protagonists Region 
2005 Wolves Attack Prairie (langxi caoyuan) Bandit Inner Mongolia 
2005 Millet Ear Turns Yellow (gusui huangle) Gentry/merchant Manchuria 
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2006 Broken Jade (yusui) Gentry/merchant Tianjin 
2007 Crimson West Hunan (xuese xiangxi) Gentry and bandit Hu’nan 
2008 Venture into East of Shanhai Fortress 
(chuang guandong) 
Immigrant 
merchant 
Shandong, 
Manchuria 
2008 Auspicious Cloud  over Naiman Banner 
(xiangyun naiman) 
Mongolian Chief 
& bandit 
Inner Mongolia 
2009 Sword suspended in the Sky 
(zhongtian xuanjian) 
KMT general/ 
independent force 
Unknown 
2009 The Sorrowful Soul of Tengchong 
(tengyue shanghun) 
Gentry/Merchant Yunan 
2009 Legend of Ha’er (Ha’er chuanqi) Bandit/warlord Sichuan 
2009 Course of History (lishi de jincheng) Landlord Anhui 
2010 Iron Pear Flower (tie lihua) Warlord & bandit Northwest 
2010 Qiao Longbiao (Qiao Longbiao) Bandit Shandong 
2012 Independent Brigade (duli zongdui) Bandit Unknown  
2012 Ordinary Man (‘s responsibility) (pi fu) Bandit Northwest 
2012 Valley of Snow Wolves (xuelang gu) Bandit/strongman Northwest 
2012 Flaming Meteor (huo liuxing) Independent force Shandong 
2012 Two Bandit Queens (liangge nvfeiwang) Bandit Huabei 
Source: compiled by this author 
 
The burgeoning images of such non-conventional protagonists ring alarmed some 
conservative ideologues of the CCP. In September 2011, The People’s Daily published a 
critique of such a development in recent films and television series, under the title, 
“Caution! Entertainment Is Burying History”. Through an analysis of some recent 
works, it expressed deep worries that these films and television series were only 
interested in entertainment and making profit, which was at the cost of historical 
veracity. It alarmed that many producers reduced preparation time for making television 
series, and only cared for making a visual shock to attract audience.288  
                                                        
288 Shan He and Jiabei Cui, 2 Sep 2011, “Dangxin! Yule maizang le lishi (Caution! Entertainment is 
burying history),” available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/15568230.html 
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This is a political accusation of the changing narrative as reflected in these films and 
television series, but the commercial interest it emphasizes is not exaggerated. In China, 
anti-Japanese films and television series are profitable both politically and commercially. 
Crimson West Hu’nan has set a successful model in the two regards. The series contains 
attractive commercial elements from nearly every perspective – handsome protagonists, 
a sorrowful love story, exotic folk songs and customs, and the gorgeous landscapes in 
West Hu’nan. It is ranked the second in audience size at its broadcast time of the year.289 
Relying on the success in the cultural market, Crimson West Hu’nan was awarded the 
first prize of the best anti-fascist television series between 2005 and 2010 by China 
Television Artists Association.  
 
Whereas commercial interest has engendered enthusiasm for producing films and 
television series that break away with the old narrative, market mechanism has also 
distorted the images of anti-Japanese resistance in the new narrative. In order to survive 
in fierce market competition, film and television series producers tend to use the most 
eye-catching elements to attract audiences. Once such an element proves to be 
successful, it will be soon copied and employed by others. Since the subversive image 
of Li Yunlong (Showing Sword) became popular, many anti-Japanese television series 
have adopted this “coarse-style” to portray major protagonists. Their innovation, if any, 
is to make the protagonists more subversive and coarser. As a result, we have seen the 
rise of vulgar and maverick images of anti-Japanese heroes in many later works, such as 
the leader of the bandits in Crimson West Hu’nan, the CCP warrior in Euphorbia 
Flower (2007) (langdu hua 狼毒花) and the charismatic warlord in Iron Pear Flower 
(2010) (tieli hua 铁梨花). All these protagonists have been commercial successes in the 
cultural market.  
 
Sometimes producers are motivated to seek new elements for the protagonists in order 
to outdo competitors. This has brought continuing change in the styles of major 
                                                        
289  For the audience rate of Crimson West Hu’nan, see http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/m/2007-12-
11/13511829870.shtml 
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protagonists in recent anti-Japanese films and television series. The popular television 
series Town of Tiger Killing (2009) (shahukou 杀虎口) represents such a commercial 
success. Inspired by classic Hong Kong film series Young and Dangerous (guhuo zai 古
惑仔), the television series uses a blend of youth idol drama and triad society drama, 
which are tailored to attract a young audience. Filled with the youthful spirit of 
provocation, as the director of the television series admits, Town of Tiger Killing is 
made for the generation of the late 1970s and the 1980s under the cloak of the anti-
Japanese war.290  
 
Another strategy for gaining commercial success is to use women as major protagonists 
in anti-Japanese resistance, because it is rare to portray legendary heroes in female 
identities in the old narrative. For example, while the image of bandits has been over-
exploited in the new narrative, some shift to construct an image of female bandits to 
cater to the appetite of the audience. In early 2012, two such series were released at the 
same time - Flaming Meteor (2012) (huo liuxing 火流星) and Two Bandit Queens (2012) 
(liangge nvfeiwang 两个女匪王), both starring popular Chinese actresses. For shrewd 
producers and directors, using images of female resistance is a good selling point, 
because it can whet the appetite of the audience by blending erotic elements and 
national sorrows in the works.  
 
Directed by Zhang Yimou, China’s most internationally well-known film director, The 
Flowers of War (2011) (jinling shisanchai 金陵十三钗) illustrates this point, as a most 
sensational Chinese film in 2011. The plot of the film is simple. Twelve young 
prostitutes hide themselves in the cellar of a cathedral during the Rape of Nanjing, and 
finally sacrifice their lives in order to protect the girls in the cathedral from the Japanese. 
The film is impeccable in terms of visual and acoustic aesthetics. As a talented film 
director, Zhang Yimou knows well what the audience want – the erotic clothing and 
                                                        
290 Nan Yu, 11 May 2009, “Shahu kou: pizhe geming waiyi de heibang xi (Town of Tiger Killing: a 
triad society drama under the cover of revolution),” Xinshiji Zhoukan (New Century Weekly), 
available at http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/m/2009-05-11/17352512207.shtml; “Shahu kou: kangri ticai de 
qingchun pai (Town of Tiger Killing: the youth idol style of anti-Japanese themes),” 29 Apr 2009, 
available at http://ent.sina.com.cn/v/2009-04-29/ba2496842.shtml 
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postures of the women, the sorrowful love story between a Chinese prostitute and a 
white American, the brutality of the war, and the tragic sacrifice in the end.  
 
However, Zhang’s taste and motivation have been harshly criticized, both at home and 
overseas. Zhu Dake, a renowned professor of cultural criticism berates Zhang for his 
exploitation of such a national sorrow and human disaster. Disgusted by the political 
and commercial interest that is behind the film, Zhu labels it as “pornographic 
patriotism”.291 Hollywood Reporter would certainly agree with Professor Zhu, as seen in 
the straightforward critique for the film that “it’s something…only the crassest of 
Hollywood producers would come up with – injecting sex appeal into an event as 
ghastly as the Nanjing massacre.”292  
 
Despite of the critiques, The Flowers of War has become a big commercial success. 
According to the statistics of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, 
with total revenue of 467.14 million RMB from cinema screening in the domestic 
market, The Flowers of War was the best-selling film of 2011. The figure continued 
increasing, and by 1 January 2012, it reached a total of 584 million RMB.293 Therefore it 
seems that the Chinese public does not feel as disgusted as the professional critics do 
with the “pornographic patriotism” in the film.  
 
Besides the state and market, the appeals arising from local, religious and minority 
groups for recognition in the national discourse also contribute to the emergence of new 
images in the narrative of anti-Japanese resistance. In Sichuan Legion Fights till the 
Last Drop of Blood, the protagonists are not the regular KMT army, but a troop of 
inferior quality that is sent out by Sichuan Province to the frontline. The film depicts 
                                                        
291 Dake Zhu, 13 Dec 2011, “Shisan chai de qingse aiguo zhuyi (The pornographic patriotism of The 
Flowers of War),” http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_47147e9e0102e25m.html 
292 Todd McCarthy, 11 Dec 2011, “The Flowers of War: film review,”  
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/flowers-of-war-film-review-christian-bale-272125 
293 “2011 quanguo dianying piaofang gongbu, jinling shisanchai duoguan (The Flowers of War ranks 
the first in ticket revenue among Chinese films of 2011),” 18 Jan 2012, Chengdu Wanbao (Chengdu 
Evening), http://ent.newssc.org/system/2012/01/18/013425167.shtml 
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how Sichuanese soldiers, who are regarded as third-rate and treated with discrimination 
in the regular KMT army, bravely fight the Japanese in the war of resistance.  
 
Religious leaders and artists from ethnic-minority regions are also a vigorous force in 
struggling for the acknowledgement of the sub-populations they represent in the 
national discourse of anti-Japanese resistance. The Qixia Temple 1937 (2005) (qixiasi 
1937 栖霞寺 1937) is a film based on the real story of the Qixia Temple in suburban 
Nanjing during the Nanjing Massacre. It recounts the monks’ heroic acts of saving KMT 
military officers and more than 24,000 refuges under the terror of the Japanese. The 
playwright and producer of this film is a charismatic monk of the Qixia Temple, who 
was presiding over the temple from 2003 to 2005.  
 
Auspicious Cloud over Naiman Banner (2008) (xiangyun naiman 祥云奈曼) and Diary 
on the Kunlun Mountains (2010) (kunlun riji 昆仑日记) are two recent works that 
depict anti-Japanese resistance by the ethnic minorities. The protagonists of the twenty-
episode Auspicious Cloud over Naiman Banner are a Mongolian chief and a group of 
bandits in Naiman Banner of Inner Mongolia. Diary on the Kunlun Mountains is 
dedicated to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang who helped the Chinese army to transport 
strategic supplies over the Kunlun Mountains in dangerous weather. The playwrights of 
both films are scholars who are resident in these ethnic regions, and have profound local 
knowledge and deep attachment to the localities.294 
 
Interacting with these sub-national groups who are motivated to identify themselves 
with the course of national resistance are various actors who are seeking political and 
economic benefits in constructing the new narrative of nationalism. For the sake of 
political correctness and developing tourism, local government is one such enthusiastic 
supporter of expression of local identities in national discourse. As a result, local 
governments, television stations, and their affiliates become active producers and 
                                                        
294 Among the four playwrights, one is ethnic minority (Mongolian) and the three others are Han 
Chinese living for a long time in ethnic regions, which indicates that their view of ethnic minority’s 
anti-Japanese resistance can be Han-centric. The Mongolian playwright is a high-rank official in the 
Han-dominant local government. 
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sponsors of patriotic films and television series. For example, Crimson West Hu’nan is 
produced by Hunan Provincial Television, Venture into East of Shanhai Fortress (2008) 
(chuang guandong 闯关东) by Film and Television Producing Centre of Shandong 
Provincial Government and Dalian City Television, and The Sorrowful Soul of 
Tengchong by Teng Chong County Government and Yunnan Provincial Ethnic Film 
Studio. 295  The Qixia Temple 1937 is sponsored with one million RMB by Jiangsu 
Provincial Government and Nanjing City Government. 
 
Shrewd businessmen are also interested in exploiting local identities to make money 
from anti-Japanese films and television series. The exotic customs in local culture, such 
as dialect, music, food and clothing, are cultural symbols that are both appealing and 
profitable. While the national audience views these films and television series, they are 
also impressed by local cultures and attracted by exotic customs. The mysterious culture 
of West Hu’nan in Crimson West Hunan, the melodious local opera in Death and Glory 
in Changde, and the native Nanjing dialect in The Flowers of War – all the cultural 
elements of the locality in films and television series become a selling point for tourism 
and products of local specialties.  
 
Transcending People’s War: Alternative Narratives in the post-Mao Era 
 
Although the intervention of the state, market, and local, religious and minority groups 
has changed the images of anti-Japanese resistance and shattered the CCP’s myth of 
national salvation in the post-Mao era, the new images represented in films and 
television series still bear traces of the communist culture that was prevalent in the Mao 
era.  
 
In the early PRC, the concept of people’s war, which was developed under the CCP and 
Mao Tse-Tung’s thought, was acclaimed to be a decisive factor that had determined 
China’s victory in the war of resistance. As Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s designated 
                                                        
295 All televisions in mainland China are state-owned and supervised, including Yunnan Provincial 
Ethnic Film Studio.  
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successor in the Cultural Revolution, boasted on the 20th anniversary of the victory of 
the WWII, the fundamental reason for a weak China to win over a strong Japan was 
accredited to the belief that “the anti-Japanese war is truly a people’s war under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Tse-tung, which implements the 
correct political and military line of Marxism and Lenism.”296 Reflected in films, the 
images of the people in the early PRC are obscure and lacking personalities. Their 
capacity and achievement in the course of resistance depend on their relations to the 
CCP. Therefore, in such films, ordinary people are victimized and killed, those trained 
by the CCP can grow up to become capable local leaders, and the guerrilla leaders 
dispatched from the CCP’s military base are depicted as legendary heroes who defeat 
the enemy and save the people. 
 
In the post-Mao era, there emerges a subversive trend that tries to redefine the idea of 
people’s war in films and television series. A variety of political and social actors, who 
were conventionally defined as class enemy or bad elements in the people in the early 
PRC, are now reinterpreted as an independent force of resistance in China’s war of 
resistance, and reintegrated into the new narrative. These actors almost cover the entire 
spectrum of the social hierarchy - from KMT generals, warlords and capitalists to 
members of the gentry and landlords in locality to subaltern groups such as bandits and 
prostitutes – all of whom constitute an ensemble of the new people in China’s war 
narrative. Accordingly, the role of the CCP has contracted, from the unique leader of the 
people to a supporter of or an ally of other organized forces in the course of resistance, 
and sometimes its image is even absent. 
 
Despite these striking differences in the images of anti-Japanese resisters, the new 
narrative is still influenced by the legacy of communist culture. Although these new 
images of anti-Japanese resisters decipher the old myth of the CCP’s role in the course 
of anti-Japanese resistance, they still lack a deep reflection on the war, and are unable to 
present the veracity of history. To some extent, the new narrative is constructing a new 
                                                        
296 Biao Lin, Aug 1965, “Renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui (Long live the victory of People’s War),” 
http://www.marxists.org/chinese/linbiao/marxist.org-chinese-linbiao-196508.htm 
164 
 
myth in national memory, which is born on the debris of the old one. Consequently we 
see the emergence of a group of new stylized images of anti-Japanese resistance, while 
the old ones under the leadership of the CCP are receding from the mainstream. The 
problem of these new images is that personalized experience is still ignored in the new 
narrative. As was in the old narrative, individual experience and memory is replaced by 
the stylized images of anti-Japanese resistance, which are shaped today by political, 
commercial and local interest, not the interest of the CCP alone. 
 
Nevertheless, in some recent works, mainly those relying on the spread of the Internet, 
there surfaces a challenge to these stylized images, and instead uses oral history to 
recount individualized experience of the war of resistance. Among these works, 
Archives of Females in the anti-Japanese War (2008) (kangzhan nvxing dang’an 抗战
女性档案) and My anti-Japanese War (wode kangzhan 我的抗战) series I (2010) and II 
(2011) are a landmark. Both documentary series are made by individual producers.  
 
Zhang Xi is a writer and the producer of Archives of Females in the Anti-Japanese War. 
With the support of voluntary graduate students from a film college, she spent 100 
thousand RMB out of her savings, recording ten thousand minutes of her dialogue with 
60 female soldiers of the Eighth Route Army, who were aged in their eighties and 
nineties at the time of interview.297 The documentary series presents an entirely different 
angle of the CCP’s female soldiers in the war of resistance, which is closer to the 
veracity of history than are the images of heroines in films and television series.  
 
Coming from diverse family backgrounds - bankers, landlords, KMT generals, 
intellectuals, workers and peasants - these young women participated in the Eighth 
Route Army for a variety of reasons during the war of resistance. Not everyone was a 
nationalist, and not everyone joined the CCP army voluntarily. Whereas there were 
                                                        
297 “Zhang Xi, Fu Hongxing jiemi Kangzhan Nvxing Dang’an (Xi Zhang and Hongxing Fu decipher 
The Women’s Files of the Anti-Japanese War),” 18 Apr 2008,  
http://you.video.sina.com.cn/v/2/2008/0418/25752.html 
For the video recording of the interview, see http://you.video.sina.com.cn/a/1596088.html 
For the book, see http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/index_42904.html 
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some who left family and sought to join the CCP army for revolutionary ideals, there 
were some others who joined the Eighth Route Army in order to escape harassment of 
other troops, and some others who had hoped to fight the Japanese while maintaining 
their independence from any organized political force.  
 
Whatever their initial motivations were, the experience in the Eighth Route Army 
changed their lives. Some of these female soldiers died in the war. Some were held 
captive by the Japanese, and for the sake of this experience, they became victims of 
political movements in the post-1949 era. Some survived the war of resistance, but did 
not escape the tragedy of enforced marriage with high-rank CCP officers. Others were 
true heroes of the resistance, fighting against both the Japanese army and the CCP 
arranged marriage.  
 
This short documentary series, which lasts only 69 minutes due to limits of funding, has 
displayed for the first time the personal voices of ordinary female soldiers in the CCP 
army. It manifests a multitude of dimensions of the sweet and sour lives of female 
resistance fighters in a time of war and turmoil, which has not been represented in 
previous works. Therefore, although Archives of Females in the anti-Japanese War also 
presents images of female soldiers from different social classes, it does not attempt to 
construct a stylized story of social integration and national salvation as the new war 
narrative does. By revealing personal experiences and memories of these forgotten 
female resistance fighters, it challenges the new war narrative of the post-Mao era that 
is built on the collaboration and competition of various political, commercial and local 
interest groups. 
 
The two series of My anti-Japanese War, produced by Cui Yongyuan, a renowned 
CCTV talk show host, are the largest project so far that tries to deconstruct stylized 
images of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and reflect a more accurate picture of the 
war based on oral history. Starting in 2002, the self-funded project, which costs more 
than 120 million RMB, has interviewed 3,500 war survivors by the end of 2010, 
recorded by video two million minutes of oral accounts, and collected more than three 
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million photos related to the war of anti-Japanese resistance. 298 The 32 episodes of 
Series I were broadcast in 2010, and the 30 episodes of Series II were put online in 
2011.299  
 
Targeted at the young generation, the documentary series uses the Internet as its primary 
platform. Within only one month, the first series received more than 10 million hits.300 
Soon after the success of online broadcasting, it was rebroadcast by 84 local televisions 
in November 2010. In April 2011, the series was rebroadcast on CCTV, the most 
authoritative state television in China.301  
 
When interviewed by Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoumo), a popular pro-liberal 
newspaper, Cui interpreted his motivation for producing the series as such.  
 
You see the experience of every unique individual in the war. We do not need to 
make any judgment. It provides us with a new understanding of the anti-Japanese 
war that transcends all the previous textbooks.302  
 
Therefore, in My anti-Japanese War, we not only see abundant accounts of ordinary 
people and anti-Japanese resisters, whose sacrifice and bitterness of life were forgotten 
in the collective memory of the Chinese nation, but hear, for the first time, the voices of 
individual prisoners of war (POW) and puppet army soldiers, whose accounts were 
wiped out of historical records in textbooks, popular films and television series.  
 
                                                        
298 For the statistics, see http://tv.sohu.com/s2011/wodekangzhan/ 
By the time the second series was broadcast in 2011, 4000 interviews had been completed.  
299 To view the first series, see http://tv.sohu.com/s2011/wodekangzhan/ 
To view the second series, see http://tv.sohu.com/s2011/wodekangzhan2/index.shtml 
300 “Wode kangzhan wangluo shoubo cuilei (The first screening of My Anti-Japanese War on the 
Internet moving audience to tears),” 14 Sep 2010,  
http://ent.huanqiu.com/moive/mainland/2010-09/1100248.html 
301 “CCTV jilu pindao shoubo wode kangzhan (CCTV documentary channel first broadcasting My 
Anti-Japanese War),” 19 Apr 2011, http://yule.sohu.com/20110419/n306071138.shtml 
302 Yu Xia, 20 Oct 2011, “Huanyuan lishi quanmao keneng bushi yidairen neng wanchengde (It may 
be not possible to restitute a full image of history by one generation),” Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern 
Weekends), http://www.infzm.com/content/50437 
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On the other hand, although the motivation of Cui is to enrich national memory and 
restore the veracity of history, the effect of the two series may have counteracted his 
original intention. Despite their popularity, which had over 40 million hits on 
tv.sohu.com by November 2011, 303  My anti-Japanese War has only strengthened 
popular hatred against Japan, rather than provoking popular reflections on the war. Cui’s 
frustration with the situation was straightforward, admitting that the work would be a 
failure if it only brought up resentment against Japan. 304  After reading pages of 
feedbacks online, Cui said in disappointment,  
 
It’s all resentment. It is not what I had wished to see. I’ve read hundreds of pieces 
of feedback [online]. None is rational…I had wished that people could reflect on 
why that nation came here and made such a catastrophe. I had hoped that people 
could think hard about history...You should guard against your inherent tendency 
towards violence, inhumanity, and disrespect for human rights…They can be easily 
broken [and released]. It exists all over the world.305  
 
It appears that it is still a long way for Cui and his colleagues to see the true success of 
their works. Nevertheless, their initiative to break down the stylized images of anti-
Japanese resistance and introduce diverse personal experience into the war narrative is 
no doubt a cornerstone on the way.  
 
Besides deep resentment, there are other obstacles to restoring historical veracity and 
provoking thoughtful reflection. A prominent problem is that there lacks room in the 
PRC for political criticism and self-reflection on the Chinese nation – including both the 
political elite and the unenlightened subalterns - and their own responsibilities for the 
                                                        
303 By November 2011, there were over 40 million click throughs of viewing on tv.sohu.com. At that 
time, only thirteen of the 30 episodes of series II had been broadcast, but the click throughs for series 
II already reached 22 million. These figures were given by Cui Yongyuan in the interview with 
Hebei satellite television (see footnote 363). 
304 “Wode kangzhan er fabu; Cui Yongyuan: wo bushi haozhao dajia hen riben (My Anti-Japanese 
War II released; Yongyuan Cui: I’m not calling on people to resent Japan),” 20 Sep 2011, Beijing 
Wanbao (Beijing Evening), http://e.gmw.cn/2011-09/20/content_2667415.htm 
305 Interview with Cui Yongyuan on My anti-Japanese War, Dushu (Reading Book), Hebei Satellite 
Television, 29 Nov 2011, video available at http://www.letv.com/ptv/vplay/1420190.html 
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suffering of the nation. Comparing these new images of anti-Japanese resistance 
fighters with those in classic anti-Japanese films in pre-1949 China, the shortcoming of 
the new narrative in the post-Mao era is obvious. In films prior to 1949, the most 
acclaimed works are those of critical realism, that attempt to reveal the socio-political 
roots of war suffering, not only to blame all suffering and vices on the Japanese.  
 
Eight Thousand Miles of Cloud and Moon (1947) (baqian lilu yunheyue 八千里路云和
月) and The Spring River Flows East (1947) (yijiang chunshui xiangdongliu 一江春水
向东流) are two of the most outstanding works at that time. Directed by Shi Dongshan, 
Eight Thousand Miles of Cloud and Moon depicts the tragedy of a patriotic young 
couple during and after the war of resistance. Refusing her cousin’s marriage proposal 
and leaving a comfortable life in Shanghai, college student Jiang participates in the anti-
Japanese campaign of a performance troupe composed of patriotic young students. 
During the eight years of the war, they travel around towns and countryside nationwide 
to encourage popular resistance. Jiang marries Gao, a like-minded young man in the 
troupe. Unfortunately, miserable living conditions, the paucity of nutrition, and 
intensive performances destroy the health being of these young people. After the war, 
the penniless young couple returns to Shanghai, only to find that the family of Jiang’s 
cousin has made a big fortune and risen to the upper class, through immoral speculation 
in the war and by framing innocent people as traitors and confiscating their properties 
after the war. Unwilling to collaborate with the cousin’s family, the couple chooses to 
live in poverty. Tortured by malnutrition and indignant at post-war corruption in society, 
Jiang’s health completely collapses. 
 
The Spring River Flows East is commended as a real epic movie in the history of 
Chinese films. It has maintained an unbeatable record of revenue from screening of all 
Chinese films before 1949. When it was first screened in Shanghai in 1947, the total 
number of audience reached 712,874, taking up to 14% of Shanghai’s population at that 
time.306 The film is about the story of a patriotic and upright young man, and how he 
                                                        
306  Lifan Zhang, 2007, Junzi Zhijiao Rushui (Gentlemen’s Friendship Like Water), 
http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/chapter_41885_27959.html 
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falls into a corrupt life in the war. Zhang Zhongliang teaches at the night school of a 
textile factory in Shanghai. He falls in love with Sufen, a female worker in the factory. 
They get married and anticipate the birth of their first child. The outbreak of the war 
disrupts the happy life of the ordinary family. Zhang joins a medical team and leaves for 
the frontline. Sufen returns to the countryside with Zhang’s mother and the new-born 
child.  
 
Zhang is captured in a battle, but manages to escape. Having lost his identity documents 
and money on the way, Zhang comes to Chongqing (the KMT’s provisional capital) as a 
refugee. He tries to find a decent job, but his experience in fighting against the Japanese 
is not acknowledged, and he becomes jobless and falls into absolute poverty. In despair, 
Zhang contacts Wang Lizhen, an upper-class prostitute whom he gets to know in 
Shanghai. With the help and inducement of Wang, Zhang gets a well-paid job and 
quickly gets used to the life of the upper class. This is also a painful process of 
personality transformation. At first Zhang struggles bitterly in his mind, feels indignant 
at the extravagant life style of the elite in the time of war hardship, and is regretful for 
what he is doing for his family. Yet finally he gives in. 
 
In the countryside, Zhang’s family suffers from all kinds of hardship, as many ordinary 
Chinese families experienced in the occupied area during the war. Their assets are taken 
away by the Japanese. Zhang’s father is killed, and Zhang’s brother escapes to join the 
guerilla. Eventually the war comes to an end, but it is no longer possible for the broken 
family to return to the time before the war. Both Sufen and Zhang come back to 
Shanghai after the war, but they are not reunited. While Zhang continues the luxurious 
life of the upper class, and amasses huge wealth by confiscating properties of the 
traitors, Sufen is struggling to make ends meet for the entire family, in the empty hope 
that Zhang will return some day. At the end of the film, the couple finally meets again, 
at a lavish banquet where Zhang is the host and Sufen serves as a waitress. Realizing 
that she has been abandoned, Sufen throws herself in the Huangpu River and ends all of 
her distress in the spring river flowing east. 
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The two works are regarded as classics in the history of Chinese films, because in both 
the early PRC and the post-Mao eras, we seldom see such deep reflections on the 
origins and causes of war suffering. In both films, war suffering is no longer seen as an 
affliction imposed by the Japanese invaders. While the protagonists have survived all 
kinds of hardship in the war, the enduring suffering of the post-war era, which is 
inflicted by China’s unjust socio-political system, finally devours them. This is a point 
on which the majority of Chinese films and television series kept silent in the early PRC 
and the post-Mao eras.  
 
In both eras, the touch on the suffering of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and ordinary 
people in the post-war era, and the backwardness of the unenlightened and 
disenfranchised Chinese people, has been excluded from the mainstream discourse for 
political reasons – either through self-censorship or by the banning order of the party-
state. Let us have a look again at the legendary image of Li Yunlong, which was 
presented at the beginning of this chapter. The television series ends at the point when 
the first military rank awarding ceremony is held in 1955. At the ceremony, Li is 
awarded the rank of major general, and reaches the glorious height of his life. But the 
original novel has a different end, which continues till the 1960s. In the Cultural 
Revolution, Li Yunlong commits suicide, with the Browning given as gift by his friend 
and rival, KMT general Chu Yunfei.307 The oral history of war survivors in My anti-
Japanese War also stops at the 1945, 1950 or 1957, with little coverage of later years, 
though the accounts of these interviewees have been recorded until the 1980s. Cui 
Yongyuan, producer of the documentary, is conscious of what he is able to do and what 
he is not. As he said in an interview, “Recovering the full landscape of history is 
probably something that cannot be completed by one generation.”308  
 
In the post-Mao era, although unconventional images of anti-Japanese resistance 
fighters are allowed to flourish on screen, serious reflection on the war of resistance still 
                                                        
307  Liang Du, 2000, Liang Jian (Showing Sword), Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe (PLA 
Literature and Art Publishing House). 
308 Yu Xia, 20 Oct 2011, “Huanyuan lishi quanmao keneng bushi yidairen neng wanchengde (It may 
be not possible to restitute a full image of history by one generation)” 
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comes at the risk of being punished, if it deviates from the official line of political 
correctness. Devils on the Doorstep (2000) (guizi laile 鬼子来了), directed by Jiang 
Wen, is probably the best Chinese film that reflects this war from a Chinese perspective 
since 1949. It was awarded the Grand Prix at the 2000 Cannes Film Festival, and has 
been banned from public screening in China.  
 
Through an absurd story, the film questions the national character of the Chinese and 
tries to provoke a deep reflection on the cause and history of the war of resistance. At 
the beginning of the film, the villagers live in peace in the Japanese occupied area. One 
night, a mysterious man breaks into the home of Ma Dasan, and deposits there a 
Japanese soldier (Hanaya) and a Chinese interpreter (Dong). Not knowing who the 
mysterious man is, and fearing the Japanese army stationed nearby, the villagers decide 
to keep the captives. They feed the captives with the best food available, and wait for 
the mysterious man to pick them up. But the man does not come back.  
 
To deal with the two captives, the villagers fiercely debate. At first they decide to kill 
them, but are too intimidated to kill people themselves. Finally, they accept the proposal 
of Hanaya, who has been well treated in custody and becomes sincerely grateful to the 
villagers. He suggests that the villagers use him to exchange two wagons of grains with 
the Japanese army. However, Hanaya does not know that his army commander has 
already thought he is dead and established him as a model hero. Seeing his return, the 
commander feels shamefully embarrassed, but agrees to honor the agreement Hanaya 
reaches with the villagers.  
 
On the night of the feast, the Japanese bring food and wine to the village, and celebrate 
“friendship” with the villagers. In cheers and laughter, as the feast is going on, the 
commander suddenly orders the soldiers to kill all the villagers and burn down the 
entire village. Only Ma Dasan and his lover survive, as they are on the way back to the 
village when the massacre takes place. After the killing, the commander tells his army 
that the Emperor has just ordered the surrender of Japan.  
 
172 
 
The KMT army comes and takes over the area. Interpreter Dong is executed in public 
for treason. On the scene are numerous Chinese onlookers who are laughing in 
ignorance. Then Ma Dasan is executed in public, surrounded by the same Chinese 
onlookers who are laughing in ignorance. Ma is decapitated for “damaging international 
peace”, “disturbing public order” and “generating terror”, as he has killed some 
Japanese prisoners of war (POW) for revenge. The film comes to the height of its 
symbolic sarcasm at the end, when the KMT commander orders Hanaya to execute the 
decapitation. Hanaya, who has been held captive by the villagers and well treated by Ma, 
finally decapitates him, in a manner that the villagers have explicitly considered as a 
way to kill Hanaya. 
 
The sarcastic tone of the film subjects to critical scrutinynot only the cruelty of the 
Japanese, but the ignorance, cowardliness and forgetfulness of the Chinese, and thus the 
origin of the backwardness of the Chinese as a nation. To the director, the Chinese 
characters are not just targets of criticism and sarcasm, but a reality to face and reflect 
on. The character of Chinese peasants is related to the abysmal socio-political 
environment they live in, which is full of threats, coercion and uncertainty imposed by 
the cruel Japanese army, the fearful guerrillas, and the corrupt KMT government. In 
response to the deep reflection and international reputation of the film, the Chinese 
government has banned its public screening in China.  
 
Conclusion: Changing Images at the Crossroads 
 
Comparing the images of anti-Japanese resistance fighters in popular films, television 
series and Internet programs between the early and late time of the PRC, we see a 
fundamental change in the narrative of China’s anti-Japanese war of resistance. In the 
narrative of the Maoist years, at the core were legendary heroes under the direct 
leadership of the CCP. Accordingly, in the periphery, it was ordinary people who, under 
the mentorship of the CCP, grew up to unyielding anti-Japanese nationalists and 
liberated revolutionaries through the course of resistance.  
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Therefore, in the traditional narrative, the course of anti-Japanese resistance was closely 
intertwined with the course of communist revolution. The success of both courses was 
attributed to the direction of the CCP, and they constituted two indivisible sides of the 
same narrative. Legendary heroes, the indomitable people, and the embedded 
hierarchical relations between them and the CCP, constructed the dominant narrative of 
China’s war of resistance in popular culture. The narrative served the political needs of 
the CCP and popular taste in the early PRC.  
 
In the post-Mao era, the CCP’s dominance over the narrative of the anti-Japanese war 
has been shattered. The penetration of local government, market and a variety of interest 
groups into the industry of films, television series and Internet programs has reshaped 
the images of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and their relations to the CCP in the 
narrative. Not only class enemies, such as KMT generals, warlords, capitalists, 
members of the local gentry and landlords, but bad elements among the people, such as 
bandits and prostitutes, have been integrated into the new narrative of the war. 
Moreover, their relations to the CCP have become independent, not subordinate.  
 
The role of the CCP has also contracted in the new narrative, from absolute leader in the 
course of resistance, to a supporter, an ally, and even an absentee in the process. In 
works which CCP protagonists remain leading characters in the resistance, their images 
become fleshier and more complicated. Loyalty and obedience to the CCP is no longer 
the primary requirement for being a good CCP protagonist. Instead, the character is now 
judged by his achievements in leading the resistance against the Japanese. These 
fundamental changes in the images of resistance fighters are a response to the 
bankruptcy of communist ideology, changing popular taste in the cultural market, and 
the differing desires of various sub-populations in society.  
 
On the other hand, despite these changes, the new narrative is not free of political traces 
of the party-state and communist culture. It is still constrained by stylized images of 
anti-Japanese resistance fighters, which are inherited from the images of the people’s 
war in the Mao era. Most of these new images lack a deep reflection on the anti-
174 
 
Japanese war, and are unable to represent the veracity of history. In recent years, some 
alternative narratives have begun to emerge, which might be able to transcend these 
shortcomings. But their effects are still limited today, and they are at risk of being 
punished for political incorrectness. Today China has come to the crossroads of 
reflecting on the war of anti-Japanese resistance at a more sophisticated level.  
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Chapter 5 Contestation in the Protecting the Diaoyu Islands Movement:  
Baodiao Activists and the Authority in a Comparative Perspective 
 
In recent years, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute has become one of the major 
problems that incite Chinese nationalism and exacerbate tensions in Sino-Japanese 
relations. The anti-Japanese protest of September 2012 is just another incident that 
escalated the dispute. Sweeping over eighty cities throughout China, this protest bears 
something new and unusual, compared to the anti-Japanese demonstration in 2005. 
 
Mob violence, in terms of both level and scale, swirled out of control. It led to the 
sabotage of Japanese factories and department stores, to attacks on Japanese-brand cars, 
and to mass vandalism.309 Not only Japanese owned business but also ordinary Chinese 
were victims of brutal street violence. In Xi’an, a Chinese who had a Japanese-brand car 
was beaten to permanent paralysis. 310  A woman and her child were stopped by 
protestors, when driving a Japanese-brand car. The car was smashed, and her child was 
lost in chaos.311  
 
Shocked at and ashamed by such mob violence, the Chinese middle class spearheaded 
the ensuing public condemnation of the protest, expressing their discontent and critiques 
on social media such as weibo (the Chinese version of twitter). This was a dramatic shift 
of the role of the Chinese middle class in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, because in 2003, 
it was they who had initiated the first expedition to the Diaoyu Islands from mainland 
China. The expedition and subsequent civil activities, organized by the Chinese middle 
class and professionals, have brought the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute onto the political 
agenda of Chinese politics, and altered the set of policies from which the party-state 
could have chosen.  
                                                        
309 Justin McCurry, 17 Sep 2012, “Japanese firms close offices in China as islands row escalates,” 
The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/17/japanese-firms-close-offices-china 
310 Report on the attack in Xi’an, 21 Sep 2012, Beijing Qingnianbao (Beijing Youth Daily)   
http://news.ifeng.com/society/2/detail_2012_09/21/17795425_0.shtml 
311 Report on the attack on the woman and her child, 21 Sep 2012, Nanfang Dushibao Weibo 
(“Weibo” (Chinese Twitter) of Southern Metropolis Daily)  
http://www.xiancity.cn/readnews.php?id=58069 
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This chapter reveals why and how the Chinese middle class and professionals, with 
their understandings, interpretations and claims of nationalism which are different from 
state nationalism, intensified the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and provoked Chinese 
nationalism in the early 2000s. Their initiatives and strategies not only successfully 
challenged Japan’s administration over the disputed islands, but also weakened the 
party-state’s monopoly over the interpretation of Chinese nationalism and foreign 
policy towards Japan.  
 
This chapter also compares Baodiao (Protecting the Diaoyu Islands Movement) under 
different socio-political conditions. It shows that street violence is not an intrinsic 
character of Baodiao, but that state-society dynamics in mainland China have 
inexorably led the movement towards mob violence and social unrest under the banner 
of Chinese nationalism. There are different kinds of Baodiao mobilization in the Greater 
China area (Taiwan, Hong Kong and China). In all the three contexts, Baodiao was 
initiated from below, in the process of which social activists were contesting with the 
authority for their respective interpretations and claims of nationalism.  
 
Despite the similar nature of Baodiao in the three contexts, the movement nevertheless 
displays striking differences, particularly in the composition of activists, the strategies 
they took, and evolution of the movement. This is because, this chapter argues, the 
movement encountered a different level of repression in the three contexts, and 
consequently it required a different mobilizing structure for the activists to successfully 
bring up the challenge. This also explains why leading Baodiao activists in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and China come from different social backgrounds. It is under the most 
authoritarian political context (that is, mainland China) that Baodiao’s contestation has 
been derailed, leading to street violence and stifled civil nationalism.  
 
This is the first study that researches Baodiao in a cross-contextual comparison with 
rich resources of memoires and interviews. This kind of contextualization is new and 
different from what is found in the existing literature, with its exclusive focus on the 
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PRC. Such a historical and comparative perspective has an apparent advantage. It not 
only contributes to a knowledge of how the understandings, interpretations and claims 
of nationalism, held by the Chinese Baodiao activists, differ from what is propagated in 
state nationalism in China, but also reveals why the way China’s Baodiao activists 
construe, express and exploit state nationalism is different from their counterparts in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
Overview of the Existing Approaches in Studying Baodiao 
 
The Diaoyu Islands, named Senkaku Islands by Japan, are literarily eight islets with a 
total area of 6.3 kilometer squares located in the East China Sea, some 100 nautical 
miles northeast of Taiwan and 200 nautical miles west of Okinawa. These barren 
islands are strategically vital to both China and Japan. Economically, it is estimated that 
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) related to the islands 
contain almost 100 billion barrels of oil and rich fishing grounds.312 Strategically, China 
views these islands as part of its strategic front east of the continent.313 Politically and 
symbolically, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have become a potential trigger of regional 
instability and warfare, because neither authoritarian China nor democratic Japan is able 
to make territorial compromise under increasing domestic pressure. To China, the 
dispute over these islands triggers its sensitive nerves over the so-called “hundred years 
of humiliation”, because Japan was the only nation that nearly conquered the entire 
China in its modern history. Therefore, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands is of great economic, strategic, political and symbolic value to both China and 
Japan.  
 
Traditionally scholars have focused on the legal, historical and diplomatic aspects of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. These approaches are useful for understanding the 
development of the dispute, but they have severe limitations. In legal terms, China 
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claims its sovereignty based on the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam 
Proclamation that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”314 This means, 
according to China’s interpretation as a signatory to the declarations, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands shall be reverted to China along with Taiwan, which was ceded 
to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the 1st Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  
 
Japan refutes China’s claim by insisting that according to the 1951 San Francisco 
Treaty, it only renounced rights, titles and claims to Formasa (Taiwan) and the 
Pescadores (Penghu), with no mention of the Senkaku.315 Additionally, Article 3 of the 
treaty stipulates that “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the 
United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole 
administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. north latitude (including the 
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the 
Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus 
Island.”316 Therefore, Japan interprets that it should incorporate the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands under the trusteeship, as stipulated in the article. As a counterargument, China 
claims that it was not a signatory to the San Francisco Treaty, and therefore China is not 
bound by it.  
 
Japan further claims that these islands were terra nullius (unclaimed territory) 
legitimately incorporated in its Okinawa prefecture before the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
Therefore Japan has no obligation to renounce its sovereignty under the post-WWII 
treaties. China refutes this argument by claiming that these islands were historically part 
of China, which Japan stole from China during the late period of the Qing Empire. 
Therefore, according to China’s claim, the principle of terra nullius cannot apply. 
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Japan then questions the motivations of China and Taiwan in taking up the issue, 
because neither of them brought up the dispute until the 1969 UN Economic 
Commission report that indicated the possibility of huge oil and gas reserves in the 
vicinity of these islands. Such an accusation helps Japan attract international sympathy, 
but China soon takes its revenge, showing evidence that Japan also did not change its 
map and incite nationalists at home to incorporate the islands until after 1971.317  
 
From a historical point of view, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is fundamentally 
not a legal issue. Instead it is an issue of clashes between the old and the new world 
orders. According to this view, the arguments between China and Japan over legal 
possession of the islands, based on either historical records or principles of international 
law, fail to acknowledge that such contentions are rooted in the clash of the Sino-centric 
international order and the new world order based on European international law. 
Whereas the Sino-centric international order in East Asia started to wane in the late 
Qing Dynasty, during the same period, European international law was imposed by 
Japan, which was actively pursuing de-Asianization and modernity.318  
 
Under the Sino-centric international order, the Ryukyus (modern-day Okinawa) was 
one of the vassal states under China’s suzerainty and imperial rule. It was not 
incorporated in the Chinese empire, because it was not necessary to conquer a vassal 
state by force and establish direct administration over it, in order to subdue the vassal 
state under the Sino-centric world order. The unequal relations between the 
dominant state and the vassal state were sufficient to establish and maintain such an old 
world order centered on the Chinese empire. Therefore, “outside China proper, it was 
possible to rule even where there was no mechanism of physical governance in 
place.”319 
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However, Japan was an exception in the region of East Asia. It stayed out of the Sino-
centric tributary system during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). During the Meiji 
period (1868-1912), Japan swiftly adopted “the western lexicon into its diplomatic 
language”, and by so doing, it “was able to undermine China’s central position in Asia 
during the late 19th century by using the language and force of western international law 
to replace Chinese legal terms hitherto widely accepted in East Asia.”320  
 
The outcomes of the WWII in East Asia complicated the issue. Japan lost the war to 
China, but China could not have been able to win the war without the aid of the United 
States and the U.S. attack on Japan and its colonies. Compared to Japan, the U.S is a 
more powerful and authentic imposer of the new world order. This means that, after the 
WWII, it was impossible for the old regional order in East Asia to be restored. Mired in 
the Cold War, the U.S. created the San Francisco system that sowed the seeds of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan.321 Furthermore, the ambiguities of 
international law mean that even if China and Japan would agree some day to submit 
the dispute to international adjudication, it would still be impossible to resolve the 
conflict, because “many definitions and concepts of this modern law are still 
underdeveloped.”322 
 
The study of the diplomatic aspects of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute focuses on political 
maneuvers of the two countries at the time of diplomatic crisis. According to Min Gyo 
Koo, there are five rounds of clashes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between the late 
1960s and 2005. The first round of dispute (1968-71) was provoked by the United 
Nations’ report that under the surrounding waters of the islands, there was probably a 
huge reserve of oil and gas. This was the inception of the dispute. Against this backdrop, 
the 1971 Okinawa reversion to Japan by the United States immediately led to a flare-up 
of Sino-Japanese tensions. The second round of clashes (1978) occurred as an interlude 
in the negotiation of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. This time China 
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even sent a flotilla of armed fishing boats to the disputed waters to claim its sovereignty. 
The third round (1990-91) emerged in 1990, when Japan authorized a rightist group to 
build a lighthouse on one of the disputed islands. It provoked strong anti-Japanese 
reactions in China, which coincided with China’s decision to shore up nationalism in 
the collapse of the communist bloc. The fourth round of clashes (1996) was again 
prodded by Japan’s lighthouse on the islands, which culminated in the drowning of 
Hong Kong activist Chan Yuk Cheung in the surrounding waters. In contrast to 
previous clashes, the fifth round (2004-05) was catalyzed by China. A group of Chinese 
activists landed on one of the islands in March 2004. The simmering bilateral tensions 
were further antagonized by Japan’s authorization of a disputed history textbook. The 
discontent and distrust on the Chinese side finally erupted in an anti-Japanese mass 
demonstration in 2005.323  
 
Koo’s record of Sino-Japanese flare-ups over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands provides a 
comprehensive chronology of bilateral collisions from the inception to 2005. As seen in 
his description and analysis, at the diplomatic level, there are few differences between 
the five rounds of clashes. Each time Beijing and Tokyo put priority on economies and 
geopolitics, rather than letting nationalist flare-ups grow out of control.324 Each time 
when the crisis has cooled down, both countries lack interest in making “any efforts to 
compromise and negotiate a settlement of the dispute”, and prefer to take “a strategy of 
delaying and deferring settlement of the dispute”.325  
 
What cannot be reflected in this meticulous chronology, and what cannot be explained 
by the legal and historical approaches, is why the dynamics of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute have demonstrated different characteristics and consequences in Baodiao 
mobilization, whereas China and Japan were consistent in their political interests and 
gestures (at least till 2005). Seeing through the lens of Baodiao mobilization, state-
                                                        
323 Min Gyo Koo, 2005, “Scramble for the rocks: the disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima, Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu, and Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Dissertation, UC Berkeley. 
324 Min Gyo Koo, 2005, “Scramble for the rocks”. 
325 Taylor Fravel, 2010, “Explaining stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) dispute,” Chapter 7 in Gerald 
Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi (eds.), Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-
Japan-US Relations. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, p. 157.  
182 
 
society dynamics have changed dramatically.  
 
Over the past four decades, there has been little similarity in Baodiao mobilization in 
terms of agents, strategies and consequences. The movement first flourished in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and the U.S. in the early 1970s, in the form of student protests that aimed to 
oppose the U.S. reversion of the islands to Japan. Activists from China were absent in 
the spotlight at that time, but it does not mean that they did not exist. In the mid-1990s, 
Baodiao activists started to use expeditions to the disputed waters as a means of 
mobilization. This time, activists from China started to connect and learn from their 
counterparts in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but it was still the latter who played the main 
role in the mobilization. It was not until 2003 that activists from China successfully 
organized an expedition to the islands, relying on mobilization in both the virtual and 
the real worlds. According to some Baodiao activists, these three periods represent the 
three stages in the development of the Baodiao Movement.326 
 
The success of the third stage is of particular relevance to international concerns over 
the dispute today. As Taylor Fravel observes four years ago, in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute, “perhaps the leading source of friction in the dispute over the past two decades 
has been efforts by citizen activists to land on the islands to demonstrate their countries’ 
sovereignty claims. These actions then compel governments to get involved in the 
dispute, increasing the potential for armed conflict.”327 The mobilization of Baodiao 
activists, along with subsequent state-society dynamics, has changed the political 
agenda of the party-state as well as the evolution of the Baodiao Movement in China.  
 
Yet in the existing literature, the attempt to understand such a dynamic and the 
characteristics of the Baodiao mobilization is far from sufficient, though Baodiao has 
already become a hotbed of intensifying popular nationalism in contemporary China. 
This is because the existing studies, either from a legal, a historical or a diplomatic 
perspective, do not try to explain how and why the Baodiao activists speak and act as 
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such.  
 
Though some journalistic descriptions of these activists have begun to emerge in recent 
years, they are far from sufficient. Journalistic accounts take what activists say and do at 
surface value, without looking into the complicated relations between these activists and 
the authorities they have to encounter. Such accounts also lack a historical comparative 
view, thus tending to simplify the policy implications of the movement and remaining 
unable to explain why the movement displays striking differences in different socio-
political contexts.  
 
The historical and comparative study in this chapter will fill this gap. By comparing the 
socio-political contexts of Baodiao in different stages of the movement, it explains both 
the similarities and the differences in the ways in which Baodiao has unfolded under 
different regimes, and shows that xenophobic nationalism and street violence are not 
intrinsic characteristics of the Baodiao Movement. Only under specific state-society 
dynamics has the violent mode of mobilization emerged in the movement, as seen in the 
2012 anti-Japanese protest in China.  
 
1970-1971: Outspoken Taiwanese Students 
 
Mired in the Vietnam War in 1969, the United States started to negotiate with Japan the 
reversion of Okinawa. The two states concluded the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971, 
in which it stipulated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands be returned to Japan.328 Before 
the conclusion of the treaty, a joint communiqué was agreed in November 1969, 
signifying that both governments would immediately take consultations regarding the 
reversion.  
 
When the news reached Taiwan in early 1970, a small team of reporters from The China 
Times (zhongguo shibao) went to the disputed islands, and raised a Taiwanese flag on 
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one of them. 329  According to an interview with The Lifeweek (sanlian shenghuo 
zhoukan), this operation was more out of commercial concern than political ambitions. 
In order to outdo its competitors, Jizhong Yu, the producer of The China Times, who 
used to be a Lieutenant General of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) planned this 
“surprise attack”.  
 
Yu was very careful to mitigate the political risk of the expedition, because this 
maneuver was contradictory to the KMT’s policy preference at the time. Both Taiwan 
and Japan were U.S. protégés in East Asia, facing a direct threat from the communist 
bloc. In deciding who would go on the expedition, he only selected those reporters who 
either had close connections with the KMT or came from eminent KMT families.  
 
The reporters set out from Keelung on the evening of 1 September 1970. They entered 
the disputed waters without encountering any obstruction, because of the shocking 
nature of their expedition. Staying on one of the disputed islands for two hours, and 
raising a Taiwanese flag, they returned to Taiwan on 3 September. When the news came 
out on 4 September in The China Times, as planned, both the Japanese government and 
the Chiang Kai-shek government were indeed shocked.330 
 
This little spark, ignited accidentally by a profit-seeking newspaper, however, went out 
of control. It became the starting point of a new wave of social movement in Taiwan in 
the 1970s. The news catalyzed public opinion, inciting strong anti-Japanese nationalism 
and discontent with the KMT government. Many mainstream newspapers and 
magazines joined the chorus, urging the government to take a tougher stance to protect 
China’s sovereignty (Taiwan regarded itself as the sovereignty of China at that time). 
These include The Central Daily News (zhongyang ribao), The United Daily News 
(lianhe bao), The Independence Evening (zili wanbao), The China Magazine (zhonghua 
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zazhi) and The Outlook (zhanwang).331 Besides the media, Taiwan’s national and local 
Congresses, the Legislature and the House of Control also expressed unqualified 
support for the appeal.332  
 
What really changed state-society dynamics and left an enduring influence was the 
mobilization of college students under the banner of anti-Japanese nationalism and 
protecting the Diaoyutai (the name of the Diaoyu Islands in Taiwan). Students and 
alumni of Taiwan’s elite universities played a major role in the mobilization, 
particularly those who had extensive networks and who were actively involved in 
student publications. 
 
Xiaoxin Lin, a graduate from the National Taiwan University (NTU), was doing his 
PhD at the University of Chicago in 1970. He was the founder and editor of The Science 
Monthly (kexue yuekan), a science magazine edited by Taiwanese students in the United 
States. In late 1970, the magazine had 300 correspondents from more than 50 
universities in the States, and claimed to have more than 1000 Taiwanese students in the 
network. 333  When Lin was contacted by his colleagues at the magazine and NTU 
classmates to use this network to mobilize for the Baodiao Movement, he did not 
hesitate to give his support.  
 
The Science Monthly published three special issues on the Diaoyu Islands, and 
mobilized a nationwide network of students from Taiwan for Baodiao in the U.S. This 
led to the first mass demonstration of Chinese students in the U.S.334 On 29-30 January 
1971, Taiwanese students, along with other overseas students of Chinese origin in the 
states, protested against the reversion of the Diaoyutai in New York, Washington, 
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Chicago, Seattle, Los Angeles and San Francisco. It is estimated that on 30 January 
1971 there were more than 2,500 students demonstrating outside the UN headquarters 
in New York.335  
 
The intellectual community of overseas Chinese in the states was also fuming. In March 
1971, five hundred scholars of Chinese origin presented a joint petition to the Chiang 
Kai-shek government, urging it to defend the Diaoyutai and refuse any proposal of joint 
oil exploitation with Japan before the sovereignty was clarified. 336  The petition by 
established scholars further allayed the students’ concerns with political risk, and 
encouraged radicalization of their activities.  
 
A larger student demonstration took place on 10 April 1971 in Washington and on the 
west coast. This time, the students not only targeted the Japanese Embassy, but made 
their petition to the U.S. Department of State and the Taiwanese Embassy in 
Washington. After the demonstration, the Baodiao Movement in the U.S. soon took a 
left turn. Students were divided into three camps. The leftists and radicals placed their 
hopes on communist China. The rightists, who were backed up by the KMT, maintained 
their loyalty to their patron. And the social democrats turned their attention to 
advancing social reforms in Taiwan.337 
 
The most far-reaching outcome of the Baodiao Movement came from the mobilization 
of students within Taiwan. In the early 1970s, Taiwan’s economy had started to take off, 
but repression by the authoritarian KMT government on political activities had yet to be 
lifted. In the meantime, the transition from import-substitution to export-oriented 
industrialization inflicted a huge cost on the working class and traditional peasants. The 
moral spirit of society was also in decay. Even worse, Taiwan’s international status was 
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on the brink of collapse. Its seat at the United Nations was facing imminent threat from 
communist China, and it was losing economic aid from the U.S.338  
 
It was against this backdrop that the student-led Baodiao Movement flourished in 
Taiwan in 1970-1971. To understand these Baodiao students, it must be clarified that 
the political cost they were facing at that time was substantial. This was in the early 
1970s. Taiwan’s martial law was not lifted, and university campuses were penetrated by 
secret agents. Any autonomous student organization for social movement was strictly 
forbidden. The KMT even recruited student spies to monitor the opinions and activities 
of dissident students. 339  Therefore the political opportunity was unfavorable for 
Taiwanese students to initiate the Baodiao Movement.  
 
This explains why students from Hong Kong, who were studying in Taiwan but less 
fearful of the KMT authorities, were the forerunners of Baodiao organizing on 
campuses. On 12 April 1971, some Hong Kong students of the National Taiwan 
University (NTU) put up a large poster on campus. It was a taboo-breaking act, because 
at that time, no political slogans were allowed at universities. On 15 April 1971, 
students of the National Chengchi University organized the first-ever student protest on 
the streets since the implementation of Martial Law in 1949.340 This activity was also 
first mobilized by a group of students, who were not Taiwanese but were studying in 
Taiwan. Of Chinese origin, these students came from all over East and Southeast Asia.  
 
Following the actions of these non-Taiwanese Chinese students, Taiwanese students 
were emboldened. On the next day of the poster incident at the NTU, a pair of huge 
scrolls appeared on campus. Filled with nationalist enthusiasm, the scrolls read, “The 
land of China could be conquered, but it could not be abandoned; The Chinese people 
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could be slaughtered, but they would not bow down.” This was a quote from the May 
Fourth Declaration, which represented the continuation of Baodiao’s nationalist spirit 
from the 1919 student movement.341  
 
Besides the National Taiwan University, many other major universities joined in this 
insurrection against the authorities, including National Chengchi University, National 
Chung Hsing University, Tamkang University, National Taiwan Normal University, 
National Tsinghua University (Hsinchu City), National Taiwan Ocean University 
(Keelung), Fu Jen Catholic University, Tunghai University (Taichung City) and Shih 
Hsin University. The students took various actions to express their discontent and broke 
political taboos. They organized forums and talks, signed petitions, held demonstrations 
on campus, presented protest letters to the U.S. and Japanese embassies, wrote letters in 
blood, and ultimately, marched out of the campuses and went to protest in the streets.342  
 
The peak of the movement came, when the U.S. was about to sign the reversion treaty 
with Japan in June. Under pressure from the students, the KMT authorities and the NTU 
compromised, permitting an authentic student-led Baodiao association to be formed. 
This proved to be a big mistake for the authorities. After hearing that the U.S. would 
formally signed the reversion agreement on 17 June 1971, the organized students 
applied for demonstrations in the name of the Baodiao association. They threatened that, 
if the application rejected, they would take action anyway. After the failure of 
persuasion, enticement, and threats, the KMT authorities approved the application, 
leading to mass demonstrations outside the U.S. and Japanese embassies on 17 June.343  
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After the demonstration, Baodiao fizzled out on university campuses in Taiwan. Yet the 
Baodiao Movement in 1970-1971 has been recognized as the first major wave of 
dissident mobilization that involved college students in post-war Taiwan.344 The role of 
students in Baodiao was taboo-breaking and far-reaching. In the early 1970s, earlier 
dissident magazines such as The Liberal China (ziyou zhongguo) and The Literary Star 
(wenxing) had ceased to publish. Influential dissident intellectuals had been either 
purged or ostracized, and independent political parties (dangwai) had not yet arisen.345  
 
It was under such circumstances that the student movement of Baodiao emerged and 
changed the social spirit of the time, when Taiwan’s youth was labeled as the “silent 
generation”.346 Through Baodiao, a new generation grew up. Among these students and 
young intellectuals, some became radical critics of the KMT, some engaged in building 
campus democracy, and some others went out of the ivory tower to rebuild society in 
Taiwan. 347  For example, the three victims of the infamous incident of the NTU 
Department of Philosophy were young scholars and students Chen Guying, Wang 
Xiaobo and Qian Yongxiang. All of them were actively participating in Baodiao. 
Disillusioned with the KMT and the U.S., they openly criticized the KMT government, 
and supported leftist student movements and the unification of Taiwan with communist 
China. This led to their arrest in January 1973, and expulsion by the NTU.348 Chen 
Guying later became a member of dangwai election consultancy group (dangwai 
zhuxuantuan) working with leading activists of the Democratic Progressive Party.  
 
1996: Blood of the Hong Kong Martyr  
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In the first wave of Baodiao in 1970-1971, Hong Kong was not a silent harbor. The 
movement in Hong Kong also featured student mobilization. But in Hong Kong the 
target of student organization was the British colonial government. The protest in 
Victoria Park on 7 July 1971, which was organized by the Hong Kong Student 
Federation, gathered more than one thousand students. The brutal repression of the 
protest by the colonial government, with 21 students arrested and many more injured 
antagonized public opinion which had distanced itself from politics since the 1967 
leftist riot.349  
 
As in Taiwan, Hong Kong’s Baodiao had been related to activists who held dissident 
political opinions. In 1971, the major force of organizing the Baodiao demonstration in 
Victoria Park was comprised of leftist students. Some of these students continued to 
play a leading role in Baodiao till the 1990s, including the Hong Kong Martyr Chan 
Yuk Cheung, who drowned in an expedition to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1996.  
 
Graduating from Hong Kong University (HKU) and being a student leader of the Hong 
Kong Student Federation in 1971, Chan Yuk Cheung had a background representative 
of this group of Baodiao activists. They were leftist students leaning towards 
communist China in the 1970s. Yet this does not necessarily mean that they were 
radical communists. It was more or less a symbol of rebellion against the colonial 
government at that time. For Chan Yuk Cheung himself, it is believed that he became a 
politician from a party often critical of Beijing after the 1989 Tian’anmen Massacre. 
Therefore it is held by some scholars that their protest over the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
in the mid-1990s was in some sense a way of embarrassing Beijing.350 
 
Many of Chan’s colleagues in Baodiao were democratic activists against Beijing by the 
time of the mid-1990s. Shortly after Chan’s funeral in October 1996, Democratic Party 
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legislators Tsang Kin-shing and Albert Ho led a group of radical Baodiao activists and 
forced their way into the Japanese Consulate, an action that irritated Beijing and was 
condemned by it.351 Coming from entirely different social backgrounds, Tsang and Ho 
represent two major forces in Hong Kong’s democratic movement. Tsang is a 
grassroots politician, who became involved in politics because of the Tian’anmen 
Massacre. Ho represents the middle-class electorate. He graduated from the elitist law 
school of the HKU, and studied law in the UK. After serving as a legislator for the 
Democratic Party, Ho joined the more radical League of Social Democrats. Ho was also 
the President of the Democratic Party, and the Secretary of the Hong Kong Alliance in 
Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China. The alliance was established in 
May 1989 to support the student movement in China, and has become a major organizer 
of commemoration of the Tian’anmen Massacre in Hong Kong. 
 
After the early 1970s, mobilization for Baodiao stagnated in Hong Kong, but it did not 
perish and the dynamics of the movement were closely linked to the changing political 
dynamics in the colony. In October 1990, shortly after Japan claimed that Taiwanese 
should hold a visa to embark on the disputed islands, a mass assembly of twelve 
thousand people gathered in Hong Kong, marching from Victoria Park to the Japanese 
Consulate. This was a time when the reversion of Hong Kong to China was imminent. 
Against this backdrop, fourteen representatives of the Chinese National People’s 
Congress from Hong Kong wrote a petition letter to the National Congress Standing 
Committee, urging that the Diaoyu Islands problem should be openly discussed in the 
National Congress.352 Their petition did not have any substantial effect on the Chinese 
government’s stance and policy.  
 
Hong Kong’s breakthrough in Baodiao occurred in 1996, when one of the leading 
activists, Chan Yuk Cheung, drowned on an expedition to the disputed islands. A series 
of flare-ups in July to September triggered the incident. On 14 July the Japanese Youth 
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Federation installed a solar lighthouse on one of the islands. On 20 July Japan ratified 
the Convention on the Law of Sea, which included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 
Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). On 29 July the Japanese Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto officially visited the Yasukuni Shrine. On 28 August, during his 
visit to Hong Kong, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yukihiko Ikeda restated 
that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands had been part of Japan’s territory, and there was not 
any territorial dispute. On 9 September, some members of the Japanese Youth 
Federation returned to the islands and repaired the lighthouse.353  
 
In response to these “offensive” signals from Japan, China was quick and stern in its 
public protest, but its threatening words could not allay domestic concerns any more. 
This was different from what happened in the early 1970s, when the Chinese were 
obsessed with the Cultural Revolution, and the very few dissident voices from society 
were easily wiped off by the party-state in absence of exposure to mass media. The 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen threatened that, in response to Japan’s activities, 
bilateral relations would severely deteriorate. The CCP’s propaganda machine and 
military machine both operated. The People’s Daily and Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) 
openly attacked Japan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased blockage and 
landing exercises on islands off Liaoning Province.354  
 
Yet such a strong response was not out of Beijing’s intention to antagonize Japan, 
which had been China’s close economic partner and aid benefactor. This time, Beijing 
did not break with its conventional strategy in dealing with Sino-Japanese clashes - big 
words seldom accompanied by great deeds. This was because Beijing’s primary concern 
had been to check domestic activism of anti-Japanese nationalists and defuse 
international tension. Almost all spontaneous initiatives from society were suppressed 
or marginalized. In September, 31 journalists and editors from official newspapers, such 
as The Workers Daily (gongren ribao) and Beijing Youth News (Beijing qingnianbao), 
signed an open declaration, urging the Chinese government to take military action to 
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settle the territorial dispute.355 Meanwhile 257 Chinese citizens presented appeal letters 
to the authorities, urging the government to dispatch military forces to the islands. None 
of these initiatives generated a response. Prominent activists such as Tong Zeng, who 
made his fame in earlier anti-Japanese activities, were forced to leave Beijing during the 
time of crisis. An attempted student protest at Peking University was also nipped in the 
bud.356  
 
Taiwan’s stance was also conciliatory this time, because of its changing political 
priority, namely democratization. In the mid-1990s, Taiwan was under the pro-Japan 
President Lee Teng-hui. After Japan’s fitful provocations in July 1996, Lee stated that 
fishermen should restrain themselves from sailing to the islands in order to avoid 
conflicts. A semi-official meeting was held between the authorities of Taiwan and Japan, 
which reached a consensus that the dispute over sovereignty should be shelved, and 
common exploitation of natural resources should be adopted.357 Taiwan’s students did 
not stand up this time. The only influential action was made by the opposition party MP 
Jin Jieshou in an attempt to land on the islands. But this action would not have been 
accomplished without the aid and cooperation of his counterparts in Hong Kong.358  
 
Therefore, in 1996, Hong Kong was the centre of Baodiao mobilization in the Greater 
China area. On 9 September 759 professors and scholars, including the presidents of 
eight Hong Kong universities, signed a declaration, pressing the Chinese government to 
take immediate action.359 Large-scale protests burst out on 8 September, 15 September 
and 18 September. 360 Social activism reached a climax when Chan Yuk Cheung, a 
leading Baodiao activist, drowned on 26 September in an attempt to land on the Diaoyu 
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Islands. A demonstration of 50,000 people was organized to honor his death. Donations 
quickly flew to all sorts of Baodiao organizations.361  
 
Chan’s death did not deter further efforts of political adventurism. Rather it facilitated 
the formation of a joint Baodiao fleet in the Great China area. On 6 October, 300 
Baodiao activists from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, departed Taiwan and set off for 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on thirty ships. It is said that Japan’s Coast Guard deployed 
sixty warships to intercept the expedition.362 “The waters of Diaoyu Islands became the 
battlefield of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War,” related the Taiwanese MP Jin Jieshou, who 
was among the few who successfully landed on the islands on that expedition.  
 
With the success of this fleet, the second wave of Baodiao was dwindling. It became 
more and more difficult to launch a Baodiao expedition because the government of 
Taiwan had restricted Taiwanese fishermen to provide facilities for the movement. 
Violators would face hefty fines, and GPS was forcefully installed on fishing trawlers to 
prevent unauthorized operations.363 Therefore after 1996 it was only possible to set out 
such expeditions from Hong Kong, the geographical position of which made successful 
attempts to approach the islands more unlikely.  
 
2003-2005: Chinese Voice Expressed  
 
In the first two waves of the Baodiao movement, influential voices from mainland 
Chinese activists were nearly non-existent. This does not mean that these activists did 
not exist. Their voices were silenced either because they were physically purged in the 
Cultural Revolution or their voices were marginalized in the 1990s.  
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The balance over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was disrupted again in 2003. Yet this 
time, it was the Chinese activists, whose voices had been absent, who initiated the new 
wave of Baodiao and brought the movement to a new stage. During 2003 to 2005, they 
launched several expeditions from China to the disputed islands, along with various 
forms of social activism.  
 
As in 1996, Beijing was afraid of social mobilization that might damage Sino-Japanese 
relations and turn into anti-governmental protests. But this time, it failed to extinguish 
the Baodiao movement at home. This is not because, as postulated in the existing 
literature, Beijing saw the movement as a useful bargaining chip in international 
relations. The development of history cannot be explained by what turned out at a later 
stage, as if every stage of the development was perfectly planned and implemented by 
an omnipotent historical actor. If Beijing could have expected the expeditions and 
subsequent social activism of Baodiao, it would have tried every possible means to nip 
them in the bud, as it had done, and as it did after 2005.  
 
The Baodiao movement successfully emerged in China in 2003 because and only 
because it was prepared with great attention and organizational skills, combined with 
the lessons learnt from previous failed experiences and clever strategies of mounting a 
social movement under an authoritarian environment. Generally speaking, the overall 
strategy of the activists was to disrupt the status quo by launching an expedition to the 
islands. In so doing, they took advantage of the shocking effects of such a political 
performance, and opened a new political opportunity for subsequent social activism.  
 
On 7 April 2003, an open letter, with a detailed plan for the first expedition, was posted 
on the Patriot Alliance, a non-governmental internet forum, to solicit public donations 
for the expedition. 364 The letter was framed in enthusiastic nationalist rhetoric, and laid 
out in detail the budget, recruitment procedures, logistics and strategy of the plan. The 
purpose of the donation was to lease a fishing vessel and buy some communication 
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equipment.  
 
Although the letter was prepared by a group of activists, in order to create a credible 
public image, it was published in the name of Feng Jinhua, a nationally recognized 
nationalist known for painting graffiti at the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001. Born in 1970, 
Feng had worked in Japan and earned fame for painting he made in reaction to the 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine. His arrest and trial in 
Japan had provoked a strong popular reaction in China. Feng’s story had been widely 
circulated in national newspapers (such as The People’s Daily, and the International 
Herald Leader), local newspapers (such as The Oriental Times, and Shan’xi 
Commercial News) and on popular internet portals (such as people.com.cn, 
sina.com.cn). He was ranked near to the top in the 2001 Award for Person of the Year, 
which was sponsored by the most popular liberal newspaper The Southern Weekly 
(nanfang zhoumo). The founder of the Patriot Alliance Lu Yunfei, who used to be an IT 
product manager, was also inspired by Feng’s deeds to set up this Internet forum.365  
 
Besides the successful strategy of soliciting public attention, these Baodiao activists had 
a set of skills in managing money, human resources and public relations. This was 
possible, because they were a group of professionals from various social sectors. They 
made an effective division of labor on the basis of their respective professional 
experience and expertise, and assigned different persons to manage general affairs, 
volunteers, public donations, logistics and even media relations.  
 
To see how professional the management team was, an overview of their routine work 
in preparing for the expedition is instructive. The list of donors was updated every day, 
even though it was a time of the SARS crisis.366 The manager responsible for this task 
was a PhD student studying in Beijing. He went to the banks every day in order to 
update account information online in a timely fashion. After the expedition, the 
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expenditure was reported to the public online in great detail.367 A mechanism of check-
and-balance was established in managing the use of funds. The person who was 
assigned to oversee this task had been working in the legal profession. Knowing that the 
base of support was crucial, they created all kinds of opportunities for people with 
different levels of willingness and determination to get involved, from taking part in the 
expedition, providing logistic support, giving technical consultation, managing media 
relations to making a single donation or simply expressing support on the Internet.  
 
The task of dealing with media relations was highlighted in the organization of the 
expedition. A spokesman was designated in order to prevent chaos in the provision of 
information and to facilitate cooperation with other internet forums. A media team was 
organized, and a well-coordinated publicity campaign was launched on various internet 
portals and forums, through emails and instant chatting tools such as MSN and QQ. 
These activists even had knowledge of how to circumvent electronic surveillance by the 
party-state. During the executive meetings to prepare for the expedition, they 
consciously switched off mobile phones, and took the batteries outside.  
 
Such a high standard of strategic planning, organization skills and attention to details is 
surprising, if it is evaluated in the political context where the movement arose. Under 
the CCP’s authoritarian regime, people are forbidden to organize autonomous 
associations and therefore have little experience in social movement. It explains why 
the Baodiao Movement was not able to emerge in China until 2003.  
 
On 22 June 2003, Feng and some other activists started the first expedition to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from Yuhuan, a county in Zhejiang Province. Although their 
attempt to land on the islands was blocked by the Japanese coast guards, their dramatic 
action achieved the planned effect, which was to surprise the Chinese government and 
provoke intense public debate at home. The news of China’s first expedition to the 
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disputed islands immediately became the headline on internet portals.368  
 
Encouraged by the first expedition, some other Chinese Baodiao activists organized two 
more expeditions, in October 2003 and January 2004. The success of the first 
expedition also created a new space for political activism. After the first expedition, 
these Baodiao activists quickly occupied the new space. In July 2003, they initiated an 
internet campaign to boycott Japan’s bid for the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway. 
Within only one week, 87,000 signatures were collected. They printed out all signatures 
and presented them to the Ministry of Railway. This kind of political activism, 
combining mass mobilization on the Internet and political performance in real life, 
proved to be an effective means of mobilizing social support and soliciting media 
attention in authoritarian China.  
 
On 4th August 2003, some construction workers and local residents were harmed by 
poisonous gas leaking from Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons in North China. 
Among the victims, one died and several others became handicapped. Seeing this, the 
Patriot Alliance launched another online campaign, appealing for the victims and 
denouncing Japan. Inspired by the success of the July campaign, this time they set the 
target up to one million signatures. To their surprise, within only one month, more than 
1.12 million signatures had been collected.  
 
On 18 September, the memorial day of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, these 
Baodiao activists carried the printed signatures to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. Six 
activists, who called themselves “volunteers” in order to signal that their action was not 
politically “organized”, presented themselves to the Japanese Embassy, with each 
“volunteer” wearing white (the color of mourning) and carrying a big white box of 
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printed signatures. 369  Their petition certainly did not receive a response from the 
Ministry, but their political performance immediately caught the attention of the 
international media. 
 
These activists did not give up their plan to land on the disputed islands. This time they 
conceived a more strategic plan. Knowing that another group of Baodiao activists was 
expressly preparing for an expedition, they managed to keep their own plan secret and 
diverted public attention to that group.  
 
On the night of 22 March 2004, they secretly set out to the East China Sea from Leqing, 
a different costal county in Zhejiang Province. Remembering the lessons from the failed 
landing in the first expedition, they developed more pragmatic tactics. When the 
Japanese coast guards were approaching, they had seven activists to charge ashore in 
two small canoes, which were quick and able to evade the coast guard.  
 
Their tactics succeeded. For the first time, Baodiao activists from mainland China 
successfully made a political landing on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The landing and 
their arrest by the Japanese police became a big diplomatic headache for the Chinese 
and Japanese governments, because such an emergency forced both governments to 
take firm actions in order to live up to their nationalist credentials.  
 
However, while Japan first warned that the detainees would be handed over to the 
Japanese prosecutor for their violation of the immigration law, the arrested activists 
were eventually deported, after rounds of overt and covert diplomatic negotiations 
between the two governments. On Beijing’s side, although it openly protested Japan’s 
“illegal” detainment of the Chinese activists, complaining that it was an infringement on 
China’s sovereignty, 370  the CCP nevertheless tightened control over these 
“troublemakers” after their release. This was to appease Tokyo and avoid further 
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disruption to the bilateral relations from society. 
 
After the landing in March 2004, all expeditions from China to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands have been forcefully stopped by the authorities. As in Taiwan in 1996, the 
Chinese fishermen were warned not to lease vessels to the Baodiao activists. “Watch 
fire, watch water, and watch Baodiao” became a slogan of propaganda in fishery 
villages. Monitoring these activists and suspicious actions was assigned as a political 
task for local officials. 
 
Not only expeditions to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but other kinds of political 
activism were suppressed. On 31 August 2004, the Patriot Alliance started a second 
online campaign against Japan’s bid for the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway. Only 
after one day, their web server was suspended, and their internet forum was forced to 
close down for two months.371  
 
The lethal blow to these activists came after the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration. 
Starting in February from an online campaign against Japan’s bid for the United Nations 
Security Council, anti-Japanese nationalism soon spilled over into the streets, sweeping 
more than twenty Chinese cities. As the Patriot Alliance was the only identifiable civic 
organization of active nationalists, the authorities suspected that it had been engaged in 
mobilizing the mass demonstration. The fact is not able to verify at the moment, as 
neither governmental materials are available nor any of the activists admits this.  
 
As a result, these activists were harassed by the security branches of the government. 
Some were placed under house arrest, and some others were detained at the time of the 
protest. After 2005, most activists stopped active engagement in Baodiao, and turned 
their efforts to less politically sensitive issues such as charity. Like the social democrats 
after Taiwan’s Baodiao in the early 1970s, most of these activists have been engaging in 
rebuilding society – from supporting the education of poor children, to raising funds for 
the comfort women and retired soldiers of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, for whom the 
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authoritarian government did not take its responsibility to provide. The efflorescence of 
the Baodiao Movement ended in China. 
 
Why Baodiao Has Become Violent in China 
 
The three stages of the Baodiao Movement are interconnected. In the first stage, Hong 
Kong students in Taiwan and the U.S. were the forerunner of mobilization, who 
inspired Taiwanese students to stand up under the KMT’s rule of terror. The first stage 
had also prepared some leading activists for the second stage of the movement in the 
mid-1990s. The drowning martyr Chan Yuk Cheung was a student activist in Baodiao 
in 1971, when he was a leading figure of the Hong Kong Student Federation.  
 
Some prominent Hong Kong activists in the second stage became an important source 
of inspiration for the Chinese Baodiao activists in 2003. Among the fifteen persons on 
the first expedition to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from China, two were from Hong 
Kong. The two persons were Luo Jiu and Zeng Haifeng, both of whom served on the 
Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, Luo Jiu is a grassroots 
democrat of the League of Social Democrats.  
 
The most distinct feature shared in the three stages is that Baodiao unfolded in the 
context of contestation between rival claimants to governmental authority, regardless of 
whether it was in the CCP’s China, in the KMT’s Taiwan, or in Hong Kong under the 
British colonial rule. Besides their nationalist claims, the Baodiao activists in all of the 
three contexts demanded a right of political participation, and made a challenge to the 
government regarding who was the qualified representative of the Chinese nation.  
 
Even in the most authoritarian context of the three, that is, in China under the rule of the 
CCP, the contentious nature of the Baodiao Movement was clear, and most of the 
leading Baodiao activists are conscious of this. Although the political environment does 
not allow the Baodiao activists to link the movement with a dissident movement and 
although tough repression makes these activists very cautious in framing their goals and 
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strategy, the Chinese Baodiao activists have had a strong sense of how to use political 
participation to influence China’s foreign policy.  
 
It is impossible to take back the Diaoyu Islands on our own…The purpose of our 
expeditions and landing on the islands is to create conflicts, so that international 
society can see that there exists a dispute over the islands…We are helping the 
Chinese government to gain international recognition if it can take back the islands 
some day.372 
 
Apparently, “helping the Chinese government” is a deliberate choice of wording, 
because the Chinese government has never asked for its citizens to help “gain 
international recognition” in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. As we will see in the next 
sections, it is the spontaneous activities of the Chinese citizens that have reshaped the 
policy choice of the Chinese government. A more accurate interpretation of “helping 
the Chinese government” means demanding and exerting the right of political 
participation in influencing foreign policies. This is the discourse that some leading 
Baodiao activists try to avoid using in order to facilitate the movement.  
 
“Civic rights must be separated from Baodiao. The goal should be clear – taking back 
our interests in the Diaoyu Islands and defending national interests. Do not intermingle 
it with other purpose.” Li Nan, the spokesman of China’s Baodiao Movement spoke 
firmly to the author. But he also admitted frankly, that “something can be done, but it 
cannot be said…otherwise it will obstruct the entire cause. 373  Apparently, for such 
activists as Li, they were conscious of the civic core of the Baodiao Movement, but for 
strategic purpose, they chose to overemphasize the statist interest of the movement.  
 
Feng Jinhua, the symbolic leader of these activists, framed the motivation of Baodiao in 
a most straightforward way.  
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Why have we done this? You know, it is impossible to take back the territory of the 
Diaoyu Islands through our expeditions…The fundamental purpose is to claim our 
rights. Every Chinese has the right to express his opinion of the state’s policy, 
diplomacy and economic performance. He has the right to change something. China 
will have a brighter future if every Chinese has that consciousness. This kind of 
consequence is more important than that of protecting those tiny islands.374  
 
In an article in China’s Diaoyu Islands (zhongguo diaoyudao), an e-Journal published 
by the Baodiao activists, Feng made a candid and provocative declaration on the 
meaning of the Baodiao Movement. As the title of the article suggests, “Baodiao is a 
civil rights movement to defend state sovereignty”,  
 
In view of the Chinese people, Sino-Japanese diplomacy should serve (the interests 
of) the Chinese rather than the convenience of diplomats or the welfare of the 
Japanese. Not seeing this, the better it is for Sino-Japanese relations, the worse it is 
for the Chinese people…The policy of unconditional and unilateral friendship (of 
the Chinese government) has stoked the rise of ultra-rightist groups in Japan, and 
inflicted tremendous damage on the Chinese people. The Chinese government 
should reflect hard on its mistakes of Japan policy, and hear more from the 
public….The government in social transition suspects Baodiao, and fears that 
Baodiao will incite social turmoil and threaten political stability. Not only Baodiao 
but other civic activities and social activists, such as the problems of land 
acquisition, disputes in medical affairs, environment protection and human rights, 
are strictly surveilled and controlled. Baodiao is situated in the same political 
context as these activities. Therefore the present atmosphere for Baodiao is not 
optimistic.375  
 
Despite this common feature of civic contestation in Baodiao, there are significant 
                                                        
374 Author’s interview with Feng Jinhua  
375 Jinhua Feng, “Baodiao shi weihu guojia zhuquan de minquan yundong (Baodiao is a civil rights 
movement to defend state sovereignty)”, Zhongguo Diaoyudao (China’s Diaoyu Islands), electronic 
magazine (unclear publication date). 
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differences in terms of agency and forms of mobilization in the three stages. Unlike in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, Baodiao in China did not burst out in the form of student 
demonstrations. Nor was it led by experienced dissident politicians, who were backed 
up by political parties. The variations can be explained by different levels of 
authoritarianism in the three political contexts, which result in differences in the 
propensity of the authorities to repress, and in mobilizing structures available to the 
Baodiao activists.  
 
Of the three cases, Hong Kong had the most liberal political context. Although that 
democratization in Hong Kong did not start until the early 1980s, and despite the fact 
the process followed the executive-legislative model, which did not involve a 
significant role of local elites and mass participation,376 Hong Kong had had a vibrant 
civil society and a relatively high standard of freedom of press before starting 
democratization.  
  
In contrast, Taiwan in the early 1970s and China in the early 2000s were both under a 
regime of one-party authoritarianism. Yet the levels of authoritarianism still differ in the 
two cases. In Taiwan, though the KMT had a tight control over university campus in the 
early 1970s, it was not as supersensitive as the CCP to repress elite university students 
in the 1990s.  
 
The political taboo was different in the two contexts. While the KMT had to show some 
respect for intellectuals and elite students under the conservative culture of 
Confucianism, the CCP regarded elite university students as the foremost challenger to 
the regime, bearing in mind the experience of the Tian’anmen Massacre in 1989. As a 
result, in China, any kind of political mobilization has been strictly forbidden on 
campuses. The only exception was the 1999 anti-American demonstration after the U.S. 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, a state-sanctioned protest.  
 
                                                        
376  Siu-Kai Lau and Hsin-chi Kuan, 2000, “Partial democratization, ‘Foundation Moment’ and 
political parties in Hong Kong”, The China Quarterly, Vol.163, pp. 705-720 
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In 1996, when the Baodiao Movement was flourishing in Hong Kong, some students of 
Peking University applied for an anti-Japanese protest permit, and used the emerging 
internet tools to call for support from peer students. It was a time when computers and 
the Internet were just introduced to China. Only three research institutes in Beijing - 
Peking University, Tsinghua University and the Chinese Academy of Sciences – had 
university-wide internet forums. Yet their online call received active responses from 
students of all three institutes.  
 
After their application for protest was rejected, the students at Peking University held a 
sit-down demonstration on the great lawn on campus, in order to express their great 
anger and discontent. They did not rush to the streets, as the elder generation of students 
did in 1989, simply because they could not. Even at a time when streets were already 
filled with angry anti-Japanese protestors, as seen in both 2005 and 2012, students’ 
participation was still strictly banned, and the university campuses were kept silent by 
all sorts of means. 
 
The difference in the authorities’ propensity to repress has an effect on the mobilizing 
structures of the Baodiao Movement. It is acknowledged that regime type is a major 
variable that helps to explain mobilizing structures in social movements. In 
contemporary democracies, formal organization is a major structure of mobilization. 
But in regimes “where intermediate associations are underdeveloped and associations 
beyond state control are illegal”, informal networks, “the ecology and ecology-based 
networks and communications is the only means that social movement can count on”.377  
 
This is why we see that Baodiao mobilization was backed up by formal organizations 
and experienced politicians in Hong Kong in 1996, the best developed pro-democracy 
system of the three political contexts. In contrast, Baodiao in Taiwan in the early 1970s 
had little organizational base, and it was limited to informal means of mobilization such 
as networks of alumni, friends, colleagues, and the ecological base of university campus. 
                                                        
377 Dingxin Zhao, 1998, “Ecologies of social movements: student mobilization during the 1989 
prodemocracy movement in Beijing,” American Journal of Sociology, 103(6), pp. 1493-1529. 
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In China, which was the most repressive context of the three, even such informal means 
were paralyzed for mobilizing a social movement.  
 
Therefore, successful mobilization in China required a larger amount of resources, 
which is a paradoxical requirement, because the more authoritarian the regime is, the 
more difficult it is to acquire resources of mobilization. This explains why the attempt 
to mobilize for Baodiao by college students failed in 1996. In fact, any attempt by other 
social groups to engage in organized Baodiao activities were also stopped by the 
authorities. In November 1996, when eleven Chinese activists tried to participate in the 
United Baodiao Conference in Macao, they were prohibited from leaving China.  
 
For the Baodiao Movement to emerge in China, it had to rely on some new mobilizing 
structures that were able to circumvent traditional means of surveillance and provide 
more resources for mobilization. The opportunity ultimately came in early 2003. The 
first half year of 2003 was a rare window for social mobilization. On the one hand, the 
Internet revolution had just changed the rules of game, which made it possible to gather 
intelligence and resources nationwide for the Baodiao mobilization. At the end of 2002, 
China’s internet users exceeded 59 million.378 On the other hand, though the CCP had 
begun to tighten control over the Internet, the surveillance online was not as much tight 
as today. The Great Firewall, China’s Internet censoring and surveillance system, was 
not put into use until September 2003.379 The Internet police, whose duty was to guide 
public opinion by posting misleading information online, was not formed until after the 
anti-Japanese demonstration in 2005.380  
 
With a large population of Internet users and a period of relative Internet freedom, the 
                                                        
378  China Internet Network Information Center, 2010, Zhongguo Hulian Wangluo Fazhan 
Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao (Statistical Report of China’s Internet Development), January 2010, 
p.10, accessed on 19 Aug 2011, http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2010/1/15/101600.pdf 
379 Qinglian He, 2005, “Jindun gongcheng: weiquan zhengzhi xia de gaokeji guaitai” (“Golden 
Shield Project: the high-tech abnormal fetus under authoritarian politics ”), Deutsche Welle, 30 
March 2005, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1535010,00.html accessed on 5 Sep 2011. 
380 Jonathan Watts, 2005, “China's secret internet police target critics with web of propaganda,” The 
Guardian, Tuesday 14 June 2005, accessed on 7 Sep 2011  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/jun/14/newmedia.china  
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Internet provided a new mobilization structure for Baodiao. It was through the web 
networks that Baodiao activists were able to liaise with activists all over the country and 
launch publicity campaigns for the movement. As a result of nationwide mobilization, 
the Chinese Baodiao activists came from diverse social and professional backgrounds. 
While the activists in Taiwan in the 1970s were mainly university students and 
intellectuals, most of the Chinese activists were middle class professionals - such as IT 
specialists, entrepreneurs, managing directors, salesmen, film directors and accountants, 
with some college students and unemployed personnel from all over the country.  
 
Among them, some were experienced nationalist activists, while for some others it was 
the first time for them to participate in a social movement. Connected through the 
Internet, this mixed feature of the Baodiao activists enabled them to acquire a 
considerable variety of resources (such as funding, organization skills, and experience), 
which was crucial to initiate a social movement under the authoritarian regime. Unlike 
in Taiwan in the early 1970s, the Baodiao Movement in China did not receive much 
support from college students and the intellectual community. In fact, those leading 
activists consciously excluded college students from the movement in order to reduce 
political risk.381  
 
When Baodiao evolved into street politics, all the aforementioned differences led to a 
fundamental divergence in the outcome. In Hong Kong, because the movement was 
organized by dissident political parties and the student federation, the protests were well 
managed. In Taiwan under the authoritarian rule of the KMT, the Baodiao mobilization 
was based on university campuses, so it was able to regulate the behaviors of protestors 
through the university system. Those students who were actively engaged in the 
movement were fearful of chaos and violence in the protests, because it would be used 
by the KMT government as a pretext for punishment.  
 
Under the authoritarian rule of the CCP, however, neither political parties, nor NGOs, 
                                                        
381  Jinhua Feng, 16 Apr 2003, “Open letter for China’s first civilians’ Baodiao activity 
(Supplementary),” Patriot Alliance, http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/viewthread.php?tid=10637, accessed on 
6 Sep 2011 
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nor student organizations, were permitted to exist as an organized force to lead the 
protest. This means no organized force was able to manage the movement and restrain 
violence when the public were encouraged to vent their anger on the streets. The only 
semi-organized force of the Baodiao activists, which initiated the first expedition and 
online campaigns in 2003-2004, was too weak to take a leading role and check mass 
violence.  
 
Consequently, violent outbursts of anti-Japanese nationalism have been growing in 
China in recent years. This is because anti-Japanese sentiments have been inflamed, but 
regulated channels for expressing public opinion are repressed. It has created a power 
vacuum, available to seizure and exploitation by any kind of organized force. Therefore, 
as we see in the anti-Japanese demonstration in September 2012, the protestors raised 
placards that expressed admiration for Mao Tse-tung and called for the return of Bo 
Xilai, an elitist CCP demagogue who was one of the most powerful and controversial 
political figures in China. It was a new development in the mobilization of China’s anti-
Japanese nationalism, yet it was not so surprising.  
 
For the CCP, the policy implication of this development has been apparent. Its choice to 
contain anti-Japanese nationalism has become very limited in face of the policy 
dilemma. If it allows organized civilian forces to develop and lead Baodiao and other 
kinds of nationalist movements, the popular anger towards Japan may turn against the 
CCP someday, under the leadership of the same organizations. Because the Baodiao 
Movement is fundamentally a contest between state and society to represent the claims 
of nationalism and advocate a different agenda for foreign policy, a strong civilian 
organization emerging from the movement is anything but what the CCP would like to 
see. However, if the CCP forbids organized civilian force, then a power vacuum 
emerges, which will be eventually occupied by other kinds of organized political force. 
This is particularly dangerous, when the political elites are engaged in fierce power 
struggles.  
 
Certainly the CCP can try to mitigate the risk by showing off its nationalist credentials. 
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That is, showing to the public that the party-state is sufficiently strong and determined 
to defend the national interest and satisfy the popular demand for punishing Japan. But 
in a time when state-society dynamics require the CCP to live up to its own words, such 
a choice requires substantial behavioral changes that may cause more problems than 
what it wishes to accept.  
 
Put simply, in order to quell the nationalist appeals at home, the CCP has to display 
teeth and muscles abroad. This mechanism has changed and will continue to influence 
the behavior of the CCP in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, even though it will heighten 
tensions in the region that is contradictory to the party-state’s strategic interest. To 
prove this point, the next two sections compare the CCP’s policy before and after the 
Baodiao mobilization in 2003-2005. It also provides an analysis of the implications of 
these changes for the regime.  
 
Policy Change: A Soft Image and Conservative Policies before 2003-2005 
 
“We have achieved many of our goals. China’s surveillance vessels entered the waters 
surrounding the Diaoyu Islands just a few days ago. It is the first time that China 
publicly showed off surveillance vessels in the disputed waters. We had never openly 
admitted we were patrolling the Diaoyu Islands.” One of the leading Baodiao activists 
said proudly to the author in January 2009.  
 
The event he referred to is the entry of two Chinese marine investigation vessels in the 
territorial waters of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on 8 December 2008. In response, the 
Japanese government immediately urged the Chinese government to provide an 
explanation, and a guarantee that such an incident would not recur. 382 The Chinese 
government responded that it was a normal activity to patrol China’s sovereign waters, 
and that China would retain authority to decide when to dispatch surveillance vessels 
                                                        
382 Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirofumi Nakasone, December 9, 2008 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/12/1209.html, accessed on 19 Aug 2011 
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again.383  
 
Interpreted in a traditional way, the incident is just another piece of evidence that China 
has been increasingly aggressive in the West Pacific. Through a closer investigation, 
however, it shows something interesting that is overlooked in the previous studies. That 
is, the Chinese government used to cover, rather than show off its activities in the 
disputed waters in the East China Sea, to the domestic public. According to the 
functional logic that the CCP purposefully stoked nationalism to boost legitimacy, this 
is paradoxical, because covering up its actions would damage, rather than boost, the 
CCP’s nationalist image at home.  
 
Before the rise of China’s Baodiao Movement, the Chinese government had taken two 
measures to defend the national interest in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute – diplomatic 
denunciation and pragmatic maneuvers in the East China Sea. Neither of the measures 
was aimed at boosting the nationalist image of the CCP. Though denunciation of Japan 
inevitably stoked anti-Japanese nationalism at home, it was because people felt that the 
stance of the government was too soft, not because they were convinced of the 
nationalist credentials of the party-state.  
 
Such a diplomatic denunciation, as usual, was lodged as a passive reaction to an 
incident instigated on the Japanese side in order to appease domestic anger in China. It 
was regarded by the Chinese public as empty and soft, lacking substantial action in 
defense of national interests. Consequently, making a denunciation did not boost the 
nationalist image of the CCP, but generated widespread discontent with the CCP’s soft 
image at home, as witnessed in the open declarations and petition letters in the 1996 
Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis, and in the goals of Baodiao expressed by Feng Jinhua, one of 
the leading activists of the movement.384 Popular indignation at China’s diplomacy thus 
became a trigger for the Baodiao Movement in China.  
                                                        
383 Zhuli Zhang, 2008, “Xunhang 300 wan pingfang gongli, zhongguo haijian jiaqiang zhengyi haiyu 
guanxia” (“Patrolling three million square kilometers: China marine surveillance enhancing 
management on disputed waters”), 15 Dec 2008, accessed on 19 Aug 2011 
http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51755/141011/141119/8516728.html 
384 See footnotes 250, 251 and 271. 
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The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute was already on the radar of the Chinese government. In 
1978, before the signing of the Sino-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, a flotilla of 
armed fishing boats was sent to the surrounding waters, which was explained by the 
then Vice Premier Geng Biao as “an accident”. Deng Xiaoping made his famous speech 
on the Diaoyu Islands problem when visiting Japan in October 1978. “Both China and 
Japan agreed not to touch this problem in the negotiation of the treaty, but someone 
wanted to make troubles in order to prevent us from developing a relationship. I believe 
it is a wise choice for both governments to shelve the problem. It does not matter to 
shelve it for a while, and even for ten years. Our next generation will be smart enough 
to find a mutually acceptable solution.”385  
 
The incident was shelved by China and Japan, and the treaty was concluded. 
Nevertheless, Deng’s pragmatism did not guarantee a smarter solution. Instead the 
Sino-Japanese relations have been in trouble with heightened tensions over the islands 
since the mid-1990s. In the summer of 1996, in response to Japan’s actions on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the CCP’s mouthpiece, The People’s Daily, published an 
editorial on the front page, under the title “Japan, do not do stupid things!” The editorial 
reasserted China’s sovereignty, accused Japan of its provocative actions, and warned of 
reviving Japanese jingoism. 386 In September, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry reiterated the same thing in the editorial when making a public response.387  
 
On the other side, however, if we look at China’s maneuvers in the East China Sea, 
which did not appear in newspapers headline or in the state press conference before 
2003, we see a different China – one that was both assertive and pragmatic in pursuing 
material interests in the disputed waters. China had been far ahead of Japan in 
exploiting energy resources in the East China Sea. This brings up an interesting paradox. 
Why didn’t the CCP use these pragmatic maneuvers to boost its nationalist image at 
                                                        
385 Cuiping Sun, 2009, “1978 Diaoyudao shijian de lailong qumai (Trace the 1978 Diaoyu Islands 
Incident)”, Dangshi Wenhui (Essays of Party History), No.10, pp. 11-15 
386 Editorial, 30 Aug 1996, “Riben, biegan chunshi (Japan, do not do stupid things)”, Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily), http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/123348/123357/7296123.html 
387 Quoted from Peter Hays Gries, 2004, China’s New Nationalism, p.122 
212 
 
home? Why didn’t it show off its advantages over Japan in exploiting the East China 
Sea to the domestic audience?  
 
The only explanation is that it did not want to and it did not need to. From the two 
measures that the CCP had used to deal with the dispute, it shows that the CCP was 
more interested in acting freely, independent of the pressure of both domestic public 
and international opinion, rather than in using the dispute to stoke anti-Japanese 
nationalism at home. The benefit of such a strategy is apparent. It minimizes the 
influence of society on the CCP’s choice of policies, and maximizes the CCP’s 
maneuver space in seeking pragmatic interests, providing some leverage to pressure 
Japan yet without substantial risk of damaging bilateral relations.  
 
Therefore, in dealing with the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the problem of the East 
China Sea, showing assertiveness and building a nationalist image was previously not 
on the CCP’s agenda. It was not until the rise of Baodiao in China in 2003 that the CCP 
had to adapt its behavior in a way that displayed more assertiveness before its the 
domestic audience. 
 
Because the CCP’s soft image was misunderstood at home, which resulted from the 
cover-up of information and the suppression of institutionalized channels for popular 
opinion, Chinese nationalism in state propaganda and in popular appeals differed 
sharply before the rise of Baodiao, in terms of their intensity, substance and emotional 
attachment. Whereas state nationalism was dry and passive, popular nationalism was 
fervent, having strong appeal and being emotional. Compared to the voice from society, 
the CCP’s denunciation was much softer and more defensive in nature.  
 
One open declaration mentioned above, which was signed by 31 journalists and editors 
from official newspapers, urged the Chinese government to take immediate military 
action against Japan. When asked whether he was afraid of political pressure, the 
organizer of the open declaration responded indignantly, asking “is my love for the 
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country a crime?”388 In China Can Still Say No, a banned book and a sequel to the 1996 
bestseller China Can Say No, the authors expressly advocated a policy of “containing 
Japan”, which urged China to alienate Japan from its Asian neighbors, use Japan as a 
pretext to expand military expenditure, and finally, reunify with Taiwan to contain 
Japan.389 Such assertive and even aggressive policy recommendations contradicted both 
the rhetoric and interest of the party-state.  
 
This huge disparity between state nationalism and popular nationalism was the socio-
political background against which the Baodiao Movement emerged in China. The 
CCP’s empty denunciation was a direct trigger of the provocative actions of the Chinese 
Baodiao activists, who were dissatisfied with its softness and conservatism. Therefore 
they attempted to do something dramatic in order to change the status quo. Nevertheless, 
what these activists did not see was that the CCP had been very assertive in maximizing 
pragmatic interests in the disputed waters.  
 
Scholars of international law agree that the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the problem of 
delimiting the East China Sea are closely related.390 Because the East China Sea is less 
than 400 nm wide between China and Japan, in order to maximize national interests, the 
two countries apply different approaches under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea to delimit their maritime borders. Whereas Japan advocates the principle of 
equidistance, China claims the principle of natural prolongation of the continental shelf. 
According to this principle, China’s continental shelf extends to the Okinawa Trough. 
As the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are located at the edge of the continental shelf fronting 
the Okinawa Trough,391 the ownership of these islands is a crucial factor to determine 
the maritime interests of both countries.  
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Despite the existence of territorial disputes, China had been taking an active role in 
exploiting energy resources in the East China Sea. According to Drifte, although Japan 
had de facto control of the disputed islands, it abstained from taking concrete measures 
in exploring resources in the disputed waters for logistic and political reasons. In 
contrast, China started resource exploration in Japan’s claimed Exclusive Economic 
Zone since the early 1990s. The Pinghu oil and gas field was discovered in 1982. It was 
prepared for exploitation in 1992, and was fully operational by 1998. The two pipelines 
connecting the Pinghu field to China were even financed by Japan. In 1999, the 
Chunxiao gas field group was found only 4.8km from Japan’s alleged median line. The 
group encompasses four gas fields - Chunxiao, Tianwaitian, Duanqiao and Canxue - 
among which the geological structure of Chunxiao and Duanqiao extends into Japan’s 
side of the median line.  
 
Along with China’s exploitation of oil and gas is increasing frequency of its research 
vessels’ entry into Japan’s claimed territorial waters. The number of “unauthorized” 
entries of Chinese research vessels, reported by the Japanese Coast Guard, increased 
from four in 1991 to thirty-three in 1999, with a growing frequency in the waters 
surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands since 1996. The tensions arising from China’s 
incursions caused Japan to suspend a 17.2 billion Yen official development assistance 
(ODA) loan to China in August 2000. The suspension seemed to take some effect, 
because China agreed to work out a prior notification system with Japan. In return, 
Japan released the loan in September.  
 
After six rounds of negotiation between September 2000 and January 2001, a vague 
agreement was reached, but its implementation was weak, with different interpretations 
held on each side. China’s “illegal” incursion continued in Japan’s claimed waters, 
particularly around the waters of Okinotorishima and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
sometimes with disinformation provided and sometimes without any prior notification 
at all.392 It is reported that in 2003, eight incidents of illegal operation were detected in 
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Japan’s claimed EEZ without prior notification. In the three months from January to 
April in 2004, such detected incidents already increased to eleven.393  
 
Not only the so-called research vessels, which were suspected to be conducting resource 
investigation, but Chinese warships have started to operate in the disputed waters since 
the 1990s. In May 1999, twelve Chinese warships were found in the adjacent waters of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In July 1999 and March 2000 respectively, China 
conducted a full-scale antisubmarine maneuver in the waters.394 In November 2004, a 
Chinese nuclear-powered submarine intruded into Japan’s territorial waters, and did not 
surface, which violated international law. Japan believed that these Chinese naval 
vessels had been conducting military exercises or collecting intelligence in Japan’s 
territorial waters.395 
 
In contrast to China’s growing projection in the East China Sea, few of these 
investigations, incursions and operations were publicly reported at home to help the 
CCP build its nationalist image. It was not until the summer of 2003 that reports of 
Chinese vessels in the disputed waters started to emerge in domestic media. Still, the 
frequency and discourse of such reports differed from the later period.  
 
On 1 July, one week after China’s first Baodiao expedition, many major Chinese news 
portals cited a report from Reference News (cankao xiaoxi), a newspaper under the 
CCP’s Xinhua News Agency. Entitled “Japanese P-3C Aircrafts Monitor a Chinese 
PLAN Warship in Okinawa”, the report disclosed, by citing a U.S. Chinese newspaper, 
that the Chinese PLAN warships had been frequently operating in Japan’s surrounding 
waters since 1999. The report also admitted, again by citing an international source, that 
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the purpose of the PLAN warship “Dongdiao 232”, which was discovered 80 km east to 
Okinawa in September 2002, could be to collect intelligence on the American bases in 
Japan. 396  In mid-August, Reference News again posted a report, by citing an 
international source, that Japan had protested to the Chinese government against the 
entry of the surveillance ship “Xiangyanghong 9” into its Exclusive Economic Zone.397  
 
While these reports started to cover the military and intelligence actions of the Chinese 
government in the disputed waters, the information was allegedly cited from 
international sources. This was the style of how China was starting to provide media 
coverage of its operations in the East China Sea. As it did not contain first-hand 
interviews and descriptive details, such reports were not very useful in boosting the 
CCP’s credentials in defending the national interest. As seen in the next section, more 
straightforward and emotional representations of the CCP’s nationalist image would 
soon emerge. 
 
In sum, the CCP refrained from using its assertive and pragmatic actions in the 
territorial dispute to build a nationalist image at home. This was out of strategic 
calculation - to avoid infuriating Japan and to give itself more maneuver space in 
international bargaining. Two outcomes ensued. 
 
First, by emphasizing Japan’s instigation and by withholding information of China’s 
operations, the domestic audience was given a black-or-white impression that China had 
been a victim, whereas Japan was an aggressor in the dispute. This inadvertently 
provoked rising popular nationalism that urged the Chinese government to take a 
tougher stance in international society.  
 
It also led to a second outcome. Because the Chinese government was regarded as soft 
and unable to defend the national interest, making empty threats without substantial 
                                                        
396 “Riben P-3C xunluoji zai chongsheng jianshi yi zhongguo haijun jianting” (“Japanese P-3C 
aircrafts monitors a Chinese PLAN warship in Okinawa”), 1 July 2003, accessed 1 Jan 2012 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-07-01/10461257027.shtml 
397 19 Aug 2003, Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), accessed 1 Jan 2012  
http://www.ncsb.gov.cn/gongzuodongtai/2003/200308/2003082002.htm 
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actions, it increased people’s distrust in, rather than their support for, the party-state. In 
this sense, the CCP’s two-faced approach in dealing with the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
damaged rather than bolstered its nationalist image.  
 
This is contradictory to the ivory-tower-style inference that the CCP had been using 
anti-Japanese nationalism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute to enhance its legitimacy. 
The CCP did try to use nationalism to enhance legitimacy since the 1980s, but it was 
just a general strategy. The effects of the strategy, and the intention of the CCP on 
different issues and at different times, have varied. Pragmatism, rather than using 
nationalism for certain kind of purpose, is the guiding principle of the CCP’s calculation 
and action.  
 
What is really dangerous is that a deep misperception of China’s foreign policy has 
been manufactured, which has put the CCP under domestic pressure to behave in a 
more hawkish way in dealing with international disputes. Because in reality, the CCP’s 
pragmatic policy was not as soft as in the eyes of the Chinese, this may lead to over-
performance and over-reaction of China in dealing with international crises, particularly 
in East and Southeast Asia where the Chinese public think that their government used to 
yield too much.  
 
Even China’s assertive military elite have seen such a danger. As Chinese Rear Admiral 
Yang Yi worriedly expresses, there is a huge discrepancy in the perceptions of China’s 
foreign policy. Whereas the public at home blames the government for being too soft, 
incapable of defending national interest, the international society perceives China’s 
foreign policy as hawkish.398 Unfortunately, Admiral Yang and his colleagues do not 
seem to realize that it is the CCP’s two-faced approach and the suppression of 
information in the past years that has led China to this dangerously conflictual situation.  
 
China’s two-faced approach was driven by its diplomatic pragmatism and a political 
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tradition of shielding information from the public. The benefit is short-term, either to 
maintain stable Sino-Japanese relations, to extract economic assistance from Japan, or 
to exploit natural resources in the East China Sea. But the cost is long-term, as we have 
seen in the deterioration of the regional security structure in East Asia since the 2000s.  
 
Policy Change: A Nationalist Image and Assertive Policies after 2003-2005 
 
The successful mobilization of Baodiao in 2003-2005 has changed the policy options of 
the CCP. Whereas the CCP’s major concern used to be pragmatic flexibility, it has to 
show off its nationalist credentials in order to contain the Baodiao movement and avoid 
being criticized in the rising expectations of the public. 
 
All these started with an experiment of a small internet forum. The Patriot Alliance, 
through which the Chinese Baodiao activists were organized, was set up in May 2002. 
Initially, it did not have any plan of Baodiao. Inspired by Feng Jinhua’s “heroic” deeds, 
an IT product manager Lu Yunfei set up this web forum, hoping to connect with like-
minded persons.  
 
At the beginning, these nationalist activists had only a vague idea of the purpose of the 
forum - taking some concrete actions on Japan-related affairs. After some activities, 
such as holding commemorations at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial and at the Marco 
Polo Bridge in Beijing, these activists felt disappointed. “We thought it was far from 
enough to hold commemorations. It only brought some psychological comfort to us, but 
had no effect on the Japanese government,” said Lu Yunfei to this author.  
 
Hoping to accomplish something new and influential, in early 2003, the Patriot Alliance 
decided to emulate Hong Kong Baodiao activists and organize an expedition to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The success of the first expedition immediately brought public 
attention and reputation to this group of activists. Before the CCP took firm actions to 
ban the expedition after March 2004, a window of opportunity was created for 
nationalist mobilization. Two figures were indicative of their public influence. In the 
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first Internet campaign they organized to boycott Japan’s bid for the Beijing-Shanghai 
high-speed railway, a total of 87,000 signatures were collected within one week. In a 
subsequent online appeal for the Chinese victims of Japan’s abandoned chemical 
weapons, within one month more than 1.12 million signatures had been received.  
 
For the CCP, the rise of Baodiao was a surprise attack. Between the success of the first 
expedition and March 2004, there was a period to observe the situation and make 
pragmatic adjustment. Seeing that the rise of Baodiao could be used as a bargaining 
leverage with Japan, the CCP also realized the risk of letting the nationalist mobilization 
grow out of control. A delicate balance had to be maintained between managing the 
CCP’s nationalist credentials, controlling the Baodiao Movement, and dealing with 
Sino-Japan relations during this period. Thus the Baodiao expeditions and nationalist 
mobilization were allowed for a short time. 
 
One possible explanation for this toleration was the rising tension in Sino-Japan 
relations. Since the late 1990s, the bilateral relations have been in deterioration. 
Particularly after the hawkish Koizumi took up the premiership in 2001, Japan’s foreign 
policy became more provocative. 399  Between 2001 and 2006, Koizumi visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine once every year. 400  In 2001 the Japanese government approved a 
conservative textbook glossing over the Japanese invasion and atrocities during the 
WWII. The textbook controversy further acerbated relations between Japan and its East 
Asian neighbors.401 
 
However, the rising tension in Sino-Japanese relations should not be taken as the sole 
explanation. The term of Koizumi’s premiership continued until 2006, whereas the 
CCP’s attitude towards the Baodiao Movement was changing in 2004 and 2005. In fact 
Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2006 was the most controversial one, because 
it was the first time that he had visited the shrine on an anniversary of Japan’s surrender 
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in WWII.  
 
This shows that the CCP’s policy towards the Baodiao Movement was more likely to be 
based on the estimated political cost and threat to the regime, rather than on the political 
benefit in international bargaining. This is clear because it was after two sensational 
incidents of high political risk that the CCP started to tighten control over Baodiao. 
 
The first incident occurred in the fourth expedition to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. It 
was the first time that the Chinese Baodiao activists successfully landed on the islands. 
Yet the landing in March 2004 created big trouble for China and Japan, because the 
emergency forced both governments to perform a firm action of claiming sovereignty. 
The seven Chinese activists who landed on the islands were arrested by the Japanese 
police. Whereas Japan first warned that the detainees would be handed over to the 
prosecutor for violating immigration law, these activists were eventually deported under 
diplomatic pressure. But this did not allay the anger of the Chinese, as “deportation” 
implied it was an “illegal entry”.  
 
The Chinese government openly protested against the “illegal” detention, accusing 
Japan of infringing on the sovereignty of China and human rights.402 However, after this 
incident, a strict ban was implemented, such that any expedition from China to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was prohibited. After March 2004, every attempted expedition 
to the disputed islands was stopped by force. Other forms of nationalist mobilization 
were also placed under more strict control by the authorities.  
 
The second incident was the anti-Japanese mass demonstrations of 2005. The 
demonstrations were ignited by the online campaign against Japan’s bid for the 
permanent membership in the UNSC. The campaign had been acquiesced to by Beijing, 
and major commercial portals such as sina.com were allowed to provide web servers for 
it. The campaign collected a total of 42 million different signatures, among which the 
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Patriot Alliance contributed only 3.84 million.  
 
When nationalist fever in the virtual world spilled over to the streets, it generated a 
great fear of political turmoil. From 26 March to 16 April, the largest demonstrations 
since 1989 swept more than twenty major Chinese cities, including Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Chongqing, Chengdu, Beijing, Wuhan, Shanghai, Nanjing and Tianjin. In 
each city, first, an anonymous call for demonstrations, with the route plan and starting 
time, was widely spread through various internet forums, instant chat tools and mobile 
phones.  
 
Although the Patriot Alliance was not the organizer of the demonstrations, these 
activists were questioned and detained by the police and security agencies, because the 
authorities were not able to identify other organized force of nationalists. These activists 
were soon released due to a lack of evidence. All the leading activists this author has 
interviewed denied playing a role in organizing the demonstrations, but some of them 
admitted that some activities such as collecting signatures in the central business district 
of some cities might have led to some “development beyond our expectation”. The 
demonstration resulted in a second forced closure of the Patriot Alliance. Some activists 
have been blacklisted on the surveillance roster of local authorities.  
 
After the demonstrations, the Baodiao Movement quickly subsided in China. Yet it was 
also through this process that a new discourse of anti-Japanese nationalism revolving 
around the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute constructed a nationalist image of the CCP. The 
rising expectation from the public, stoked by the Baodiao activists, had imposed a great 
amount of pressure on Beijing to show off its nationalist credentials.  
 
The CCP quickly learnt to adopt some new behavioral modes. Instead of passively 
lodging protests to Japan, it started to make publicity of its efforts in asserting 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. In December 2004, the State Post Bureau issued 
the first postcard with the print of the Diaoyu Islands.403 In October 2005, the first stamp 
                                                        
403 “Zhongguo shouci faxing yi diaoyudao fengguang wei zhuti de mingxinpian (China first issued 
222 
 
including the image of the Diaoyu Islands was issued.404  
 
In the mass media, it also began to openly discuss the Chinese vessels’ regular patrols in 
the disputed waters. For example, on 27 Feb 2006, International Herald Leader (guoji 
xianqu daobao) under the Xinhua News Agency, published an exclusive interview with 
the political commissar of the Chinese Marine Surveillance Corps. The report could be 
read as a display of Beijing’s muscle in defending the national interest, 
 
From 7 July 2004 to the end of 2005, the Marine Surveillance Corps has dispatched 
146 sorties aircraft and 18 sorties surveillance vessels to patrol the East China Sea. 
During this period, we made 807 minutes’ video materials, took 7232 photos, and 
spoke to Japanese counterparts on their vessels for over 500 minutes, which 
demonstrates our determination and efficacy in defending the maritime interests of 
the nation.405  
 
Such reports with concrete statistics from authoritative sources effectively informed the 
readers of how well Beijing has been defending the national interest. It remakes the 
image of the Chinese government, from a passive respondent to an assertive defender of 
the nation, and strengthens the legitimacy of the CCP on that basis.  
 
The 2010 collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese naval vessels in the 
waters of the disputed islands provided a new lens through which to observe the CCP’s 
new image in the mass media. On 7 September, the three ships collided, when the 
Japanese Coast Guard tried to intercept the fishing trawler. The Chinese captain was 
arrested and faced potential prosecution.406 This incident immediately escalated into a 
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diplomatic contest. During the short period (7-25 September) when the captain was 
detained, the spokeswomen of the Chinese Foreign Ministry held eight press 
conferences, denouncing Japan’s behavior. The Assistant Minister Hu Zhengyue, the 
Vice Minister Song Tao, the Minister Yang Jiechi and the State Councilor Dai Bingguo 
urgently summoned the Japanese Ambassador Uichiro Niwa.407  
 
Such public gestures and media reports during this crisis subverted the CCP’s 
traditional image and behavioral mode. It has become more assertive and more 
performative, targeting the domestic audience. In the press conference on 17 September, 
not only making verbal denunciations, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed that 
both the Marine Surveillance Corps and the Fishery Administration had recently 
dispatched vessels to stop Japan’s oceanic investigation and protect Chinese fishing 
trawlers in disputed waters.408  
 
On 21 September 2010, an online report was widely disseminated, disclosing that the 
Chinese and Japanese warships had been confronting one another for hours in the 
Chunxiao Oil Field. Citing an old report without an identifiable publication date, the 
news vividly described how two Chinese warships were bravely confronting forty-two 
Japanese aircrafts in the oil field in the East China Sea, and how they were able to repel 
the Japanese from China’s territorial waters. Moreover, this piece of news was full of 
theatrical description, casting doubt on its veracity. It cited the revealing anecdote of an 
anonymous witness, who alleged that he saw the patrolling operation of the Chinese 
warship fleet.  
 
At 11.30am, 9 September, we were having our meal and taking a rest. Suddenly we 
saw the patrol fleet of our Chinese Navy…There were five warships in the 
fleet…with three slowly operating around the platform, like a mother gently 
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caressing her frightened children! Our excitement was beyond words! Long live our 
country! Long live the People’s Liberation Army!409  
 
On 23 September, Ship No 201 of the Fishery Administration started a thirteen-day 
patrol in the waters of the disputed islands. Global Times (huanqiu shibao), a major 
CCP mouthpiece under the Xinhua News Agency, sent journalist Cheng Gang onboard 
to make an on-scene report. After Cheng’s return, China Central Television (CCTV) 
made a special program of Cheng’s experience, and Cheng was interviewed by the 
CCTV’s star talk show host and the program was broadcast to national audience.410  
 
On 22 November, two months after the release of the Chinese captain, the liberal 
Southern Daily (nanfang ribao) published an article with the title “The Diaoyu Islands: 
We come whenever we want”. The article told a heroic story of Ships No. 310 and No. 
201 of the Fishery Administration, which overcame the troubles created by the Japanese 
patrol vessels, and successfully operated around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
 
According to the report, it was the fourth time that the Chinese Fishery Administration 
patrolled the disputed islands since September. In the report, the most theatrical part 
was a vivid description of a brief dialogue between the Chinese and the Japanese when 
they were confronting one another at sea. Asked when the Chinese patrol fleet would 
leave the waters, the Chinese responded,  
 
“The Diaoyu Islands are China’s sovereign land. We will perform normalized 
patrol of the waters.” 
 
“What is normalized patrol?” asked the Japanese.  
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“It means that we come whenever we want. We can come here every day.”411 
 
The dialogue, along with other evocative reports on China’s actions in the East China 
Sea since 2005, shows a trend of the changing image of the Chinese authorities before a 
domestic audience. The CCP has learnt, and has to learn, how to construct a nationalist 
image of itself in the face of rising tensions in the territorial dispute. Perhaps more 
importantly, it has to change the priority of its policies under the pressure of the 
Baodiao Movement. That is, to put pragmatism aside and stress the symbolic meaning 
of its actions, as we have seen today. Such a policy change has a worrying part – that 
the CCP’s stress on performing a nationalist image will not alleviate domestic pressure 
of nationalism in the long term. It is simply a means of convenience to relieve pressure 
for the CCP, but may force it to pay a much higher cost in the near future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Baodiao Movement in China is primarily a civilian nationalist movement that aims 
to pursue the right of political participation, influence the state’s foreign policies, and 
compete with the party-state for a different interpretation and claim of Chinese 
nationalism, not a means of expediency for the CCP to boost regime legitimacy. This is 
also the common character of Baodiao in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China throughout 
different stages of the movement. 
 
The evolution of Baodiao reflects the state-society relations in which the movement has 
unfolded. The differences in Baodiao in composition of activists, structure of 
mobilization and consequences of activism are explicable in terms of the political 
context of the movement. Whereas it relies on political parties, student organizations 
and university campus for mobilization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the authoritarian 
environment in China requires a higher level of resource mobilization for the movement 
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to emerge. Therefore the leading activists in initiating the movement are mainly 
composed of middle class professionals whose resources, sophistication and 
professional expertise can compensate for the lack of organizational support.  
 
It also explains why violence has burst out in anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 
recent years. While anti-Japanese sentiments have flared up, they lack regulated 
channels and organizational bases for venting public opinion. The CCP does not tolerate 
the existence of an organized civic force that has the potential to challenge its rule. The 
experience of the Tian’anmen Massacre makes the CCP more repressive towards 
mobilization on university campuses than the KMT authorities in Taiwan, which were 
able to contain the nationalist movement through student organizations. Consequently, 
the CCP has no civilian ally to check the violent and xenophobic eruptions of anti-
Japanese nationalism. This has created a power vacuum, available to be seized and 
exploited by any kind of organized force, particularly at a time of internal political crisis. 
This is what we have seen in the midst of the downfall of Bo Xilai and elite power 
struggle in September 2012.  
 
The repressive environment also accounts for why the Baodiao activists in China are 
very careful to frame their discourse and strategy, and to distance themselves from 
political dissident movements. As the spokesman of these activists said in an interview 
to this author, “Civic rights must be separated from Baodiao. … Do not intermingle it 
with other purpose.” This rational reaction of the Chinese activists, which is bounded by 
the structural constraints in China’s state-society relations, drives the development of 
the Baodiao Movement in a conservative direction. Although some leading activists 
such as Feng Jinhua are not afraid of speaking out about civic rights in a straightforward 
way, his words do not suggest that the Baodiao Movement is likely to evolve into a 
well-organized dissident movement. This is different from the evolution of the 
movement in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
As a result, the statist goal of the movement has been overemphasized, and the civic 
discourse has been downplayed. It does not mean that the Chinese activists are 
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brainwashed by the CCP. On the contrary, it shows evidence of conscious and strategic 
choice. On the other hand, the mobilization of the Baodiao activists has also influenced 
the policy choices of the party-state. This became possible under an authoritarian 
regime by creating international conflicts through surprise activities, by bringing up the 
shelved issue to the spotlight in mass media, by pushing it onto the political agenda of 
the party-state, and ultimately, by influencing the set of choices that the authoritarian 
state has had.  
 
Since the rise of Baodiao in 2003-2005, the CCP has changed some behavioral modes 
in dealing with the territorial dispute with Japan. Instead of making empty 
denunciations and covering up its actions in the East China Sea, China has begun to 
publicize, strengthen and acclaim its actions in the disputed waters to build a nationalist 
image for the CCP. The style of media coverage has also shifted from vague citations 
from foreign sources to theatrical descriptions and in-depth interviews with informants 
from authoritative sources. Compared to its traditional double-dealing approach, these 
changes have been reshaping the image of the CCP before its domestic audience, from a 
soft respondent to an assertive defender of China’s national interests.  
 
This is to relieve nationalist pressure on the CCP and to undermine the legitimacy of 
organized social mobilization from below. Yet the long-term outcome of this change for 
the CCP does not imply optimism. What is really dangerous is that a deep 
misperception of China’s foreign policy has already been manufactured in the mind of 
the Chinese people, due to the CCP’s double-dealing approach and the cover up of 
information in the past years. While the CCP’s action is regarded as soft and empty at 
home, in reality, its pragmatic policy is not as soft as in the eyes of the Chinese public. 
This will lead to over-performance and over-reaction for China to deal with 
international crisis, particularly in East and Southeast Asia where the Chinese think that 
their government used to yield too much. The CCP will have to pay an expensive cost 
in the long-term.  
 
This chapter is not arguing that the rise of the Baodiao movement is the only factor or 
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the most important one that has led to the change. Other factors, such as China’s 
growing concern with energy security, the sectoral interest of the Marine Surveillance 
Corps, the Fishery Administration and the People’s Liberation Army, are also worth 
considering. It also does not imply that Japan has no responsibility for inciting Chinese 
nationalism or aggravating the crisis. In this chapter, the author focuses on Baodiao on 
the Chinese side, and shows it is a critical aspect for understanding the rise of Chinese 
nationalism and its policy implications. Future research on any other aspect of the issue 
will benefit from the research undertaken in this chapter.  
 
This chapter, again, proves the central argument of the thesis: On the one hand, Chinese 
nationalism from above and Chinese nationalism from below are necessarily different. 
In different sub-populations, popular nationalism is comprehended and represented with 
different meanings, interpretations and claims. On the other hand, the picture presented 
in the thesis is not an authentic and autonomous bottom-up dynamic, because every 
bottom-up initiative and every aspect of that initiative, still bears the traces of the party-
state. Such traces can play an important role in influencing the bottom-up initiative, the 
development of Chinese nationalism, and policy implications of Chinese nationalism. It 
is the evolution of socio-political dynamics, not the content of Chinese nationalism 
(either from below or from above), that determines what kind of force it will serve for 
China’s domestic politics and international behavior.  
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Chapter 6 The Party Line or Personal View:  
China’s Outspoken PLA Officers in the Mass Media 
 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, the thesis surveyed the understandings, interpretations and 
claims of Chinese peasants, intellectual activists, and middle class professionals, who 
autonomously initiated and participated in two sensational nationalist movements. The 
Civil Reparations Movement and Baodiao Movement have profoundly influenced the 
rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism and Sino-Japanese relations today. The two 
chapters not only debunk a narrowly top-down picture of Chinese nationalism, showing 
the differences between popular nationalism and state nationalism, but also display the 
differences in sub-populations in terms of their understandings, interpretations and 
claims of Chinese nationalism.  
 
It further questions, the extent to which such bottom-up dynamics of sub-populations 
are authentic and autonomous, and explores how the party-state has been penetrating 
these dynamics, though on the surface these dynamics were indeed initiated and 
operated by social activists. It finds that the historical influence of communist culture 
and political mobilization, and the embedded power relations under an authoritarian 
regime, have both played a role in shaping the processes and consequences of these 
dynamics. It has influenced such dynamics through harsh repression and reconstruction 
of the subjectivity of the activists. Therefore, such bottom-up dynamics and sentiments 
of Chinese nationalism are not as purely authentic and autonomous as assumed in most 
existing studies. Chinese nationalism from below, its various means of mobilization and 
consequences still bear the traces of the party-state.  
 
This chapter focuses on the top echelon of the social hierarchy in the Chinese society, 
and provides a further piece of evidence to corroborate the major argument of the thesis. 
It looks at one of the most mysterious groups within the Chinese elite, the high-ranking 
officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and analyzes why and how this group 
has incited anti-American nationalism in China through their understandings, 
interpretations and claims diverging from the Party line. Because the identity of the 
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military elites has an overlap with the agency of the party-state, it implies that the state 
should also be understood in a disaggregated fashion in understanding nationalism from 
below. 
 
It makes a unique contribution to the study of contemporary Chinese nationalism and 
the Chinese military. In most studies of Chinese politics, outspoken PLA officers are 
rarely an engaging topic, because they were confined to secretive military institutions 
and invisible in the public sphere. In recent years, however, Chinese military officers 
have made their debut in the mass media, and their popularity with the public is 
impressive. Their appearance on television and in broadcasting, in newspapers and 
magazines, and their writing of bestselling books and blog posts, differs qualitatively 
from their occasional public appearances in the past. The dissemination of their 
opinions is supported by the mouthpieces of the party-state and pro-liberal newspapers 
and magazines as well. Some of these PLA officers have even risen to become star 
public intellectuals, with acclaim from populist nationalists. Some military officers 
manage to maintain active blogs with millions of hits, and their books on national 
strategy have become bestsellers on the cultural market. 
 
What is more intriguing is that, with the increasing exposure of PLA officers in the open 
media, they have made many heterodox statements which deviate from the officially 
stated line of the party-state. In particular, they have raised concerns with respect to 
China’s policy towards the United States and related security issues in East Asia. While 
the Chinese top leadership shares a consensus that maintaining cooperative relations 
with the external world (particularly the U.S.) is mandatory for China’s ascendancy to 
world power,412 these PLA officers do not hesitate to lash out both at the U.S. and at 
China’s policy towards that country.   
 
The military are typically viewed as hardliners across the world. However, given that 
communist China has a tightly-controlled media system and a tradition that “the party 
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controls the gun”, this new phenomenon is of both academic and policy interest, as 
many statements from these military officers appear to be their personal viewpoints. 
Moreover, these viewpoints are no longer limited to internal briefings and discussions 
of the party and the military, but are starting to penetrate the public sphere. This occurs 
against a political backdrop where China’s civilian leadership today has little military 
experience and relies on a fragile legitimacy.  
 
The new phenomenon of PLA officers speaking out in the mass media raises a number 
of questions. First, through what channels are their views being aired to the public and 
how much mass exposure do these views receive? Second, how consistent are the views 
being aired with the prevailing Party line? Third, why has the appearance of such 
heterodox statements by PLA officers become possible in the tightly controlled media 
system of authoritarian China? Fourth, what impact do these views have on public 
opinion, and what influence does public opinion have on elites and policy decisions?  
 
These four questions, if taken together, represent an extensive research agenda. This 
will contribute to understanding China’s civil-military relations, the influence of 
domestic politics on foreign policy, and the prospects for China’s shifting international 
strategy. For the purpose of the thesis and given the limit of space, in this chapter, the 
author addresses the first two questions with data collected from public sources, and 
speculates briefly on the other two.  
 
The Rise of Outspoken PLA Officers and Changes in the Linkages between the 
PLA and the CCP 
 
Before analyzing the PLA’s appearance in the mass media, in order to understand the 
new phenomenon and its internal dynamics, as a backdrop of the chapter, this section 
takes a look at the linkages between the PLA and the CCP, and the existing arguments 
on how changes have emerged in these linkages. According to the conventional view in 
the literature, with the political-military party gurus passing away in the post-Deng 
Xiaoping era, the Chinese leadership has lost military credentials, and the military has 
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also lost their power of intervention in party decisions. 413 Therefore, the nature of 
China’s civil-military relations has been changing.414  
 
One distinctive feature of this change is that the civil and military elite have bifurcated, 
as a result of which the Chinese military elite today are “less willing and able to 
intervene in elite politics, barring severe cases of internal political and/or social chaos 
that threaten regime survival.”415 Consequently, the role of the PLA in elite politics has 
been markedly reduced.416 Due to modernization and professionalization of the army, it 
is commonly held that now the PLA “largely stays out of domestic politics.” “The 
PLA’s involvement in politics is diminishing; the military are returning to the military 
camps.”417 
 
Nevertheless, there is disagreement with the effect of such a change. In a prescient 
study on the PLA’s role in national security policy-making in 1998, Swaine finds the 
Chinese military have significant influence over foreign policy-making, in both formal 
and informal ways. He predicts that such an influence is “probably on the rise”, and that 
“the overall ability of the civilian leadership to resist military encroachment on the 
foreign policy subarena…is almost certainly declining.”418  
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The PLA’s encroachment on China’s foreign policy, particularly policy towards the U.S., 
is not only a result of generational change in the Party leadership, but of an increasing 
willingness of the military to change the rules of the game. There is an interesting quote 
in Lampton’s book, which reflects such a change in an incisive dialogue. In an interview 
between Lampton and a PLA general, the uniformed officer vividly said,  
 
Change the game – not to play the old way – you [the United States] can sell 
weapons to Taiwan. If you [Taiwan] buy one ABM, we’ll deploy [more missiles] – 
the same amount. For the U.S., we will, for instance, sell weapons you don’t like 
and sanction U.S. companies that sell [weapons to Taiwan]. My way is to change 
the rules. Renegotiate a new agreement.”(italics added)419  
 
In recent years, the process of policy-making in China has also been undergoing 
fundamental changes. The number of actors has been increasing. These new actors have 
generated new problems and exerted new pressure on the leadership who used to 
dominate the arena of foreign policy-making.420 Accompanying the rise of new actors is 
the change in the media sector, which was unleashed by the CCP’s decision to grant it 
financial autonomy, and invest heavily in the infrastructure of the Internet.421  
 
The convergence of these changes increases the capacity of new actors to launch policy 
campaigns, and to exert influence over the preferences of the public. This is particularly 
interesting, because the Chinese regime has very limited institutional channels for 
political participation for new actors. This new means of making publicity is also seized 
by outspoken PLA officers, who express their nationalist views in the mass media, stoke 
chauvinist Chinese nationalism, and manufacture public opinion that may be reflected 
back to the top leadership.  
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The changing character of the Chinese leadership, the raised willingness of the PLA, 
and the emergence of new means and an active opinion market, all of these factors have 
affected the linkages between the PLA and the CCP. Whereas the effects of these 
changes on elite politics and foreign policy-making are debatable, the existence of such 
changes and the fact that they have an influence on the linkages between the PLA and 
the CCP are clear.  
 
In the rest of this section, there is an overview of the three changes in detail, and an 
analysis of how and why these changes are likely to have an influence on the linkages 
between the PLA and the CCP. In so doing, it provides a socio-political backdrop for the 
major argument of this chapter. This is also the first attempt in the existing literature that 
analyses the structural changes in the linkages between the PLA and the CCP from these 
three perspectives. Finally, one caveat should be recalled. This chapter does not attempt 
to assess how much political influence outspoken PLA officers have on the decision 
making of the Chinese leadership. Other kinds of empirical data are needed to assess the 
impact, and collecting such data deviates from the purpose of this thesis as a whole.   
 
Leadership Turnover – the PLA’s New Opportunity 
 
Leadership turnover in the CCP provides the PLA with an unprecedented opportunity. 
With the end of the era of political strongmen, the PLA elite have become a political 
leverage as well a political investment for the weak leadership, who have insufficient 
authority and a fragile basis in the legitimacy of rule. In return, this can give the military 
room for maneuver to exert influence on policy, although that in the supreme decision-
making body of the Party (i.e. the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee), 
there are only two members coming from the military (the two vice-chairmen of the 
Central Military Commission). Therefore it is premature to conclude that the military 
has lost power to intervene in elite politics and foreign policy-making. 
 
Past Chinese leaders were all military men, who developed strong ties with their 
subordinates and gained loyalty in the military. The top Chinese leadership today does 
235 
 
not have men with military backgrounds. This is one development that signals the 
decoupling of military-civilian relations in China. Yet such decoupling does not 
guarantee that the PLA has distanced itself from the political sphere. Neither does the 
process of modernization and professionalization of the PLA. This is for two reasons.  
 
First, it is a misperception that the PLA used to be interventionist in politics. The PLA 
was deeply involved in politics in the time of Mao (for example, in the Cultural 
Revolution) and Deng (for example, in the Tiananmen Massacre). However, it was 
because the then party leaders had ordered it, not because the PLA sought it to advance 
its sectoral interest or ambition.422 Therefore the PLA had never really gone out of the 
military camps in the era of political strongmen. Its interest and ambition had been 
subordinate to the order of the party leaders, who were founding fathers of the Chinese 
army.  
 
Second, the process of modernization and professionalization is a double-edged sword 
for civil-military relations. On the one hand, the process can foster the separation 
between the army and party organizations. On the other hand, it nurtures the sectoral 
interest, political ambition, and qualified personnel of the PLA. This can boost the 
willingness of the PLA to intervene in policy-making.  
 
In the wake of the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East, in March 2011, the Chinese 
political leaders immediately raised the salary of the entire military, which is seen as an 
indication of the CCP’s weakness and lack of confidence in its legitimacy.423 Back to 
the time of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) and Hu Jintao (2003-2013), 
cultivating personal ties with the PLA through appointment and promotion was a vital 
strategy for their political survival and continuing political influence after their 
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423 “Chinese military starts to raise salary, up to 40% for low level officers (Zhongguo jundui 
quanmian jiaxin, shiguan zuigao zhang sicheng)”, 2 March 2011, available at  
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2011/03/110302_pla_salary.shtml accessed on 7 Aug 
2011 
236 
 
resignations.424  
 
However “it might be too simplistic to assume that these military appointees will owe 
loyalty to the current CMC (Central Military Commission) chairman” who promotes 
them at the last step because “most of them advanced their careers through ordinary 
step-by-step promotions” and “may have strong residual allegiances or patron-client ties” 
to preceding CMC chairmen.425 “Lack of life-and-death friendship made in the war, the 
Chinese top leadership today can hardly have credibility and absolute loyalty as the 
supreme commander of the military….The discrepancy in behavior between a hawkish 
army and the political leadership is impossible to erase. Their relationship is an ordinary 
one of mutual interest.”426 
 
Because the Chinese leadership today have little military experience, and have to court 
the military for support in political struggle for maintaining its legitimacy of rule, the 
political elite can be restrained by the military elite in making policy decisions. This 
means that the role of the PLA in elite politics will not necessarily diminish, and its 
influence over policy-making is not necessarily dwindling. As the late pioneer of PLA 
studies Ellis Joffe incisively pointed out fifteen years ago, “[t]he new situation contains 
the potential for unprecedented military influence on the make-up of the Party 
leadership and on its policies.”427  
 
Professionalization and Generational Shift – the PLA’s New Willingness 
 
The willingness of the PLA to intervene in policy-making is a more complicated 
problem. The rising educational level and generational shift of PLA officers is a major 
factor contributing to the growing willingness of the military to air their views on policy. 
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At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the education level of PLA officers was 
unacceptably low. Deng Xiaoping saw it as a most urgent problem to raise the PLA’s 
education level and transform the Chinese army into a modern force. 428  Major 
transformation of the PLA’s education system was undertaken in the 1980s. Deng’s two 
successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, were both concerned with ameliorating the 
quality of the PLA so that it could win local wars under informatized conditions.429   
 
The modernization and professionalization of the PLA has trained a new generation of 
military officers. As an unexpected outcome, the new officer corps is becoming more 
willing to be outspoken than their predecessors, as their knowledge structure and 
foreign expertise are catching up. A study by Li and Harold shows that in the time of the 
post-17th Party Congress, China’s military elite are “among the best-educated and most 
well-trained specialists ever to lead Chinese forces.”430  
 
Professionalism and expertise have boosted both the confidence and the ambition of 
PLA officers to influence policy-making. On some occasions, the remarks of these 
outspoken PLA officers deviate, and even contradict the doctrine of China’s stated and 
long-term policies. This has two implications. First it means that their influence over 
policy making should not be over-estimated. Because their views are more likely to be 
on the sideline in the Party, they are incentivized to take an outspoken manner to air 
policy recommendations. But my emphasis here is on the second implication. The 
emergence of outspoken PLA officers and their deviance from the Party line implies a 
strong willingness of the military professionals to intervene in policy-making, in both 
foreign and domestic affairs, even at the cost of breaking political taboos. 
 
In July 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu, dean of the Defense Affairs Institute at the 
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National Defense University, made a remark on the worst-case scenario of U.S.-China 
relations at an official briefing to a group of Hong Kong correspondents. His remark 
immediately stoked an explosive reaction from within China and overseas.  
 
If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the 
target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear 
weapons…We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities 
east of Xi’an. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of 
cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.431  
 
General Zhu’s remarks obviously contradict Beijing’s longstanding position of no-first-
use doctrine. Beijing quickly distanced itself from this blunt statement432 and killed the 
career of the troublemaker.433 According to the author’s interview with the general in 
the summer of 2011, he thought his intention and remarks were distorted in the media, 
and the Chinese government had been unaware that he would make such remarks.434 
General Zhu was not recommending a nuclear war. Neither did his statement stand for 
the Chinese government. This “blunt” military man was trying to use doublespeak and 
brinkmanship to influence both China’s U.S. policy and America’s China policy, both of 
which were apparently out of his reach. 
 
Not only China’s U.S. policy, but also its domestic policy has been under critique from 
the military. In April 2011, General Liu Yuan, the political commissar of the 
General Logistics Department, called for China to return to his father’s “new democracy” 
(as opposed to Western democracy) at an intellectual forum in Beijing. Liu’s father, Liu 
Shaoqi was the President of China from 1959 to 1968. He used to be the anointed 
successor to Mao Tse-tung, but was brutally purged by Mao and died in custody in 
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the Cultural Revolution.  
 
The intellectual forum was organized to discuss Changing Our View of Culture and 
History (gaizao wo’men de wenhua lishiguan), a book of General Liu’s longtime friend 
and political advisor, Zhang Musheng, who is a left-leaning intellectual. At the forum 
Liu did not conceal his discontent with domestic politics and spiritual vanity in 
contemporary China. In the preface Liu wrote for the book, which has been widely 
circulated online, he even made an audacious statement, saying that “[a]ctually, all the 
Party’s General Secretaries have betrayed and recanted many things – both inside and 
outside the country, both in recent times and in the past.”435 
 
Moreover, the study of the Chinese military should not neglect the group of “princeling 
generals”. One political consequence of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) is that a 
large number of young male offspring of the revolutionary military officers joined the 
PLA at a time when joining the army was a privilege, compared to being sent to the 
countryside. With this cohort of military men entering their fifties and sixties, a group of 
so-called “princeling generals” has risen in the PLA.436  
 
Meritocracy, along with nepotism, has contributed to their success in climbing up the 
ladder of power.437 This new socio-political phenomenon will have enduring effects on 
the evolution of Chinese politics. The existence of this group increases both the capacity 
and the willingness of the PLA elite to influence China’s policy. This is not only 
because these princeling generals are embedded in a personal network with political and 
military elite, but because they share a strong “heritage complex” to defend their fathers’ 
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political legacy - the regime of the party-state.  
 
Mass Media and the Internet – the PLA’s New Capacity 
 
With the opening of new opportunities and the increasing willingness of the PLA to 
influence policy making, the rise of commercialized mass media and the Internet 
provides a means for outspoken PLA officers to extend their influence beyond the 
military barracks. This chapter is not discussing the traditional means of internal 
briefing, intelligence reports and intra-party discussions. It focuses on the role of mass 
media and new media. This is not only because it is a new arena for the PLA to exert 
influence, but because this arena is at the junction of the Party, the army and society, 
which offers a unique perspective from which to observe the changing nature of socio-
political dynamics in China. 
 
In recent years, China’s mass media has become a new realm where politics are being 
debated before the audience outside the Party, which may render broad implications for 
policy making and political transformation in the long term. 438  Besides traditional 
channels to express opinions to the political leadership, such as policy papers and 
intelligence reports, PLA officers can now seize mass media and the Internet to 
propagate their thoughts to the public. Today the most outspoken PLA officers are star 
commentators on television and broadcast, authors of bestseller books, invited 
columnists for popular newspapers and magazines, and sometimes, even popular 
bloggers.  
 
These outspoken PLA officers mainly come from military universities or think tanks. 
Some of them are retired military strategists, but most are active officers. Although few 
combat commanders are visible in the mass media, they are not entirely disappearing. 
Overall, the scholarly background of these military officers does not mean that their role 
is minimal. Through personal networks in the army, training institutions where they 
teach, and exposure in the mass media, they are well placed to pass on their views to the 
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general public as well as to the political elite and civilian officials. Sometimes, active 
high-rank officers also seize the media to express their policy recommendations for 
foreign and domestic affairs. 
 
Some of the senior officers come from families in the military profession. Their fathers 
fought in the anti-Japanese war of resistance and the Chinese civil war. They grew up in 
the housing compounds in the military barracks in the Cultural Revolution, an 
experience which shaped a shared identity and way of thinking. A few of these officers 
are “princelings”, whose father or father-in-law was among the top leadership of the 
PLA and the CCP. Such a family background gives them an extended network in 
military and political elite.  
 
Most of the mid-level officers teach at China’s most distinguished military institutions, 
which are responsible for training younger generations of combat commanders. In 
recent years the CCP has realized that knowledge of national security is necessary for 
training senior civilian officers as well. Since 2001, the National Defense University 
(NDU) has been designated as a training base for provincial-level officers and ministers. 
From 2006 to 2010, forty high-rank civilian officers were trained there each year.439 
Many of the outspoken PLA officers are professors at this university. They may not be 
directly involved in the high-level, institutionalized foreign policy process,440 but most 
of the next generation PLA elite will emerge from the pool of students of these officers. 
Among China’s 57 highest-ranking military officers in 2007, almost all attended the 
NDU or other military academies to obtain degrees or mid-career training.441 
 
With the rise of new media is the growing attention of the Chinese leadership to public 
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opinion. As China has moved beyond the era of charismatic leadership, in the field of 
foreign policy making, domestic factors have become an intervening force.442 China’s 
foreign policy makers believe that the media and the Internet reflect somewhat authentic 
public opinion. This is an unfortunate misperception. Information from such sources as 
the Internet, which the Chinese leadership hopes to rely on, is skewed towards extreme 
nationalist emotion.443 Yet this new feature of Chinese politics endows the PLA with 
new capacity to influence decision making. Through shaping public opinion, which is 
exceptionally responsive to nationalist and reformist views, the military officers can 
expect to make an indirect influence over policy making.  
 
Methodology and an Overview of the Chapter 
 
This chapter surveys four types of Chinese media – television and broadcast programs, 
newspapers and magazines, bestselling books, blog posts and websites. In the studies of 
the Chinese military, information transparency and reliability of news leaks has been a 
notorious problem, though access to military analysts has substantially improved since 
the 1990s. 444  Unlike previous studies on the PLA, this chapter does not rely on 
information collected from academic articles or news leaks from Hong Kong, which are 
either unavailable to most of Chinese audience or are questionable in reliability.  
 
Instead this chapter draws on open-source materials that have been watched, read and 
debated by millions of Chinese, not internal reports or academic articles being 
circulated and read by only a limited number of academics or military staff. In so doing, 
the chapter has a selection bias of empirical materials, because the mass media 
encourage and highlight the most outspoken speakers. However, for the purpose of this 
research, this is a positive factor, because it is precisely the views of these most 
outspoken PLA officers that penetrate into the public sphere and influence public 
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opinion. As Susan Shirk points out, the information gathered from such sources may be 
skewed, but it is precisely this skewedness of information that affects the perceptions 
and choices of policy-makers.445 
 
In the rest of the chapter, it first uses three sections to describe and analyze the major 
channels that outspoken PLA officers have used to air their viewpoints. They include 
television and broadcasting, newspapers and magazines, bestselling books, blogs and 
websites. The substantive viewpoints of these officers will be investigated, which focus 
on the U.S. and related security issues. Choosing such a focus is not only because the 
U.S. is identified by Chinese military strategists as the top rival, but because the most 
intense security problems in the region, such as the East China Sea dispute and the 
South China Sea dispute, are regarded by them as a fundamental U.S. problem. Then 
the chapter analyzes how and why the expressed views of these PLA officers follow or 
deviate from the Party line. A conclusion will follow.  
 
Creating a Public Image on Television and in Broadcasting 
 
The emerging public image of the Chinese military officers has been tied to the 
emergence of popular military programs on television and in broadcasting. As all 
television and broadcasting stations are controlled by the party-state, the appearance of 
military officers on these programs should be subject to the permission or acquiescence 
of the Party. Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, a star commentator on China Central 
Television (CCTV), spoke frankly in an interview in 2004 of the Party’s intention to 
guide public opinion. It was one year after Zhang made a talk show on the U.S.-Iraq 
War on CCTV Channel 4.  
 
When a war breaks out, the government has to take some measures that may not be 
understood by the public. Through scientific and objective commentaries of the 
experts, the pressures on the government can be alleviated…The public has the 
right to know what is going on, but using foreign reports directly will mislead the 
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public.446 
 
There is no doubt that these military officers, who have made appearances in the mass 
media, especially in the state-owned media, have a political commitment to guiding 
public opinion, but they are not puppets manipulated by the Party. In the age of 
information, competing sources are available, and the audience is not easy to fool. The 
PLA officers have to sell their viewpoints, knowledge and even personalities in the 
media in a smart way in order to become genuinely popular.  
 
Outspoken PLA officers, even the most conservative ones, who are keen to line up their 
media remarks with the Party line, find it very difficult to acquire guidance from the 
Party. The favorite military commentator of the CCTV, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong 
claims that “unconditional political loyalty to the Party, rather than knowledge, is the 
most important qualification for a television commentator.” But in reality, even Zhang 
has no particular way of knowing the guidance from the Party, and he can only gauge 
the Party’s intention through public speeches made by representatives of the Ministry of 
Defense or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It becomes “very terrible” to him that on 
such sensitive issues as the Diaoyu Islands dispute, there is “no guidance from the top”, 
as he has admitted in a recent interview.447  
 
More importantly, there is a structural tension between the military and the civilian 
government. Whereas the best strategy of the Chinese government is to construct an 
image of the U.S. according to the changing needs of the time, it is hard for the military 
to change its harsh tone towards the U.S. from time to time, regardless of whether it is 
driven by genuine belief, budgetary concern, or political commitment. Therefore, the 
views of PLA officers, as expressed on television, cannot be reduced to those of the 
Chinese government.  
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Compared to the changing rhetoric of the government, PLA officers have been more 
consistent in expressing their perceptions of the U.S. in the mass media. Defense 
Review Week (fangwu xinguancha) is a popular military talk show broadcast every 
weekend on CCTV Channel 7. To test whether military commentators modify their 
views in line with the immediate needs of the Party, the author watched all U.S.-related 
programs of January 2011, when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Washington.  
 
Whereas the official mouthpieces of the Party depicted Hu’s trip in a rosy rhetoric of 
U.S.-China friendship, strategic trust and mutual benefit, 448  the tone of military 
commentators on Defense Review Week did not soften. When asked why the U.S. was 
seeking to reduce USD 78 billion of military expenditure in the next five years, Senior 
Colonel Cheng Hu responded determinedly,  
 
The ultimate goal of the United States is to guarantee sufficient funds for high-tech 
military R&D. It is not seeking an absolute advantage for the present or in the next 
ten years. It is seeking an absolute advantage in the next ten to twenty years.449   
 
Following Cheng, Colonel Li Li commented,  
 
It will reallocate the bulk of money to NASA and the Missile Defense Agency, 
which will play an important role for U.S. dominance in a global strategic 
configuration.450  
 
This was on 29 January 2011, only one week after China had been touting its 
partnership with the U.S. during President Hu’s state visit. Even shortly before the visit, 
military commentators saw no reason to sing the praises of the U.S. In the program on 8 
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January 2011, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong explained why the U.S. deployed 
aircraft carriers in the following way,  
 
The United States deploys aircraft carriers for only two purposes – military 
deterrence and waging a war…If one aircraft carrier cannot deter the opponent, it 
deploys two; if this fails again, it deploys three and initiates a war. There is not 
much to study in U.S. strategy. It is simply the trick of carrots and sticks.451 
 
Defense Review Week is not the only popular program that invites serving military 
officers to comment on international affairs. Focus Today (jinri guanzhu) is a daily 
program broadcast at the “golden hour” (9.30 pm) on CCTV Channel 4.452  Every day it 
invites two experts to make comments on foreign affairs and strategic issues. Table 1 is 
compiled by the author, by watching video materials from Focus Today’s official 
website. It shows the total number of programs available for analysis, the total number 
of days when one or both of the commentators are PLA officers (serving or retired), the 
total number of appearances that PLA officers make on the program, and the total 
number of U.S.-related programs in each month.  
 
Table 1 
 Programs 
(day) 
PLA officers 
(day) 
PLA officers 
(appearances) 
U.S.-related 
programs (day) 
May 2011 30 26 26 12 
June 2011 28 23 25 14 
July 2011 30 26 31 17 
Source: compiled and categorized by the author from Focus Today’s website. 
 
From the statistics, we can see a high ratio of appearance of military officers in this 
program. The number of PLA officers, by appearance, is greater than the number per 
                                                        
451 Fangwu Xinguancha (Defense Review Week), CCTV, 8 Jan 2011,  
http://military.cntv.cn/program/fwxgc/20110108/107908.shtml accessed 15 Aug 2011 
452  Video programs available at http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/jinriguanzhu/index.shtml accessed 15 Aug 
2011 
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day, indicating that on some days both commentators are from the PLA. The discussions 
in the program follow current international affairs, but U.S.-related issues are often the 
theme of discussion. A breakdown of the content of U.S.-related discussions sheds light 
on how the image of the U.S. is constructed in such a program, and communicated to 
the Chinese public. 
 
Table 2 
 May 2011 June 2011 July 2011 
U.S. intervention in South 
China Sea and East Asia 
 11 11 
Arms Sales to Taiwan 1  4 
Meeting Dalai Lama   1 
U.S. Dollar Crisis   1 
Anti-terrorism 8  1 
U.S.-China Strategic Relations 3 4 8 
U.S.-Russia Relations  1  
Arms R&D 1   
Source: compiled and categorized by the author from Focus Today’s website.  
 
It is no surprise that the program in May 2011 revolved around U.S. anti-terrorism 
operations, because in that month, Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed in 
Pakistan. In June and July, the South China Sea dispute and Sino-U.S. strategic relations 
in East Asia became the most discussed topics, under the titles such as,  
 
- Strengthening military deployment and watching the Asia Pacific: Who is the 
U.S. guarding against? (4 June 2011);  
- Is the U.S. behind Vietnam’s provocation in the South China Sea? (10 June 
2011);  
- What is the intention of the U.S. and Japan in blaming regional tension on China? 
(22 June 2011);  
- Are U.S.-Japan-Australia joint war games aimed at ‘jointly curbing’ China? (8 
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July 2011);  
- War games in the South China Sea again: the U.S. seeks to persuade ASEAN to 
confront China (16 July 2011);  
- The South China Sea, arms sales and the Dalai Lama: is U.S. China policy 
changing or not? (25 July 2011)…  
 
The coverage of these eye-catching discussion topics in the program is extensive, and 
the information provided by these military commentators is consistent. That is, the 
United States is a hegemonic power that threatens China’s regional security and national 
aspiration.  
 
Such a consensus on the U.S. threat is amplified and spread by other means in the mass 
media. The Yi’nan Military Forum (yinan junshi luntan) is a weekly talk show 
broadcast on China National Radio (CNR), where Major General Jin Yi’nan gives 
strategic analysis of current military affairs on China and all over the world.453 Initially 
held in 2006, this is the first military commentary program in China that is named for an 
individual military officer. In the program, the image of the United States is both 
calculated and provocative.  
 
To the U.S., the Diaoyu Islands is a chess piece in the Far East. It exploits its value, 
but will not let itself be bound to it. Nor will the U.S. pay a high cost for it… The 
more discord there is in Sino-Japanese relations, the more advantages the U.S. can 
play out. If the fissure in Sino-Japanese relations is reparable, the U.S. will try 
every means to tear it apart, but not to the uncontrollable degree that the U.S. itself 
may be dragged in.454 
 
This is how General Jin commented on the U.S. role in the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis. On 
                                                        
453 It is a sub-program of CNR’s Guofang Shikong (Defense Time and Space). The official website of 
the program is http://mil.cnr.cn/jmhd/gfsk/ For a brief introduction of the program, see its blog: 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50e39b440100om6y.html accessed 15 Aug 2011 
454 Yinan Jin, 5 Mar 2008, “Junshi zhuanjia Jin Yinan tan diaoyudao xianzhuang (Military expert 
Yinan Jin on the status quo of Diaoyu Islands)”, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50e39b4401008on3.html accessed 15 Aug 2011 
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another occasion, Jin lambasted the U.S. China Military Power Report as such,  
 
What the U.S. is doing has a lot to do with its Cold-War logic, which is dominated 
by the only-one-winner mentality. One’s win is bound to be the loss of the other, 
and the world can only accommodate one winner…It is not only a Cold-War logic, 
but also an imperialist logic.455  
 
Like their colleagues on television, the military officers invited to talk on radio appear 
in groups. Military Watch at Evening Peak (wan’gaofeng guanjunqing) is a daily CNR 
program that has been broadcast since 2009 at the “golden hour” (6.15 p.m.). The 
purpose of the program is to provide timely coverage and analysis of military news. The 
group of commentators for the program is composed of 30 military experts from “the 
army, navy, air force, second artillery force, armed police and industry of defense 
technology, including both university professors and serving generals.” 456  A quick 
survey of the program’s website shows that these experts include Major General Jin 
Yi’nan, Major General Luo Yuan, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, Rear Admiral Yin 
Zhuo, Major General Jiang Chunliang, and a dozen colonels and senior colonels.457 
 
Becoming Popular in Newspapers, Magazines and Bestselling Books 
 
Outspoken PLA officers have become omnipresent in newspapers and magazines, 
ranging from official mouthpieces to liberal newspapers and commercial magazines. In 
Global Times (huanqiu shibao), the international face of the Party’s mouthpiece, the 
military voice on the U.S. threat is assertive. In a dialogue with U.S. officers held at 
Tsinghua University, according to the report of Global Times on 23 April 2011, Rear 
Admiral Yang Yi declared that the U.S. was the greatest threat to China, when he was 
                                                        
455 Yinan Jin, 2 Apr 2009, “Mei paozhi <zhongguo junli baogao> shi dianxing de lengzhan siwei 
(U.S. China Military Power Report represents a typical Cold-War logic)”, accessed 15 Aug 2011 
http://www.cnr.cn/military/tebie/jyn/gjjq/200904/t20090402_505292244_3.html 
456 The blog of Wan’gaofeng Guanjunqing (Military Watch at Evening Peak):  
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50e39b440100om75.html accessed 15 Aug 2011 
457 The official website of Wan’gaofeng Guanjunqing (Military Watch at Evening Peak):  
http://www.cnr.cn/junshi/jmhdd/gfsk/wgf/index.html accessed 15 Aug 2011 
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asked by a U.S. officer. “It is the U.S....The U.S. is the only power that has the capacity 
to threaten China’s security in full range.”458  
 
Liberal newspapers and commercial magazines, such as Southern China Weekly 
(nanfang zhoumo), Life Week (sanlian shenghuo zhoukan), New Beijing News 
(xinjingbao), Oriental Daily (dongfang zaobao) and China Weekly (zhongguo zhoukan), 
have also shown an effervescent interest in publishing the views of outspoken military 
officers. Unlike the Party’s mouthpiece such as Global Times, liberal media may not 
intend to lambast the U.S. directly, but the image of the U.S. represented there is hardly 
positive as well.  
 
Outspoken PLA officers are able to sell liberal media an image of the U.S. as a 
malicious hegemonic power in a way that is acceptable to the readers. In an interview 
with Life Week, Major General Qiao Liang starts with a question of China’s aircraft 
carrier and marine interests, but then he shifts to make remarks on the global financial 
regime. Framing the issue in an authentically academic manner, General Qiao shows 
that, in the current financial regime built on the hegemony of U.S. dollars, control over 
waterways and flows of goods is much less important than control of flows of capital. 
According to him, the U.S. has built a colonial-style financial empire, and all of U.S. 
military operations have been serving this purpose. Wielding the power of setting prices 
and stopping China from acquiring high technology and strategic assets, the U.S. is 
exploiting China’s sweatshop workers, wrecking China’s environment and plundering 
China’s assets by making U.S. treasury bonds the only investment tool available to 
China.459 Apparently, this is a more advanced version of the U.S. conspiracy theory than 
the bankrupt ideology of the CCP could have offered to attract an audience.  
 
                                                        
458 Wen Wang and Fei Huang, 23 April 2010, “Wo shaojiang jibian mei gaoguantuan, zhiyan mei shi 
zhongguo zuida weixie (China’s rear admiral debating with U.S. high officers, declaring U.S. being 
China’s largest threat)”, http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2010-04/790183.html, accessed 23 Aug 
2011. 
459 Ran Zhang, 17 Jun 2011, “Haiyang liyi xuyao hangmu: zhuanfang junshi zhanlue zhuanjia Qiao 
Liang (Marine interests need aircraft carrier: interview with military strategist Major General Liang 
Qiao)”, Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan (Life Week), Vol. 636, 
http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2011/0617/33650.shtml accessed 23 Aug 2011 
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Besides newspapers and magazines, bestselling books are another vehicle for PLA 
officers to influence the image of the U.S. in the eyes of the public. It is not new for 
China’s military officers to publish books on defense issues and national strategy, but 
now, for the first time, serving military officers are becoming incredibly popular in 
China through their widely-read books. To a large extent, their success does not rely on 
the “ideological correctness” of their views, but on the popularity of their works in the 
market. It means that the political influence of their views in the mass media now 
depends on their commercial success. The rest of this section describes the three most 
representative books of the past ten to fifteen years.  
 
The most influential one is Unrestricted Warfare, written by two then senior colonels of 
the PLA Air Force. First published in 1999 by the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House, this book warns of the coming age of using non-traditional means to threaten 
international security. According to the authors, unrestricted warfare means “warfare 
which transcends all boundaries and limits”. In such an era, the goal of warfare is “to 
use all means whatsoever…to force the enemy to serve one’s own interests.”460  
 
This kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, that information will be 
omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere. It means that all weapons and 
technology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the boundaries lying 
between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be 
totally destroyed...461  
 
The book does not offer a specific agenda for any country or actor to wage or resist 
unrestricted warfare. However the dramatic outcome of an unauthorized printing of the 
book in the U.S. has rendered it controversial. Soon after the tragedy of September 11, 
an unauthorized English translation of the book, with a fabricated subtitle “China's 
                                                        
460 Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, 2011(1999), Chaoxian Zhan (Unrestricted Warfare), Chapter 2 
“Zhanshen de miankong mohu le (The War God's face has become indistinct)”. The translation of 
English is taken from FBIS’s translated book, pp.50-57. 
461 Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, 2011(1999), “Lun xinzhanzheng (Preface to part one: on new 
warfare)” in Chaoxianzhan (Unrestricted Warfare). This translation of English is taken from FBIS’s 
translated book, p12. I have doubled checked the translation when citing from FBIS. 
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Master Plan to Destroy America” and an astonishing picture of the burning World Trade 
Centre on book cover, appeared in the U.S. In later Chinese editions, both authors 
indicated that they had fallen victim to a plot that had tried to destroy the career of 
Chinese military strategists.462  
 
Although we have already discerned some traces, it is very shocking to us that now 
we can confirm that we the authors of Unrestricted Warfare, have fallen victim to 
an unrestricted war waged by some country against us.463  
 
Evidently, here “some country” refers to the U.S. Soon an article started to be 
circulating on the Internet under a shocking title, “U.S. CIA plotting to kill Chinese 
hawks by using the Internet”. The article claims that one of the two authors, Wang 
Xiangsui, had been forced to leave the army, and the other one, Qiao Liang, had been 
marginalized, due to the publication of this book.464  
 
This chapter does not intend and has no information to judge whether this is indeed an 
unlimited war against Chinese military strategists by the U.S. or a third party, or 
whether this is an unlimited war against the image of the U.S. by Chinese strategists, or 
against Sino-U.S. relations by a third party. The interesting point is that, though 
Unrestricted Warfare does not target the U.S. as a specific threat, the aftermath of this 
book has successfully constructed the U.S. as an evil-doer sabotaging China’s rise and 
threatening its national security. 
 
In 2010, two other non-fiction books, written by serving PLA officers, became 
                                                        
462  See the prefaces to the 2nd and the 3rd Chinese editions. Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, 
“Zhonwen zaiban zixu: women de minyun bei gaibian (Preface to the 2nd Chinese edition: our 
destiny has been changed)” in Chaoxianzhan (Unrestricted Warfare), accessed 17 Aug 2011,   
http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/chapter_155457_104004.html; “Zhongwen sanban zixu: wuchu 
bujian chaoxianzhan de zongji (Preface to the 3rd Chinese edition: traces of unrestricted warfare can 
be seen everywhere)” in Chaoxianzhan (Unrestricted Warfare), accessed 17 Aug 2011  
http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/chapter_155457_104005.html  
463 Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, “Zhongwen sanban zixu (Preface to the 3rd Chinese edition)” 
464 Jian Zhong, 2010, “Mei zhongqingju tumou wangluo jiaoshao zhongguo yingpai (U.S. CIA 
plotting to kill Chinese hawks by the Internet)”, accessed 17 Aug 2011  
http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=21481 
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sensational bestsellers. In early 2010, Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu of the National 
Defense University published China’s Dream: Major Power Thinking and Strategic 
Posture in a Post-American Era. Unlike the first edition of Unrestricted Warfare, this 
book was published by a commercial publishing house, and targeted a popular audience 
from the very beginning. It is said that the manuscript had been bid for by dozens of 
commercial publishers, because they believed its sensationalist views would generate 
significant profits.465 “According to Colonel Liu, the America era is receding and the 
China century is dawning. Throughout the century, all that happens in the world comes 
down to U.S.-China rivalry. The ultimate goal for China is therefore to uproot the 
United States as a hegemonic power and to create a brave new world without any 
hegemony.”466  
 
Although Liu’s rhetoric seems very offensive, a closer look at his underlying rationale 
reveals the more defensive nature of his hostility towards the U.S. “In the book, Liu 
presents an interesting list of eight things that China will not do to the United States. 
They are: 1) the Chinese are not the Japanese before 1945 and they will not launch a 
Pearl Harbor attack on the U.S.; 2) the Chinese are not the Germans between the two 
world wars and they will not fire the first shot at the U.S.; 3) the Chinese are not the 
Russians before 1991 and they will not fight a Cold War against the U.S.;…7) China 
will not launch any peaceful evolution campaign against the U.S.; and 8) China will not 
enter into any alliance whose mission is to contain the U.S. At the end of the list Liu 
asks, ‘Can the United States make China feel at ease in these eight areas?’”467 
 
Senior Colonel Dai Xu’s C-Shape Encirclement: China’s Breakthrough in Domestic 
                                                        
465 Phillip C. Saunders, April 2010, “Will China’s dream turn into America’s nightmare?” China 
Brief, 10(7),  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36217&cHash=
2f34909bc2, accessed 17 Aug 2011 
466 This quoted summary of Liu Mingfu was made by Yawei Liu through personal communication. I 
am very grateful for his permission to let me use this. The reference is: Mingfu Liu, 2010, Zhongguo 
Meng: Hou Meiguo Shidai de Daguo Siwei yu Zhanlue Dingwei (China’s Dream: Major Power 
Thinking and Strategic Posture in a Post-American Era), Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban Gongsi 
(China Friendship Publishing House). 
467 This quotation of Liu Mingfu was made by Yawei Liu through personal communication. I am 
very grateful for his permission to let me use this. 
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Plights and International Threats entered the spotlight in the same year. Compared to 
the discourse in China’s Dream, Colonel Dai is pessimistic in the face of China’s GDP 
fetishism and corrupted spirit. Not baffled by GDP growth, he argues that it is not the 
figures, but the quality of GDP that will be ultimately transformed into power in 
international society. He understands that the GDP of the U.S. and Japan are upheld by 
high-technology industries, such as information science, aeronautics, manufacturing and 
biotechnology, which are profitable and convertible to military power in war time. In 
contrast, China’s GDP is sustained by real-estate bubbles and cheap products 
manufactured in sweatshops, which rest on exploitation of the Chinese people, and 
cannot be converted into military power.468  
 
In his view, the threat of the U.S. is dauntingly imminent, as China has been encircled 
geopolitically by the U.S. and its allies, leaving only a small exit to the North East. The 
imperialist ambition of the U.S. predetermines that its strategic goal is to dominate the 
world and clear the obstacles on its road to domination. “So it must contain you, 
sabotage you, and tear you down.”469 Furthermore, “A third wave of partitioning China 
led by the West is in conception…In the next 10-20 years, by around 2020 to 2030, 
there will be slaughter and plunder that is plotted and targeted against China.”470  
 
Manufacturing Public Opinion through Blogs and Websites 
 
Compared to the blogs of academics in institutes of higher education, blogs written by 
serving or retired PLA officers are rare. The website sponsored by The People’s Daily, 
people.com.cn, hosts the largest blog alliance of military experts.471 On this website, 
fifteen to twenty serving and retired military officers contribute regular blog entries, 
which are accessible to readers nationwide.  
                                                        
468 Xu Dai, 2010, C Xing Baowei: Neiyou Waihuan xia de Zhongguo Tuwei (China’s Breakthrough in 
Domestic Plights and International Threats), Shanghai: Wenhui Publishing House. Excerpts of the 
electronic copy available at http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/index_120427.html, accessed 17 Aug 
2011 
469 Ibid., pp. 35-36 
470 Ibid., pp. 32-34 
471 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/60833/71270/6054353.html accessed 19 Aug 2011 
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These officers include star military commentators on television and in print media, such 
as Major General Jin Yinan, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, Senior Colonel Dai Xu 
and the author of Unrestricted Warfare, Professor Wang Xiangsui, as well as some less 
well-known military intellectuals. They are selected from a list of fifty to sixty military 
experts whose opinions are frequently reported or quoted in the media. Their interviews, 
articles and even transcripts of public lectures are carefully compiled on the website.472  
 
Allowing and encouraging military experts to write blogs on such an authoritative 
website could be a propaganda strategy for influencing public opinion. For example, 
when the South China Sea dispute escalated in the spring of 2009, the website 
immediately published a special focus, with contributions from these military bloggers, 
under the title “The South China Sea in Turbulence, China Facing Harsh Challenges”.473 
In the special focus, these experts provided multiple perspectives of the issue, but their 
perceptions of the U.S. role in the dispute were identical. That is, the invasion by the 
U.S. oceanic surveillance ship Impeccable into the Chinese waters was intentional and 
unacceptable. The frequent U.S. presence in the Chinese waters challenged China’s 
sovereignty and threatened China’s national security.  
 
In terms of strategy for the South China Sea dispute, they recommended a much tougher 
policy. “The U.S. should better restrain itself from getting involved…China will not 
hesitate to take military action when necessary.”(Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong) “The 
most effective means to avoid a bigger tragedy is to release war energy through small-
scale conflicts.”(Sen. Col. Dai Xu) 474  These voices, when gathered together, were 
mutually reinforcing, and could influence public opinion as a whole.  
 
For the Chinese state, which is of fragile legitimacy and dependent on global trade, any 
miscalculation concerning regional armed conflict could lead to unexpected regime 
collapse. It is hard to imagine that the Party would have released a clear signal for these 
                                                        
472 http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51756/index.html accessed 19 Aug 2011 
473 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/60833/72591/9018510.html accessed 19 Aug 2011 
474 Ibid. 
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military experts to recommend war, which is contradictory to its claimed doctrine of 
peaceful rise. Although the leadership may hope that the words of military experts have 
a deterrent effect on the U.S. and on neighboring countries, they would not wish to see 
that they go too far, becoming a troublemaker or playing unrestrained brinkmanship. 
The fate of Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, who was punished in 2005 for making an 
unauthorized statement on nuclear deterrence towards the U.S., is a clear barometer of 
the leadership’s political will. 
 
Unlike other channels for public exposure, the Internet opens up a relatively free 
platform for these uniformed men to express their personal views on domestic issues. In 
a blog post written on 14 March 2009, with the title, “The Two Meetings are Not a 
Teahouse”, Senior Colonel Ma Jun openly voiced discontent with the representatives of 
the Chinese National Congress. In China, the Two Meetings (lianghui) refers to the 
National People’s Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference held in 
March each year. “These low-quality proposals sound like gossip in a teahouse. But the 
Two Meetings should be the place to discuss policies!”  
 
Senior Colonel Dai Xu, one of the most active anti-U.S. PLA officers, is famous for not 
hiding his sharpness in criticizing domestic problems. “The National People’s Congress 
is a collective representative institution to discuss policies…The most important thing is 
to represent the electorate and express the opinions of the electorate.”475 He is also the 
most diligent military blogger. His blog has over 1.1 million hits at china.com.cn,476 
more than 4.1 million at caogen.com,477 and above 4.1 million at sina.com.cn.478 In these 
blogs, Colonel Dai writes poems that satirize the corrupt and sycophantic atmosphere of 
the Chinese bureaucracy,479 advocates social justice and checking power abuse,480 and 
                                                        
475  Jun Ma, “Lianghui bushi chaguan (The Two Meetings are not teahouse)”, 
http://blog.people.com.cn/blog/c9/s53351,w1237003022691181 accessed 20 Aug 2011 
476 http://blog.china.com.cn/daixu accessed 20 Aug 2011.  
477 http://dx.caogen.com/ accessed 20 Aug 2011. 
478 http://blog.sina.com.cn/daixu2010 accessed 20 Aug 2011. This blog has not been updated since 
Aug 2010. 
479 http://blog.people.com.cn/blog/c1/s48177,w1249133745902981 accessed 20 Aug 2011 
480 Xu Dai, “Gongzheng shi guojia qiangda de qidian (Justice is the start point of national strength)”, 
http://blog.people.com.cn/blog/c1/s48177,w1243338027255571 accessed 20 Aug 2011 
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criticizes real-estate bubbles and their devastating effects on industry, the environment 
and national security.481 
 
Those who are not invited to write blogs on people.com.cn can open their blogs on a 
commercial website, such as sina.com.cn, blshe.com, or blog.china.com.cn. But the 
number of such military bloggers is small. According to the author’s research, less than 
ten military officers are maintaining or have maintained blogs on commercial websites. 
Among them, Maj. Gen. Qiao Liang and retired Sen. Col. Wang Xiangsui have active 
blogs.482 This may indicate that the two authors of Unrestricted Warfare were indeed 
purged after the publication of their sensational book. They may feel free to write blogs 
because they have little to lose now.  
 
A second type of military bloggers includes Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan and Sen. Col. Meng 
Xiangqing.483 Their blogs have been inactive since 2010, when an internal notice was 
issued to forbid serving military officers from blogging.484 Yet there is still some leeway, 
and thus we see a third type of military bloggers, who are most media savvy, such as 
Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong and Sen. Col. Dai Xu. The total number of hits of 
Colonel Dai’s three blogs on commercial websites is close to 10 million.485 But the most 
astonishing statistics come from the superstar, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong. From 
January 2009 to August 2011, his blog at qq.com had over 61.7 million hits and over 
23.6 million visitors.486 The readership of some articles on his blog was above or close 
to one million. The blog, as a new channel of mass exposure, has substantially amplified 
the influence of Admiral Zhang.  
 
                                                        
481 Xu Dai, 21 Aug 2007, “Fangdichan zhicheng buqi zhongguo jueqi (Real estate cannot uphold 
China’s rise)”, http://blog.people.com.cn/blog/c9/s48177,w1187671793382487 accessed 20 Aug 
2011 
482 Liang Qiao’s blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/qiaoliang99 
Xiangsui Wang’s blog: http://blog.china.com.cn/wangxiangsui/ accessed 20 Aug 2011 
483 Xiangqing Meng’s blog: http://mengxiangqing.blshe.com/;  
Yuan Luo’s blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/zhenshanhu and http://luoyuan.blshe.com accessed 20 Aug 
2011 
484 For the existence of this regulation, see Maj. Gen. Yuan Luo’s farewell letter on his blog:  
http://luoyuan.blshe.com/post/637/567019 accessed 20 Aug 2011 
485 See footnotes 245-247. 
486 Zhaozhong Zhang’s blog: http://622006681.qzone.qq.com/ accessed 21 Aug 2011 
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Besides the articles published on official websites and personal blogs, there are a good 
many articles, videos, and transcripts of lectures of outspoken military officers, which 
are widely disseminated in China’s vibrant virtual world. Among these officers, Air 
Force General Liu Yazhou, the Political Commissar of the PLA’s National Defense 
University and son-in-law of the late Chinese President Li Xiannian, is the most 
prominent and controversial figure. He has published a series of provocative essays on 
national strategy and Sino-U.S. relations, as well as on political reform in China.487  
 
Like other PLA strategists, General Liu sees the U.S. as a global hegemon that intends 
to block China’s rise to world power. Unlike his peers, however, he does not believe that 
the U.S. is in decline, or that China is competent to challenge the U.S. in the 21st 
Century.  
 
We should not assume that the U.S. takes China as its principal opponent because 
China takes the U.S. as its principal opponent. We should not assume that the U.S. 
sees China as its principal opponent in overall strategy because the U.S. sees China 
as its principal opponent in ideology. The U.S. still sees China as one regional 
opponent.488  
 
Contrary to the shared view of his fellow strategists that the U.S. has shifted its strategic 
focus to East Asia, General Liu insists that America’s strategic centre has been and will 
continue to be in Europe.489 While claiming to be an “authentic nationalist” himself490, 
his aspiration to the American spirit is effervescent. In an address to middle-level 
military officers at the Kunming Air Force base, General Liu applauded three 
“formidable” characteristics of the U.S. – its elite selection system, its magnanimity and 
                                                        
487 Yazhou Liu, 2001, “Duitai zuozhan: zhanlue pinggu (War against Taiwan: a strategic evaluation)”; 
2001, “Da’guo’ce (The grand national strategy)”; 2005, “Da zhanlueguan zhi mei ri zhong sanguo 
yanyi (Grand strategic view: three kingdom game)”; 2005, “Xinnian yu daode (Faith and morality)”; 
2010(2001), “Xibulun (On the West)”, Fenghuang Zhoukan (Phoenix Weekly), 5 Aug 2010. 
488 Yazhou Liu, 2001, “Duitai zuozhan (War against Taiwan)” 
489 Yazhou Liu, 2001, “Da’guo’ce (The grand national strategy)” and 2005, “Da zhanlueguan (Grand 
strategic view)” 
490 Yazhou Liu, 2005, “Xinnian yu daode (Faith and morality)” 
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tolerance, and its great power of spirit and morality.491  
 
General Liu’s applause for the U.S. is closely linked to his ambition to enhance China. 
It is out of the same ambition, not in pursuit of liberal right, that he talks provocatively 
of political reform.  
 
The drive for reform has been exhausted. We need a new drive. All the problems 
China is facing today can find the root in political regime...The core of political 
reform is democratization, especially intra-party democratization.492  
 
What determines the fate of a nation is not only its military and economic 
power…National survival makes it imperative for us to advance political 
reform…A transition from authoritarian politics to democratic politics will 
inevitably take place in the next ten years…Political reform is the historical mission 
endowed on us. We have no way to retreat.493  
 
The last quote is from “On the West”, a treatise written by General Liu ten years ago. So 
his ambitious prediction that political reform would “inevitably” occur “in the next ten 
years” is already bankrupt. Nevertheless the reprint of some excerpts of this treatise in 
Phoenix Weekly (fenghuang zhoukan) in August 2010 stoked a huge wave of public 
interest. It was regarded that the article was a signal released from some elements in the 
top leadership or military hawks.494 In order to contain the explosive consequences, 
Phoenix Weekly hastened to publish a statement, “clarifying” that the article had been 
written ten years ago, and had not been proofread by General Liu when published this 
time.495 The real motivation for publishing this sensitive article at the time thus seems 
bizarrely ambiguous.  
 
                                                        
491 Ibid. 
492 Yazhou Liu, 2001, “Duitai zuozhan (War against Taiwan)” 
493 Yazhou Liu, 2010(2001), “Xibulun (On the West)” 
494 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5879758,00.html accessed 22 Aug 2011.  
495 Fenghuang Zhoukan (Phoenix Weekly), 9 Aug 2010, accessed 22 Aug 2011  
http://www.doc88.com/p-98136705877.html 
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Following or Deviating from the Party Line? 
 
To summarize, the viewpoints of outspoken PLA officers, as expressed through various 
channels in the mass media, are consistent in terms of the image and intention of the 
United States. The U.S. is regarded as the foremost rival that maliciously intends to 
block, derail and delay China’s rise, and is a major threat to China’s national security. 
Despite such a consensus, there are variations in their views concerning whether 
antagonism between the U.S. and China is inevitable in the new century. The discord is 
mainly about whether the U.S. is receding or still in its prime; whether China will 
supersede the U.S. in the new century or will be encroached upon by the West; whether 
the U.S. targets China as its foremost threat as China targets the U.S.; whether the U.S. 
is an evil-doer or also an advanced model to be emulated. 
 
The consensus of outspoken PLA officers is also consistent with Beijing’s viewpoints 
on the surface. Although there are more and more exchanges in economic, cultural and 
even military spheres since the normalization of U.S.-China relations, the old days 
when the U.S. was viewed by China as a “beautiful imperialist” are gone forever. As 
Nathan and Scobell summarize in their recent Foreign Policy article, Beijing still sees 
“the United States primarily through a culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens”. From such a 
perspective, the U.S. is regarded as “militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and 
selfish”, a capitalist power that uses “cheap Chinese labor and credit to live beyond 
their means”, and an offensive realist state that “cannot be satisfied with the existence of 
a powerful China.”496 Therefore the viewpoints of these PLA officers, as exposed to the 
public, seem to echo the Party line in the nationalist propaganda and its longtime fear of 
U.S. intention and capacity.  
 
However, a close investigation, as demonstrated in this chapter, reveals that these PLA 
officers are more likely to use media channels to express their personal viewpoints or 
sectoral interests. The successful emergence of such deviations, between the expressed 
                                                        
496 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, 2012, “How China sees America: the sum of Beijing’s 
fears,” Foreign Affairs, 91(5), pp. 35-36.  
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views of outspoken PLA officers and the Party line, in the tightly controlled media 
system of authoritarian China, is an outcome of changing socio-political dynamics in 
contemporary China. It is not because the Party sent these officers to do this job in order 
to educate and influence public opinion, though it might be the reason or pretext for 
their appearances in the mass media, which acquires the permission or at least some 
acquiescence from the Party. In one word, these outspoken military officers are not 
puppets of the Party, who are ordered to take the “low road” in order to support the 
“high road” of formal Party statements. Despite some superficial convergence with the 
Party, their views are heterodox in nature, compared to the Party’s acknowledged line of 
policy. 
 
Two aspects of their appearances in the mass media make this clear. First, it is obvious, 
from their remarks and statements to the public, that they are not only dissatisfied, but 
increasingly impatient with China’s foreign policy, which in their eyes is soft and lacks 
intelligence. Their recommendation for policy change is more creative and offensive in 
nature, often deviating from the Party’s officially stated line and diplomatic practice. 
Second, no longer content with confining themselves to the foreign policy arena, they 
have begun to make public critiques of domestic policy. Outspoken PLA officers have 
made relentless critiques of the government’s domestic policies, including rampant 
corruption, low-quality policy proposals to the National Congress, degenerate 
bureaucracy and power abuse, and the failure of industrial policy. 
 
One indicator of the relative autonomy of the PLA elite in making such public 
appearances is that sometimes the party-state is completely unaware of their actions and 
remarks. It is very likely that the CCP would have opposed to or stopped them if it had 
knowledge in advance. In recent years, one of the most sensational actions of the 
“autonomous” PLA was the J-20 flight test in January 2011. This “scientific 
experiment”, which took place only several hours prior to the meeting between the 
Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, was a bold 
display of force by the PLA. China’s civilian leadership was apparently not apprised of 
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this dangerous political performance, which was a shock to U.S. visitors.497  
 
According to former U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman, who was present during the crisis, 
it showed a clear divide between the Chinese civilian leadership and the military.498 In 
two recent articles on the Party-PLA relations in China Leadership Monitor, Swaine 
argues that, despite the oligarchic nature of the collective leadership of the Party and the 
removal of the PLA from the most powerful decision-making bodies, the PLA still has 
considerable autonomy in “purely military” issues, such as deciding military tests and 
military operations outside the mainland. In view of Swaine, this maneuver space can 
enable the PLA to have a significant influence on China’s foreign relations.499  
 
In the view of this author, it is because of, not despite, the PLA’s lack of strong 
institutional leverage in the oligarchic collective leadership to impose their will on 
policy making, that recent years have witnessed their growing outspokenness in the 
mass media, and their tendency to manipulate such “purely military” issues to campaign 
for their political agenda. Paradoxically, both measures are the “weapons of the weak” 
of China’s mighty military force, which has been guarded against and constrained, and 
meanwhile has been appeased and courted by the civilian leadership.  
 
In late 2013, the PLA elite made another astonishing soft “coup” that challenged the 
Party’s absolute dominance in making grand strategy, and campaigned for the interest of 
the military as a whole. Led by Air Force General Liu Yazhou, the once avid 
commentator on political reform and U.S. spirit, the National Defense University (NDU) 
produced a 92-minute documentary Silent Contest (jiaoliang wusheng). Using a Cold 
War style discourse, the film sternly warned of the U.S. vicious plans for ideological 
infiltration and political subversion.  
 
It has been speculated that the documentary had been prepared for an internal military 
                                                        
497 Elisabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, 11 Jan 2011, “Test of stealth fighter clouds Gates visit to 
China”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/asia/12fighter.html  
498 Jon Huntsman’s talk at the National Committee of U.S. China Relations on 23 May 2012 
499 Michael D. Swaine, 2012 (winter), “China’s assertive behavior part three: the role of the military 
in foreign policy” 
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audience, but judging from the way it was leaked to the Internet, its ultimate purpose 
was clearly political, not educational. The video was first circulated on the Internet on 
26 October. On 31 October, the Ministry of Defense’s spokesman refused to comment 
when asked to verify the video. Since that time, it has become unavailable on domestic 
websites.500 Yet the film has still been available on foreign websites such as YouTube, 
and its international influence has continued to grow.  
 
Since Xi Jinping ascended to the presidency, it is clear that he has tried to tighten 
political control in ideology in order to strengthen the rule of the CCP. A more 
confrontational position has also been taken by the Chinese government in dealing with 
regional disputes. However, Xi is aware that the stability of Sino-U.S. relations is 
crucial for China and the survival of the CCP, which can be seen in his public address 
from 2012 to 2014 when meeting with high profile U.S. officials.501 The core of Xi’s 
strategy on Sino-U.S. relations has never changed.  
 
The production and leaking of Silent Contest was unlikely to be a state action, but was 
more likely to have been an over-performance by the military elite to gain political 
credentials within the Party and the Chinese public. The discrepancy in General Liu 
Yazhou’s views and actions, between his pro-democracy treatises emerging online since 
2005 and the conservative political propaganda in Silent Contest in 2013, reflects the 
realism, not the paranoia, of this political general. Whereas there is little evidence that 
General Liu’s earlier treatises have to do with the support of other military elites, the 
birth of Silent Contest clearly indicates that these outspoken PLA elites are not a group 
of unorganized military intellectuals, because the film is an output of multiple military 
branches that requires horizontal collaboration with the NDU.  
 
A second important indicator of deviation from the Party line is the growing presence of 
these PLA officers among critics of China’s domestic policy. Besides the reformist-
                                                        
500 Jingjing Huang, 17 Nov 2013, “'Silent Contest' silenced”, Global Times,  
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/825489.shtml 
501 Zeng Wei, 11 Jul 2014, “Xi Jinping zhongmei guanxi zhanlue dingwei: hujing, huxin, hezuo 
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minded General Liu Yazhou, General Liu Yuan, the political commissar of the 
General Logistics Department, is another rising opinion-maker. Having barely survived 
horrendous persecution in the Cultural Revolution, General Liu, the son of the purged 
Chinese President Liu Shaoqi, ambitiously made his way into politics and bided his 
time.  
 
The time came in early 2011, when Liu Yuan was promoted to a full-rank general of the 
PLA, and the turmoil in domestic politics made him believe it was the right time to 
voice his political agenda. Yet it proved to be a bad decision, not only because there 
were fundamental flaws in this utopian agenda, but because he chose the wrong time to 
bring it up.  
 
This is why in April 2011, an intellectual forum was organized in Beijing to discuss a 
book of the left-leaning intellectual Zhang Musheng, Liu’s close friend and personal 
advisor. This forum can be seen as the debut of Liu Yuan in the public sphere, which is 
rare for a serving PLA officer in a key position. Led by General Liu, a group of the most 
distinguished PLA intellectuals attended the forum, including Major General Zhu 
Chenghu, Qiao Liang and Luo Yuan. At the forum, these outspoken PLA officers 
engaged in an intensive debate with both liberal and leftist public intellectuals.  
 
The third indicator is that the strategic thought of these PLA elite is more diverse and 
offensive than what the Party has had. In an increasingly conflict-laden region, the Party 
has started to incorporate new thinking from military strategists, while the Party’s own 
strategic thought remains unchanging in official propaganda.  
 
For example, the concept of “strategic opportunity period” was first proposed in the 16th 
Party Congress report in 2002. This is an advanced version of “hiding brightness and 
biding time”, requiring China to take advantage of the first twenty years of the 21st 
century, a period of relative peace and development, to develop its economy and 
technology. 502  After ten years, this concept remains as a major strategic concept, 
                                                        
502  For a brief definition of strategic opportunity period, see the Party’s official website:  
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advocated and propagandized by the Party. On 23 July 2012, in one of the most 
important speeches made by President Hu Jintao to his ministers and provincial 
governors, such a strategic doctrine was reiterated and reemphasized.503  
 
However, to some outspoken PLA elites, China’s “strategic opportunity period” has 
already passed. In their view, the civilian government is too obsessed with the illusion 
of a strategic opportunity period. 504  Instead, they propose new thinking on China’s 
grand strategy, 
 
Although China has grown to be an economic and military power, its thought lags 
far behind…the changes in international struggle, and even behind the changes of 
itself. We lack a comprehensive plan (of both strategies and tactics) for our national 
security and interests. 
 
We should not understand ‘hiding brightness and biding time’ as to act with 
tolerance or maintain stability…The instability of your opponent is a favorable 
condition for you…We should learn to make use of troubles and even create 
troubles for rivals in international politics…We have long followed the principle of 
non-intervention. Non-intervention can be an official doctrine, but it cannot be a 
principle of action.  
 
We should realize that we have a multitude of means…War is not the only means of 
fighting. You can deploy the army. You even can wage an ‘inadvertent assault’. But 
you should be able to make yourself blameless…This is real master of the game.505  
 
These remarks should be taken seriously by China observers, because if they had had, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/134999/135000/8104208.html 
503 See the speech on People’s Daily 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-07/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20120724_1-01.htm 
504 “Nanhai wenti yu zhongmei boyi (South China Sea problem and Sino-U.S. gaming)”, Interview 
with Liang Qiao by Guoji Xianqu Daobao (International Herald Leader), published 26 July 2012, 
also available at Liang Qiao’s blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5d98f6740102dz22.html 
505 Ibid. 
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they would not have been shocked by China’s use of new strategic thought in recent 
international incidents. For example, on 12 July 2012, Major General Jin Yi’nan made a 
new policy recommendation for the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in his radio program, 
which immediately stoked explosive reactions. He suggested that in dealing with the 
dispute, the Chinese government should link it to the status of the Ryukyu Islands 
(Okinawa). He suggested warning Japan that even today its occupation of Okinawa has 
not been legally supported.506  
 
Another example is the recent establishment of Sansha City by the State Council. As an 
attempt to gain more leverage in the South China Sea dispute, this maneuver has 
actively involved the military. To China’s neighboring countries and the U.S., such a 
new strategic thinking, as advocated by outspoken PLA elites, is more troublesome than 
the kind of A-bomb deterrence inadvertently made by Major General Zhu Chenghu. 
This is because, under any circumstance, the threat of first use of nuclear weapons and 
destroying hundreds of U.S. cities will most likely remain as a means of deterrence. 
However, making endless troubles for rivals and playing chess by unusual rules are 
easier to implement and more difficult to handle.  
 
This is not the kind of conventional thinking and practice of China in dealing with 
international relations in the past two decades. It has been nurtured by Chinese military 
strategists for the past decade. The prototype of such thinking was already visible in 
1999 in Unlimited Warfare, if not earlier. Now, with the new opportunity in civil-
military relations, a growing willingness of the military elite to stand out, and the 
availability of new channels in the mass media, outspoken PLA officers are presenting 
and campaigning for what they have been thinking for years before the public, the top 
leadership of China, and international society.  
 
In so doing, some of these outspoken PLA officers have materially benefited, by 
publishing bestseller books or giving well-paid public lectures, in a role similar to that 
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of public intellectuals in a commercial knowledge market. But this is not the primary 
motivation that drives them into this business, which does not necessarily compensate 
for the political risks they are taking. This is particularly true for senior officers whose 
expressed views are deviating from the Party line.  
 
As one of the most outspoken PLA generals, the rationale that Major General Jin Yi’nan 
uses to explain his actions may be worth considering. To him, the political risk of being 
exposed in the mass media can only be motivated by one thing – a strong sense of 
responsibility for promoting China’s hegemony of discourse so that it can compete with 
the BBC, CNN, FOX and NHK.507 Such a rationale may be seen as doublespeak by 
cynics, because it implicitly shows off General Jin’s deep loyalty to the party-state.  
 
However, the record does show that some senior PLA officers, such as Major General 
Zhu Chenghu and Qiao Liang, have been punished, not rewarded, for their 
outspokenness and heterodox views. Even Real Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, the one 
who is keenest to follow the Party line and receives most exposure in state-controlled 
media, complains about the political risk of making remarks in public, because there is 
no explicit guidance from the Party.  
 
Therefore, it is the political ambition to shape public opinion and influence China’s 
policy-making that motivates these PLA officers to come to the spotlight. Such an 
ambition comes from socio-political changes in China’s military and Party relations. On 
the one hand, it expresses a sincere sense of professional responsibility for the state, for 
the national interest, and for advancing the sectoral interests of the military in China’s 
reconfigured political arena. On the other hand, that is not all there is to this story. The 
ambition is also out of the human drive for personal advancement and self-realization. 
By making themselves outspoken and unique in the mass media, outspoken military 
elite are setting themselves as role models, in contrast to those corrupt and mediocre 
Party officials, who are regarded as grave-diggers of the party-state.  
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Conclusion 
 
The emergence of outspoken PLA officers reflects some fundamental changes in 
China’s civil-military relations in the post-strongman period and the information age. 
The turnover of the leadership provides the PLA with an unprecedented political 
opportunity. Whereas the weak leadership needs the PLA elite as political leverage to 
consolidate authority in the Party, this relationship of exchange can give the PLA 
leverage to expand its influence over policy and politics.  
 
The rising educational level and generational shift of PLA officers contribute to a 
growing willingness of the PLA elite to air their views and intervene in policy-making. 
The modernization and professionalization of the PLA has brought to the front stage a 
new generation of military elites who are “among the best-educated and most well-
trained specialists ever to lead Chinese forces.” Professionalism and expertise have 
boosted both the confidence and the ambition of PLA officers to influence policy-
making. The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath have resulted in the coincidence that 
a group of “princeling generals” are emerging in recent years, who are boldly ambitious 
and determined to defend their fathers’ political legacy.  
 
Along with these changes in political opportunity and ambition, the rise of 
commercialized mass media and the Internet provides a means for outspoken PLA 
officers to extend their influence beyond the military barracks. Unlike the traditional 
means through which personal views are circulated within a limited number of 
audiences in the PLA or Party system, the mass media and new media have amplifying 
effects. The media extend the influence of the PLA elite directly to Chinese society, and 
is likely to indirectly influence policy-making by  the leadership by reshaping public 
opinion.  
 
From the analysis of outspoken PLA officers in the mass media, some preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the emergence of outspoken PLA officers has required 
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the permission or at least the acquiescence of the Party. Second, their views are being 
aired through a multitude of means in both traditional and new media, ranging from the 
most strictly controlled, such as television and broadcasting, to the most open, such as 
the Internet, from the most conservative media, such as the Party’s mouthpieces, to the 
most liberal ones, such as the most successful commercial newspapers.  
 
Third, despite some convergence with the Party, their views are heterodox in nature, 
compared to the Party line and stated policy. Because many of their expressed opinions 
and actions are entirely beyond the Party’s awareness, are running ahead of the Party’s 
strategic thought, and are penetrating into the sphere of domestic policy, it is more 
likely that these PLA officers have seized the channels of mass media to express their 
own viewpoints and campaign for military interests as a whole. 
 
This is driven by a sense of responsibility for the party-state and by the political 
ambitions of the PLA. For some senior military strategists, instead of keeping in silence, 
they would rather take the risk of being punished for crossing the boundary, which is 
conventionally set by the civilian leadership. This is illustrated in a number of cases, 
such as the reprimand of Major General Zhu Chenghu for his A-bomb deterrence 
speech, the reprimand of Major General Luo Yuan for his implicit criticism of China’s 
Taiwan policy,508 the punishment of the two authors for publishing Unlimited Warfare, 
and the stated motivation of Major General Jin Yi’nan.  
 
As argued along similar lines in previous chapters, it is the differences in the 
motivations, interests, interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism vis-a-vis the 
U.S. as a world hegemon that makes outspoken PLA elite popular in both state-
controlled media, and commercial and liberal ones. It is because of, not despite, such 
differences and conflicts that this group is distinct and powerful in occupying the field 
of discourse and stirring up anti-U.S. nationalism in contemporary China. Their 
critiques of China’s domestic politics, which are sincere as this chapter shows, help 
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them to gain popularity and political capital that is necessary to expand their influence 
in the public and in policy-making circles.  
 
On the other hand, despite their deviance from the Party line, it is apparent that their 
views have been influenced by the military and Party system in which they were 
educated, trained and socialized. On the surface, their views are consistent with the 
Party line in nationalist propaganda, and convey deep fear of the U.S. in the Party elite. 
The consistency is not simply a result of opportunistic efforts to court the will of the 
Party. The viewpoints of outspoken PLA officers, as expressed through various channels 
in the mass media, are consistent in terms of the image and intentions of the United 
States. It is the similar kind of knowledge structure and socio-political position that 
determines what kind of framing these military officers can use to advance their 
political agenda and policy recommendations.  
 
Because the ultimate purpose of outspoken PLA elites is political, it is the evolution of 
socio-political dynamics, not their expressed views at the moment, that will determine 
what kind of force they will exert in China’s domestic politics and international 
behavior. Whereas their anti-U.S. propaganda, which is more persuasive and effective 
than that of the Party, may lead to heightened anti-U.S nationalism in China and 
growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, it does not necessarily mean that these PLA 
elite are paranoid fascists and belligerent warmongers. Whereas their critiques of 
domestic politics, which help them to win unprecedented popularity in the public, may 
be facilitating anti-corruption campaigns, it does not necessarily mean that these PLA 
elite will become a forerunner of China’s democratization in the future. It would be 
reckless to leap to either conclusion.  
 
The emergence of these outspoken PLA officers opens a new window through which 
China observers can peer into subtle changes from within. Further research is required 
to substantiate some speculations in this chapter, and follow up the evolution of this 
important dynamic under China’s authoritarianism. To end this chapter, at a time when 
mounting political appeals are becoming a new feature of the PLA, the author finds the 
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following anecdote is particularly interesting. When asked whether the Pentagon 
intended to influence Obama’s China policy by publishing The China Military Power 
Report, Major General Jin Yi’nan responded, “In this regard, they have a larger political 
ambition…The ultimate purpose of U.S. military leaders is not to target China, but to 
target the Obama administration. They are calling into question some policies of the U.S. 
government.”509 Isn’t the U.S. military a mirror image of the PLA? 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Policy Caveats 
 
In Chapters 3 to 6, the thesis provides four cases, which range from the bottom to the 
top of social hierarchy in Chinese society, on the role of different understandings, 
interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism in shaping the substances of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism. By looking at state-society dynamics in producing 
nationalism and incentivizing the use of nationalist appeals by the state and various 
interest groups, the thesis explains how and why nationalism has become an ideology 
for Chinese who have abandoned communism and do not take for granted what is 
propagandized by the party-state.  
 
It shows that because of, not despite of, the existence of such differences in the 
understandings, interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism between state and 
society, and between sub-populations in society, Chinese nationalism has been 
reinforced through the interactions between the state, market and various social actors. 
The contents and appeals of Chinese nationalism are diversified, capable of capturing a 
sympathetic audience and powerful in mobilizing different parts of society. Therefore, 
the power of Chinese nationalism does not come from the state’s monopoly of 
interpretations and claims as an orthodox ideology, but from the power of nationalist 
discourse to empower social actors, and to have their voices expressed and heard at 
national and symbolic levels.  
 
Chapter 3 shows how new remembering of the anti-Japanese war of resistance has 
emerged from the interactions of different and sometimes conflictual understandings, 
interpretations, and claims of Chinese nationalism. The new commemoration of war, 
constructed on the victimhood of Chinese people, has become a driving force for anti-
Japanese nationalism in China. Arguing against the conventional wisdom that sees the 
new remembering as the outcome of elite myth-making or purely bottom-up dynamics, 
this thesis shows that war suffering has its own life and it can survive in a society much 
longer than commonly assumed. The process of preserving, transforming and 
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expressing war suffering in national discourse is a complicated process of mutual 
reinforcement and restriction between a variety of actors.  
 
War suffering did not perish in the Maoist period. On the one hand, it was preserved, 
spread and transformed by victims and their families at the bottom of society, by 
unwritten means such as storytelling, life hardship, and loss of social networks and 
change of family status in the community. On the other hand, even in the Maoist years 
when Japan was not a target of anti-foreign nationalism on the political agenda of the 
CCP, the expression of war suffering was already exploited by the party-state, from 
time to time, as a resource for political mobilization. Through mobilizations and 
techniques of socialist campaigns such as “speaking bitterness”, mass assemblies and 
meetings, model stories, amateur drama performances, and official investigations, the 
historical memories preserved and reproduced today still bear the traces of the party-
state and its communist culture. 
 
In the post-Maoist period, changing socio-political conditions allow war victims and 
their descendants to air grievances and suffering with new opportunities. Their alliance 
with the intellectuals, who have different understandings, interpretations and claims of 
nationalism and Sino-Japanese relations, empowers the bottom of society and makes it 
possible for their unheard voices to transcend the boundaries of locality. In this process, 
bottom-up initiatives have encountered the top-down patriotic project of the party-state, 
which attempted to encourage and exploit the discourse of Chinese nationalism to fill in 
the ideological vacuum after the collapse of communism. Thus war suffering at the local 
level has been exploited again in the post-Maoist years, but this time it has been 
nationalized to serve the political agenda of the CCP. State nationalism and popular 
nationalism hence have converged, producing a strong resentment against Japan after 
six decades since the end of war, through the joint endeavors of Chinese war victims, 
intellectuals and the state.  
 
Therefore, there does not exist a purely authentic process of elite myth-making or 
bottom-up dynamics. The new remembering of the anti-Japanese war of resistance was 
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not born out of a narrowly top-down process. It was neither initiated, nor dominated, by 
the Chinese political elite. The different motivations, interpretations and claims of war 
victims, local activists, intellectuals, and the party-state, along with the political legacy 
of the Maoist period, have constructed the expression of war grievances in the post-
reform era. They enable the expression in certain ways, and restrict it in other ways in 
today’s public discourse. 
 
Following Chapter 3 on how historical memories of war suffering have been preserved, 
transformed and nationalized, Chapter 4 provides an original survey of the images of 
anti-Japanese resisters in Chinese films, television series and Internet programs. By 
examining changes in the narrative of China’s war of resistance, as represented in such 
cultural products, and by comparing them between the early PRC and the post-Mao era, 
Chapter 4 explains how and why changes as such have occurred and evolved with the 
changing state-society dynamics.  
 
Cultural products are reflection of politics in reality. Cultural products for mass 
entertainment have played an important role in constructing grand narratives in modern 
societies. As revealed in Chapter 4, the disparities and tensions between sub-populations 
and the party-state in the understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese 
nationalism, are not only represented in political mobilization and social activism in the 
real world, but also reflected in cultural products of mass entertainment as well. Taking 
the early PRC as a reference point of time, it is evident that a fundamental change has 
occurred in the visual representation of anti-Japanese resistance in the post-Mao era.    
 
In the early PRC, the narrative of anti-Japanese resistance is entirely constructed around 
the theme of communist revolution led by the CCP. The course of anti-Japanese 
resistance and the course of communist revolution are two indivisible sides of the same 
coin in propaganda. While at the core of the narrative are legendary heroes under the 
direct leadership of the CCP, in the periphery, it is ordinary people who grew up thanks 
to the liberation movement of the CCP, and who became brave anti-Japanese resistance 
fighters and revolutionaries. The relations between these actors and the CCP reflect the 
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revolutionary nature of the narrative, as all of these images are arranged in hierarchical 
order in terms of their relations to the CCP.  
 
In the post-Mao era, the old narrative has been replaced by the new narrative that 
represents diversification of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and shatters the 
hierarchical relations in the old narrative. Such a change is possible because a variety of 
actors with different motivations, interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism 
have seized opportunities in an emerging cultural market and penetrated the industries 
of films, television series and the Internet. This structural change in China’s state-
society dynamics has reshaped the images of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and their 
relations to the CCP in the narrative.  
 
In the new narrative, both the class enemy, such as KMT generals, warlords, capitalists, 
members of the local gentry and landlords, and “bad elements” in the people, such as 
bandits and prostitutes, are integrated into the mainstream images of anti-Japanese 
resistance fighters. The role of the CCP has also contracted, from absolute leader, to 
supporter, ally and even absentee in the course of resistance. Even in the works where 
CCP protagonists remain as leading character, the standard of judging good CCP 
protagonist has changed as well. Loyalty and obedience to the CCP is no longer the 
primary requirement, which is replaced by achievements in leading the course of anti-
Japanese resistance. 
 
These changes have subversively reconstructed the relations between anti-Japanese 
resistance fighters and the CCP, as the images of these fighters are becoming more 
independent, no longer subordinate to the leadership or guidance of the CCP. The new 
images have won wide popularity in Chinese society, and also become a profitable 
theme in the industry of mass entertainment. On the other hand, these new images are 
not free of traces of political culture and constraints of the early PRC and the post-Mao 
era. These changes are not simply a process of de-politicizing the images of anti-
Japanese resistance and returning to historical veracity, but one of re-politicization, 
which is still unable to represent the veracity of history.  
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Chapter 5 investigates the role of the Chinese middle class and professionals in the rise 
of contemporary Chinese nationalism. It reveals why and how their understandings, 
interpretations and claims of nationalism, which are different from state nationalism, 
intensified the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and incited Chinese nationalism in the early 
2000s. This chapter also compares Baodiao (Protecting the Diaoyu Islands Movement) 
under different socio-political conditions, and explains why state-society dynamics in 
mainland China have led the movement to mob violence and social unrest under the 
banner of Chinese nationalism. It is the first study that researches Baodiao in cross-
contextual comparison with rich resources of memoires and interviews. 
 
There are different kinds of Baodiao mobilization in the Greater China area (Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and China). In all the three contexts, Baodiao was initiated from below, as a 
means of mobilization through which social activists contest the authorities over 
different interpretations and claims of nationalism. The evolution of Baodiao reflects 
state-society relations in which the movement has been unfolding. The differences of 
Baodiao in composition of activists, structure of mobilization and consequences of 
activism cannot explained by the political context of the movement.  
 
In China, the Baodiao Movement has been primarily a civilian nationalist movement 
that aims to pursue the right of political participation, influence the party-state’s foreign 
policies, and compete with the CCP for different interpretations and claims of Chinese 
nationalism, rather than a means of expediency for the CCP to boost regime legitimacy. 
Their initiatives and successful mobilizations have weakened the party-state’s 
monopoly over the discourse of Chinese nationalism, and influenced policy choices of 
the party-state towards Japan.  
 
This became possible under China’s authoritarian regime, because these activists have 
used a combined strategy of creating international crisis by surprise activities, therefore 
bringing the shelved issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute to the spotlight in mass media, 
and ultimately forcing the dispute onto the political agenda of the party-state. Since the 
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rise of Baodiao in 2003-2005, the CCP has changed behavioral mode in dealing with 
the territorial dispute with Japan. Moreover, these changes cannot be entirely attributed 
to the changing stances of Japan or China’s growing interest in natural resources in the 
disputed waters. Such changes attempt to reshape the image of the CCP, from a soft 
respondent to an assertive defender of China’s national interests, in the eyes of domestic 
audience.  
 
Yet the repressive environment also makes Chinese Baodiao activists very careful in 
framing their discourse and strategy, and distancing themselves from political dissident 
movement. Consequently, the civic nature of the movement is purposefully downplayed 
by the activists themselves, and repressed by the party-state as well. Instead the statist 
goal of the movement has been overemphasized by both sides. This does not indicate 
that Chinese activists are brainwashed by the CCP. On the contrary, it is their conscious 
and strategic choice under the socio-political conditions of the PRC.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the highest echelon of the party-state. It studies the rise of outspoken 
PLA officers, who were previously confined to secretive military institutions and 
invisible in the public sphere, against the changing linkages between the PLA and the 
CCP. It explains how and why such a group of Chinese military elites are able and 
willing to launch media campaigns in the mass media to stoke anti-American Chinese 
nationalism. Because the identity of the military elites has an overlap with the agency of 
the state authority, it implies that the state should also be understood in a disaggregated 
fashion in understanding nationalism from below. 
 
Since the passing away of Deng Xiaoping, the nature of China’s civil-military relations 
has fundamentally changed, as civil and military elites have bifurcated, and the era of 
strongmen has ended. These changes in civil-military relations provide an 
unprecedented political opportunity to the PLA elite, who are more confident and 
willing to intervene in policy making as they are the generation of the best educated and 
most well-trained in the Chinese military.  
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This development of military ambition coincides with the emergence of “princeling 
generals” who joined the PLA in the Cultural Revolution, and are ambitious and 
determined to defend their fathers’ political legacy – the regime of the CCP. Along with 
these changes, the rise of commercialized mass media and the Internet provides a means 
for outspoken PLA officers to extend their influence beyond the military barracks, and 
deliver their influence directly to Chinese society.  
 
Although the emergence of outspoken PLA officers requires the permission or at least 
acquiescence of the CCP, the views aired by the military elite are essentially heterodox 
and departing from the Party line and stated policy. Some of their expressed opinions 
and actions are entirely out of the CCP’s awareness, some are running ahead of the 
CCP’s strategic thought, and some others are trying to penetrate into the sphere of 
domestic politics. Therefore, it is more likely that the PLA elite have seized the 
channels of mass media to express their own viewpoints and campaign for military 
interest as a whole.  
 
In so doing, these military elite are driven by a sense of responsibility and political 
ambition, sometimes at the risk of being punished for crossing the boundaries, which 
are conventionally set by the civilian leadership. Like in previous chapters, it is the 
differences in the motivations, interests, interpretations and claims of Chinese 
nationalism between these military officers and state propaganda that make outspoken 
PLA elite popular in both state-controlled media, and the commercial and pro-liberal 
ones. Their critiques of domestic politics help them to gain popularity and political 
capital that further expand their influence in the public.  
 
On the other hand, despite their deviance from the Party line, it is apparent that their 
views have been influenced by the military and Party system in which they were 
educated, trained and socialized. On the surface, their views are consistent with the 
Party line in the nationalist propaganda, and transpire deep fear of the U.S. in the Party 
elite. It is the similar kind of knowledge structure and socio-political position that 
determines what kind of framing these military officers can use to advance their 
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political agenda and policy recommendations.  
 
Taken together, the four empirical chapters provide a systematic study of the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism through the lens of state-society dynamics. By 
investigating different sub-populations across the hierarchy of Chinese society, and 
researching representations of changing dynamics in the cultural market, this thesis 
finds that not only between nationalism from above and nationalism from below, but 
between different sub-populations, nationalism is comprehended and represented with 
different meanings, interpretations and claims.  
 
It then explores how such differences have shaped contemporary Chinese nationalism as 
such. In particular, it focuses on how initiatives from below interact with the 
authoritarian state and the demands of the market, the processes of which determine 
both the substances and forms in the expression of Chinese nationalism. It argues that 
because of, not despite of, the existence of such differences in the understandings, 
interpretations and claims of Chinese nationalism between state and society, and 
between sub-populations in society, nationalism has become an arresting ideology that 
fills in the vacuum left by the bankrupt ideology of communism, capturing sympathetic 
audiences and proving powerful in mobilizing different parts of society.  
 
What the thesis presents is a complicated picture. On the one hand, it debunks and 
complicates a narrowly “top-down” picture of Chinese nationalism. On the other hand, 
it does not present a simple picture of authentic and autonomous “bottom-up” dynamics 
that have led to the rise of Chinese nationalism. As found in the thesis, bottom-up 
initiatives still bear the traces of the party-state, through the unequal power relations 
embedded in socio-political conditions, through the historical legacy of communist 
culture, and through the construction of the subjectivity of social actors. Such traces 
have played an important role in the development of contemporary Chinese nationalism. 
 
In this process, top-down and bottom-up mobilizations of nationalism are different from 
each other and sometimes contesting with each other, but they are not essentially rival. 
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In top-down mobilization, the party-state attempts to rebuild legitimacy, and reduce 
social and political conflicts in the jurisprudence. In bottom-up mobilization, though 
different groups of society seek to inject their own meanings, interpretations and claims 
into nationalism, the groups studied in the thesis only attempt to revise and amend the 
meaning of nationalism at national and symbolic levels, rather than to subvert and 
abandon the discourse of Chinese nationalism as a whole. This essentially differs from 
religious and ethnic separatism that employs ethnic nationalism as the means of 
mobilization within religious and ethnic minority groups.  
 
In this thesis, neither religious nor ethnic separatism is considered. This is not a simple 
strategy of precluding rival relations between top-down and bottom-up mobilizations, 
but for the sake of academic and practical concerns. The rise of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism, which has inspired intensive debates among academics and policy advisors, 
refers to the phenomenon of growing anti-foreign nationalism which is regarded as 
having the ambition and potential to challenge the Euro-centric civilization and the U.S. 
hegemony. Although religious and ethnic separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang (i.e. Tibetan 
and Uyghur nationalism) deserves special attention for China’s internal stability, its 
challenge to international security mainly comes from potential spill-over effects if 
China is embroiled in ethnic unrest and turmoil in the future. Given the main concern 
with contemporary Chinese nationalism in the international and academic contexts, and 
given the practical consideration to focus one thesis on one problem, it is a strategic 
choice to preclude religious and ethnic separatism in this thesis.  
 
This choice of research subjects (i.e. excluding religious and ethnic separatism) leads to 
the impression that the explanation offered in the thesis only applies to certain outcomes, 
such as the kind of dynamic stability demonstrated in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. This is a misimpression. The dynamics of mutual constitution of top-down and 
bottom-up nationalist claims could lead to an outcome of conflict and disorder (e.g. 
ethnic violence and civil wars) as well as order and stability. In fact, the explanation this 
thesis offers is a process-oriented explanation, not an outcome-oriented one.  
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Here is an illuminating example. As discussed in the section “Why nationalism can 
incite popular passion and appeal” in Chapter 1, the mutual constitution of different top-
down and bottom-up nationalist claims can also lead to outcomes of civil conflict, 
violence and instability. Knowing the danger and cost associated, people participate in 
large-scale ethnic violence, not because they are duped by elites who provoke conflict 
to gain, maintain or increase their hold on power. Rather ordinary folks follow because 
they are strategic actors, motivated by all kinds of purposes that are not necessarily 
ethnic nationalist (e.g. desires to loot, to revenge or fear of tit-for-tat). Hence for ethnic 
nationalism to become a useful tool of mobilization to provoke large-scale violence and 
ethnic conflicts, it also requires the mutual constitution of top-down and bottom-up 
claims, interpretations and understandings, as described and explained in detail in this 
thesis for contemporary Chinese nationalism. The major difference, for the scenarios of 
large-scale ethnic violence and the scenarios of contemporary Chinese nationalism, is 
the composition of nationalist claimants and participants. Those who participate in 
large-scale ethnic violence are usually young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or 
underemployed. In contrast, the claimants and participants under the study of this thesis 
represent a much broader category of society, including the middle class and the elite.  
 
To clarify, let me reiterate what the thesis has argued and what it has not. The thesis 
argues that the mutual constitution of top-down and bottom-up nationalist claims, 
interpretations and understandings forges a symbiotic relationship between state and 
society. As a result, it has made nationalism into an effective tool of mobilization and 
social integration, which the state (or elite) alone would have failed to manufacture. 
However, this thesis does not argue that these claims, interpretations and understandings 
are in fundamental rivalry. In most scenarios, they are different and sometimes they 
contest with each other. But the bottom-up nationalist claims do not subvert or abandon 
the discourse of top-down nationalism as a whole, though they try to capture and 
reinterpret the latter. To illustrate this point, all kinds of Chinese nationalists studied in 
this thesis challenge the party-state’s monopoly over the claims and interpretations of 
Chinese nationalism, but they do not subvert or abandon Chinese nationalism as a 
whole, nor do they tolerate any challenge from religious and ethnic separatism to the 
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Chinese nation-state.   
 
If top-down and bottom-up nationalist claims are in essential rivalry, then subverting 
claims and mobilizations from bottom are repressed. This can be seen in the 
development of Tibetan or Uyghur separatism in contemporary Chinese nationalism. In 
general, these essentially rival claims of nationalism do not arrest much interest of this 
author. In these scenarios of essential rivalry, top-down and bottom-up nationalist 
claims do not accommodate each other, because they operate in two parallel fields, each 
of which can be explained by the mechanism of mutual accommodation and top-down 
and bottom-up symbiosis proposed in this thesis. For example, consider how Tibetan 
and Uyghur exile elites employ ethnic nationalism to advance their political agenda, and 
how bottom Tibetan and Uyghur nationalist claimants in China understand, interpret 
and respond to the provocation of their elites overseas. Symbiotic relations and mutual 
accommodation can be observed in this top-down and bottom-up dynamics as well, but 
not in the rival relationship between the Chinese government and the Tibetan/Uyghur 
separatist nationalists (whether the elites or the masses).  
 
To summarize, the symbiotic relations and mutual accommodation between top-down 
and bottom-up nationalist claims can lead to ethnic violence and civil conflict as well as 
social integration and dynamic stability, depending on the direction of top-down 
nationalism as a whole. Top-down and bottom-up nationalist claims are not oftentimes 
in essential rivalry, though they are always different, and sometimes contest with each 
other. When they are in rivalry, the subverting nationalist claims and mobilizations from 
below are necessarily repressed by the state, as long as the state retains sufficient power 
of repression. In fact, it may not be accurate any more to define such rival relations as 
top-down and bottom-up dynamics, because for these rival relations to emerge, it would 
require at least two groups of elite – one producing orthodox nationalist claims for the 
nation-state, and the other manufacturing subversive ones. As illustrated in ethnic 
separatist movements, it would be hard to imagine a picture of purely, authentically, 
autonomously “bottom-up” separatist nationalism without the provocation and 
involvement of the elite of ethnic minority.  
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Therefore, the prerequisite for top-down and bottom-up mobilizations of nationalism to 
reach mutual accommodation is the absence of alternative elite group who are both able 
and willing to bring consequential rivalry against the nation-state and state legitimacy 
into the relations with the state or the ruling elite. The ensuing problem then becomes 
this one: Through what mechanisms would such mutual accommodation be more or less 
effective in achieving the goal of the state? As this thesis has argued, the symbiotic 
relationship between state and society is crucial for producing the homogenizing power 
of nationalism. The success of nationalism as a mobilizing discourse not only depends 
on the state’s intention and capacity to exploit the interests and claims from bottom, but 
also on the degree of autonomy and spontaneity of the claims and interests advocated by 
social groups.  
 
This renders some operational mechanisms that are necessary conditions for reaching 
mutual accommodation when there is no alternative elite group who intends to compete 
for the legitimacy of rule. First, the state needs to have both the intention to inspire 
nationalism and the capacity to utilize and constrain nationalist claims from below. If 
the state does not have the intention to build or rebuild legitimacy on nationalism, it is 
unlikely for social groups to find resonance at the national and symbolic levels, even 
though they have incentives to campaign for their own understandings, interpretations, 
and claims of nationalism. This is one of the reasons why contemporary Chinese 
nationalism did not emerge as a significant socio-political phenomenon until the 
bankruptcy of the communist ideology. Likewise, if the state has strong intention to 
exploit nationalism, but state capacity is too low to utilize and constrain nationalist 
interests and claims from below, it is also difficult for the state to transform nationalism 
into an active political force.  
  
In order to utilize nationalist interests and claims from below, it requires some degree of 
autonomy and spontaneity from social groups to advance their nationalist claims, which 
may deviate from the state’s original plan in campaigns for nationalism and may not 
have necessary nationalist dimension at all. This necessary condition further requires 
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the existence or emergence of some public space and information for social actors to 
take the initiatives, organize themselves, formulate and express their claims and 
interpretations. As seen in the Chapters on the Civil Reparation Movement (Chapter 3) 
and the Baodiao Movement (Chapter 5), before the early 1990s when the party-state 
started its patriotic campaign, Chinese war victims and a small group of civic activists 
were already initiating to commemorate war suffering and demand war reparation. But 
their activities were unable to leave enduring influences in the repressive political 
environment. Likewise, the Baodiao movement did not successfully emerge in China 
until 2003, because in the first two waves of the movement (i.e. the early 1970s and the 
mid-1990s), Baodiao activists from mainland China were physically purged and their 
voices were marginalized by the state. Without different understandings, interpretations, 
and claims of nationalism from below, and without a liberalizing society and a market 
that open public space and gather new information for the expression and mobilization 
of bottom-up nationalist claims, state nationalism could hardly generate widespread 
popular appeal and turn into an effective mobilizing ideology. Neither the indoctrination 
of state nationalism, nor the appeals from the duped and seduced, can work to this effect.  
 
Meanwhile the state needs to retain a certain level of capacity to constrain nationalist 
interests and claims from below, so that the development of bottom-up nationalist 
claims and mobilizations will not endanger the legitimacy of the state. The level of 
capacity depends on the socio-political structure and historical-political legacy of a state. 
As argued in the thesis, there are not purely authentic and autonomous “bottom-up” 
dynamics that have led to the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. In the context 
of contemporary China, bottom-up initiatives bear significant influences of the party-
state mainly through two mechanisms – one is the unequal power relations embedded 
between state and society, and the other is the historical legacy of communist culture. 
Both mechanisms have been at work in regulating and constraining the autonomous and 
spontaneous mobilizations of nationalism from below, making contemporary Chinese 
nationalism as such as we have seen. By physical repression, resource allocation, media 
censorship, and reconstruction of the subjectivity of social actors, the Chinese party-
state has successfully penetrated the processes of generating bottom-up nationalist 
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claims and mobilizations, filtering the most subversive part of nationalism from below 
before it comes into the public discourse.  
 
The study of this thesis not only makes a theoretical push in the general field of nations 
and nationalism, it also sheds light on a new direction to studying contemporary 
Chinese nationalism. Using mixed methods, it analyzes and explains the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism through Chinese politics behind it, from the social 
groups at bottom of society to the top of its social pyramid. Unlike propositions 
deriving from arm-chair theoretical inductions and sketchy empirical surveys, the 
findings of this thesis have important policy implications. 
 
Above all, we should be careful not to draw too much from the phenomenon of rising 
Chinese nationalism when making China policy. The complicated dynamics that 
determine the substances and forms of Chinese nationalism shows that, it is the 
evolution of socio-political conditions and state-society dynamics, rather than the 
substances and explicit claims of state nationalism or popular nationalism, that will 
determine what kind of force Chinese nationalism is likely to act as in China’s domestic 
politics and international behavior. The rest of this concluding chapter summarizes five 
caveats, all of which are derived from the research in this thesis, for making China 
policy.  
 
The First Caveat 
 
For Chinese and Japanese statesmen who hope that time will ultimately wash away the 
remembering of war suffering and hatred caused by the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, this is 
an empty wish and it would better be abandoned. War suffering has its own life. It does 
not end with the passing of the war generation. Rather it can be transformed and 
nationalized, through the joint endeavors of victims, their families, social activists, 
intellectuals, and the state. Moreover, when war suffering has been transformed and 
nationalized, the actual sufferers of war and their families, who are usually the 
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subalterns of society, are no longer able to determine how their suffering can be 
redressed in the complicated processes of political bargaining.  
 
In today’s China, such processes of transformation and nationalization have been 
completed. It means that the best time for reaching deep reconciliation and wiping out 
the scars of war suffering is unfortunately missed. As a result, war suffering of the 
Chinese people in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War has become a political symbol in the 
collective memory of the nation. Since political symbol is immortal, if the political 
symbol of war suffering is not properly dealt with, it would be unrealistic to expect that 
generational shift or friendlier policies towards Japan will reduce hatred and resentment 
towards Japan in Chinese society.  
 
The Second Caveat  
 
For both Chinese and Japanese governments, if they want to build more stable and 
reliable bilateral relations, more practical strategies with foresight should be taken to 
facilitate deep reconciliation between the two nations. The kind of policy and diplomacy 
they adopt will have far-reaching implications for regional security and the prospects of 
both nations. The foremost lesson that both governments should learn from the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism is this: It would be impossible to reach deep 
reconciliation between two nations unless bottom-up initiatives could emerge and 
interact with top-down processes. This is the mechanism that accounts for the rise of 
contemporary Chinese nationalism. It is through the same mechanism that deep 
reconciliation between China and Japan, and long-term stability of the region could be 
achieved.  
 
Since the restoration of Sino-Japan relations, the problem of war compensation has been 
used as diplomatic leverage between the two countries. Although the Chinese 
government had officially renounced the right to demand compensation, the Japanese 
government has supported China’s industrialization through ODA and low interest loans 
as a form of implicit compensation. Through these mechanisms, Japan has also gained 
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priority when making access to the Chinese market and certain industries of special 
importance.  
 
On the intergovernmental level, this strategy has been successful, creating a win-win 
situation for both governments, and satisfying economic needs of elites from both 
nations. However, it is essentially a short-sighted policy of expediency, not a long-term 
strategy with foresight. Today this policy is no longer suitable for the needs of both 
nations and governments. Apparently this policy lacks moral ground. Since it is 
unfortunate that justifications on moral grounds only fall on the deaf ears of politicians, 
let me establish the point on the ground of instrumental rationality: Such a policy is 
counterproductive in instrumental sense as well.  
 
This is the reason. Such a policy does not take into account growing appeals, expressed 
grievances, and differing claims of Chinese sub-populations in inspiring contemporary 
Chinese nationalism. It hence fails to understand and properly tackle the causal 
mechanisms that have produced contemporary Chinese nationalism. It might be 
counter-intuitive to China and Japan scholars, but it is the brutal fact: More ODA and 
low interest loans Japan has contributed to China’s industrialization, the tensions are 
more aggravating between Chinese social actors and their government in the 
understandings, interpretations, and claims of Chinese nationalism. As this thesis 
reveals, it is exactly such differences and tensions that has inspired the rise of 
nationalism in contemporary China.  
 
It is not a wise strategy to achieve intergovernmental economic gains on the ground of 
implicit war compensation. After all, reconciliation between two governments is not 
deep reconciliation. Only reconciliation between two societies is. Shunning 
responsibility for Chinese war victims and refusing to compensate for the grievances 
from bottom, it will only lead to distrust and hatred in Chinese society, fueling the 
grievances embedded in anti-Japanese nationalism. Whether or not the Japanese 
government has realized this, grievances and hatred will never be compensated for by 
official aid and lending at the intergovernmental level. Such policies are only an 
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expediency to facilitate intergovernmental relations and national economy. Grievances 
needs to be redressed, and hatred to be appeased. To accomplish deep reconciliation, 
both Chinese and Japanese governments should not ignore the real source of Chinese 
nationalism – that is, the competing understandings, interpretations, and claims of 
nationalism from Chinese society, and their inherent tensions with the party-state.  
 
The Third Caveat 
 
With the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism, the CCP’s control over nationalism 
has been weakened, compared to the Maoist years. Therefore it is unrealistic for 
international society to expect that the Chinese government will be able to contain 
nationalism at home. There is simply no way for the CCP to monopolize the 
understandings, interpretations and claims of nationalism in increasingly liberalizing 
society. What the CCP can do is to regulate and check violent outbursts of Chinese 
nationalism, and play a lesser role in inspiring nationalism. From time to time, the CCP 
can also be asked to make efforts to alleviate tensions in bilateral relations, but it cannot 
be counted on to ameliorate bilateral relations in the mid- or long-term.  
 
To clarify, it is not to say that the CCP has no responsibility for or has not played a role 
in the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism. It has in both senses. But today it is 
unable to dictate the direction of its development, which depends on evolving state-
society dynamics in contemporary China. It is also not to say that the CCP is weak. The 
CCP may have been weakened in some aspects, but it is not weak. 
 
In fact, state repression and social control still constrain the ways in which Chinese 
nationalism can be expressed. Looking back at the evolution of anti-Japanese nationalist 
movements since the 1980s, the CCP has used a combined strategy of physical violence, 
psychological threat and social marginalization to regulate mobilization and nationalist 
activism. Whenever some kinds of bottom-up mobilization prove to be effective, they 
are soon stopped by the Chinese government. As a result, the boundaries between the 
permissible and the forbidden are continuingly redrawn. It has effectively prevented the 
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emergence of professional activists in Chinese society. 
 
The Fourth Caveat 
 
Following the third caveat, it leads to the fourth one that with the decline of the CCP’s 
control over nationalism, the party-state is likely to become more assertive before 
domestic audience in order to curtail both liberal and illiberal nationalism at home. This 
is one major factor that has led to Beijing’s changing policy in the East China Sea. It 
does not mean, however, that Beijing is becoming more prone to military confrontation.  
It means that Beijing has to behave more assertively so that it can undermine the 
justification and pressure from popular nationalism.  
 
As seen in Chapter 5, before the rise of Baodiao in 2003-2005, the CCP had refrained 
from informing domestic audience of its assertive and pragmatic actions in the East 
China Sea, not concerned with building a nationalist image at home. This is a reflection 
of its strategic calculation to avoid infuriating Japan and give itself more maneuvering 
room in international bargaining. However it is contradictory to the functionalist 
proposition that the CCP used to exploit the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and anti-Japanese 
nationalism at home to enhance legitimacy. The contradiction has generated at home a 
conventional misperception of China’s foreign policy as being soft and conceding, 
hence putting the CCP under domestic pressure to deal with international disputes in a 
more hawkish way. This kind of pressure is particularly dangerous, because in reality 
the CCP’s pragmatic policy was not as soft as it appeared to be at home. Pushing the 
CCP to be less soft and conceding will actually lead to China’s over-performance and 
over-reaction in dealing with international crisis, particularly with regards to issues that 
the Chinese perceive their government used to yield too much.  
 
The Baodiao movement in 2003-2005 is an illuminating case. Its successful 
mobilization from mainland China has changed the set of policy options for the CCP. 
Whereas the major concern of the party-state used to be pragmatic flexibility, since that 
the CCP has to show off nationalist credentials in order to contain the Baodiao 
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movement and avoid being criticized in face of rising expectation of the public. This 
logic of action has added uncertainty to regional stability. Moreover, the effect of such a 
policy change is not something that the CCP will be able to control, regardless of its 
intention and interest.  
 
The transformation of Beijing’s policy has kicked off a domino effect, and changed the 
perceptions of China’s intention and capacity in international society. With China’s 
growing projection of power and influence in the region, it becomes more likely for 
international society to see it as a revisionist state, and for Chinese at home to expect 
more substantive outcomes from the assertive performance of the state. Therefore, the 
CCP will be more and more tied up by its own nationalist image in order to appease 
domestic nationalism. Meanwhile it will encounter more and more constraints in 
making foreign policies that aims at resolving disputes with neighboring countries. 
These constraints are detrimental to China’s fundamental interest – maintaining a 
peaceful and supportive international environment for its modernization. In the future, 
even though the CCP wishes to avoid military confrontation, it will become very 
difficult (if not impossible) for the CCP to control the political dynamics that ultimately 
lead to conflicts. Confrontation or accommodation has become something that will not 
be determined by China’s intention and capacity alone. 
 
The Fifth Caveat 
 
The last caveat concerns international security. Evidence is insufficient to decide 
whether Chinese nationalism is ultimately good or bad for international security. A 
practical study on its policy implications should consider the entire portfolio of China – 
such as its interests, intentions, capacities, historical record of its international behaviors, 
opportunities and constraints, rather than deduce from the logic of competing IR 
theories. Moreover, it should also consider the portfolio of each actor that influences 
and is influenced by Chinese nationalism. They include state actors and non-state actors. 
The interests of actors should also be defined in both short- and long term.  
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At the end of this thesis, let me illustrate examples of three state actors - the United 
States, Japan and China. A state actor must first specify its own grand strategy in order 
to understand policy implications of Chinese nationalism. For the United States, its own 
grand strategy shapes the way how the U.S. national interests will be influenced by 
Chinese nationalism. A growingly nationalist China would mean different things to the 
U.S. if it would choose the strategy of neo-isolationism, selective engagement, or 
primacy.510  
 
In the view of neo-isolationists, the U.S. would be better off to retreat from its 
overstretch in East Asia and maintain national defense only on the homeland through 
nuclear deterrence. In contrast, if U.S. strategists opt for selective engagement, then any 
major regional conflict (e.g. a crisis in the East China Sea) would be critical for the U.S. 
security. In this scenario, the U.S. should make serious commitments to defending 
Japan’s claims in the East China Sea. If necessary, the U.S. should also encourage 
Japan’s military buildup for the balance of power. Such a grand strategy would change 
the U.S. strategy towards Japan as well – because the U.S. has to decide whether it is 
willing to see a normalized Japan that is no longer in need of the U.S. presence on its 
territory.  
 
If the U.S. chooses the strategy of primacy, believing that it should and could behave 
like a benign hegemon to promote peace worldwide, then its responsibility for assisting 
allies would be very different from that in the two aforementioned situations. If the U.S. 
further believes that its responsibility is not only to maintain peace and defend allies, 
but also to democratize China (a utopian ambition in the view of most realists), it would 
become more complicated to infer policy implications of Chinese nationalism, 
compared to the scenario that the U.S. is only interested in maintaining present power 
structure in East Asia.  
 
                                                        
510 For an overview of different schools of U.S. grand strategy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. 
Ross, 1996/97, “Competing visions for U.S. grand strategy,” International Security 21(3), pp. 5-53. 
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Therefore, before discussing policy implications of Chinese nationalism for the U.S., 
the prerequisite is to ascertain what kind of grand strategy the U.S. would choose, and 
how the strategy would be in the U.S. interest in short- and long term. However, in 
complex and ever-changing reality, the foremost difficulty would be this: The U.S. is 
not clear what its grand strategy would be as well. As a result, the U.S. is likely to put 
the burden of choice on other state actors, and design its national strategy in reaction to 
the moves of other states.  
 
This logic of ambiguity in determining grand strategy can also apply to Japan. In the 
20th century, Japan lost two opportunities to become the hegemon of East Asia, one in 
the WWII by ambitious overstretching, and the other in the post-WWII era by over-
restraining its economic influence. At the beginning of the 21st century, the likelihood of 
direct Sino-Japanese confrontation is increasing. Japan comes to face a third test to 
choose grand strategy for the nation.  
 
For Japan, it would be a worst strategic choice to play the cyclical game of escalation 
and de-escalation in territorial disputes with China. The reliability of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance is dubious. The U.S. commitment to Japan is ambiguous, and the U.S. 
determination to maintain hegemonic presence in the region in face of China’s growing 
strength is questionable. After all, the U.S. force can hardly deter China’s assertive 
moves in the region when the CCP is in face of growing Chinese nationalism at home. 
Therefore, Japan’s best strategy would be to strengthen its own military capacities and 
raise its own international status, rather than rely on the ambiguous guarantee of the U.S. 
By assuming more responsibilities in East and Southeast Asia, Japan could present itself 
as an independent and reliable power to the region, hence a sought-after ally for other 
countries in face of China’s rising hegemony in the region.  
 
By adopting such a strategy, it is not necessary for Japan to turn belligerent. In fact, it is 
a strategy of avoiding over-reaction in the long term. For the best interest of Japan, the 
East China Sea dispute and rising Chinese nationalism should be used as a leverage to 
achieve the goal of raising Japan’s international status, not as an expediency of 
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provoking anti-Chinese nationalism and remilitarization. Japan could and should be 
more confident in its soft power in the Asia Pacific. The burden of WWII could also be 
turned into an asset of Japan’s soft power, if it would take more effective actions to 
appease bottom-up anti-Japanese nationalism in its former colonies and occupied areas. 
In so doing, Japan needs to reconsider policy implications of its conventional 
intergovernmental aid and support, and focus on collaboration with civil organizations 
in victim countries. Moreover, Japan would be strategically benefited if it could 
convince other countries (particularly South Korea) that its dispute with China is 
essentially different from the territorial disputes it has with other Asian neighbors. Such 
a strategy of assurance would be feasible, if Japan could isolate and redefine the dispute 
with China at the level of grand strategy, no longer confining it as a dispute concerning 
territory and sovereignty.  
 
Finally, let me address the strategic options for China. The rule of the CCP greatly 
complicates China’s strategic interest. Unlike most state actors in the region (except for 
North Korea), China lacks a solid base of legitimacy. Therefore its primary strategic 
interest is to balance between the desire for regime security and the growing aspiration 
for projecting power and influence in the region. Compared to China’s regional 
competitors, this is a more complicated goal to achieve. Therefore, theoretically, China 
requires superior skills of diplomacy and a more effective government based on 
meritocracy, compared to those competitor states. But this is exactly what China is in 
short of. It is also unlikely for China to make up the deficiency in foreseeable short term. 
 
Put it in a simple way, China is in urgent need of talents. However, China’s education 
system does not produce such talents, and in the world market of talents, an 
authoritarian regime does not have competitive advantage to attract and utilize such 
talents (due to factors such as bureaucratic inefficiency, inflexible command-and-
feedback system, and ambiguous and unfair rewarding system). As a result, it would be 
very difficult for China to be equipped with the kind of strategic talents that it is in 
urgent need of. This practical obstacle has far-reaching policy implications. Whereas the 
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primary strategic interest of the CCP is to balance between regime security and its 
growing appetite for regional power and influence, it can mess things up.  
 
If the CCP were able to control Chinese society as it had done in the Maoist era, this 
would not be a big problem for international society. However, as the CCP’s capacity 
has been weakened in this regard, there could emerge some kind of devastating 
downward spiral. That is, the more insecure the CCP feels at home, the more necessary 
it feels to perform assertively before domestic audience. The more assertively China 
performs, it makes the problem appear more serious to international society, leading to 
escalating tensions and expectations for assertiveness at home. The downside of the 
vicious cycle is apparent. For the CCP’s long-term security, it requires a friendly, or at 
least a peaceful international environment, in which China is regarded as a respectful 
power and a reliable negotiator. But it has become more and more difficult to satisfy 
such a requirement, as the legitimacy of the regime is bound up with its assertive 
performance in international society. The time when the CCP could dictate foreign 
policy making is gone, and it is not prepared to deal with the new situation with 
required strategic foresight and diplomatic skills.     
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